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I 
 
Abstract 
This dissertation examines the discourses of race, nation and ethnicity in late 
Qing and early republican China, focusing primarily on representations of the 
Han. It argues that the competing and changing representations of the Han in 
this period formed an integral part of the process of modern Chinese nation 
building. 
 
The empirical basis of the dissertation consists of three layers: intellectuals’ 
discourses, school textbooks and dictionaries. These layers constituted 
interconnected layers of discourses that were involved in the broader process of 
Chinese nation-building. The dissertation demonstrates that intellectuals’ 
discourses played a central role in constructing new notions of Chinese identity 
and the role of the Han, and thereby also in producing different ‘templates’ or for 
Chinese nation-building during the late Qing and early republican period. After 
the establishment of the Chinese Republic in 1911, these modern perceptions of 
Chinese national identity were endorsed by the ruling elites and were gradually 
disseminated and popularised further by means of school textbooks and 
dictionaries. Taken together, the examination of discourses on the Han in these 
three types of sources therefore offers an account of how early Chinese 
nationalist ideas were produced among the elites and then disseminated among 
the broader population. 
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Introduction                                                
Over the past few decades, social identities and social inequalities related to 
ideas of nation, ‘race’1 and ethnicity have been analysed extensively across 
different academic disciplines. In regard to relevant studies on China in this 
field, the period of the late Qing and early republican China is playing an 
increasingly important role in Chinese historical research. As a period 
associated with radical social reforms and revolutions, and social 
controversies, it saw the conflicts between and the interweaving of ideologies 
developed within traditional Chinese society and modern Western discourses 
on human difference. These discourses established Chinese identity in 
relation to the concepts of race, nation and ethnicity, which were used as 
social markers of essential human difference, and had an increasing impact 
on the Chinese society during this period. 
 
The significance of the period of late Qing and early republican China has 
been noted by different scholars. For example, Frank Dikötter (1992) has 
highlighted the historical significance of the late Qing and early republican 
period as a time associated with radical social changes, and has emphasised 
the increasing impact the West had on Chinese society: 
 
‘During the 19th century, a new social environment was shaped by 
internal and external developments. Population growth, social 
dislocation, peasant rebellions, administrative fragmentation and 
political crises were the most important aspects of internal change. 
Western intrusions from the Opium War (1839-42) onwards were 
superimposed upon this established pattern of internal decline’ (31). 
 
                                            
1
 The term race is used with quotation marks by many authors, to indicate that the concept of 
race has no inherent validity and is fundamentally socially constructed. Although my research 
shares this view I will not use quotation marks in the remainder of the thesis, because the 
constructed nature of race is evident from my analytical approach. It is the assumption of this 
thesis that the concept of race should always be considered within social, political and cultural 
contexts, to uncover how it is represented and deployed in specific circumstances.   
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These factors make the late Qing and early republican period an ideal focus 
for my thesis, which examines the competing representations of the Han, as a 
race, a nation or an ethnic group, and investigates how these representations 
relate to the wider political, social, cultural and historical contexts. In 
particular, my thesis argues that the competing and changing representations 
of the Han in this period formed an integral part of the process of modern 
Chinese nation building. 
 
The empirical basis of my research project consists of three layers: 
intellectuals’ discourses, school textbooks and dictionaries. I shall argue that 
these layers constituted interconnected layers of discourses that were 
involved in the broader process of Chinese nation-building. I will demonstrate 
in my dissertation that intellectuals’ discourses were playing a central role in 
constructing new notions of Chinese identity and the role of the Han, and 
thereby producing different ‘templates’ or ‘programmes’ for Chinese nation-
building during the late Qing and early republican period. After the 
establishment of the Chinese Republic in 1911, these modern perceptions of 
Chinese national identity were endorsed by the ruling elites and were 
gradually disseminated and popularised further by means of school textbooks 
and dictionaries. Taken together, the examination of discourses on the Han in 
these three types of sources therefore helps me gain an insight into how 
nationalist ideas were produced, transformed and spread from cultural elites 
to the popular masses. 
 
The Han as the largest ethnic group in Chinese society played a major role in 
the social fabric and transformation of Chinese society during the late Qing 
and early republican period, and remains the predominant group in present 
China. According to relevant data based on the latest census conducted in 
2010, the total national population in mainland China (including 31 provinces, 
autonomous regions, municipalities and CPLA, excluding Hong Kong, Macao, 
Taiwan and overseas Chinese) has reached 1,347,350,000 by the end of 
2010. Out of these, 1,225,932,641 people in mainland China are Hanese, 
which accounts for 91.51% of the national population. Compared to the 
relevant data in 2000, the proportion of the Han in the national population had 
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increased 5.74% and the majority of Chinese people are Hanese (National 
Bureau of Statistics of China, 2010). 
 
Representations of the Han vary, and in contemporary English language 
literature on the topic, the term Han is often used with reference to a variety of 
categories of difference such as race, nation and ethnicity. For example, in his 
article focusing on the comparison of life between ethnic minorities and Han 
Chinese, Wei Shan (2010) has referred to the Han as a ‘nationality’ and 
‘ethnic group’: ‘besides the majority Han Chinese (91.5% of the population), 
the government recognises 55 other ‘nationalities’ or ethnic groups, including 
Zhuang, Manchu, Hui…’ (14). Anthony Howell and C. Cindy Fan (2011), on 
the other hand, exclusively referred to the Han as an ethnicity in their study 
on ethnic migration and inequality in Xinjiang (119). In a similar vein, Forsby 
(2011) used the term ethnic group, even though his usage of this term comes 
close to race: ‘even if one may question the validity of referring to a distinct 
Han-race from a purely genetic perspective, there seems to be a good case 
for employing the broader term of ethnic group to underline the common 
descent of the Han-Chinese and to delineate them from some of the non-Han 
minority groups within China’ (16). 
 
This corresponds well with the ways in which Chinese language literature 
represents this group, referring to it as a nationality, an ethnic group, a race or 
a nation. The understanding of the relationship between the Han and the 
Chinese nation is shifting accordingly. In addition, the term Han in Chinese is 
frequently used in combination with the term minzu, which can be translated 
as nation, race or ethnicity, depending on context. For example, the 
contemporary Chinese ethnologist Fei Xiaotong (1999 [1989]) compared the 
Han to a ‘snowball’ (4) when he explained the formation of the Zhonghua 
minzu (Chinese nation/race). By this he meant that the Han were like a core 
(hexin) that literally fused (ronghe) other minority ethnicities into a Han-
centred whole, which made the ‘snowball’ bigger and bigger (4). Influenced by 
Fei, many Chinese scholars searched for scientific evidence to prove the 
existence of the shared origins of the Chinese nation, i.e. to prove that all 
different groups were ultimately integrated in a single Chinese nation. For 
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instance, Chen Liankai (1994) has outlined the development of an indigenous 
Han culture in the Central Plains regions of the Yellow and Yangtze river 
valleys since 7,000 years ago, based on which a large group named 
Zhonghua minzu (the Chinese nation) was shaped gradually. While Chen 
emphasised the shared origin of the Han and other groups in China, other 
scholars have drawn from what they consider the biological dimension of 
Hanese identity, clearly coloured by the modern concepts of race and modern 
genetics. Wen Bo (2004) and his colleagues for example defined the Han as 
a group with a shared genetic make-up when suggesting that, ‘the Y 
chromosome and mitochondrial (mt) DNA data have demonstrated a coherent 
genetic structure of all Han Chinese’ (302).  
 
These multiple meanings of the Han suggest that attempts to understand Han 
as a term associated with one exclusive social category (nation, race or 
ethnic group) are analytically limited. Therefore, instead of attempting to 
provide a definitive answer to the question of whether the Han can be 
understood as an ethnic group, a race or a nation, my research seeks to 
identify such competing and multi-faceted ways of categorising and 
describing the Han, and to investigate their social significance in a particular 
historical and social context, namely the late Qing and early republican era. 
Why was the understanding of the Han so fluid? As I will seek to show, the 
different meanings of the Han were closely linked to different (and contested) 
understandings of the Chinese Self and its relevant Others, both internal and 
external. As such, they constituted part and parcel of the process of nation-
building, which gave rise to a modern sense of the Chinese national Self and 
was closely intertwined with large-scale institutional, political and cultural 
changes at the time.  
 
As acknowledged at many points in this thesis, my work was inspired by 
Frank Dik tter’s (1992) study of racial discourses in China. Dik tter has 
pursued a comprehensive study on racial discourses in China, including the 
period of late 19th century and early-20th century that I have focused on. In 
Dik tter’s understanding, however, other social categories and discourses, 
e.g. nation and ethnicity, were predominantly subsumed under race and racial 
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discourses, and he did not pay much attention to how these discourses 
interacted and overlapped. In contrast, my study pays close attention to a 
range of different social categories and discourses of inclusion and exclusion, 
and considers how they together contributed to the construction of Han 
identity and more generally, Chinese identity, in relation to the process of 
nation building. In addition, when discussing the racial representations of 
Chinese identity, Dik tter has mainly focused on intellectuals’ discourses, 
without paying much attention to their dissemination and reception among the 
broader population. My research, in contrast, moves beyond intellectuals’ 
discourses and considers the discursive construction of the Han and Chinese 
identity in a wider sphere, namely in school textbooks and dictionaries, which 
served as important instruments for building modern national attachments at 
mass level. Last but not least, my study examines the understanding of the 
Han in relation to the Chinese Self and its constituent groups, and hence also 
pays close attention to the delineation of belonging and exclusion within the 
Chinese Self - in relation to the Han and the Manchu, for instance - rather 
than focusing primarily on racial and other discourses that distinguish the 
Chinese Self from its Western or African others. In this sense, my analysis 
therefore moves beyond and complements Dik tter’s seminal work in this 
area, by examining Chinese identity discourses (with a focus on the Han) 
from the perspective of nation-building. 
 
There are several reasons for adopting such an analytical focus, and for 
focusing the analysis on the late Qing and early republican era. The notions of 
nation and nationalism were introduced to China from the West in the late 19 th 
century, i.e. during the late Qing era. During the decades that follow, these 
ideas gradually took root first among the Chinese elites, who used ideas of 
nationhood and nation-state to make sense of the role of China in the world 
and especially vis-à-vis the West and Japan. Slowly but surely, these ideas 
started entering public debate, first through pamphlets and speeches among 
the intellectual elites. By the early 1914, Western observers started noting 
fundamental changes in Chinese self-perceptions. In 1914, Max Weber 
described the developments in China in the following, rather telling manner: 
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‘Only fifteen years ago, men knowing the Far East, still denied that the 
Chinese qualified as a “nation”; … yet today, not only the Chinese 
political leaders but also the very same observers would judge 
differently. Thus it seems that a group of people under certain 
conditions may attain the quality of a nation through specific behaviour, 
or that they may claim this quality as an “attainment”’ (174). 
 
Arguably, what Weber was describing was a process of Chinese nation 
building, a process that led ‘from a universal but loosely connected empire 
into a particularistic but centrally governed nation-state’ (Zhao, 2004: 37). It is 
also worth noting that this process was paralleled by other modernisation 
processes in China, including military modernisation, the building of a modern 
state and modern educational system, as well as a rise in  anti-Western 
sentiments (cf. Zheng, 1999: 1). 
 
As I seek to show in my dissertation, it was during the early republican era 
that the nation-building process at mass level started in earnest. It was at this 
point that modern national discourses, and modern perceptions of the Han as 
a part of that, entered wider public consciousness by means of mass 
education and mass communication. To demonstrate this, my thesis traces 
the competing and changing discourses about the Han and the Chinese not 
only in elite discourses, but also in school textbooks and dictionaries. By 
comparing the discourses from the two periods I show how the modern ideas 
about the Han and the Chinese self gradually replaced earlier, pre-modern 
conceptions of the Chinese Self. With the help of these modern means of 
mass education and communication, the modern sense of the Chinese 
national Self was spreading among wider and wider circles of the population, 
drawing them all into the same Chinese ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 
1983). As Eric Hobsbawm (1983) argued, ‘the nation, with its associated 
phenomena: nationalism, the nation-state, national symbols, histories and the 
rest, all rest on exercises in social engineering which are often deliberate and 
always innovative; if only because historical novelty implies innovation’ (13). 
Drawing on Hobsbawm’s ideas, my thesis thus seeks to trace this process of 
‘social engineering’ by examining and comparing three layers of public 
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discourses, moving from elite discourses outwards to mass-circulated 
discourses.     
 
 
Structure 
The thesis consists of three main parts. The first part is concerned with 
‘theory, methods and history’. I first provide a theoretical discussion of 
relevant literature on race, nation and ethnicity with their intersectionality, 
focusing on both English and Chinese language literature. I will also offer a 
brief overview of some of the key literature on nation-building and 
nationalism, and consider it in relation to developments in Chinese society in 
modern times. This is followed by an introduction of the sources and 
methodologies adopted in my research. In order to provide a more 
comprehensive outline of the period that my research focuses on, a historical 
overview of key developments during the late Qing and early republican 
period is included as the last chapter of the first part. The second part of my 
dissertation is focused on the analysis of the representations of the Han in 
three selected Chinese intellectuals’ discourses during the late Qing and early 
republican periods: Zhang Binglin (1868-1936), Sun Zhongshan (1866-1925), 
and Liang Qichao (1873-1929). The third part of my project consists of two 
chapters. The first one provides an analysis of the representations of the Han 
in Chinese school textbooks during the late Qing and early republican 
periods, while the second one examines the representations of the Han in 
dictionaries in the same period. This is followed by a reflexive conclusion 
based on the results gained in my analysis of these different sources. 
  
8 
 
 
 
Part 1: 
Theory, Methods and History 
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Chapter 1: A Review of Literature on Race, 
Nation and Ethnicity 
In this literature review, two main issues will be discussed: the first part of the 
review reflects upon the classic debates on race and racism, nation and 
nationalism, and ethnicity, in Western (mostly English-language) literature, 
since these concepts have been mainly developed in the context of European 
societies, and have been subsequently transferred to different social and 
cultural environments, including the Chinese environment. The second part of 
the review focuses on the equivalents of the terms race, nation and ethnicity 
in Chinese society, and briefly looks at differences in the ways they are 
defined and translated. 
 
However, such a division of the chapter does not imply that it is possible to 
distinguish neatly between the two sets of discussions - the ‘Western’ and the 
‘Eastern’ approaches. Rather, these two types of perspectives overlap. 
Chinese debates were clearly influenced by, and built upon, Western ideas; 
however, they were also appropriated to suit Chinese traditional culture and 
established understandings of the Chinese Self. Before I proceed with the 
analysis, it is therefore important to note and understand these differences 
and appropriations.  
 
 
1. The Discussions of Race, Nation, and Ethnicity in 
the West 
In contemporary social sciences, race, ethnicity and nation are mainly 
debated as socially constructed and interlinked categories of social inclusion 
and exclusion. This section will reflect upon the scholarly discussion of these 
concepts in Western social sciences. In this part, the perspectives will be 
discussed separately at first, before contradictions and intersections between 
the terms race, nation and ethnicity are considered. 
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1.1 The Discussion of Race in the West 
The modern idea of race, used to categorise humans into allegedly 
biologically and culturally clearly distinct groups, was predominantly invented 
in the 18th and 19th century and closely linked to scientific racism and the 
period of European Enlightenment (Miles, 1989). During the Enlightenment, 
European scholars developed hierarchical systems of racial classification, 
and separated human groups into different races, arguing that these could be 
categorised on the basis of both physical and moral qualities.  
 
Enlightenment race discourse was often pseudo-scientific and dubious. The 
number of existing races of mankind, the permanence of ‘racial types’ and the 
criteria of race classification, were questions of significant controversy among 
scholars. However, most theories shared an ideology of white superiority, 
considered the white race as powerful and superior to other races, equipped it 
with supreme physical and moral qualities, and placed it on top of the racial 
hierarchy. Steve Garner (2007), among others, has referred to his ideological 
link between white supremacy and power: 
 
‘The power talked of here is of unchecked and untrammelled authority 
to exert its will; the power to invent and change the rules and 
transgress them with impunity and the power to define the Other, and 
to kill him or her with impunity’ (14). 
 
Bernasconi and Lott’s The Idea of Race (2000) provides a useful framework 
for the historical review of modern Western research on race, covering a 
range of important historical and contemporary literature on the topic. German 
philosopher Immanuel Kant, according to them, was the one of first Western 
thinkers who constructed ‘a rigorous scientific concept of race’ (2000: viii), 
which was marked by his focus on ‘the permanence of racial characteristics 
across the generations’ (ibid). 
 
Michael Pickering has demonstrated how in the later 18th and 19th century, the 
theme of race became increasingly associated with the representation of 
white racial superiority, which ‘belonged first of all to Europeans’ (2001: 113). 
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The corresponding racialised ‘stereotypical Other’ of the non-European 
people was therefore socially constructed, and became an ideological 
component leading the European colonial-imperial expansion during the 19th 
century. Alber Memmi’s The Colonizer and the Colonized (1957), which 
explored the national injustice and stereotype, has influenced many scholars. 
They considered that Western nations in this period are racialised both - the 
‘coloniser’ and the ‘colonised’ - ‘the colonial situation manufactures 
colonialists, just as it manufactures the colonised’ (56). Memmi and other 
scholars presented the former as white, civilised, and racially superior to the 
colonised people, represented as inferior, uncivilised others in need of white 
control, and domination. This attitude of white chauvinism is reflected in the 
work of many Enlightenment thinkers, among them, David Hume, who stated 
in his in Essays - Moral, Political and Literary (1974 [1741/1742]): 
 
‘I am apt to suspect the Negroes to be naturally inferior to the whites. 
There scarcely ever was a civilised nation of that complexion, nor even 
any individual eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious 
manufactures amongst them, no arts, no sciences. On the other hand, 
the most rude and barbarous of the whites, such as the ancient 
GERMANS, the present TARTARS, have still something eminent about 
them, in their valour, form of government, or some other particular’ 
(374). 
 
To clarify the characteristics of the idea of race and its crucial role as an 
ideology legitimising social inequality and domination, Pickering (2001) notes: 
‘the category of race denotes a form of labelling imposed on certain groups by 
those who base their sense of difference from these groups on their self-
arrogated superiority. It is an exclusive form of categorisation because it 
attempts to define groups as inherently inferior to those who command the 
labelling, and on these grounds to legitimate their social domination’ (114). As 
such, race can be seen as a socially constructed category of difference, that 
attempts to naturalise social difference as essentially naturally inherited. 
 
‘Scientific-racism’, associated with the Enlightenment discourses on race in 
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European thought in the 18th and 19th century, was one of the core sources of 
modern racism. Many earlier monogenist representations of race, which 
assumed a common origin of all human races, became gradually 
marginalised by polygenist theories. The latter promoted the idea of more 
permanent racial types and argued that human races did not share one origin 
but were of essentially different origins. Such polygenist views became 
increasingly popular since the mid-19th century. For example, Robert Knox 
argued in The Races of Men: ‘race is everything: literature, science, art - in a 
word, civilisation, depends on it … Look all over the globe, it is always the 
same; the dark races stand still, the fair progress’ (Knox, 1862 [1850], cited in 
Young, 1995: 93).  
 
Hierarchical theories of race were advocated by different European scholars 
of this period, who attempted to legitimate and rationalise European 
imperialist ambitions and colonial conquest. Audrey Smedley (1993) asserted 
that, in the course of the 19th century, ‘race … [became] a worldview, …a 
cosmological ordering system structured out of the political, economic, and 
social realities of peoples who had emerged as expansionist, conquering, 
dominating nations on a worldwide quest for wealth and power’ (25). Ideas 
about race during the 19th century and early 20th century were deeply 
influenced by the ideologies grown within the colonial environment 
(Lawrence, 1982). As several authors have argued, theories of race and racial 
hierarchies served to naturalise and reproduce the existing inequalities of 
social power between different groups and more specifically the dominance of 
the white race over other races (Frye, 1992). For example, the black race was 
often represented as physically unusually strong, ugly, bestial, immoral, 
inherently criminal etc. (Bell, 1992). By analysing Bolt’s work, Pickering 
concludes that ‘Victorian racism did not exist in a direct causal relationship to 
imperialism and colonial policy. It should not be seen simply as their ex post 
facto endorsement, but rather as centrally informing them and functioning as 
their “variable though invaluable adjunct”’ (Pickering, 2001: 134). In other 
words, racism was the core and dominant mechanism in promoting any types 
of imperial policies during the late 19th century (Curtin, 1960-63: 40). 
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The theory of Social Darwinism that emerged in England and the United 
States in the 1870s was an influential theory of this period seeking to apply 
the principles of Darwinian evolution to sociology and politics. It postulated 
that biological and accordingly cultural differences were racially determined 
and was used to generate additional scientific support for earlier theories 
about the alleged racial superiority of the white race. A core argument within 
Social Darwinist discourse was the idea that other non-white races were 
inferior and less adequately equipped in the natural struggle for survival, and 
some of them doomed to vanish (see for example Brantlinger, 1985). Rudolf 
Cronau among others used social Darwinist arguments to oppose the idea 
that the ‘lower races’ could be civilised, and considered them ‘doomed’: 
 
‘The current inequality of the races is an indubitable fact. Under equally 
favorable climatic and land conditions the higher race always displaces 
the lower, i.e., contact with the culture of the higher race is a fatal 
poison for the lower race and kills them… [American Indians] naturally 
succumb in the struggle, its race vanishes and civilisation strides 
across their corpses… Therein lies once again the great doctrine, that 
the evolution of humanity and of the individual nations progresses, not 
through moral principles, but rather by dint of the right of the strong’ 
(cited in Weikart, 2003: 273). 
 
The racial discrimination evident in Western historical racial studies of this 
period culminated in the eugenic notion of the degeneration and destruction 
of allegedly ‘inferior’ races. The rise of eugenics as a new scientific discipline 
in Europe in this period is associated with the work of Francis Galton, who 
defined ‘eugenics’ as ‘the science which deals with all influences that improve 
the inborn qualities of a race; also with those that develop them to the utmost 
advantage’ (1909: 35). 
 
Francis Galton’s Hereditary Genius (1869) made a case for the comparative 
study of different races and argued eugenics co-operates with the workings of 
Nature by assuring that humanity shall be represented by the fittest races. 
‘What Nature does blindly, slowly, and ruthlessly, man may do providently, 
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quickly, and kindly. As it lies within his power, so it becomes his duty to work 
in that direction; just as it is his duty to succour neighbours who suffer 
misfortune’ (Galton, 2000 [1911]: 83). Galton and his supporters considered 
that the different human races were fixed by heredity and had set them into a 
racially hierarchical system without allowing them to be changed during the 
process of evolution. The distinctions among different races were clarified by 
quoting a range of social markers including both physical and mental 
characteristics. In addition, eugenicists were convinced that it was justified to 
encourage those considered the ‘fittest races’ to breed, while preventing 
those considered ‘racially inferior’ from breeding. 
 
Western polygenist ideas regarding the permanency of racial types, eugenic 
race theories, and the race discourse of the European Enlightenment more 
widely have been questioned and criticised widely in contemporary Western 
social sciences (e.g. Garner, 2009; Omi, 2001 and Silverstein, 2005). Robert 
Miles, one of Britain’s most renowned theorists on the topic, for example, 
suggested with Malcolm Brown in year 2003 that the concept of race is not a 
useful term without considering its social construction: 
 
‘Thus, perversely, social scientists have prolonged the life of an idea 
that should be consigned to the dustbin of analytically useless terms: 
There are no races and therefore no race relations”. Unfortunately, 
social scientists have frequently assumed that it is possible to 
overcome the problems inherent in using the term race analytically by 
simply using scare quotes - that is substitute race for race. This has the 
virtue of emphasising that race is not a real attribute of human biology, 
but socially constructed and discursively perceived. In this case, the 
theory, by simply using the term, is contributing to perpetuate the 
racism’ (Miles & Brown, 2003: 90). 
 
Instead, Miles suggests to replace the concept of race with the concept of 
racialisation, which he defines as ‘a dialectical process by which meaning is 
attributed to particular biological features of human beings, as a result of 
which individuals may be assigned to a general category of persons which 
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reproduces itself biologically … The process of racialisation of human beings 
entails the racialisation of the processes in which they participate and the 
structures and institutions that result’ (Miles, 1989: 76). He went further to 
explain racialisation as ‘those instances where social relations between 
people have been structured by the signification of human biological 
characteristics in such a way as to define and construct differentiated 
collectivities’ (Miles & Brown, 2003: 101). 
 
Early critics of Enlightenment race discourses and the belief in white racial 
superiority included Franz Boas, whose empirical investigation aimed at 
examining the ‘Instability of Human Types’ (Bernasconi & Lott, 2000: xii-xiii).  
Boaz criticised, ‘the old idea of absolute stability of human types’ as one that 
‘must, however, evidently be given up, and with it the belief of the hereditary 
superiority of certain types over other’ (Boas, 2000 [1911]: 88). In addition, 
John Rex (1986), in order to criticise the negative impacts created by existing 
racial ideologies on African humanity and their culture, noted that ‘ethnic 
groups sometimes had identities imposed on them to restrict their mobility 
and to facilitate their exploitation and oppression’ (71). 
 
Another important early scholar in the field, Ashley Mongtagu (2000 [1941]: 
105) went even further in his radical refusal of the biological validity of race as 
a marker of difference. In the mid-20th century, he published an article under 
the programmatic title The Meaninglessness of the Anthropological 
Conception of Race (105) and explained: ‘the indictment against the 
anthropological conception of race is 1) that it is artificial; 2) that it does not 
agree with the facts; 3) that it leads to confusion and the perpetuation of error, 
and finally, that for all these reasons it is meaningless, or rather more 
accurately such meaning as it possesses is false’ (ibid). A similarly radical 
critical argument is provided by Anthony Appiah. As Montague, he questioned 
the validity of the anthropological concept of race by suggesting ‘the truth is 
that there are no races: there is nothing in the world that can do all we ask 
race to do for us’ (Appiah, 2000 [1986]: 134). 
 
The scholarly Western debates around the topic of race could be therefore 
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divided into two different camps: those thinkers who consider race to be ‘a 
fixed, concrete, and objective set of biological characteristics’ (Bernasconi & 
Lott, 2000: xv); and those who assume that race is a ‘mere illusion, an 
ideological construction designed to serve the interest of racists’ (ibid: 134). 
 
Today, the Western scientific community has largely abandoned the 
essentialist biological and anthropological ideas of race characteristics of the 
first of these camps. Instead, many social scientists suggest studying race 
critically as a social and cultural construct (e.g. Scott & Marshall, 2009). They 
examine its historical and social construction, and analyse race as a social 
category of identity, as well as a category (re-)producing relations of power 
and inequality in modern societies. The contemporary research on race within 
the social sciences is therefore ‘largely concerned with examining the causes 
and consequences of the socially constructed division of social groups 
according to their so-called race’ (Scott and Marshall, 2009: 543). 
 
In regard to the research focused on race and racism, a wide range of 
influential works covering different aspects of the topic was published in 
recent years. For example, Michael Banton, in his influential work Racial 
Theories (1998 [1987]), provides a useful overview of Western historical 
theories of racial and ethnic relations and contemporary debates on these 
older claims. The book shows how the concept of race was defined in the 
West during the 18th and 19th century, and emphasises the link between 
racism and domination by defining it as ‘the predication of decisions and 
policies on considerations of race for the purpose of subordinating a racial 
group and maintaining control over that group’ (187). 
 
Regardless of this critical turn in Western studies on race and racism and the 
contemporary refusal of scientific racism, the widespread perception of racial 
ideas in viewing the world, which is referred to as ‘popular racism’ by Michael 
Pickering (2001), continues to be a problem in modern Western societies. 
Historically, this popular form of racism was strengthened by the development 
of modern public media and the promotion of racialised stereotyping of the 
Other and the superior Western white Self in various popular cultural forms. 
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According to Pickering, ‘racist and imperialist views were (in both senses of 
the term) articulated by journalists, artists, novelists, travel writers, historians, 
advertising copy-writers, cartoonists and songwriters, as well as by scientists 
and intellectuals. Their ubiquity was such that they were commonplace in the 
visual images found on such ephemera as brand labels, postcards, alphabet 
books and cigarette cards’ (126). Although contemporary media and cultural 
forms are no longer as obviously racist as in the past, racial stereotyping 
persists to this day (e.g. Entman and Rojecki, 2001). 
 
 
1.2 The Discussion of Ethnicity in the West 
According to John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith (1996), ‘ethnicity’ is a 
relatively new term that firstly appeared in the Oxford English Dictionary in 
1953; however, the English origin of its relative term ‘ethnic’ has been used 
since the Middle-Ages in Europe (4-5). 
 
Scholarly attempts to define ethnicity have often remained vague and 
demonstrate the conceptual ambivalence of the term. Vilfredo Pareto, for 
example, has in this context considered ethnicity as ‘one of the vaguest terms 
known to sociology’ (1963: 2). It has been widely accepted by academics that 
ethnicity is often linked with culture, and may include ‘objective’ markers such 
as language, religion, traditions etc. In some early studies, Geertz (1962) and 
Shils (1957) referred to ethnicity as a primordial natural phenomenon with its 
foundations in family and kinship ties.  By emphasising the impact of ‘kinship’ 
as the primacy of ethnicity, Geertz (1963) argued: 
 
‘By a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the ‘givens’ 
or more precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the 
assumed ‘givens’ of social existence: immediate contiguity and live 
connection mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems from 
being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular 
language, or even a dialect of a language, and following particular 
social practices. These congruities of blood, speech, custom and so 
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on, are seen to have an ineffable, and at times, overpowering 
coerciveness in and of themselves’ (109). 
 
This approach of defining ethnicity is emphasising the emotional ethnic bond 
and relating it to a biologically and culturally grounded ethnic identity. More 
contemporary scholars, on the contrary, have conceptualised ethnicity 
increasingly as a socially constructed category of difference, grounded in the 
make-up of modern societies. For example, Okwudiba Nnoli (1995) conceives 
ethnicity ‘as a social phenomenon associated with some forms of interaction 
between the largest possible cultural-linguistic communal groups (ethnic 
groups) within political societies such as nation-states’ (1). However, due to 
centuries of migration, cultural groups, languages and traditions are spread 
across the globe, and often contribute to the construction of so-called ‘hybrid’ 
identities. As Fenton (1999) suggested, the presence of hybridity and the 
global hegemony of English language may not be necessarily conducive to 
clear-cut forms of collective identification. 
 
Furthermore, several academics have argued that ethnicity is primarily 
subjective rather than objective in character, and linked to subjective feelings 
of belonging, identification with a group. Definitions of ethnicity that adopt a 
subjective approach are widespread and varied. For instance, Max Weber 
was one of the first social scientists referring to the concept of ethnicity in 
modern society in relation to a subjective sense of association and 
commonality. He hence perceives ethnic groups as those human groups that 
entertain a subjective belief in their common descent (1994 [1948]: 389). 
Young (1965) likewise regarded ethnicity as ‘the active sense of identification 
with some ethnic units’ (234). In a similar vein, Sanda (1976) defines it as 
associated with a strong ‘feeling of allegiance to one’s ethnic group’ - in other 
words - a sense of belonging (33).  
 
Many more recent works on ethnicity conceptualise it entirely as a social and 
cultural construct and a central element in the formation of group identity. Sian 
Jones (1997), for example, sees ethnicity being made up by ‘all those social 
and psychological phenomena associated with a culturally constructed group 
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identity’ (xiii). Ethnic identity is similarly seen as a subjective phenomenon. He 
argues it to be grounded in perceptions and feeling of cultural identification 
with/and belonging to a group, constructed in cultural opposition to Others 
and/or in terms of a shared lineage. Jones hence refers to ethnic identify as 
‘that aspect of a person’s self-conceptualisation which results from 
identification with a broader group in opposition to others on the basis of 
perceived cultural differentiation and/or common descent’ (ibid). 
 
The concept of ‘ethnicity’ has seen various applications, since the term can be 
applied to various social categories in modern society, e.g. class, gender, and 
etc. The analytical usefulness of the terms ‘ethnicity’ and ‘ethnic groups’ have 
been questioned by different scholars (e.g. Ruane and Todd, 2004; Brubaker, 
2004). Bob Carter and Steven Fenton (2010), for example, are among those 
who have criticised the definition and explanation of complex social 
processes in terms of ethnic qualities or ethnically grounded social forces as 
reductionist. At the same time, Carter and Fenton (2010) are critically aware 
that ethnicity - despite scholarly attempts to emphasise its socially 
constructed character - is sometimes still used as an essentialist category 
with ‘natural’ connotations. In a recent study on the concept of ethnicity, they 
have argued that: 
 
‘… the term ethnic and its derivatives do not serve “us” well analytically 
when presented as either “ethnicity” or as “ethnic groups”. The first 
(ethnicity) fails because it implies a factor, a social force, an essential 
element, or a social process which is definable by its ethnic quality and, 
as such, has causal power’ (7). 
 
This critical reflection is helpful, as it draws our attention to the analytical 
limitations and socially and culturally constructed character of ethnicity and 
ethnically defined identities. We can see that to some extent ethnicity is as 
other social markers of difference, e.g. nation, gender, class, a discursive 
element in societal processes of ‘making up people’ (Hacking, 2002, 2006), 
which means that ‘… numerous kinds of human beings and human acts come 
into being hand in hand with our invention of ways to name them’ (Hacking, 
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2002: 113). The ways in which people categorise themselves and others, and 
form social identities have historically changed, and are now seen as socially 
influenced by wider society, and enhanced within both the political and the 
academic sphere. As argued by Immanuel Wallerstein: ‘ethnicity must be 
viewed as a plastic and malleable social construction, deriving its meanings 
from the particular situations of those who invoke it … Ethnicity has no 
essence or centre, no underlying features or common denominator’ 
(Wallerstein, 1987, cited in Smith 1998: 204). 
 
Following this line of thought, according to Peter Ratcliffe (2004), ethnicity 
might be viewed as a social category that is ‘multidimensional and stratified’ 
(190). Similarly, Carter and Fenton (2010) also conclude that: ‘ethnic 
categories are found in all social systems and actors deploy them as ‘practical 
categories’. The task of the sociologist therefore is to understand the key 
elements of the social system in which ethnic categories are implicated. This 
requires re-inserting ‘ethnicity’ into the general theory of social action and 
social structure.’ (8) Thus, rather than considering ethnicity as a fixed concept 
with clearly defined specific characteristics, it is more important to analyse the 
process of its social and cultural construction and the means by and ways in 
which it is formed. Last but not least, the concept of ethnicity plays an 
important role in ethno-symbolist theories of nation and nationalism, which will 
be discussed in the next section. 
 
 
1.3 The Discussion of Nation in the West 
In his book Contemporary Debates on Nationalism, Umut Özkirimli (2005) 
reviewed two basic camps in debates over how to define the nation, which 
are similar to those identified in debates about ethnicity: one focuses primarily 
on ‘objective’ markers of the nation, i.e. those that are accessible to an 
external observer; while the other puts emphasis on subjective elements, i.e. 
those that become evident only once we take into account the thoughts and 
feelings of people that constitute a nation. As Hutchinson and Smith (1994) 
have argued, one of the most representative definition of nation that focuses 
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exclusively on ‘objective’ elements or markers can be found in the work of 
Joseph Stalin, who defined the nation as ‘a historically constituted, stable 
community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, 
economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture’ 
(20). 
 
However, this perception of the conceptualizing nation as being grounded in 
several ‘objective’ elements, has been criticised intensively in academic 
debates on the subject. Zygmunt Bauman (1992), among others has criticised 
the idea that nations are based on objective criteria, and can be defined in 
objective terms. He instead emphasises the elusive, ambivalent and changing 
characters of nations, when suggesting that, the attempts at defining the 
nation in an objective way are ‘de-problematizing the very elusiveness and 
contingency of the nation’s precarious existence’ (677). Bauman promoted a 
more critical perspective on the study of nation and nationalism when 
criticising the ‘objective definition’ as one that - ‘obliquely legitimises 
nationalistic claims’ - dismissing the belief that nations can be defined in an 
objective way as ‘an artefact of boundary-drawing activity’ (ibid). He 
attempted to deconstruct synthetic qualities of nations rather than exposing 
pre-existing, ‘objective’ factors. 
 
Given these criticisms, it is easy to understand why there are only very few 
scholars today who are aiming to define the nation as a phenomenon that can 
be understood as being based on objective criteria. Instead, subjective 
elements have come to be considered necessary in academic circles in 
defining and correctly understanding what a nation is. Different scholars have 
analysed the subjective factors involved in the building and reproduction of 
nations in various ways, taking into account factors such as national 
‘solidarity’ (Renan, 1990 [1882]: 19, Hechter, 2000: 11), ‘self-awareness’ 
(Connor, 1994: 212), ‘loyalty’ (Weber, 1994 [1948]: 25) and ‘collective memory 
(Young, 1993).  
 
Apart from their discussion on the question ‘what is a nation’, academics in 
the field of nation and nationalism are also often preoccupied by the question 
22 
 
of when the idea of nation is ‘born’, and how it developed. Authors typically 
associated with the so-called ‘modernist’ school share the conviction that 
nations and nationalisms are recent socially and culturally constructed 
communities and formed as a consequence of the development of modern 
industrial societies. They argue that the nation did not exist as an immemorial 
phenomenon, but is rather associated with different socially invented, 
imagined and mythical qualities. Ernest Gellner was one of the leading 
representatives of ‘modernist’ school. In his classic work Nations and 
Nationalism (1985), he argued that both nations and nationalism are 
essentially modern phenomena. According to him, nationalism is a ‘new form 
of social organisation, that is based on deeply internalised, education-
dependent high cultures each protected by its own state’ (48). Benedict 
Anderson’s (1991) concept of nation, which became one of the most 
commonly quoted definitions in this research field, defines the nation as’an 
imagined political community - and imagined as both inherently limited and 
sovereign’ (6). National communities are here defined as limited, as they are 
set up within geographical boundaries, which Anderson acknowledges to be 
to some extent elastic and contested in historical context. Nations are defined 
as sovereign, as the concept of the modern nation is according to Anderson 
closely linked to progressive Enlightenment concepts of freedom, democracy, 
national independence and sovereignty. 
 
The national community is an imagined community, because even though the 
members in the smallest nation would not know each other ‘in the minds of 
each lives the image of their communion’ (ibid). Therefore, according to 
Anderson, ‘communities are to be distinguished, not by their 
falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined’ (ibid). In this 
context he refers to Gellner’s argument that: ‘nationalism is not the awakening 
of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist’ 
(Gellner, 1965; cited in Anderson, 1991: 6).  
 
However, some scholars have argued that subjective national consciousness 
does not develop on its own; but to some extent relies on objective markers, 
which are necessary to generate the feeling of commonality that gives birth to 
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or sustains the nation. In other words, in the process of their formation, 
nations are seen as necessarily seeking references - ‘ostensibly objective 
features’ (Tamir, 1993: 65) to validate their existence. Anthony Smith (1991), 
the leading representative of the Ethno-Symbolist school in the study of 
nation and nationalism, agrees in principal with the modernist thesis that 
nations and nationalism are predominantly specific to the modern era. 
However, he argues that modern nations and nationalism are normally rooted 
in pre-modern ethnic groups and traditions. He claims that most nations hold 
pre-modern ethnic ties, and defines the nation as ‘a named population 
sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass 
public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for its 
members’ (14). 
 
Smith (1991) defines ‘ethnie’ similarly as ‘a named population sharing a 
collective proper name, a presumed common ancestry, shared historical 
memories, one or more differencing elements of common culture, an 
association with a specific “homeland” and a sense of solidarity for significant 
sectors of the population’ (14). He is convinced that a strong relation exists 
between modern nations and their pre-modern cultural-ethnic ties. He has 
attempted to combine both subjective and objective factors in defining a 
nation. Smith (1991) claimed the ‘modernist approach fails to account for 
contemporary trends in ethnicity and nationalism’ and sees ethnie as a key 
concept for the analysis of the genesis of modern nations (14). The dominant 
modernist school has criticised Smith in return for over-rating the relevance 
and importance of ethnic elements in the construction of modern nations; and 
has shown that many modern nations developed without references to pre-
modern, ethnic ties, a clearly defined ethnic character, shared ethnic core, or 
descent. Modernists have in this context argued that ethnie is not a pre-
modern precondition of modern nations and nationalism, but in itself a social 
construct linked to the rise of modern nationalism (see The Warwick Debates 
on Nationalism, Smith, 1996: 357-370). 
 
Other scholars have supported Smith’s theory, among them are 
Alain Dieckhoff and Natividad Gutiérrez (2001), who suggest that national 
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identities exist within distinct pre-modern ethno-heritages, which are 
determined by ‘the patterning of historical sequences, territorial associations, 
traditions and values of a particular ethnic community’ (3). David Miller (1995) 
argued similarly that ethnicity is a powerful foundation for nationalist 
sentiment. However, he also claimed that ‘even nations that originally had an 
exclusive ethnic character may come, over time, to embrace a multitude of 
different ethnicities’ (20). The nation, according to them, is something 
constantly perceived adaptable to the political environment and social context. 
 
Newer approaches in the analysis of the concepts of nation and nationalism 
have distinguished and categorised two different types of national identities 
defined in the public realm, generally, civic and ethnic forms of nationalism. 
Oliver Zimmer (2002) argued, ‘national identity, thus understood, is a public 
project rather than a fixed state of mind. Taking place at the interface of 
culture and politics, the public definition (and re-definition) of nationhood is 
contingent within certain limitations’ (173-174). Simply speaking, both cultural 
and political constraints are included in the construction of national identities. 
Zimmer provided a useful summarised distinction between the civic and the 
ethnic concept of nationalism: 
 
‘Civic nations, so the classic argument runs, derive their legitimacy and 
internal cohesion from their members’ voluntary subscription to a set of 
political principles and institutions. In sharp contrast, ethnic nations are 
founded on a sense of self-identity determined by “natural” factors such 
as language or ethnic descent. Consequently, civic nationhood is the 
outcome of deliberate human commitment, while ethnic nationhood 
results from long=term cultural and historical evolution’ (174).  
 
It has been shown that although the debates on defining the nation continue, 
a growing number of authors are coming to the conclusion that it is impossible 
to define the term nation in a universally applicable way. Craig Calhoun 
(1997) hence came to conclude that the understanding of nationalism should 
be linked to its historical and social construction: 
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‘Nationalism is too diverse to allow a single theory to explain it all. 
Much of the contents and specific orientation of various nationalisms is 
determined by historically distinct cultural traditions, the creative 
actions of leaders, and contingent situations within the international 
world order’ (123). 
 
John Hall (1993) has similarly emphasised the need to discuss nationalism 
within its diverse historical contexts. He argued that ‘no single, universal 
theory of nationalism is possible. As the historical record is diverse, so too 
must be our concepts’ (1). Thus, the best way of analysing the competing 
definitions and theories of nation and nationalism might be to regard them as 
competing representations of, or discourses about, identity emerging within 
specific historical contexts. As a consequence, it would be naïve to simply 
take the terms ‘nation’ and ‘nationalism’, and the various definitions of these 
terms developed in the Western world and apply them directly in an 
examination of Chinese society. Instead, we should first look for Chinese 
terms and definitions that refer to similar phenomena, and examine how they 
are used. I will discuss such terms in the Chinese context in the second part 
of this literature review. 
 
 
1.4 The Relations between Nation, Race and Ethnicity 
In regard to the discussion of the relationships between the terms nation, race 
and ethnicity, two basic approaches can be distinguished. Some scholars 
focus their attention mainly on the distinctions between these social concepts. 
Other authors, instead, consider and analyse these terms (race, nation and 
ethnicity; and often also gender and class), and the phenomena they refer to, 
as interconnected and sometimes even interchangeable (e.g. Andersen and 
Hill Collins, 2006; Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992; Hill Collins, 1998, 2000; 
Crenshaw, 1991; Dill and Zambrana, 2009; and Wigger, 2009, 2010). Instead 
of treating these terms as distinct and mutually exclusive social categories, 
they prefer to analyse them as different but interlinked representations of 
social identity, and investigate how they ideologically underlie complex 
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processes of social inclusion and exclusion, and politics of belonging and not-
belonging in Modern Society.  
 
The concept of intersectionality has provided a new way of viewing the 
relationship between gender, race, ethnicity, sexuality, class and nationality, 
which is focused on analysing the multi-faceted ways in which these 
categories are discursively intertwined. There are various forms of 
combination of categories that have been studied broadly. For example, race 
and gender are investigated as intertwining ‘simultaneous and linked’ social 
identities (Browne and Misra, 2003: 488). Patricia Hill Collin (1990) has 
conducted an influential study on black feminism to study the representations 
of multiple social categories rooted in specific social backgrounds. As 
Crenshaw (1991) suggests, ‘indeed, one of the projects for which postmodern 
theories have been very helpful - is thinking about the way power has 
clustered around certain categories and is exercised against others’ (1296-7). 
The concept of intersectionality, which has been termed ‘a fundamental idea’, 
is based on the analytical insight that ‘neither race, nor class, nor gender 
stand alone as organising principles of society; rather, they intersect, overlap, 
intertwine, simultaneously structure, and weave the fabric of all people’s 
experiences’ (Andersen, 2006: 75). 
 
Judging from the literature in the field, the relationship between race and 
ethnicity is particularly complex and vague. The essence of ethnicity, 
according to many sociologists (i.e. Bulmer: 1986), is associated with 
‘memories of a shared past’; in other words, ethnicity is related to collective 
memory, while race is rarely defined in terms of memory. Some scholars have 
highlighted the necessity of clarifying the distinction between these two 
concepts. Malik (1996) notes, ‘there is a general sense that if race describes 
differences created by imputed biological distinction, ethnicity refers to 
differences with regards to cultural distinctions’ (177). Other scholars (Banton, 
1998; Guillaumin, 1995) offer a slightly different explanation of the relationship 
between ethnicity and race, and argue that race can be defined as the 
biologically and culturally determined hierarchical classification and 
naturalisation of groups, while ethnicity is seen as related predominantly to an 
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internal, self-identification. 
 
A similarly complex relationship exists also between the terms ethnicity and 
nation, akin to that between ethnicity and race. In many cases nations are 
considered to derive from an ethnic group; for example, some scholars claim 
that nations are merely ‘politicised ethnic groups’ (Smith, 1993: 48-62), or 
‘institutionalized ethnic groups’ (Eller, 2002: 17). The concepts of nation and 
ethnicity share certain elements, for example, their association with collective 
memory of past experiences (either it is remembered or imagined). 
 
In regard to the distinction between the nation and a mere ethnic group, Craig 
Calhoun (1993) considered that ‘[it] is precisely the attribution to the former of 
the right to an autonomous state, or at least autonomy of some sort within the 
state. On such an account it doesn’t matter whether the nation is an ethnic 
group that has proved its superiority in historical struggle (material or 
ideological), or a multi-ethnic population’ (220-221). It has been shown that, 
one of the significant distinctions between these two terms lies in the link 
between nation and nationalism: nationalism is commonly related to a clear 
demand to establish a state, in order to politically legitimise the boundaries, 
which is not requisite for an ethnic group, which will discussed in more detail 
in the following section. 
 
On the other hand, several scholars do not believe it is necessary to 
distinguish these terms in an absolute and universally applicable way, or 
assume they refer to distinct social spheres. Instead, they believe that 
ethnicity can be used together and interchangeably with the term race. As 
Yasmin Gunaratnam (2003: 4) points out, Stuart Hall had doubts about the 
usefulness of clear-cut distinctions between ethnicity and race. After drawing 
a binary opposition between race and ethnicity, he noted that ‘biological 
racism privileges markers like skin colour, but those signifiers have always 
also been used, by discursive extension, to connote social and cultural 
differences’ (Hall, 2000: 223). Due to this, attempts to systematically isolate 
these categories of social sciences (race, nation and ethnicity) have been 
rejected by several scholars. They on the contrary have emphasised the 
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importance of studying the reciprocal connections, discursive overlaps and 
intersectionalities between these social concepts of difference. For example, 
Nira Yuval-Davis and Floya Anthias (1992), argued that ‘racisms cannot be 
understood without considering their interconnections with ethnicity, 
nationalism, class, gender and the state’ (VIII).  
 
The theoretical paradigm of intersectionality, and its emphasis on the 
interconnections between markers of difference such as nation, race, ethnicity 
and gender that have been widely used in Western literature, has obvious 
advantages for this project. Foremost so, since representations of the Han in 
Chinese society used different categories of identity and meanings of Han, 
combining ideas of nation, race, ethnicity and culture. However, in the context 
of this thesis, the analysis of intersectionality is a means rather than an end. 
By attending to the relationships between the ideas of race, nation and 
ethnicity in the three types of discourses - intellectuals’ writings, textbooks 
and dictionaries - I will seek to show that these ideas were effectively involved 
in the broader process of Chinese nation-building. I shall return to this 
question in the last section of this chapter.  
 
 
2. The Discussions of Race, Nation and Ethnicity 
among Chinese Scholars: Issues of Translation and 
Definition 
The concepts of race, nation and ethnicity based on English language 
literature have been theoretically reviewed in the last section, and multiple 
contradictions and interconnections between these terms were addressed. In 
this following part of the chapter, I will focus on the equivalents of these terms 
in Chinese society, and briefly look at differences in the ways they are defined 
and translated. 
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2.1 The Discussion of Nation and Nationalism in China 
The notions of nation and nationalism first started being used and discussed 
in China in the context of modern nation-building processes in the 19th 
century. The process formed part of broader, fundamental social 
transformations driven by both internal and external factors, and gave rise to 
a thorough re-conceptualisation of Chinese self-perception. The modern 
notion of China as a nation departed significantly and challenged several key 
dimensions of the traditional construction of identity in Chinese society. To put 
it simply, Chinese people underwent a profound change in their perception of 
themselves and their country, from the notion of their country as synonymous 
with ‘the world’ (tianxia) to the acknowledgment of their country as only ‘a part 
of the world’, i.e. as one nation among many. 
 
After the eruption of the First Sino-Japanese War in 1894, various intellectual 
institutions were established in the country, including the Baohuang hui 
(Chinese Empire Reform Association, established in 1899 in Canada, by 
Liang Qichao [1873-1929] whose work will be examined in detail in the 
following chapter, and Kang Youwei [1858-1927]). Such institutions deeply 
influenced the Chinese public, and especially impacted on the Chinese 
immigrants living abroad. The core of the Baohuang hui is characterised by 
the aim of protecting the emperor, which has owned a wide social root. This is 
because of the fact that most Chinese immigrants at the time were seeing the 
emperor as the representative of the nation (Wang, 1988: 139). 
 
The term nation was first translated into Chinese by Liang Qichao when he 
applied the concept to minzu and minzu zhuyi, which referred respectively to 
nation and nationalism. Hughes Christopher (1997) noted that, the term 
minzu ‘was only introduced into the Chinese vocabulary in 1899 by the 
constitutional reformer Liang Qichao in Minzu cidian (National Dictionary)’ (3). 
The term minzu appeared in Liang Qichao’s work Dongji Yuedan (Comments 
on Japanese Book), published in 1899, in which he refers to the dongfang 
minzu (the Eastern nations) and minzu jingzheng (national competition) (41). 
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However, the term nation was not always translated using the word minzu; 
sometimes another Chinese term guo (nation, state) was used in some 
literature. The growing consciousness of national identification within China in 
this period was demonstrated by the increasingly popularity of the usage of 
the term minzu, which was in meaning closely linked to the notion of ‘nation-
state’ (guo). 
 
The concept of nation in modern China after the outbreak of the First Opium 
War in 1839 has been differentiated by academics from the collective 
consciousness of belonging among the Chinese in the past. ‘In the traditional 
Chinese cultural norms, ethnic identity rested on the distinction between 
barbarian minorities and civilised Han’ (Ma, 2007: 5). The creation of a 
modern Chinese nation, of national consciousness itself, however, was 
associated with new concepts resting on the acknowledgement that the world 
order had become one of competing nations. The traditional foreign policies 
proposed by ancient China were focused on promoting Han culture and 
persuading other ethnic groups within Chinese society to accept and be 
integrated into Han culture. These policies were developed at a time when the 
late Qing government was rather weak and was faced with the challenge of 
powerful Western military technologies. 
 
Chinese intellectuals, therefore, were looking for appropriate theoretical and 
ideological guidelines to stabilise the weakened Chinese government. In this 
context, a group of terms that were created in the modern Western social 
sciences were translated into Chinese, including territory (guodi), sovereignty 
(guoquan, or zhuquan) and citizen (guomin, e.g. a Chinese journal name 
Guominbao published during the time), all of which were among the key 
building blocks of Chinese nationalist discourse at the time. The appearance 
and usage of these terms reflected a growing focus on politics among 
Chinese elites in touch with the foreign countries. 
 
The Chinese term guo has been sometimes also used as a translation of the 
English term nation and vice versa. In 1887, the Chinese diplomatic minister 
Zeng Jize, for example published an article in English in The Asiatic Quarterly 
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Review in London, entitled China: The Sleep and the Awakening. In the 
Chinese translation of this famous article, the word ‘nation’ was translated as 
‘guo’ (1992 [1887]: 155-164). The same pattern was also followed by Western 
authors writing in Chinese, including the author of Waiguo Shilve (The 
Summarised History of Foreign Countries, 1847) Robert Morrison, the author 
of Diqiu Tushuo (The Graphic Theory of the Earth, 1856) and others. 
 
Some academics have argued that the Western cultural imprint on the term 
nation was not matching a specific corresponding term in Chinese. For 
example, Rui Yifu (1972) stated: ‘according to Sun Zhongshan, the meaning 
of guozu is same as minzu; and minzu and guojia can be understood in the 
same way. All these three terms are actually sharing a same origin in Latin 
“nationem”, which is commonly used as the term “nation” in English, German 
and French. This is why I claim that the meaning of these three words is a 
trinity’ (1972: 4). 
 
As evident from the above, it is rather difficult to identify a universally 
applicable Chinese translation for the English term nation. The usage of the 
term nation in Chinese society has shown differences in various contexts. 
This is due not only to the confusion over the definition of the term nation in 
English, but also to the complexity of the structure of Chinese characters. It 
frequently happens that we cannot find the exact one-word English equivalent 
for a particular Chinese word; instead, it is always necessary to consider the 
contexts when specific usages of the term are investigated. 
 
 
2.2 The Discussion of Ethnicity in China 
Having discussed different reflections of the term ethnicity within modern 
Chinese history, the Chinese sociologist Ma Rong (2001), as well as some 
other Chinese scholars (Fei, 1989; Huang, 2002) selected the term zuqun in 
Chinese as the standard translation of ethnicity and ethnic group. According 
to Ma Rong (2004), ‘zuqun (ethnicity) can be regarded as a term reflecting the 
nature of lineage and culture of a community’, while nation is more focused 
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on politics (64). The main purpose of this was to clarify the relationship 
between ethnicity and nation (Ma, 2001). In another article, Ma (2007) noted: 
‘“nation” is related to “nationalism” and the political movement for “national 
self-determination” taking place in Western Europe in the 17th century’ (201). 
The term ‘ethnic group’, on the other hand, ‘refers to groups that exist and 
identify with a pluralist country with various historical backgrounds, cultures 
and traditions’ (ibid). 
 
However, the debates about ethnicity among Chinese academics are often 
intertwined with debates on nations and nationalism, and it is impossible to 
discuss the particular definitions of ethnicity without at the same time 
considering how these relate to debates about nation and nationalism. This is 
influenced by the traditional perception of civilisation among Chinese 
intellectuals: ‘the Western invasion has created a boundary for Chinese 
intellectuals with the foreigners, which is supposed to be the boundary for the 
nation or nation-state; however, it is more a cultural boundary existing in the 
ideas of Chinese governors and intellectuals’ (Gao, 2007: 45). It has been 
shown that both political and cultural markers were brought into consideration 
in order to differentiate between a Chinese Self and the Others by applying 
the categories of nation and ethnicity. 
 
In regard to this issue, the already mentioned Liang Qichao (1873-1929) drew 
a conceptual link between the Han as a nation, and the Han as an ethnicity. 
He distinguished between two forms of Chinese nationalism (1989 [1903]): 
xiao minzu zhuyi (large nationalism), which referred to ‘the relationship 
between the Han nation and the other nations (tazu) in the country’, and da 
minzu zhuyi (small nationalism), which referred to ‘the relationship between 
the various nations within the country as a whole and the various nations 
abroad’ (75-76). In his discussion of Liang’s work, Zhao (2004: 66) argued 
that Liang’s large nationalism is the equivalent of state nationalism, while his 
small nationalism can be seen as the Chinese equivalent of ethnic 
nationalism. 
 
In contrast, Zhang Binglin (1868-1936), a Chinese philologist and 
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revolutionary, and another author whose work I examine in detail later in this 
dissertation, considered the Han not only as an ethnicity, but also a nation, 
definitely excluding the main rival group of the Manchu, as well as other 
ethnicities in China. In his article paiman pingyi (Level-headed Discussion of 
Anti-Manchuism) published in the newspaper Minbao, argued that ‘it is just 
like if the key rope of a fishing net is loose, all the meshes are open, anti-
Manchu is the precondition of everything’ (1908, Vol 2: 8). 
 
The different understandings of nation and ethnicity in Chinese society 
outlined above are based on different ways of categorising human groups in 
specific historical contexts. Although some of the understandings resemble or 
echo those familiar from Western literature, the meanings of the Chinese 
terms for nation and ethnicity are clearly multiple and shifting. This suggests 
that any simple application of Western concepts can be misleading. Instead, it 
is necessary to conduct an in-depth analysis of the representation of these 
ideas in specific texts and historical contexts, and to investigate in what ways 
they use all the different terms identified above (guo, minzu, min, zulei) in 
order to construct the Han, and more broadly identity and difference during 
the period of the late Qing and early republican China. 
 
 
2.3 The Discussion of Race in China 
The debates about race in non-Western societies have historically been 
ignored for a long time. Ideas and representations of race have played a role 
in Chinese society as well, and predate the import of the Western concept of 
race into Chinese society. One of their core elements was the equation of 
Chinese with Hanese, and the portrayal of the Hanese Chinese people as 
culturally superior. This representation was linked with the perception of non-
Hanese people in China as ‘barbarian’ or less civilised. It was ideologically 
grounded in the belief that Han cultural and moral system could be seen as 
the only and absolute standard of evaluating the degree of civilisation of a 
certain group. This idea can be traced to the period of Chunqiu (722-481 BC) 
(Dikötter, 1992: 2-3). 
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According to Frank Dik tter (1992), ‘the ruling elite, dominated by the 
assumption of its cultural superiority, measured alien groups according to a 
yardstick by which those who did not follow “Chinese ways” were considered 
“barbarians”’ (2). Li Chi (1928) used the distinction between ‘raw’ and ‘cooked’ 
food as a marker in defining the boundary between a ‘civilised’ group and a 
‘barbarian’. People who were considered barbarian by Hanese Chinese 
standards included according to Li (1928): ‘The tribes on the East called Yi. 
They had their hair unbound, and tattooed their bodies. Some of them ate 
their food that without being cooked’ (229). 
 
From the 18th century onwards, following the intensification of relations with 
the West, racial stereotypes of Western society proliferated. Westerners and 
the West in general were described as evil and equated with devils or ghosts 
in China. The description of Westerners as yangguizi (foreign devils) was very 
common at the time (Meng, 2006). Some descriptions of Western people 
included references to physical features, for instance the term hongmaofan 
(red-haired barbarians) (ibid: 9). 
 
Simultaneously, the racial discourse in modern China was referring to the 
perception of racialised and dehumanising stereotypes of Africans in Chinese 
society, which could be seen as a discursive echo of prominent Western 
racialised identifications of Africa as primitive. Kang Youwei for example, one 
of the most significant Chinese intellectuals at the time, degraded and 
dehumanised Africans in his book The Book of Great Unity (da tong shu, 
1956 [1901]) claiming ‘…those people have iron faces, silver teeth, protruding 
pig-look jaw, like an ox from the front, with all body covered in hair, and dark 
black hands and feet…they are as stupid as the sheep and swine’ (23). 
 
Racialised and inferiorising stereotypes like the ones above, which are a 
typical element of racism in modern Western societies, were widely used 
throughout modern Chinese history. This reflects the Chinese recognition of 
Western ideas as well as the ways in which they were defining the Self and 
Others’ hierarchically. Thus, it is necessary to conduct archive analysis of 
specific Chinese historical texts and investigate in what ways the Chinese and 
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Hanese were defining and representing themselves in racialised terms, in 
order to construct their identity and distance themselves from people they 
categorised as Others. In particular, it is important to consider how the 
category of race was applied in such representations, and how it was related 
to other categories of identity and difference identified earlier (guo, minzu, 
min, zulei). 
 
In regard to the racialised representations during the late Qing period in 
China, ‘the idea of zhong [seed, species, race] started to dominate the 
intellectual scene at the end of the 19th century and continued to be 
considered a vital problem by many intellectuals until the end of the 1940s’ 
(Dikötter, 1999: 420). The discussion of race was especially intense during 
the colonial period because of the increasing influence of Western ideas, 
which makes the problem even more complex. Liang Qichao, Yan Fu, and 
others were deeply influenced by Western theories. For example, Yan Fu 
worked on the translation of some important Western books, among which 
Evolution and Ethics (Huxley, 1893) is one of the most important. The 
translation of this book brought a new understanding of race and ethnicity to 
the Chinese academic scene. 
 
Liang Qichao made an effort to define the conflict and struggle with the West 
in a racialised construct when arguing: ‘the yellow race is defined in direct 
opposition to the white race’ (1999 [1896]: 52). He eagerly advocated the 
integration of the yellow race in order to resist white domination, and 
emphasised the important role of China and the Chinese population within 
what he considered the yellow race: ‘The Chinese population counts for 70 to 
80 percent of the of yellow race, thus the survival or extinction of the yellow 
race is determined by the survival or extinction of China’ (ibid). 
 
The racial construction of identity in modern China clearly reflected the ‘fears 
of extinction’ among the Chinese (Dikötter, 1992: 75). Having witnessed the 
weakness of modern China, racial discourse in China ‘indicates that the white 
peril was not merely a political weapon: racial extinction was a genuine 
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concern shared by many Chinese who felt threatened by the West towards 
the end of the nineteenth century’ (Dikötter, 1992: 77). Therefore, the demand 
to organise reform became an urgent task for Chinese intellectuals, since the 
late Qing government was considered incapable to resist the challenges from 
the West. 
 
 
3. Who are the Han? 
The definition of the Han in China was and continues to be shaped by all of 
the debates and identity categories mentioned so far. The Han are defined in 
various ways, all of which are closely related to the understanding of ‘China’ 
and ‘Chinese’. Some studies argue that Han culture’s dominance in Chinese 
society involves elements of race and racism. Chow Kai-wing (1997) for 
example, analysed statements made by Zhang Binglin, who was among the 
first to describe the Han as a race. Chow echoed Zhang’s claim that the Han 
was constructed as a racial group: ‘although divided by dialects, those who 
consider themselves Han Chinese have a sense of belonging to a group 
which shares more or less the same culture, a history and a vague sense of 
belonging to the “yellow race”’ (34). The significance of the term yellow race in 
structuring the racial discourse in modern China is clarified by Dikötter (1997) 
as well, who argued ‘the symbolic meanings ascribed to the colour yellow 
placed it [the yellow race] in a privileged position in the construction of social 
identities’ (12). 
 
The sharpest conflict exists surrounding the debate whether the Han should 
be considered as a nation or an ethnic group. Some scholars represent the 
Han as a nation, and equate Hanism to Chinese nationalism. Fei (1999: 119), 
for example, traced the emergence of the Han as the ‘magnetic core’ (ningju 
hexin) of the Chinese nation to long before the founding of the first Chinese 
empire, the Qin dynasty, in 221 BC. He claimed that people residing in the 
central plains of the current territory of China were already seen by outsiders 
as a ‘quasi-nation’ (zu lei) and that ‘the Han people in fact formed a national 
entity (minzu shiti)’ (ibid). 
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Ancient mythology and archaeology have been used to support this argument 
(Bai, 2003). This interpretation of history was very important for the creation of 
the myth of the unitary Chinese nation-state because, as Fei Xiaotong has 
suggested, lishi de rentong (historical identification) is the spiritual basis of 
ethnic identification and plays an extremely important role as the integrating 
force of the Chinese nation. Due to this force, ethnic minorities on the frontier 
who were assimilated into the Chinese nation also accepted this historical 
identification in addition to accepting the Han lifestyle (Fei, 1989). Similar 
ethnocentric views can be found in other types of nationalism, since the 
construction of national identity ‘often involves privileging the culture of a 
specific ethnic group either as the dominant group of the political arena or the 
oppressed subgroup of the nation’ (Chow, 2001: 1-2). 
 
On the other hand, a number of previous studies support the view that the 
Han should be seen as an ethnicity. For example, Dru Gladney (1993) 
regarded the Han as an ethnic group that played a key role in the 
development of Chinese society. A similar view was adopted by Edward J. M. 
Rhoads (2000), who analysed the ethnic relations and political power in Late 
Qing and Early Republican China.  
 
However, both of these opinions are challenged by Fei Xiaotong (1988: 119), 
who developed the thesis of Duoyuan yiti geju (A Unitary Pattern with Pluralist 
Origins), regarding the relationship between Chinese identity as a unit and 
sub-identities among different groups. Fei argued that the zhonghua minzu 
(Chinese nation) is a unitary and independent nation (the Chinese minzu) of 
its own, which is constituted by plural nationality or ethnicities, including the 
Han and all the other minzu in the Chinese territory. Zhao Suisheng (2004) 
summarises this thesis in three brief phrases. ‘1) Han has been the zhuti 
minzu (core nationality); 2) there has been a fusion of many ethnic 
nationalities in Chinese history; 3) contemporary China as a nation-state was 
created by the joint efforts of various ethnic groups’ (61). 
 
Judging from this brief overview of competing definitions and categorisations 
of the Han, it is clear that there is little point in trying to fit the Han into one 
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single category of race, nation or ethnicity. Instead, I would argue that what 
we need is an alternative approach that focuses on the multiple ways in which 
the Han are constructed and represented, and approaches them as 
competing ways of imagining the Chinese nation, embedded in particular 
social and political contexts. These competing imaginings, I argue, formed 
part and parcel of the broader process of Chinese nation-building. 
 
 
4. The Process of Modern Nation-building and its 
Reflection in China 
The history of modern China is characterised by the fall of the Qing 
government and the rise of a modern nation-state. My analysis of the 
discourses of the Han and the Chinese nation is effectively an investigation of 
the process of Chinese nation-building, and more specifically an analysis of 
competing (nationalist) identity discourses and the way they were formed 
among the elites and then, disseminated among the wider population by 
means of intellectuals’ writings (published in newspapers and pamphlets), 
textbooks and dictionaries. This section briefly examines a selection of key 
theories of nationalism and nation-building and draws on them to establish an 
interpretive framework for the analysis of discourses about the Han and the 
Chinese in these three sets of sources. 
 
The concepts of nation and nationalism are widely debated. One of the key 
issues at stake in existing literature is the relationship between nations and 
nationalism and modernity. While some scholars, sometimes known as the 
‘modernist group’, emphasise the modern qualities of nations and regard 
nationalism as a product of the modern development and transformations of 
materials and discourses (Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm and 
Ranger, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1990; Özkirimli 2000), others, typically referred to 
as ethno-symbolists, seek to show that modern nations are constructed and 
developed based on pre-existing ethnic groups, and cannot be understood 
fully without reference to pre-modern roots (Connor, 1990; Smith, 2003). 
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Definitions of nations and nationalism differ accordingly. Anthony D. Smith, 
the most influential scholar in the ethnosymbolist group, defined the nation in 
his book National Identity (1991) in following way: 
 
 ‘a named human population sharing a historic territory, common myths 
and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy 
and common legal rights and duties for all members’ (14). 
 
As evident from this quote, Smith puts emphasis on ‘historic territory’, 
‘common myths’ and ‘historical memories’, all of which he sees as closely ties 
to pre-modern ethnic communities which served as the basis for modern 
nations. In response to modernist theories, Smith claimed that ‘too great an 
emphasis on the “modernising” potential of nationalism overlooks the 
importance of the ethnic roots in the past’ (Smith, 1983: xi). He took particular 
issue with Hobsbawm’s theory of ‘invented traditions’, discussed further on, 
arguing that it ‘places too much weight on artifice and assigns too large a role 
to the fabricators’ (1998: 130). Smith re-stated his approach again in his 
recently published his book Ethno-Symbolism and Nationalism: A Cultural 
Approach in 2009, which again emphasizes the importance of pre-modern 
ethnic roots and their symbolic dimensions for the understanding of the 
persistence and appeal of modern nationalism.  
 
In contrast to ethnosymbolists, modernists generally assume that nations are 
a product of modernisation, and can be invented regardless of whether 
suitable pre-modern ethnic groups exist or not. More specifically, modernists 
consider that nations are the consequence of nationalism, as noted by Ernest 
Gellner (1983): ‘it is nationalism which engenders nations, and not the other 
way around’ (55). Gellner’s (1983) emphasis on the constitutive and 
revolutionary nature of nationalism is evident also in his definition of 
nationalism: 
 
‘In brief, nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy, which requires 
that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones, and in 
particular, that ethnic boundaries within a given state - a contingency 
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already formally excluded by the principle in its general formulation - 
should not separate the power-holders from the rest’ (1).   
 
The following passage, which emphasises the role of invention in nationalism 
and nations, is indicative as well: 
 
‘Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it 
invents nations where they do not exist - but it does need some pre-
existing differentiating marks to work on, even if, as indicated, these 
are purely negative’ (168). 
 
Benedict Anderson and Eric Hobsbawm - are two further important scholars in 
the modernist group. Compared to Gellner and other modernists such as 
John Breuilly, who focus primarily on political and economic aspects of nation 
building, they are more focused on cultural processes. As my dissertation is 
interested primarily in discourses and hence culture, their work is of most 
direct relevance.  
 
Like Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm (1983, 1991) emphasised the invented and 
artificial character of nations, and focused on - as the subtitle of his key book 
on the topic suggests - the process that led from nationalism as a 
‘programme’ and nation as a ‘myth’ to nations and nation-states as taken-for-
granted elements of ‘reality’.  The emphasis on invention comes particularly 
clearly to the fore in his book The Invention of Tradition, where the examined 
different ‘invented traditions’ used historically to engender mass support for 
nationalist ideas. Hobsbawm defined ‘invented tradition’ in this way:  
 
‘“Invented tradition” is taken to mean a set of practices, normally 
governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic 
nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour 
by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past. In 
fact, where possible, they normally attempt to establish continuity with 
a suitable historic past’ (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983: 1-2). 
 
Among examples of invented traditions Hobsbawm’s book examines diverse 
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cultural phenomena, from national songs, flags and holidays to celebrations 
and folk costumes.  
 
Hobsbawm’s work has proved to be particularly useful as a general 
framework for my analysis of the process of constructing a modern Chinese 
identity, linked to a modern Chinese nation-state. What I seek to do in my 
thesis is to trace the formation of modern (nationalist) ideas about the 
Chinese Self and its Others, and its gradual dissemination among the wider 
population. Using Hobsbawm’s words, I am hence tracing the process of 
Chinese nation-building from the early national ‘programmes’ and ‘myths’ to 
the point when these programmes were gradually translated into ‘reality’ in 
the sense that they became shared and taken for granted among the broader 
population. As I show further on, the establishment of the Republic of China 
was paralleled by fundamental changes in discourses about the Han and the 
Chinese, which were then incorporated into new educational materials and 
dictionaries. Furthermore, several of these changes involved ‘inventing’ 
traditions, which served the political aims of the new republican, nationally-
minded elites. The Chinese Self and its history were selectively reinterpreted 
to suit the purpose of modern Chinese nation building, and the perceptions of 
the Han changed accordingly.  
 
The early republican period was also a period of growth in state 
administration and expansion of education brought by the growth of the 
modern state, which were both prompted by the increasing recognition among 
the Chinese authorities that these institutions could be used as effective 
vehicles of propaganda. Because nationalism is a mass ideology, dependent 
on the acceptance of nationalist ideas among civilians at mass level, 
propaganda, and more generally the popularisation of nationalist discourses, 
is crucial to its success, and constitutes an integral element of nation-building. 
This point has been noticed by Hobsbawm as well, who also noted the key 
importance of nationalist propaganda in the context of war: 
 
‘… it is significant that the belligerent governments appealed for 
support for this war, not simply on the grounds of blind patriotism, and 
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even less on the grounds of macho glory and heroism, but by a 
propaganda addressed fundamentally to civilians and citizens’ (89). 
 
These points apply well to Chinese nation-building as well. As Zhao Suisheng 
(2004) argued, wars – and especially China’s defeats in conflicts against 
Western countries and Japan - were a key incentive for the creation of a 
modern, unified nation and nation-state:  
  
‘Modern Chinese nationalist consciousness was a product of recent 
history sparked by China’s defeats in a series of wars against the 
Western powers and imperial Japan in the nineteenth century. Fearing 
the extinction of China in the newly encountered nation-state system, 
seasoned Chinese political elites searched for the nationalist thread 
among the tangled fabric left by the breakup of the universal empire 
and followed that thread through the chaos of disunity to the creation 
and maintenance of a new, unified nation-state’ (38-39). 
 
In line with this, my analysis will look at how these key conflicts were tied to, 
and served as incentives for, changes in discourses about the Chinese Self, 
and hence the rise of a modern sense of the Chinese national Self, defined in 
contrast to Japan and the Western Other, and seen as culturally unified or at 
least integrated, centred on the cultural core embodied in the Han. 
   
A particular challenge in this process was the overcoming of hostilities 
between China’s numerous ethnic groups, and in particular between the 
Manchu and the Han. As my analysis shows, intellectuals’ discourses about 
the Chinese Self and its Others in the late imperial era were initially rather 
divisive and sought to exclude and demonise one or more ethnic groups. After 
the establishment of the republic, however, elite discourses changed and 
became more open conciliatory and inclusive, in line with the growing need 
for national integration and unity. Comparable traits can be found also in 
dictionaries and in particular in school textbooks from the same period. 
Arguably, similar to many other cases around the world, modern Chinese 
education sought to engender political loyalty based on a set of ‘meanings 
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that individuals impute to their membership in an ethnic community, including 
those attributes that bind them to that collectivity and that distinguish it from 
other in their relevant environment’ (Esman, 1994: 27). At the same time, and 
similar to many other cases across the world, the process of modern Chinese 
nation-building involved the process of  elimination (or integration) of cultural 
and social distinctions that existed among many ethnicities in China, with the 
aim to justify the establishment of a unitary state. Arguably, like other 
examples of modern nation building, Chinese nation building was aimed at 
building ‘the convergence of territorial and political loyalty irrespective of 
competing loci of affiliation, such as kinship, profession, religion, economic 
interest, race, or even language’ (Hass, 1986: 709).     
 
Another important modernist theory of nations and nationalism that proved 
useful to my analysis of discourses is the theory of nations as imagined 
communities developed by Benedict Anderson. According to Anderson, ‘print 
capitalism’ is the central aspect of modernisation, and he argues that ‘print 
capitalism’ was as a powerful force that can explain the rise of nations and 
nationalism, because it provided the basis for national imagination: 
 
‘what, in a positive sense, made the new communities imaginable was 
a half-fortuitous, but explosive, interaction between a system of 
production and productive relations (capitalism), a technology of 
communications (print), and the fatality of human linguistic diversity’ 
(1991: 42-43). 
 
Anderson therefore emphasised the role of printed language in the process of 
nation-building. He regarded books, periodicals and newspapers as different 
cultural means that participated in the construction of an imagined national 
community, and helped build a standard national written language. In this 
way, national discourses, embedded in mass circulated newspapers and 
books, served as effective vehicles of spreading and unifying national 
imagination as well as national written language as a means of this 
imagination.  
 
44 
 
Of course, Anderson’s theory is not directly applicable to the materials I am 
examining, because Chinese economy at the time was far from a modern 
capitalist economy, and we therefore cannot talk of ‘print capitalism’ in the 
sense Anderson has in mind. Even though commercial publishing existed, the 
driving force being the use of print for the purpose of nation-building was the 
state. This is particularly clear in the case of print media I examine in the 
second and third layer of my analysis, i.e. school textbooks and dictionaries, 
which were overseen and regulated by state institutions. As I will show, in the 
period of the early republic, these print media served as means of spreading 
a new, modern Chinese national imagination, and thereby arguably served as 
efficient modern instruments of national propaganda for the republican 
government. With regard to each of these sources, I will also show how the 
discourses they helped spread are linked to the particular, changing social 
and political environment in which they appeared. 
 
A further thing worth explaining in this context is my understanding of 
discourse and its link with nationalism. To put it simply, my approach follows 
that of Özkirimli (2005) who defined nationalism as a particular type of 
discourse, or a specific way of seeing the world: 
 
‘… people live and experience through discourse in the sense that 
discourses impose frameworks that limit what can be experienced or 
meaning that experience can assume, thereby influencing what can be 
said or done. Hence, nationalism is a particular way of seeing and 
interpreting the world, a frame of reference that helps us make sense 
of and structure the reality that surrounds us’ (29-30). 
 
More specifically, what my analysis focuses on are the key elements of 
nationalism as discourse, namely the perceptions of the Chinese Self, its 
relevant Others, the choice of markers used to delineate between the Self 
and the Other (e.g. biological and cultural markers) as well as (at some points 
in the analysis) the perceptions of the national past. 
 
To sum up, the three levels of discourses and sources I am analysing are 
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linked to key modern institutions that were established as part of nation-
building, and which served as instruments of diffusing nationalist ideas at a 
mass level: the institutions of the public sphere (with different newspapers, 
pamphlets and other outlets by means of which the intellectuals were 
spreading their ideas, as well as dictionaries for popular use) and the modern 
education system. Hobsbawm’s arguments about mass culture and its 
propaganda functions, and Anderson’s focus on the role of print in national 
imagination, provide a useful general analytical framework for my analysis. 
From this perspective, these modernist approaches to nations and 
nationalism are evidently valuable for my analysis. At the same time, my 
choice of these theories should not mean that I necessarily agree with every 
single aspect of them. For instance, I have already pointed out that 
Anderson’s theory is not entirely and directly applicable to the Chinese case.  
 
More generally, by choosing these theories, I do not wish to imply that 
competing approaches, such as ethnonationalism, are entirely mistaken. For 
instance, my analysis shows that there are some basic continuities between 
the late imperial and early republican discourses about the Chinese, in the 
sense that they are both Han-centred and based on the belief in the cultural 
and civilizational superiority of the Han. At the same time, I also note key 
differences in the relationship between the Han and other ethnic communities. 
Evidently, at discursive level, the modern Chinese nation was indeed rooted 
in, and built on, older, late Qing discourses of the Self. However, to make a 
more informed assessment of these issues and the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of modernist v.s. ethnosymbolist approaches, my thesis would 
need to focus more directly on exact continuities and discontinuities between 
modern Chinese nation and pre-modern ethnic groups. To do so, I would 
need to move beyond discourse analysis, and employ a different range of 
sources, which is beyond the scope of this project.  
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Chapter 2: Sources and Methodology 
In order to gain an insight into the different representations of the Han in 
Chinese society of the late Qing and early republican period, my empirical 
research will cover three types of sources: 
 
1. The works of three selected Chinese intellectuals; 
2. The content of school textbooks; 
3. The definitions of nation, race, ethnicity, and other relevant concepts such 
as state and people, in Chinese dictionaries, as part of the process of nation-
building. 
 
By covering these three types of sources, I will seek to understand not only 
the competing definitions of the Han in elite intellectual discourses, but also 
the ways in which these definitions were disseminated and popularised 
among a broader audience. 
 
This chapter offers an overview of each of the three types of sources, and 
explains my method of analysis. Before that, however, I shall first explain my 
choice of historical focus. 
 
 
1. Choice of Historical Focus 
My analysis focuses the period between the outbreak of the First Sino-
Japanese War and the first decade of the twentieth century. This choice is 
inspired by Frank Dik tter’s influential study that discusses the development 
of racial thought in China from a historical perspective, and reconstructs the 
evolution of the idea of race from 1793 to 1949. He divided the historical 
development of the definition of race within Chinese society into four stages: 
 
1. The Emergence of a Racial Consciousness (1793-1895) 
2. The Reformers and the Idea of Race (1895-1902) 
3. The Revolutionaries and the Nation-Race (1902-1915) 
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4. Race after the New Culture Movement (1915-1949) (Dikötter, 1999: 
420-432). 
 
In my study, I decided to focus on the two middle stages, during which social 
conflicts in Chinese society were particularly serious and marked by intense 
patriotic passions. This was the time of some of the most momentous events 
in Chinese modern history, including the fall of the Qing Dynasty, the Chinese 
republican revolution of 1911, and the formation of the first Republic of China. 
Jon Woronoff (2008) explains the significance of this period in the following 
way: 
 
‘Over its very long history, China has usually been a calm and 
predictable place. But one period stands out for its radical, dramatic, 
and often bloody change - with different forces pulling in different 
directions, so evenly balanced that until the very end no one could 
foresee the outcome. What occurred during the century-and-a-half 
“modern China” period is not only unprecedented; it was also largely 
unexpected and is still not fully understood’ (2009: ix). 
 
This was also a period of growing influence of Western modern ideas of race 
and nation, heated discussions about the correct definition of Chinese identity, 
and the social role played by Han identity in Chinese society. My decision to 
study the period of late Qing and early republican China was also influenced 
by the fact that important Chinese intellectuals published their main works 
during this time. 
 
 
2. Methodology: Discourse, Narrative and Comparison 
My research perspective is discourse-oriented and discourse analysis is 
therefore the most important method has been adopted. My analysis is 
conducted in the methodological frame of a historically oriented discourse 
analysis. 
 
The term discourse is widely defined, for example, one of the broadest 
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definition is made by Fasold (1990) noted ‘the study of discourse is the study 
of any aspect of language use’ (65). Candling (1997) refers to the term 
discourse as ‘language in use, as a process which is socially situated’ (ix). 
According to Fairclough (1995), ‘discourse analysis can be understood as an 
attempt to show systematic links between texts, discourse practices, and 
socio-cultural practices’ (16-17). This method has been widely used in 
different ways, and is often focused on the ‘relationship between language 
use and social structure’ (Deacon et al. 1999: 146-148). It also reflects on 
‘forms of representation in which different social categories, different social 
practices and relations are constructed from and in the interests of a 
particular point of view, a particular conception of social reality’ (ibid: 148).The 
discourses considered in this thesis consist of  the sentences and phrases, 
which have been used in intellectuals’ articles published in books or 
newspapers, school textbooks and dictionaries during the late Qing and early 
republican period that are linked to my research topic. 
 
The discourses that have been identified for my research are focused on 
showing systematic links between discourses on the Han and the changing 
socio-political context of late Qing and early republican China. More 
specifically, I seek to demonstrate that the different ways of situating the Han 
discursively - as a race, a nation or an ethnic group - were closely connected 
to changing socio-political circumstance sin which the discourses were 
produced. This is particularly clear in my comparative analysis of intellectuals’ 
discourses, because each of the chosen intellectuals adopted a slightly 
different political stance, and their definitions of the Han (as well as other 
groups within the Chinese population and understandings of China and the 
Chinese more generally) differed accordingly, as well as changed over time in 
line with their changing political convictions. In a similar vein, the analysis of 
dictionaries and school textbooks shows how the discourses changed as we 
moved from one historical period and context to the next. 
 
These three types of discourses - intellectuals’ discourses, school textbooks 
and dictionaries, could be to some extent related to the different classes, 
namely, elites, educated middle-classes, and wider population. At this point in 
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history, Chinese educational system was still open to select few (universal 
compulsory education was introduced only later) and it is therefore feasible to 
argue that school textbooks reached primarily the educated (upper) middle 
classes. Dictionaries were potentially read among a wider public, especially if 
we consider that they were likely to be used in a group or family setting with 
both illiterate and literate members. My thesis therefore traces the process of 
formation of modern national ideas among the elites and their dissemination 
among the educated middle-classes and the wider population (Yu, 1996: 
137). 
 
I should also clarify that while focused on the Han, my analysis also examines 
the discourses on other groups and identities linked to the Han, especially the 
Manchu and of course the broader identity of China and the Chinese, as well 
as the identities of relevant external others, including Westerners and the 
Japanese. This is necessary because any definition of the Self is closely tied 
to the definition of the Other (Pickering, 2001) and hence the discourses 
about the Han were inextricably linked to discourses about other groups that 
were considered as either part of, and linked to, the Chinese Self, or 
presented as its Other.          
 
In terms of the specific textual analytical methods adopted, my analysis 
centred on two discursive elements: a) identity categories such as race, 
nation, ethnicity and their equivalents in Chinese and b) identity markers, for 
instance the different adjectives or phrases used in connection with different 
identity categories, such as ‘civilised’, ‘educated’, ‘smelly’, ‘yellow’ etc. By 
investigating the use of identity categories and identity markers together I was 
able to show, among other things, that identity markers we usually associate 
with race and racism today, and which refer to biological and physical 
characteristics - e.g. ‘smelly’, ‘tall’, ‘well-proportioned’ etc. - were not 
necessarily used only in connection with the category of race, but also 
descriptions of nations and ethnic groups. This alone is enough to show that a 
clear-cut differentiation between ethnic, nationalist and racist discourses is not 
particularly useful in this context.   
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In my analysis, I also seek to use comparison - across different types of 
sources and different periods - to gain a better understanding of a) the nature 
of debates about the Han and their links with contemporary discourses about 
race, nation and ethnicity in the chosen historical period; and b) the ways in 
which these discourses were disseminated among the broader population. 
Given these aims, it is clear that my main focus is on ‘how’, rather than 
explanatory, even though I also seek to relate the changing discourse to 
changes in the broader political, social and cultural environment, and to 
processes of nation-building.  
 
Another method of relevance to my analysis, especially in the analysis is 
narrative analysis. In historiography, the narrative has traditionally been the 
main rhetorical device used (Stone, 1979). The term narrative has been 
discussed in different ways, as it is ‘a primary act of mind’ (Hardy, 1977: 12), 
‘the primary scheme by means of which human existence is rendered 
meaningful’ (Polkinghorne, 1988: 11), and ‘a means by which human beings 
represent and restructure the world’ (Mitchell, 1981: 8). Bruner (1990) 
summarised it as an ‘organising principle’, by which ‘people organise their 
experience in, knowledge about, and transactions with the social world’ (35). 
 
One of the clearest and simplest explanations of the narrative method can be 
found in Connelly and Clandinin’s (1990) work, who argue that ‘humans are 
storytelling organisms who, individually and collectively, lead storied lives. 
Thus the study of narrative is the study of the ways humans experience the 
world.’ (2). Griffin (1992) defines narrative as the organisation of simultaneous 
actions and occurrences in a consecutive, linear order ‘that gives meaning to 
and explains each of its elements and is, at the same time, constituted by 
them’ (Griffin, 1993: 1097). In line with this, my analysis of textbooks was 
particularly concerned with the question of which historical events or issues 
were chosen and how they were arranged in a narrative. In relation to this, I 
also examined who, or which groups, were presented as the Self and the 
Other in these events and narratives. 
 
More broadly speaking, my research is also influenced by social 
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constructionism, a research perspective rooted in the work of the German 
sociologists Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, as outlined in their 
influential book The Social Construction of Reality (1966). They argued that ‘it 
is important to keep in mind that the objectivity of the institutional world, 
however massive it may appear to the individual, is a humanly produced, 
constructed objectively’ (57). They therefore highlighted the contribution of 
individuals’ performance to an improved construction of society: ‘one must 
also be initiated into the various cognitive and even affective layers of the 
body of knowledge that is directly and indirectly appropriate to this role’ (72). 
The three layers of knowledge that will be focused on in my research - 
intellectuals’ discourses, and the content of school textbooks and dictionaries, 
are all produced by different ‘individuals’, and all demonstrate different 
authors’ understandings and perceptions of the social phenomenon and the 
identity of Han. They were influenced and shaped by the social reality during 
the late Qing and early republican China, and vice versa. I will apply these 
analytical perspectives to my research to understand how ideas of the Han 
were socially and historically constructed and developed in Chinese 
intellectual discourse, encyclopaedias and dictionaries, and textbooks during 
the late Qing and early republican period. 
 
 
3. Intellectuals 
A growing number of contemporary studies of modern Chinese history 
consider the relevance of ideas developed by Western scholars for an 
understanding of Chinese identity. The important works in this context include 
Dik tter’s study on the racial discourses in modern China, and Joshua A. 
Fogel’s study on the concept of ‘people’ (1997). Some of these studies also 
take into account the work of one or two specific Chinese intellectuals. For 
example, Howard Richard’s (1962) study focuses on Kang Youwei’s 
intellectual ideas, and Eris Chiyeung Ip (2008) focuses on Sun Zhongshan’s 
constitutionalism. Others put emphasis on the discussion of relationships 
between the Han and the Manchu in Chinese society (Rhoads, 2000). 
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These studies differ in their analytical perspectives and discussions of 
Chinese and Han identities. Nevertheless, they all demonstrate the relevance 
of Chinese intellectual debates during the period of late Qing to the early 
twentieth century for an analysis and historically adequate understanding of 
the development of representations of the Han in Chinese society. However, 
there have been few attempts so far to study the development of 
representations of the Han in Chinese intellectual discourse in empirical depth 
as I do here. 
 
My analysis of the discourses of Chinese intellectuals is mainly focused on 
the main works of three core thinkers of this period: Zhang Binglin, Sun 
Zhongshan and Liang Qichao. I selected them for two main reasons: firstly, 
they were all among the most influential intellectuals of their age played an 
important role in shaping public debate, and their writings continue to be 
regarded as important sources for Chinese studies across the world. 
Secondly, they also represent different typical attitudes towards, and 
understandings of the role and definition of Han identity in Chinese society. 
 
In the following section, I will briefly outline the contributions of these three 
thinkers, and identify the writings I have used as the basis of my analysis. 
Further detail about the biographies, ideas and political careers of each of 
these intellectuals is provided in Chapter 4. 
 
 
3.1 Zhang Binglin 
Zhang Binglin (1868-1936), who is well known for his extensive and profound 
knowledge and scholarship, was a Hanese representative of the intellectual 
camp, a radical Chinese nationalist and especially famous for his promotion 
of the idea of anti-Manchuism (paiman). Manchu is a large Tungusic ethnicity, 
which originated in Manchuria (today’s Northeast China). They arose during 
the seventeenth century, conquered the Ming Dynasty and established the 
Qing Dynasty (1644-1912). The Qing Dynasty ruled China until its abolition in 
1911 by the Xinhai Revolution, and the establishment of the Republic of China 
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(Rowe & Brook, 2009; Fenby, 2009). 
 
The conflict between the Manchu and the Han had existed for a long time in 
Chinese history, yet became acute after the failures of the Manchu 
government in the wars with the Western powers, including the First (1839-
1842) and Second (1856-1860) Opium Wars, and the First Sino-Japanese 
War (1894-1895). The late Qing Dynasty is a period during which ‘the 
Western and Japanese invasions became a fatal threat to China’s 
independence’ (Ma, 2007: 206). 
 
Zhang Binglin was born in a traditional Hanese family in 1868. His father 
Zhang Jun actively supervised Zhang Binglin and his brothers’ learning in 
classic Chinese culture during their childhood period. Apart from the eldest 
brother who died at an early age, Zhang Binglin and his two brothers had all 
got good results in the keju examination. Zhang Jun required his sons to 
excel in two main aspects: the first was the integrity of personality, while the 
other was knowledge (Chen, 2008: 4). Zhang Binglin was greatly influenced 
by his father’s supervision, especially with regard to these two requirements. 
Chen Yongzhong (2008) explains these two requirements as the following: 
‘the first is actually to require his children not to grovel to the Qing court; the 
second is to require his children to comprehensively and deeply understand 
the classics and history works, instead of focusing on literature and painting. 
In addition, the integrity of personality is always more important than 
knowledge’ (4). 
  
Having witnessed the weakness of the Qing court, the idea of anti-Manchuism 
spread quickly among the Hanese intellectuals. Zhang Binglin’s work was 
representative of this camp. Zhang considered that the Han had been 
suffering from the Man Qing’s cruel government for a long time and concluded 
that there had never been ‘an equality between Manchu and Han’ (1997 
[1901]: 151). However, this radical attitude was not accepted by all Han 
intellectuals. Some of them, like Kang Youwei, held a traditional sense of 
loyalty to the Manchu government, while others like Liang Qichao and Sun 
Zhongshan considered the revolt against the foreign invasion to be the 
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primary task for Chinese people. These perspectives will be discussed in the 
next part of the chapter. Zhang’s racial and national ideas were obviously 
distinct from other famous Chinese intellectuals at this point, which inspired 
me to analyse his work and contributions to intellectual discourse on the Han 
in China in depth. 
 
The main body of Zhang’s work I will analyse consists of the writings 
published in Zhang Taiyan zhenglun xuanji (The Selection of Zhang Taiyan’s 
Political Discourses), edited by Tang Shiju (1977). This book contains 257 
articles written by Zhang, including his political essays, discourse, speeches, 
announcements, letters and poems, which provide a comprehensive insight 
into the changes of Zhang’s ideas in different historical periods. 
 
3.2 Sun Zhongshan 
Sun Zhongshan (1866-1925) is widely recognised in contemporary China as 
the ‘Father of the Modern China’ (Ip, 2008: 327). Being a Hanese scholar, Sun 
is one of the main founders of the Republic of China and of the Chinese 
Nationalist Party (Kuomintang). He is therefore undoubtedly an important 
figure in modern Chinese history. 
 
Sun Zhongshan was born in a Cantonese Hakka family of farmers, in the 
village of Guangdong province. In 1878, when Sun was aged 13, he went to 
Honolulu to live with his elder brother. Apart from this, Sun had various 
experiences of studying in Southeast Asia, which has differentiated his ideas 
from other Chinese intellectuals who had received the traditional Confucian 
education in China, for example, Kang Youwei.  
 
After studying various scientific disciplines in the United States and Southeast 
Asia, including English language, Christianity, science, and mathematics, Sun 
went back to China at the age 17. He received a vocational training in 
medicine at the Guangzhou Boji Hospital. After the First Sino-Japanese War, 
Sun Zhongshan started promoting the idea of revolution to overthrow the Qing 
government and establish a modern political structure to replace the old 
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dynastic system. He organised different communities to promote anti-
Manchuism, for example, Xingzhong hui (the Society for the Revival of China) 
in 1894. He had also raised money to support these communities and to 
organise revolutionary activities (Mackerras, 2008: 31). On New Year’s Day of 
1912, he helped establish the Provisional Government of the Republic of 
China, which was also the first republican government in Asia. Being widely 
respected by the delegates from 16 provincial assemblies, Sun was named 
the ‘provisional president’ of the newly established government (Schoppa, 
2006: 140; Spence, 1990: 267).   
 
In 1904, Sun Zhongshan had created the revolutionary philosophy of sanmin 
zhuyi (Three Principles of the People), which includes three principles of 
minzu (nation, nationalism), minquan (democracy, the People’s power) and 
minsheng (the People’s welfare, livelihood). Richard Wilhelm (1931) 
evaluated Sun’s political ideas and stressed its synthesising and integrating 
qualities: 
 
‘The greatness of Sun Yat-sen rests, therefore, upon the fact that he 
has found a living synthesis between the fundamental principles of 
Confucianism and the demands of modern times, a synthesis which, 
beyond the borders of China, can again become significant …’ (8) 
 
The significance of Sun Zhongshan’s work in the history of Chinese revolution 
and in the context of social changes in Chinese society during the late Qing 
and early republican China has been widely analysed by Western scholars. 
For example, Harold Z. Schiffrin (1970) conducted a study investigating Sun’s 
political practices until 1905. In a later book, Schiffrin (1980) has further 
extended his work on Sun Zhongshan, covering the period until 1925. Sidney 
H. Chang and Leonard H. D. Gordon’s book All Under Heaven (1991) has 
more recently provided a comprehensive analysis on Sun Zhongshan’s 
revolutionary thoughts. Nevertheless, Marie-Claire Bergère (1994) considers 
that the importance of Sun’s political idea has not yet obtained enough 
attention in Western scholarly circles: ‘in the West, Sun’s Three Principles of 
the People has never been rated as one of the great works of contemporary 
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Chinese thought’ (391). 
 
The influential impact of Sun Zhongshan’s political ideas and their relevance 
to an understanding of modern Chinese history as well as the representations 
of the Han during the late Qing and early republican period have influenced 
my decision to analyse Sun’s thoughts in the context of Chinese identity. My 
in-depth analysis of his work will mainly focus on Sun Zhongshan quanji 
(Complete Works of Sun Zhongshan) (1981), Guofu quanji (Completed Works 
of Father of the Nation) (1973), both of which have included a large number of 
Sun’s works published in different periods that allow adequate historical 
comparison for research purposes.  
 
3.3 Liang Qichao 
As Wang and Wei (2005) state, Liang Qichao (1873-1929) was ‘a leading 
intellectual of the late Qing and early Republican eras’ (67). As noted by Xiao 
Yang (2002): 
 
‘Liang Qichao (1872-1929) was one of the foremost intellectual leaders 
of contemporary China and one of its major political figures. He was 
arguably the most widely read public intellectual during the transitional 
period from the late Qing Dynasty to the early Republican era. Like 
Diderot in France and Herzen in Russia, Liang was a thinker whose 
opinions and activities changed the direction of political and social 
thought in his country’ (17). 
 
Liang was born in a small village in the Guangdong province. In 1890, he 
went to the capital and became a student of Kang Youwei, another influential 
intellectual figure at the time (Wu, 2004: 40). Liang Qichao’s political 
standpoints were similar to Kang Youwei’s. They both advocated 
constitutional monarchy and Western democracy. Their differences arose 
from the failure of the 100 Days Reform, after which Kang Youwei was still 
loyal to the Qing emperor and government while Liang became increasingly 
radical and opposed to royalist attitudes (Wu, 2004: 85-91). 
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In 1899, Liang Qichao published his work Dongji yuedan (Comments on 
Japanese Books) (1989 [1899]). He was one of the earliest intellectuals who 
used the term minzu (nation) when he referred to the dongfang minzu (the 
Eastern nations) and minzu jingzheng (national competition) in his work. 
Subsequently, he was also influential in introducing Western theories about 
nation and nationalism to Chinese society. His ideals were related directly to 
Johann Caspar Bluntschli’s (1808-1881) thesis of No State, No Nation, for 
‘the Nation comes into being with the creation of the State’ (Bluntschli, 1885: 
86). From 1899 to 1903, Liang published various articles introducing and 
promoting Bluntschli’s theories in the newspaper Xinmin Congbao, e.g. 
Guafen weiyan (The Prophecy of Chinese Division) (1999 [1899]: 30), Guojia 
sixiang bianqian yitonglun (The Discussion on the Changes of the Similarities 
and Differences in National Ideas) (1999 [1901], 94-95) and Zhengzhixue 
dajia bolunzhili zhi xueshuo (The Theory of Political Scientist Bluntschli) (1999 
[1903]). Bluntschli was a Swiss jurist, politician and contemporary of Liang 
Qichao. One of Bluntschli’s works discussed by Liang is The Theory of State, 
in which he argued that the state was supreme over the nation and society. 
This idea inspired Liang Qichao to argue against the attempts of the anti-
Manchu movement that promoted the overthrowing of the Qing government; 
instead, he called for reconciliation between the Manchu and the Han, in 
order to establish a state that integrated different groups in China and was 
capable of resisting the West. 
 
Liang Qichao was an enthusiastic supporter and promoter of Chinese 
nationalism, similarly to the other two intellectuals, Zhang Binglin and Sun 
Zhongshan, though they had different understandings of the goals of 
nationalism. He made a great effort in praising nationalism and its significant 
function of standardising the relationship among different nations, which he 
believed to claim that a nation should not invade or be invaded by other 
nations (1989 [1899], vol.1: 19). 
 
Liang Qichao has published a large number of writings, many of which 
appeared in the Yinbing shi heji (Collected Writings from the Ice-Drinker’s 
Studio) (1989 [1936]). This book includes more than 700 of Liang’s articles, 
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has been published several times and is considered to be the most 
comprehensive collection of Liang Qichao’s work (e.g. Wilkinson, 2000: 401). 
My analysis is therefore focused on this collection. 
 
 
4. School Textbooks 
School textbooks serve as one of the crucial organs in the process of 
constructing legitimated ideologies and beliefs in a society, and can be 
regarded as a reflection of the history, knowledge and values considered 
important by powerful groups, including academic experts, in society. In many 
nations, debates over the content and format of school textbooks are sites of 
considerable educational and political conflict. This is because school 
textbooks play an important role in spreading elite opinions and ideas among 
the general population and in shaping the opinions and values of future 
generations. The production of textbook content can therefore be considered 
as the result of a competition between powerful groups and their struggle over 
meaning (Liu & Hilton, 2005). Textbooks inform and shape peoples’ 
understanding of the world, and are hence seen as crucial in the creation of 
collective national memory, designed to meet specific cultural, economic and 
social imperatives. 
 
Being an important type of discourse, the content of textbooks published 
during a specific period reflects the corresponding social facts in this same 
period. When he refers to the link between textbooks and society, Nicholls 
(2003) noted that ‘to an overwhelming extent the initiatives represent a 
response to the devastating wars and conflicts, often fought on ethnic, 
nationalist or sectarian grounds, that dominated the twentieth century’ (11). 
He argues from a critical perspective that textbook research should focus on 
‘the mechanisms within national education systems that perpetuate prejudice, 
stereotyping and bias and, through bilateral and/or multilateral dialogue’ and 
‘discuss alternative ways of proceeding’ (ibid). 
 
The second part of my research will therefore focus on the sphere of 
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education. I am going to discuss some of the most important school textbooks 
on the subject of history published during the period of the late Qing and early 
republican China. In order to collect the relevant sources of school textbooks 
and also dictionaries, I have spent 1 month at the Chinese National Library in 
Beijing at the end of 2008. The key words I have used to search the relevant 
results were student (xuesheng), middle school (zhongxue), primary school 
(xiaoxue), textbook (keben, jiaocai or jiaokeshu) and history (lishi). By setting 
the publishing time, and the key words as the conditions of searching, I was 
able to obtain all the relevant resources. However, for the purpose of 
presenting my analysis of school textbooks, I chose to focus on some texts in 
a few numbers of textbooks, which means that some sources were not 
included after consideration because of the limited length required for the 
thesis. The textbooks I have included were all influential works and 
representing different standpoint in shaping public debate, which were 
frequently mentioned and discussed in different academic disciplines of 
Chinese studies. 
 
In my analysis, I attempt to identify and discuss the key representations of 
Han and Chinese identity, and clarify in what ways and by what means school 
history textbooks in China tended to retain an ethno-centric and nationalistic 
role in the education system. The textbooks are hereby regarded as a form of 
ideological discourse, which presents national history in specific ways, to 
express different ideas and promote disparate ideologies, as well as different 
understandings of the Han as a nation, race and ethnicity. 
 
The analysis will focus on three key themes that are common to textbooks 
published during the late Qing period as well as those published in the early 
republican era: 1) the origin of the Chinese nation; 2) the significance of 
minzu and the position of the Han; and 3) the role of minority groups. By 
comparing and contrasting the ways in which these themes are addressed in 
the two different periods I shall demonstrate how historical narratives and 
notions of Han and Chinese identity appearing in textbooks shifted with the 
changing political and social context. 
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5. Dictionaries 
The third part of my empirical research consists of an investigation of 
definitions and explanations of the term Han and related terms such as 
nation, race and ethnicity in Chinese dictionaries during the late Qing and 
early republican period. The focus on dictionaries is informed by their crucial 
role in the construction and reproduction of knowledge in modern societies. 
Dictionaries are widely accepted as authoritative sources of information, and 
are holding a power of definition in society. The public generally trusts the 
entries and explanation of terms in dictionaries, and considers their content to 
be objective, and trustworthy. This contributed to the significance of this book 
genre in forming people’s knowledge systems and ideas. Some scholars have 
argued that the determination of the meanings of words is essentially a social 
phenomenon concerned with relations of ideology and power. For example, 
Russian scholar Vološinov (1986) described words as ideological signals, 
whose forms are determined by conditions of a particular social organisation 
and specific participants within their communication. He has argued that, ‘the 
meaning of a word is determined entirely by its context. In fact there are as 
many meanings of a word as there are contexts of its usage.’ (1986: 79). 
From this perspective, dictionaries can provide an excellent insight into the 
changing, contextually defined meanings of words. 
 
The definitions and explanations of certain terms in dictionaries developed 
through history and reflect changes in society. They are influenced by 
intellectual discourses. Academics whose ideas are changing and developing 
historically, influence the definitions and meaning of terms in dictionaries, and 
can in this sense have an impact on social reform in return. As ‘books of 
knowledge’ written by intellectual experts and consulted by people in their 
daily lives, they form a link between expert discourses and public discourses. 
Hence, the dictionaries have a crucial educational function in society in that 
they are shaping peoples’ understanding of society. According to Moon 
(1989), a dictionary is a tool of ideological expression in modern society, while 
Benson (2001) argues that the form of the dictionary itself, and the ways in 
which it conveys information about language and the world, tend to suppress 
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cultural diversity and privilege the dominant ideology within a society (29).  
 
In line with the rest of the analysis, the investigation of dictionaries is split into 
two parts. The first part focuses on the late Qing period and on the Kangxi 
zidian (Kangxi Dictionary), while the second part examines the early 
republican era and focuses on a group of dictionaries that were most 
influential in this period, including the Shehui kexue da cidian (Dictionary of 
Social Sciences) and the Zhonghua da zidian (Simplified Chinese). The 
analysis centres on definitions of specific terms, including Han, zhong (race), 
ren (human being), zu and minzu (ethnicity/nation) and guo (state).   
 
Like my analysis of textbooks, this part of my research is driven by the wish to 
move beyond elite discourses and gain an insight into popular discourses 
about the Han, race, nation and ethnicity in China at the time. I should 
immediately clarify that I do not want to suggest that the content of textbooks 
and dictionaries offers a direct insight into popular perceptions of the Han as 
such. Rather, I see textbooks and dictionaries as only one of the factors 
(albeit a very important one) that shaped popular perceptions, alongside, for 
instance, local and familial authorities. Also, despite the growing influence of 
education in China at the time, illiteracy rates were very high and systematic 
attempts to eradicate mass illiteracy did not start until the dawn of the 
Communist republic (Peterson, 1997), which meant that the impact of written 
materials was limited to a rather narrow social stratum. Nonetheless, given 
the lack of other more direct sources, textbooks and dictionaries still offer 
valuable insights into the dissemination and popularization of ideas of race, 
nation and ethnicity at the time. 
 
Chinese dictionaries during the late Qing and early Republican period were 
organised very differently from English dictionaries. Most of them were 
graphically organised, rather than in alphabetical order. This means that the 
process of identifying sections relevant for my analysis was different from the 
one characteristic of alphabetically organised dictionaries. Each Chinese 
character contains a radical (bushou), which partially implies the meaning of 
62 
 
the character. For example, the characters tree (shu, 树) and forest (lin, 林) 
share the same radical 木 . When I looked for a character in Chinese 
dictionaries, I had to identify its radical first, since all the characters sharing 
the same radical were listed together in a specific section. This is followed by 
counting the strokes of the character, because they were all in order with an 
increasing number of strokes that contain. In this way, I was able to locate the 
place of the characters I was looking for in a dictionary. Different types of 
Chinese dictionaries will be discussed in a more detail in Chapter 6.     
 
In the course of my empirical research on representations of Han in Chinese 
society I aim to investigate and compare definitions and explanations of terms 
related to Han, such as people, minzu, nation, race, ethnicity in Chinese 
dictionaries from the late Qing period to the first decade of the 20 th century. 
The focus on this period corresponds with the other two layers of analysis in 
my project, namely, intellectuals’ discourses and school textbooks. This 
arrangement allows me to conduct a comparative analysis of the above terms 
in different dictionaries of this period to historically reconstruct the meanings 
which the dictionaries attached to Han, and examine how they are linked to 
representations of race, nation, and ethnicity,  
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Chapter 3: A Historical Overview of the Late 
Qing and Early Republican Period  
To provide a sound historical context for my investigation of the outlined three 
different layers of analysis, namely, intellectuals’ discourses, school textbooks 
and Chinese dictionaries during the period of late Qing and early republic, I 
will in this chapter offer a general historical overview of this era. It will 
demonstrate in what ways modern Chinese society has experienced various 
challenges to its existing social order from both internal and external powers, 
and highlight major areas of social conflicts and transformations in social and 
political thoughts. It will also examine in what ways the Chinese people 
responded to what they considered threats from the West. 
 
The social situation during the period of the late Qing and early republican 
China was characterised by two ‘great dramas’ described by Fairbank (1978): 
one linked to the conflict between Western forces and the resistance of the 
Chinese ruling class; the other generated by the tension between the Chinese 
ruling class and the wider Chinese population (1-2), both of which together 
contributed to the shape of Chinese modern history. Rebecca E. Karl (1998) 
has described the historical significance of the period between 1895 and 1911 
as a time of radical social and political change in Chinese society. It 
‘witnessed a transformation in both national and global consciousnesses’, and 
‘saw the simultaneous breakdown of the dynastic socio-political order and the 
emergence of a broad consciousness of an unstable global order among 
Chinese intellectuals’ (1099). More recently, Peter Zarrow (2006) has also 
highlighted the importance of this era as a time of fundamental systemic 
changes in the social and political order of Chinese society, associated with 
the decline of the Chinese dynasty and the birth of the modern Chinese 
nation: 
 
‘The importance of the late Qing and Republican periods can hardly be 
exaggerated. Many historians, looking back, have called the early 
twentieth century “transnational”. It marked the end (more or less) of 
one sociopolitical system and the beginning of another. An empire 
64 
 
ruled by a dynastic house became a nation with a constitution, even if 
the organs of the nation-state remained weak’ (3). 
 
Inner conflicts and social upheaval and transformation in Chinese society 
were closely intertwined with broader conflicts between China and the West. 
Being a large-scale country, Chinese people believed that they had created 
the most advanced civilisation in the world. However, the situation changed in 
modern times: the lack of communication with the outside world during the 
Qing Dynasty, which was a result of the ‘Close-door Diplomatic Policies’ 
pursued by the Qing court, had largely limited the understanding of the global 
environment as well as the development of modern capitalism. The modern 
Western invaders during the late Qing period challenged the long-term 
understanding of foreigners that traditional China was able to control and 
govern in the past. Furthermore, the traditional Chinese habit of differentiating 
between the civilised Chinese Self (Hua or Huaxia) and the barbarian/non-
Chinese other (Yi) had been threatened and undermined by the West. In the 
traditional Chinese cultural and moral system, the distinction between the 
identities of the Self and Other most commonly referred to notions of the 
civilised Han and the barbarian non-Han. As argued by Ma Rong (2007): ‘the 
ancient Chinese viewed Chinese culture as the “most advanced civilisation” of 
the world, which would sooner or later influence surrounding “barbarians”. 
From this point of view, those who were assimilated into the Chinese 
civilisation became “members” of this “civilised” world with “Han” as its “core”. 
Those who were un-assimilated remained “barbarians” who needed to be 
“educated”’. (6) 
 
This perception of identity among Chinese people was radically challenged by 
the Westerners during the late Qing period, who were challenging China 
coming from the sea, with their advanced weapons. The large size of Chinese 
territory and population had motivated Western countries to attempt gaining 
and expanding their influence in China since an expansion of markets and 
sources was needed to achieve the further development of capitalism in 
Western countries. At the same time, increasing conflicts between China and 
the West were also provoked a rise of nationalism in Chinese society. 
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According to Colin Mackerras (2008), nationalism was a defining emotion of 
this period of Chinese history: ‘it is doubtful if any other single emotion 
characterises this period politically in China more strongly than nationalism. 
The main reason for this is that the Chinese were reacting against their 
experience of the nineteenth and early twentieth century’. (6) 
 
Discourses of identity and difference became central in the course of these 
transformations, and internal and external conflicts in Chinese society became 
more focused on nationalism, and less associated with traditional 
Confucianism. As a result, Chinese intellectuals active during the late Qing 
period gradually abandoned the extensive usage of the term Yi when referring 
to foreigners (Gao, 2007: 44). They realised that Western invaders were not 
only culturally different from ‘us’ - but also more advanced in natural sciences 
and technologies. In addition, a growing number of ideas in modern Western 
politics had been adopted by Chinese intellectuals’ and applied in their 
reflections on Chinese society during the late Qing and early republican 
period. For example, Peter Zarrow (2006) has focused on the pursuit of 
constitutionalism, which he argues ‘represented a major break with the past’ 
(78) by the Chinese officials during the late Qing period: ‘in late Qing China, 
officials pursued constitutionalism with cautious optimism, convinced that a 
populace that was inculcated in proper values and disciplined by a 
paternalistic but all-seeing state could unite with the Throne’ (76). All of these 
transformations contributed to the historical significance of the period. 
 
In order to more comprehensively analyse the representation of Han in 
intellectuals’ works, school textbooks and dictionaries in different stages, this 
chapter will now provide a historical review, serving as an introduction to the 
historical background surrounding representations of Han in the late Qing and 
early republican period. My selection and inclusion of specific events and 
issues discussed in this chapter was guided by the aims and focus of this 
dissertation - namely the aim to examine the changing discourses about the 
Han and the Chinese in late Qing and early republican China. One of the 
central arguments developed in the thesis is that these discourses were 
shaped by the broader social and political context of the period. This chapter 
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therefore seeks to provide an overview of the key historical events and trends 
that played a role in changing the structure of Chinese society, especially with 
regard to changes of the political, social and educational system, 
technological developments, as well as China’s position in the international 
arena, and its relationship with the West. The large-scale transformations of 
Chinese society that occurred in the late Qing and early republican era are of 
course more than a sum of individual events and issues. Nonetheless, an 
overview of these events and issues can provide a helpful introduction to 
broader trends and shifts of interest to the thesis, and is indispensable if we 
are to understand the discursive shifts analysed in subsequent chapters. 
 
This historical review is divided into four sections. The first three sections 
each on one period each. The first period is the late Qing period, from the 
outbreak of the First Sino-Japanese War in 1894, to the start of the Chinese 
Revolution 1911. The First Sino-Japanese War was an important watershed in 
the history of modern China and East Asia. It marked the start of the fall of the 
Qing court (Larsen, 2008: 231). The failure of the First Sino-Japanese War 
had also motivated Chinese intellectuals’ wish to promote reforms, which was 
one of the conditions of the Hundred Days’ Reform. The second period is the 
revolutionary period itself (1911-12), culminating in the establishment of the 
Republic of China in 1912. The third period is the early republican period from 
the establishment of the Republic of China in 1912 to the May Fourth 
Movement in 1919, which was interpreted as the first major peak of the 20 th 
century movement to alter the content of ‘Chinese tradition’ (Mackerras, 2008: 
41). Each part of the chapter will begin with a brief introduction of the period 
and its key actors, and continue with a review of the key events. The last, 
fourth section of the chapter, offers and account of Japan’s modernisation, 
which had an important impact on Chinese development and on discourses 
about the Han and the Chinese throughout all the three periods.  
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1. The Late Qing Period 
From 1894 to 1910 the Qing court was ruled by two emperors, namely 
Emperor Guangxu (1871-1908 and Emperor Xuantong (1906-1967). In 
contrast to the early Qing Dynasty, especially the period of the emperors 
Kangxi, Yongzheng and Qianlong, the last years of the Qing Dynasty were a 
period of decline, which was mainly characterised by a series of so-called 
‘unequal treaties’ imposed by Western powers. Paul J. Bailey (2001) claimed 
that ‘the Qing Dynasty’s problems were compounded by the emergence of a 
new and potentially far more dangerous threat, that of an expanding West 
aggressively demanding commercial and trading privileges’ (20). The 
following chart shows the foreign encroachments in late Qing China. 
 
FIGURE 3:1 The foreign encroachments in late Qing China 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Schoppa, R. K. (2000) The Columbia Guide to Modern Chinese History, New 
York: Columbia University Press. 
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The Westerner’s economic success and increasing power in China linked to 
the use of  advanced technologies prompted the Chinese to acknowledge that 
‘only by adopting certain aspects of Western technology could China hope to 
cope with the West’ (Mackerras, 2008: 16). Led by this realisation, the Qing 
government sent a large number of Chinese students to study abroad, and 
sought to adopt advanced modern Western technologies, including the 
telegraph, the machine industry and ship building technologies. 
 
Facing the imperial threat from Western powers determined to broaden their 
influence in and imperial control over Chinese society, it was now more 
important than ever for Chinese intellectuals to disseminate their knowledge 
and ideas among the wider population, in an effort to help modernise Chinese 
society. The technology of the printing press played a key role in this effort. 
During the late Qing Dynasty, various newspapers were established in several 
Chinese provinces. These newspapers allowed readers to obtain access to a 
range of political opinions that accordingly inspired various directions of 
political and social awareness and preferences (Spence, 1990: 225). They 
also helped raise popular awareness of China’s position in the world. 
 
This was also the time when terms such as nation, race and ethnicity were 
introduced into the Chinese vocabulary (Gao, 2007: 56-72). Writings 
published by Chinese intellectuals - many of them appearing in the newly 
established newspapers - as well as textbooks and dictionaries played an 
important role in popularising these new ideas and concepts, and in 
standardising their meaning (ibid). 
 
The main source of these social upheavals and changes was the widening 
influence from the West, which had gradually increased towards the end of 
the 19th century, and played an important role in shaping the transformation of 
Chinese society as a whole. The challenge brought by the West was 
enormous and unprecedented, as explained by Schoppa (2000): 
 
‘China had faced foreign invaders before, but they had come by 
horseback, on land, and hade wielded bows and arrows. Generally, 
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China had been able to deal with them, to a greater or lesser degree, 
bringing them into the Chinese cultural sphere. But now the foreign 
invaders had come by ships, with powerful cannons and other 
armaments, and there was no indication that they would ever accept 
the Chinese cultural tradition. The disjuncture with the past was 
evident. The crises of the nineteenth century thus presented Chinese 
leaders with a dilemma: how to overcome their obvious military and 
strategic weakness so that they might deal with these foreigners from a 
position of some strength’ (38). 
 
In other words, the priority for Chinese leaders at that time, was to seek an 
appropriate way to ‘enable China to catch up with the West, defeat 
imperialism and establish for China a respected position in the world 
community’ (Mackerras, 2008: 5). Therefore, one of the most important 
characteristics of the late Qing period was the increasing contact and conflict 
with the West in different spheres, including economics, culture and sciences. 
 
The First Opium War in 1839 had forced China to abandon its long-standing 
isolationist policies and open its doors to foreign influence (Bickers, 2011: 18). 
Due to the growing needs of the development of Western capitalism, China 
was regarded as one of the main targets of Western expansion due to its 
huge market and rich resources. The increasing economic contact with the 
West had brought a great number of benefits for Western countries, which on 
the other hand had further weakened the power of the Qing court. Imperial 
China under the Qing court accounted for approximately 32% of the world’s 
economy before 1800, while thereafter and especially after 1860, Chinese 
economy had shown less than 1% growth annually until 1949, and her share 
in the world’s economy dropped to less than 5% (Maddison, 1998: 39). 
Having benefited from the Opium Wars in the 19th century and the resulting 
treaties, Western countries had intensified their imperial demands directed at 
China (Bickers, 2011: 18-51). The term ‘unequal treaties’ was frequently used 
in the early 20th century in China, and this was considered by the Chinese 
people a humiliation to the country ‘because they were not negotiated by 
nations treating each other as equals but were imposed on China after a war, 
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and because they encroached upon China’s sovereign rights … which 
reduced her to semicolonial status’ (Hsü, 1970: 239). There were a large 
number of ‘unequal treaties’ (e.g. Treaty of Nanjing signed after the First 
Opium War, Treaty of Shimonoseki that was signed after the First Sino-
Japanese War, and etc.) that had been signed during the late Qing period. 
These treaties were a reflection of the increasing weakness of the Qing court 
as well as the Chinese social reality, the desire of Western imperialism, and 
also an important motivation for the rise of Chinese nationalism and the wish 
to learn from Western political practices. 
 
Hence, the second strand of Chinese society during the late Qing period was 
characterised by different ideological reforms, transformations in social and 
political thought, including the shift from traditional Confucianism to the 
promotion of nationalism, the re-cognition of the Self and the relationship with 
the Other. Mackerras (2008) sees the rise of Chinese nationalism, associated 
with the concept of the modern Chinese nation and nation state as linked to 
changes in public understandings of ‘loyalty’: ‘so the people within the nation 
should give their loyalty not to the emperor or family, as had earlier been the 
case in China, but to the state that represents the nation’ (7). Having 
witnessed the privileges increasingly enjoyed by foreigners and the 
proliferation of unequal treaties with the West, Chinese elites began doubting 
traditional Confucian teachings and their ability to stem the onslaught of 
Western imperialism. Instead, they embraced patriotic ideals as the only way 
to ensure national survival.  
 
All the above transformations were intertwined with a range of tensions and 
conflicts both externally, between China and the West, and internally, between 
the proponents of new ideas and those supporting established traditions. 
Schoppa (2006) has summarised different Chinese responses to the West 
into two main cultural perspectives - a traditionalist and a reformist: ‘some saw 
China’s saving strategy in the revivification of its culture: traditional culture 
was incomparably great… the use of such implements of war would sully the 
Chinese hands that wielded them. If tools of war were to be part of the answer 
to China’s problems, then the Chinese should use those from the Chinese 
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repertoire warfare from the past’ (38). Others, however, ‘contended that 
Western weapons and ships were simply inanimate machines - culture-
neutral, as it were. These self-strengtheners argued that foreign weapons and 
ships could thus be bought or manufactured without cultural contamination’ 
(ibid). 
 
The social and political conflicts and reforms occurring during the last period 
of the Qing Dynasty were mainly associated with these two conflicting 
perspectives. We will now turn to three important historical events that served 
as triggers or catalysts for the wide-ranging economic, ideological and political 
changes outlined above: the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) and the 
Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895), the Hundred Days’ Reform (1898) and the 
Boxer Uprising (1899-1901). 
 
 
1.1 The First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) 
‘In regard to the last era of the Qing Dynasty, the first Sino-Japanese War has 
been considered a historically important marker of social change in Chinese 
history. As noted by Larsen (2008):  
 
‘The Sino-Japanese War is a significant watershed in East Asian 
history. It marks the beginning of an increasingly aggressive Japanese 
imperial expansion onto the Asian mainland. For many, it also marks 
the beginning of the end of the Qing Empire, as the demoralizing 
defeat on the battlefield was followed by increasing foreign inroads into 
the Qing Empire as outside powers sought to “carve the Chinese 
melon”’ (231). 
 
The Qing Dynasty had experienced a time of outstanding prosperity in its 
early stages, which could be shown to some extent by its successful attempts 
at expanding its territory.  Qing rulers successfully claimed rule over different 
regions, including Korea, the Liuqiu Islands, and Burma (Larsen, 2008). In the 
late stage of the Qing era, however, the rise of Japanese imperialism played 
an important role in Asian history, which changed the relationship among 
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Asian countries. For example, the relationship between the Qing Empire and 
Korea was broken by the Meiji Japan, which requested to include Korea as a 
part of their territorial expansion (Larsen, 2008). The following chart illustrates 
the changes in the Qing territories during 1800 to 1900, which clearly 
demonstrate the expansion of territory in the early stage of the Qing Empire 
and a reduction of territory during the late era of the Qing Dynasty. 
 
FIGURE 3:2 Changes of the Qing territories during 1800 to 1900 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Crossley, P. K. (2008) The Late Qing Empire in Global History, Asia in World 
History, 1750-1914, Vol 13 (2): 4-7. 
 
The Meiji Japan’s power in Korea had rapidly grown in the 1880s; additionally, 
Japanese diplomats were able to station in Seoul and open treaty ports in 
1882 (Larsen, 2008). Since 1892, the banned Korean religious society 
Donghak (East Learning Society) started gaining ground again. A large 
number of peasants had joined Donghak and undertaken various activities 
73 
 
against the Korean government; the rebellion developed so rapidly that 
government troops were unable to resist the threat. In May 1894, the Korean 
King Kojong requested the Qing Empire to help suppress the rebellion. The 
Qing court issued the request for assistance. An official statement issued on 
June 7 1894 claimed the need ‘to restore the peace of our tributary state, and 
to dispel the anxiety of every nation residing in Korea for commercial 
purposes’ as the primary justifications for the Qing intervention (Conroy, 1960: 
245). After the domestic situation in Korea calmed down, the Chinese 
representative Li Hongzhang planned to leave Korea. However, Japan then 
declared its agenda to contribute to Korean reform as a whole, rather than 
only focus on the Donghak Rebellion. 
 
The Qing court rejected the Japanese proposal to build a jointly sponsored 
reform project: ‘the idea may be excellent, but the measures of improvement 
must be left to Korea herself. Even China herself would not interfere with the 
internal administration of Korea, and Japan, having from the very first 
recognised the independence of Korea, cannot have the right to interfere with 
the same’ (Vladimir, 2007 [1896]: 229, cited in Paine, 2003: 119). 
 
Having been declined by the Qing court, on July 23, 1894, Japanese troops 
seized the Korean royal palace and officially declared War to China on August 
1. The Chosŏn government announced a statement claiming the alliance with 
Japan, in order to expel the Qing power from Korea on August 22, 1894 
(Eastlake & Yoshi-aki, 1897: VII). 
 
The Chinese reinforcements sent by the Qing government had experienced a 
painful failure in a series of battles with Japanese forces in Korea. By late 
October 1984, the Japanese managed to cross the Yalu River and entered 
into Chinese territory. In a devastating battle, the Japanese troops destroyed 
one of two battleships and a significant number of cruisers in Weihaiwei in the 
Shandong Province of China. Humiliated by the defeat, all the senior Chinese 
admirals and commandants of the forts committed suicide. (Spence, 1990: 
222-223) 
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The Treaty of Shimonoseki, which was signed at the Shunpanrō hall on April 
17, 1895, marked the end of the First Sino-Japanese War. This treaty ended 
China’s centuries-long suzerainty over Korea and recognised the pro forma 
independence of Korea. The Meiji Japan government took control over Korea 
and received annual tributes. China was also forced to cede control over 
Liaodong, Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands to Japan, and was required to 
open various ports and rivers to Japan for trading purposes. The Manchu 
government issued Japanese merchants the right to build up factories and 
rent warehouses and transportations in China without paying any taxes to the 
Chinese government (Elleman & Kotkin, 2009: 15). 
 
Japan’s victory in the First Sino-Japanese War marked the growth of its 
national influence in Asia and the whole world, and was followed by further 
territorial expansion and an increasingly aggressive stance in foreign policy 
that continued until World War II (Spence, 1990). To conclude, the First Sino-
Japanese War and the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki can be regarded 
as a milestone reflecting the weakness and decline of the Manchu court. The 
signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki weakened the legitimacy of the imperial 
court, as well as stimulated the Chinese younger generation’s demands for 
reform in a wide range of areas. These increasingly pressing demands 
eventually led to the Hundred Days’ Reform. 
 
 
1.2 The Hundred Days’ Reform 
China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese contest over Korea made it clear that 
China was lagging well behind modern developments not only with respect to 
the West, but also with regard to its small, long disregarded neighbour Japan, 
which made great advances in assimilating and appropriating Western 
technologies and knowledge. Chinese intellectual elites were increasingly 
keen to follow the Japanese example and adopt ‘Western learning’ for 
practical purposes, yet at the same time, they were also adamant about the 
need to preserve the essence of traditional Chinese culture. Kang Youwei, 
who was an influential Chinese intellectual serving in the Qing court, which 
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culminated in the decision to implement the so-called Hundred Day’s Reform 
(Grasso, Corrin & Kort, 2009: 54-55). The issued edicts aimed to undertake a 
range of reforms in different spheres in Chinese society, including 
administration and education, and also directed the elimination of different 
political posts, e.g. the post of governors in the provincial bases (Bailey, 2001: 
31-33; Chesneaux, Bastid & Bergere, 1976: 321). 
 
Evidently, the Guangxu Emperor as well as his advisors, such as the 
intellectuals Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao, were aware that the fundamental 
structure of the Chinese philosophical and moral system had to be 
reconsidered if China was to respond to the challenges of modernisation and 
ensure the continuity of its cultural traditions (Bailey, 2001: 31-32). In 
response to these demands, the reform began on 11 June 1898, and although 
it only lasted for 104 days, it ‘brought to light not only the systemic problems 
of late-Qing imperial rule but also… rising tensions in the Chinese political 
discourse (Kwong, 2000: 693). In regard to the social significance of this 
reform, Luke S. K. Kwong (2000) argued that it was intertwined with 
nationalist ambitions: ‘few students of modern China would dispute that the 
Hundred Days Reform of 1898 ushered in a major nation-building effort that, 
despite false starts and setbacks, has continued to this day’ (663). Stressing 
the historical significance of the Hundred Day’s Reform, and its contribution to 
the reform of late Qing Chinese society, he sees it as linked to the formation 
of a modern Chinese ‘civil society’, and brings the power of both elites and 
ordinary mass into the consideration: 
 
‘the rapid growth of study societies and of the periodical press after the 
Sino-Japanese War raised the question of elite empowerment that 
ought to be closely studied in any discussion on the emergence of “civil 
society” in modern China. The intensifying concern for “people’s 
power”, for the political potential of social groups, and for national and 
dynastic survival was but a short step away from demanding a greater 
voice in public affairs’ (693-694). 
 
The reformers claimed that innovation had to be accompanied by both 
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institutional and ideological changes. The  program of the reform included a 
rapid construction and strengthening of the Chinese economy by means of 
applying the principles of modern Western capitalism; the introduction of 
modern manufacturing and commerce; a reform of the Chinese military; the 
introduction of a constitutional monarchy with elements of democracy; and the 
modernisation of the traditional exam system and creation of a modern 
educational system that paid greater attention to mathematics and science 
rather than Confucian texts (Spence, 1990: 226-227). Traditional schools had 
to be transformed into modern institutions. One of the best Universities in 
China - Peking University - was founded during this time (Chesneaux, Bastid 
& Bergere, 1976: 321). 
 
Liang Qichao promoted new ideas and theories borrowed from modern 
Western social sciences. He praised the ideals and achievements of the 
French Revolution and admired influential Western works such as Adam 
Smith’s The Wealth of Nations and Charles Darwin’s The Origin of Species. 
He also attempted to apply these theories to Chinese reality, in an effort to 
construct a new Chinese identity (Spence, 1990: 226-230; Gao, 2007: 58-62). 
Liang Qichao was not alone in admiring Western ideas at the time. Yan Fu 
(1854-1921), who was educated in England, translated Charles Darwin’s The 
Origin of Species into Chinese and played an important role in promoting 
Darwin’s ideas in China. Darwin’s work provided a key theoretical reference 
for Chinese intellectuals during the late Qing period (but also later) and had a 
major impact on newly formed often racialised ideas about Chinese identity 
and the origins of the Chinese nation (Dikötter, 1992: 67-71). 
 
The wish of the Emperor Guangxu and his supporters, among them Kang 
Youwei, to promote the reform across China, however, was counteracted by 
some negative attitudes in Chinese provinces regarding its implementation. 
Most of the provincial officers ‘paid only lip service’ to the reform, except for 
the governor of Hunan, Chen Baozhen, who was the only high-ranking 
provincial official who actively supported the new policies (Kwong, 2000: 691; 
Chesneaux, Bastid & Bergere, 1976: 322; Rodzinski, 1979: 369). Thereafter, 
the reform movement encountered a powerful opposition, led by the Manchu 
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Empress Dowager Cixi (1835-1908), who put an end to the reforms on 21 
September 1898, by imprisoning the Guangxu Emperor and arresting the 
reformist leaders, in order to take all power back into her own hands (Kwong, 
2000: 675). 
 
Although the overall failure of the movement further weakened the power of 
the Manchu government and the public’s confidence in the Qing court, some 
elements of the reform were re-instated over the coming years. The traditional 
keju examination was abolished in 1905 and replaced by a new, modernised 
educational system. The Chinese military was reformed as well, largely 
following the Japanese military reforms. In addition, thanks to the rapid spread 
of print technology and publications, growing numbers of Chinese were 
gaining access to new ideas derived from the West, including new ideas 
about the origins and the distinguishing traits of the Chinese nation, and about 
its position in the world (Spence, 1990: 230; Gao, 2007: 59-62). Gray (2002) 
is one of the authors (alongside Kwong, 2000 and others) who have 
emphasised the historical significance of the reform despite its initial failure. In 
his book Rebellions and Revolutions: China from the 1800s to 2000, he 
defined the significance of the Hundred Day’s Reform as a time in which the 
Chinese public attempted to express and share opinions: ‘it could be said that 
the Hundred Days’ Reform failed because Chinese public opinion was still 
unorganised and inarticulate. It was only after this failure, and in reaction to it, 
that a modern Chinese public opinion began to crystallize’ (134). 
 
On the other hand, the failure of the Hundred Days’ Reform led many 
proponents of the reform to abandon any hope for internal reform in China, 
initiated by the Manchu Court itself. Instead, many Chinese intellectuals 
started to argue that the only way to put an end to China’s gradual decline 
was to first overthrow the Manchu Monarchy (Gao, 2007: 73). This shift in 
attitudes to the Manchu was evident also in the writings of some the 
intellectuals analysed further on in this thesis. 
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1.3 The Boxer Uprising (1898-1901) 
Ashamed of the decline of their country and the loss of national sovereignty, 
not only the intellectuals, but also the broader Chinese population, were 
growing increasingly restless and dissatisfied with what they considered to be 
outdated societal norms. A historical newspaper article from Guangzhou 
published in 1899 clearly expresses the Chinese people’s growing indignation 
against foreign aggression: 
 
‘All foreign countries are insatiable and are ready to carve up China: 
Russia robbed Arthur Port and Dalian Bay, and sent 25,000 troops into 
Manchuria; Britain actually took possession of as many as seven 
provinces of the Yangtze River basin; Germany has occupied Jiaozhou 
and claimed Shandong Province as her own, and additionally started 
exploring Henan; France has occupied Guangzhou Bay, though her 
covert plan is the full possession of Guangdong, Guangxi, Yunnan and 
Guizhou; Japan has possessed Taiwan, and covets Fujian Province… 
Therefore China must be vigilant and promote innovation, in order to 
increase the awareness of being attacked’ (cited in Huang, 1964: 128, 
131, 132). 
 
This increasingly hostile atmosphere was felt also by foreigners present in 
China. For instance, when reporting about the situation in China, the British 
Rear Admiral Charles Beresford noted, ‘the continuous riots, harassment and 
rebellion across the whole country’ (quoted in Ma, 1957 [1899]: 163), which in 
his view presented a serious threat to the security of British companies’ 
investment in China. 
 
The Boxer Uprising (Yihetuan yundong) in 1898-1901 was one of the most 
representative events reflecting this growing social unrest, which fed on an 
‘atmosphere of superstition, economic depression, extreme privation, public 
anger over foreign imperialism, and resentment of the missionaries’ (Hsü, 
1995: 390). The Boxer Uprising, also known as the Boxer Rebellion, was a 
movement led by ‘the Righteous Harmony Society’ (yihetuan), mainly aimed 
at opposing the influence of Christianity and Western threats in China. The 
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Righteous Harmony Society was founded in the Shandong Province in 
response to the succession of unequal treaties signed with Western powers 
and the blatant weakness of the Manchu Qing government. The members of 
the movement consisted mainly of people who had lost their farmland due to 
natural disasters and Western exploration (Su & Liu, 2000). As noted in Victor 
Purcell’s influential work on this rebellion The Boxer Uprising: A Background 
Study (1963): ‘one feature at least of the Boxer Uprising is beyond dispute, 
namely that it was “Anti-foreign”, and, in particular, “anti-European”’ (57). 
 
These anti-Western attitudes were clearly evident also in one of the first 
reports on the activities of the movement that culminated in the Boxer 
Rebellion, which was contained in a letter written by French Jesuit Father 
Gouverneur in June 1898 (Pelissier, 1963). According to his report, placards 
were posted on the walls during the baccalaureate examinations on 27 April 
1898, containing the following message: 
 
‘Notice. The patriots of all the provinces, seeing that men of the West 
overreach Heaven in their behavior, have decided to assemble on the 
15th day of the fourth moon and to kill the Westerners and burn their 
houses. Those whose hearts are not in accord with “us” are scoundrels 
and women of bad character. Those who read this placard and fail to 
spread the news deserve the same characterisation. Enough! No more 
words are needed’ (cited in Pelissier, 1963, Kieffer [trans.], 1967: 216). 
 
As evident from the notice, the rebels held a very negative view of the West 
and Westerners, and want to see them killed. In order to spread their 
influence, the Boxers sought to promote their ideas by incorporating them into 
Chinese popular cultural form, such as music, religion, popular novels and 
street plays. Due to this, the Boxer Uprising managed to attract a far more 
extensive popular support than the Hundred Days’ Reform, in spite of lacking 
any systematic ideology (Spence, 1990: 233-235). 
 
There has been a wide range of academic work published in both English and 
Chinese that analyses the Boxers Uprising. Many studies are collected in Su 
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and Liu’s (ed.) book Yihetuan yanjiu yibai nian (A Century of Boxer Studies) 
(2000). Two of the most influential and comprehensive works in discussing the 
origins of the movement are Paul A. Cohen’s History in Three Keys (1997): 
The Boxers as Event, Experience, and Myth and Joseph W. Esherick’s The 
Origins of the Boxer Uprising (1987). Victor Purcell’s influential book The 
Boxer Uprising (1963) has been republished in 2010. Many broader studies 
on modern Chinese history contain a chapter on the Boxer Uprising, for 
example, The Cambridge History of China (Fairbank, 1978), China in the 
Twentieth Century (Bailey, 2001), and others. 
 
Another important piece of empirical research on the process of the Boxer 
Uprising was undertaken by scholars from Shandong University during the 
1960s, who collected testimonies from survivors of the Boxer era. The data of 
this study has been published in the work Shangdong daxue yihetuan diaocha 
ziliao huibian (Collection of Shandong University survey materials on the 
Boxers) (Lu, et al. 2000). The empirical investigation was focused on the 
experience of Chinese people who witnessed the rise and development of the 
movement. These testimonies provided particularly valuable insights into 
internal developments that sparked the rebellion. Among these, the 
testimonies highlighted the famine occurring in China in 1900. Most of the 
Chinese people who were interviewed in the process of the uprising, 
remembered that a serious famine happened in the 26th year of the Guangxu 
Emperor (1900), which was considered by them as the main reason 
contributing to the spread of the Boxer Uprising.  These are two 
characteristics excerpts from the testimonies: 
 
‘The 26th year of the Guangxu Emperor was a bad year, which was 
marked by a poor crops harvest… Many people had to eat bran or 
grass while some others had starved to death’. (Ma Dengying and Ma 
Yuming, from the Nangong County Liyuan Tuen, Zhao Village, 1960, 
cited in Lu, 2000: 1). 
… 
‘There was a frost in August of the 26th year of the Guangxu Emperor, 
which led to the little crops harvest’. (Li Laozhong, from the Nangong 
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County, Liyuan Tuen, Xian Village, 1960, cited in Lu, 2000: 1). 
 
Another important factor that led to the uprising was the Western challenge. 
Some scholars, for example, Victor Purcell (1963), Fairbank (1978), 
Thompson (2003), have paid attention predominantly to the influence of 
Western challenges, and regarded the Boxers rebellion often as a Chinese 
force resisting imperialism. Their arguments are supported by the testimonies 
of survivors of the Boxer era as well: 
 
‘There were four Catholic presidents: Zhang De, Wang Laozhai, Yan 
Laotong and Chen Laochong. They are very arrogant. If we have said 
a wrong word, we have to feast for apology. None of “us” dared to 
offend them’ (Han Dengxiao, from the Nangong County, Liyuan Tuen, 
Xian Village, 1960, cited in Lu, 2000: 14). 
 
According to these survivors, the foreign Christian missionaries and their local 
supporters were the main targets of the Uprising. The Catholic privilege in the 
rural areas in China had existed since the 18th century. The conflict between 
Catholics and non-Catholics became increasingly radical during the period of 
famine (according to the historical sources collected in Qingmo jiaoan [Late 
Qing Religious Cases], 1998: 229-230). Lu and his colleagues from Shandong 
University recorded the testimonies of the witnesses of Catholics’ privilege, 
which demonstrated a massive number of conflicts between Catholics and the 
Boxers described by the survivors of the Boxers era (Lu, 2000: 25-30). On 
15th March, 1899, the Guangxu Emperor was forced to grant titles to foreign 
missionaries, which had legitimised and formalised their governmental 
priorities in China (Wang, 1982: 954-965). Since then, ‘the Bishop has been 
grated the status of the provincial governor’ (ibid). 
  
A similar argument is shared by other Western scholars as well. For example, 
Paul Cohen (1997) suggested that the drought occurring in this year had 
enhanced the public’s hostile feelings toward the Catholics since Christians 
refused to participate in community prayers for rain. The cause of the drought 
was therefore partially attributed to Catholics by non-Catholics in China. 
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A series of straightforward violent activities has been undertaken by the 
Boxers towards Christian properties. They burned churches and houses, and 
additionally destroyed railway tracks, stations, telegraph lines and those 
products which represented modern Western technologies, such as lamps 
and clocks. They even killed four French and Belgian engineers and two 
English missionaries (Spence, 1990: 233). Some Chinese provincial officials 
sometimes tried to negotiate with the Boxers to protect the foreigners’ safety. 
In other cases, officials were themselves taken by the ideals promoted by the 
rebels and condoned their behaviour. In order to guarantee their citizens’ 
safety, the Western countries felt they need to send additional troops to 
Beijing from other parts of China to resist the Boxers’ power. However, due to 
the broken tracks torn up by the Boxers, some Western troops were beaten 
by the Boxers and experienced a heavy loss (Spence, 1990: 233-235; 
Pelissier, 1963, Kieffer [trans.], 1967: 217-219). 
 
The main aim and a famous slogan during the later stage of the Boxer 
Uprising was ‘fuqing mieyang’ (Support the Qing, annihilate the West), which 
demonstrates that the major characteristic of the Boxer Uprising was to 
establish an anti-Western rebellion. This is reflected in the following 
announcement issued by a leader of the Boxers: 
 
‘Big Brother Wu Xiu, who pointed to our flag and gave the speech, 
promoted the idea of fuqing mieyang. How this aim can be achieved? 
The Qing court has experienced a complete failure since she lost in the 
war with Japan in the 26th year of the Guangxu Emperor. This is 
because that the Qing afraid of death, and is totally lost without a fight. 
The international meetings are discussing about carving up China. 
Although we are bullied by the Christians, we will suffer much more if 
we let the West carve China. There are no troops in China; 
nevertheless, we have a large number of public mass in China. If we 
are united, we can lift up the back of the Qing, in order to exterminate 
the foreigners. They want to carve up China, as for the dream’. (Liao, 
1981: 109) 
 
This announcement has called for the extermination of Western foreigners, 
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which illustrates the radicalism of the Boxer movement. On June 21st 1900, 
the Qing court issued a Xuanzhan zhaoshu (Declaration of war) to the 
Western countries after a series of meetings (Ma, 1957 [1899]: 218-219). This 
decision was far distinct from the previous tolerance shown by the Qing 
government to the West, which greatly stimulated the morale of the Boxers 
(Mou, 1997: 213). 
 
Nevertheless, the Boxer Uprising rapidly crumbled when further 
reinforcements of approximately 20,000 foreign troops from eight countries 
entered into Beijing (Spence, 1990: 234-235; O’Connor, 1973). Those 
included Austria-Hungary, the United States, Japan, Russia, Britain, the 
United States, and France, and were collectively named ‘The Eight-Nation 
Alliance’ (ibid).  Finally, the Boxer Protocol, which marked the end of the 
uprising, was signed in September 1901 between the Man Qing government 
and eight Western countries (Esherick, 1987). According to the Protocol, The 
Qing government was required to pay 450,000,000 Haikwan taels, or 
$333,900,000 (Harding, 1915: 459) to these eight countries as the price of the 
ending of the war. Apart from this, the Boxer Protocol also included some 
other conditions, which required the Qing government to pay an extremely 
heavy price for this uprising (the complete version of Boxer Protocol can be 
found in the Appendix 1). The terms of the Protocol contributed to the further 
weakening of the Qing government and its legitimacy, and helped accelerate 
its final demise. 
 
The Boxer Uprising has played an important role in Chinese history, which 
increased the pace of the fall of the Qing court, and promoted a 
consciousness of national identity among the Chinese intellectuals as well as 
the wider Chinese public, most of whom had lost trust in the Qing 
government. Paul Herry Clements argued in 1915:  
 
‘the Boxer Rebellion was the last protest of China against the 
inevitable, and, in the completeness of its failure, was the final lesson 
necessary in that series of international events even since 1840 to 
teach China that, however excellent her civilisation may be in some 
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respects, it was inadequate when judged by the spirit and 
achievements of the 19th century’ (1915: 204). 
 
This has on the one hand accelerated the process of decline towards the end 
of the Qing Dynasty; and contributed to the beginnings of the modern nation 
state building on the other (Cohen 1997: 55-56). Colin Mackerras (2008) and 
others argue similarly to Cohen that the Boxer Uprising has contributed to a 
rise of nationalism in modern China: ‘…there is no doubt that nationalism took 
on a new impetus from the beginning of the twentieth century’, influenced by 
‘the major powers that had inflicted the humiliation upon China’, and 
associated with ‘the desire to roll back the forces and influences of 
imperialism in China’ (23). 
 
As I have shown in this chapter, the historical significance of the Boxer 
Uprising is associated with Western imperial threats and its deep impact on 
China and world history during and beyond this period: ‘the Boxer Uprising 
and the Boxer War were incidents inextricably tied into the world of 1899-
1900, of global developments in imperial thought and practice, and in anti-
imperial critique’ (Bickers, 2007: xxiv). 
 
 
2. The Chinese Revolution (1911-1912) 
The Chinese Revolution in 1911 can be regarded as a turning point in 
Chinese history, which brought an end to the dynastic system that had existed 
for some 2,100 years (Zarrow, 2005: 30), and also ‘profoundly disrupted the 
mixture of bureaucratic power, cultural and religious symbolism’ (Rankin, 207: 
260) in China. In regard to the historical significance of this revolution, 
Schoppa (2006) symbolically referred to the Chinese Revolution (1911-1912) 
as a watershed that bridged the end of an empire and the construction of a 
modern government: 
 
‘The meaning of the events from October 1911 to February 1912 was 
extraordinarily revolutionary… Now the abolition of the monarchy 
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demolished the whole political structure. In place for over two thousand 
years, the Son of Heaven and the empire were gone, along with all the 
traditional political principles, laws, customs, and morality... As China 
entered the spring of 1912, it was beginning the process of 
constructing a new Chinese identity, of building a new state and nation 
- the new China - in a completely uncharted, unmarked future’. (141) 
 
Disappointed with the behaviour of the Qing court and China’s deteriorating 
position in the international arena, some Chinese intellectuals adopted a more 
radical attitude towards the Qing government and called for its overthrow and 
for a full-scale revolution. Sun Zhongshan (1866-1925) another important 
Chinese intellectual whose work is examined closely in this thesis - was one 
of the most influential voices among the proponents of a revolution. Many of 
the rebellions in the first decade of the 20th century in China, were initiated by 
Sun and his alliance (Schoppa, 2006: 136). Two other influential Chinese 
intellectuals, namely Zhang Binglin and Liang Qichao were also playing 
important roles in contributing to the shaping of public opinion and publishing 
of various core works on politics during this period; however, compared to Sun 
Zhongshan, they were less close to the core of the Chinese Revolution. 
 
The fall of the Qing court effectively started with the abdication of the last Qing 
Emperor Puyi on 12 February 1912 (Mackerras, 2008: 32). This was triggered 
by a series of events that occurred in October 1911 in Hankou, one of three 
Chinese cities that were later merged into the city of Wuhan, the capital of the 
Hubei province. During the late Qing period, another city of the Hubei 
province Hanhou, was home to a large number of students who had finished 
their studies in foreign countries and were therefore deeply influenced by 
modern Western ideas, especially nationalism and patriotism, which provided 
the ideological basis for the 1911 revolution (Spence, 1990: 262-263). These 
students and other Chinese students, who were studying abroad, together 
with some Chinese individuals who were inspired by modern Western ideas, 
set up several organisations aimed at spreading their revolutionary ideas. 
Among these organisations was the Tongmeng hui (the Chinese United 
League), which was established by Sun Zhongshan in Tokyo in 1905 and 
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became an influential platform for Chinese intellectuals to communicate 
revolutionary ideas (Bailey, 2001: 62). 
 
By the summer of 1911, several soldiers of the New Army troops, which were 
established by the Qing court after the signing of the Boxer Protocol, also 
became influenced by these ideas and consequently became the military 
basis of the revolution (Schoppa, 2006: 138). The uprising was triggered by 
an explosion that occurred on 9 October 1911 when some revolutionaries 
were building bombs in their meeting house in the city of Wuchang, then 
situated in the Russian Concession - i.e. a part of Chinese territory ceded to 
Russia. The explosion attracted the attention of the Qing authorities that 
decided to investigate the event. The investigation led to the capture and 
execution of a number of revolutionaries by the Qing court. In addition, the 
Qing authority also obtained a list of revolutionary society members that 
contained names of registered soldiers. Given this precarious situation, the 
revolutionaries decided to launch the uprising immediately, to prevent further 
arrests of their members (Spence, 1990: 263). 
 
On the morning of 10 October, the Wuchang Eighth Engineer Battalion seized 
the English ammunition depot in Wuchang. Other soldiers, stationed outside 
of the city, joined the uprising, and the revolutionary forces soon won the 
support of another three New Army regiments. Following the success of the 
Wuchang uprising, other revolutionary societies launched several successful 
uprisings in Hanyang and Hankou on 11 and 12 October (Mackerras, 
2008:31; Bailey, 2002: 60-64; Spence, 1990: 262-264). In response to the 
unrest, the Qing court ordered two divisions of the Beiyang Army 2  to 
coordinate a counterattack and requested Yuan Shikai (1859-1916), a long-
term military commander, to suppress the uprising (Rhoads, 2000: 174; 
Spence, 1990: 263-265). 
 
                                            
2
 The Beiyang Army was a powerful, Western-style Chinese military force created by the Qing 
government in the late 19
th
 century. It was the centrepiece of a general reconstruction of 
China’s military system (Atwill & Atwill, 2009: 152). 
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A series of armed clashes with revolutionary forces made the Qing court loose 
more and more cities, especially in central and south China. There had been 
a large number of cities joining this revolution in early November, including 
Hangzhou (5 November), Zhenjiang (7 November), Fuzhou (8 November), 
and Guangzhou (9 November) (Rhoads, 2000: 187). Sun Zhongshan returned 
to China from exile in France at the end of 1911. On New Year’s Day of 1912, 
he helped establish the Provisional Government of the Republic of China, 
which was also the first republican government in Asia. The capital was set in 
the city Nanjing. Ever since the founding of the first anti-Manchu association 
Xingzhong hui (the Society for the Revival of China) by Sun Zhongshan in 
1894, Sun had made various efforts to raise money for the societies, 
organising revolutionary movements (Mackerras, 2008: 31). Being widely 
respected by the delegates from 16 provincial assemblies, Sun was named 
the ‘provisional president’ of the newly established government (Schoppa, 
2006: 140; Spence, 1990: 267).   
 
The representative of the Qing court, the military leader Yuan Shikai, offered 
to force the Qing Emperor to abdicate in exchange for being named the 
president of the Republic of China. In order to ensure the stability of the newly 
established government, Sun Zhongshan agreed to Yuan’s demands and 
stepped down from his position as ‘provisional president’. The Qing emperor 
declared his abdication on 12 February 1912, and thereby ended the 268-year 
long rule of the Qing Dynasty. On 10 March 1912 Yuan Shikai was 
inaugurated as the second ‘provisional president’ of the Republic of China 
(Spence, 1990: 267-268). 
 
 
3. The Early Republican Period 
The success of the 1911 Chinese Revolution has opened another chapter in 
Chinese history. However, the newly established republic experienced several 
difficulties in understanding and practically embodying the implementation of 
the ‘republic’ (Schoppa, 2006: 144). Accordingly, Yuan Shikai’s government 
relied strongly on a group of foreign advisors, drawn from Australia, Japan, 
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France and Belgium, who provided advice on China’s foreign policies, railway 
construction, military and religion (Spence, 1990: 284). In order to guarantee 
the stability of his government, Yuan made many concessions to foreign 
powers. For example, he signed-off the ‘Twenty-One Demands’ in 1915, 
which had legitimised Japan’s growing control on China in various fields, 
including factories, railways and ports in Manchuria and Mongolia (Rankin, 
1997: 278). For the same reason, the new republican government did not 
manage to dispel the fear of foreign domination. Yuan Shikai’s government 
adopted a rather obsequious attitude to the West and seemed to be doing 
little to restore China’s power and enhance its position in the international 
arena (Spence, 1990: 284). On the other hand, the rise of a ‘potent 
provincialism’ was another challenge for Yuan Shikai’s government (1983: 
213). 
 
These policies further intensified the tensions between Yuan Shikai and 
revolutionary leaders, including Sun Zhongshan. After the leadership of the 
government had been transferred to Yuan, Sun focused on organising a 
political party named Guomindang (the Nationalist Party), with the hope of 
being voted to be prime minister if the Guomindang members could gain the 
majority of seats in the Assembly (Schoppa, 2006: 146). The Nationalist Party 
has played an important role in modern Chinese history. It was the ruling 
political party of the Republic of China in mainland China (1912-1949), which 
was guided by the ideology of sanmin zhuyi (Three Principles of the People) 
developed by Sun Zhongshan. The party headquarters are now located in 
Taiwan (e.g. Bedeski, 1981). 
 
To expand his powers and ensure unbridled implementation of his policies, 
Yuan dissolved the democratically elected national parliament and replaced it 
with a body consisting of 66 men he selected from his own cabinet. This 
group produced a ‘constitutional compact’ in 1914 that effectively replaced the 
provisional constitution and gave Yuan ‘unlimited power over war, finance, 
foreign policy, and the rights of citizens’ (Spence, 1990: 284). 
 
In 1914, Japan quickened its expansion westwards and northwards into 
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China. By the end of 1915, a secret ultimatum, which was called “Twenty-One 
Demands”, was sent to Yuan Shikai in Beijing from Japan, which ‘clearly 
signaled the beginning of Japanese expansion and conquest in China’ 
(Cheow, 2006: 20). Yuan’s decision to comply with the ‘Twenty-one Demands’ 
resulted in a final and fatal blow to his legitimacy. The ultimatum included 
demands for more economic and political privileges for Japanese subjects in 
Manchuria and Inner Mongolia and a guarantee that China would not open 
any of its ports or islands to foreign powers except Japan (Spence, 1990: 285-
286). When these demands became known public opposition within China 
found expression in widespread anti-Japanese demonstrations. 
 
To regain his authority, Yuan decided to revive the monarchy and declared 
himself Emperor of the Chinese Empire on 1 January 1916, and planned to 
take the throne of the ‘Grand Constitutional Emperor’ (Schoppa, 2006: 147) 
However, strong opposition from both domestic forces and foreign 
governments made him postpone the coronation (Spence, 1990: 286; 
Pelissier, 1963, Kieffer [trans.], 1967: 260). The move also prompted many of 
Yuan’s close political allies to withdraw their support. Yuan died of uremia on 6 
June 1916 and was succeeded by the vice-president Li Yuanhong (Zarrow, 
2005: 81-82). 
 
To conclude, it can be argued that Yuan Shikai’s rule only deepened a sense 
of failure among the Chinese population. The deep fear of foreign invasion 
and domination induced many Chinese intellectuals to seek new political 
ideas and new ways of promoting social cohesion and strengthening the 
sense of belonging among the Chinese population. These efforts provided the 
foundation for the so-called ‘May Fourth Movement’. 
 
 
3.1 The May Fourth Movement 
Chow (1964) described the May Fourth Movement as a period lasting from 
1917 to 1921, characterised by an ‘intellectual atmosphere’ and constituting 
the first major attempt at altering the Chinese traditional culture. Schoppa 
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(2006) described the May Fourth Movement similarly as a radical reform 
movement with a highly critical perspective on Chinese traditional culture and 
values: ‘if the abolition of the civil service examination and the monarchy 
brought the destruction of the traditional political and social structures, the 
May Fourth Movement struck a paralyzing blow at traditional cultural norms 
and structures’ (163). 
 
The May Fourth Movement occupies a special position in scholars’ 
consideration of modern China. Yeh (1994) noted that ‘1919 was identified as 
the very moment of origin when cultural iconoclasm was joined to a political 
activism of the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggle: the watershed 
affecting the flow of all subsequent revolutionary history’ (903). In the narrow 
sense of the word, the May Fourth Movement refers to an ideological 
movement that grew out of student demonstrations that took place on 4 May 
1919 in Beijing. About 3,000 students assembled in the Tiananmen Square to 
protest against the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, which would result in 
China ceding Shandong to Japan (Lee, 2009: 33; Spence, 1990: 311; 
Schoppa, 2006: 171-173; Chow, 1964: 100-105). 
 
The New Cultural Movement is seen as the primary stage of the May Fourth 
Movement. The core of the New Cultural Movement was focused on the 
abolition of traditional Chinese culture and aimed to construct a new cultural 
and ideological direction that distances itself from Confucianism, and 
promoted Western democratic and scientific norms (Schoppa, 2006: 163). 
One of the most influential works of this period was the magazine of New 
Youth, which was established in 1915, edited by Chen Duxiu. The main 
ideological standpoint of New Youth was to promote ‘two gentlemen’, namely 
Mr Science and Mr Democracy during the movement (Mackerras, 2008: 41). 
 
The May Fourth Movement has since been characterised in various ways: as 
a response to Western liberal influence; as a product of education abroad in 
Japan, Europe or America; as an awakening to the call of international 
Bolshevism; and as an evaluative rejection of traditional Confucianism as the 
primary source of authority (Yeh, 1994). In addition, inspired by the new 
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ideologies and ideas introduced from the West, Chinese intellectuals started 
to reconsider their history as well as their culture in new ways, which was 
distinct from the ‘traditional chronological way of recording the past’ 
(Mackerras, 2008: 42). Whether liberal or revolutionary, these intellectual 
developments were then seen as the inspiration for a unified national political 
movement that spread outward from Beijing and Shanghai into provinces 
(Yeh, 1994: 903). 
 
There have been many Chinese intellectuals who contributed to this 
movement, for example, Hu Shi (1891-1962), who wrote in the vernacular to 
discuss social problems, and also Lu Xun (1881-1936), a Chinese writer, who 
was famous for his incisive criticisms of contemporary Chinese society. He 
described the problematic situation at the time in the following way: 
 
‘Imagine an iron house without windows, absolutely indestructible, with 
many people fast asleep inside who will soon die of suffocation. But 
you know since they will die in their sleep, they will not feel the pain of 
death. Now if you cry aloud to wake a few of the lighter sleepers, 
making those unfortunate few suffer the agony of irrevocable death, do 
you think you are doing them a good turn? But if a few awake, you 
can’t say there is no hope of destroying the iron house’ (5) 
 
The historical significance of the May Fourth Movement has been stressed in 
various aspects: it was firstly one of the most important milestones of the 
Chinese revolution; it was additionally regarded as ‘China’s Renaissance’ and 
the ‘Chinese Enlightenment’ (Schoppa, 2006: 179); it was simultaneously 
closely linked to the rise of nationalism and communism in Chinese society. 
 
 
4. The Impact of Japan’s Westernisation 
An important element that needs to be included into a historical review of 
modern China is the increasing Japanese cultural impact on Chinese society 
during the late Qing and early republican period. A number of Japanese 
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books, most of which were translations of Western books discussing modern 
political, social and economic concepts, have been translated into Chinese 
during this period. The late Qing court sent a number of selected students 
abroad, including Japan and some European countries, to study Western 
sciences and technologies and transfer them to China in order to enhance the 
power of the government (Zhu, 1989). 
 
It is worth noting that the Japanese awareness of the prospect of an 
increasing Western impact in Asia had been strengthened during the period of 
Meiji Restoration 3  from 1868. Having witnessed the benefits brought by 
advanced Western technologies in sciences around the world, especially for 
the military, the Japanese had therefore recognised the necessity of learning 
from the West. One of the manifestations of Japanese efforts to learn from the 
West was the translation of a large number of Western cultural and political 
works into Japanese (Murphy, 2010). The profits gained from Western 
knowledge became apparent in Japan’s victory in the First Sino-Japanese 
War in 1895, which, on the other hand, provided a good example of the 
benefits of Western knowledge for the Qing government and also for Chinese 
intellectuals who were keen to improve China’s international standing. 
Japanese works, which were a reflection of modern Western advancement in 
various fields, were regarded as a perfect medium for Chinese intellectuals to 
get access to the Western culture - something they were not familiar with and 
felt hard to understand. As argued by Alex Murphy (2010), ‘many Chinese 
reformers viewed Japanese translations of Western political, scientific and 
technological notions and terms as trustworthy foundations for their reform 
efforts’ (31), which had provided an alternative channel for Chinese 
intellectuals to educate themselves as well as ordinary people. 
 
In addition, the transmission of knowledge and the ideas of reform and 
revolution were facilitated by the travels of many Chinese intellectuals to 
                                            
3
 Meiji Restoration refers to a chain of events that restored imperial rule to Japan in 1868 
under Emperor Meiji. The Restoration led to enormous changes in Japan’s political and social 
structure, which greatly contributed to the modern nation-building of Japan in the early 20
th
 
century. 
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Japan after the First Sino-Japanese War. By absorbing the relevant context 
from Japanese-translated modern Western ideologies, Chinese intellectuals 
found an inspiration for re-defining China as a modern nation, and for their 
efforts made to promote reform and revolution. These factors partially explain 
why some Chinese intellectuals established their reform and revolutionary 
societies in Japan rather than in China. For example, this was the case with 
Tongmeng hui (the United League of China), which was established by Sun 
Zhongshan, who was one of the most important Chinese scholars at that time 
(his revolutionary ideas will be discussed in more detail in the following 
chapter). Another reason that made Chinese intellectuals leave their home 
and promote their revolutionary ideas from a foreign country, Japan, was to 
avoid the political persecution from the Qing court after the failure of the 
Hundred Days Reform. Although the Qing court was initially itself keen to 
send Chinese students abroad, it became increasingly suspicious of how they 
used the newly gained knowledge. Even Kang Youwei, who was highly 
positioned in official bureaucracy and able close to the core of imperial power, 
Emperor Guangxu, had to exile himself to Japan after the Hundred Days 
Reform (Murphy, 2010). 
 
The impact of ‘Japanese learning’ on Chinese academia was obvious in my 
research. Liang Qichao, who was the first Chinese author who used the term 
minzu to refer to a modern definition of identity, translated this term from 
Japanese. The influence was also evident in the explanations of relevant 
terms in Chinese dictionaries published during the time. Some terms are 
believed to be translated from Japanese and included into Chinese 
dictionaries at the time, e.g. minzu. Furthermore, a large number of school 
textbooks, especially those published during the late Qing period and very 
early republican era, were translations of influential Japanese history books. 
Even in some of the other textbooks, which were not direct translations, 
editors’ understanding of Chinese history was strongly shaped and impacted 
by Japanese history books. 
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5. Conclusion 
As evident from this brief overview, the political and social upheavals of the 
late Qing and the early republican era were accompanied by wide-ranging 
ideological shifts. The traditional Chinese perception of the world, based on 
Confucianism and the belief in the absolute superiority of Chinese culture was 
challenged by Western (as well as Japanese) expansion and technological 
advances. Faced with the decline of their country, Chinese intellectuals 
became increasingly open to reformist and revolutionary ideas, including 
those imported from the West, and sought to use them to establish a new 
understanding of China and its role in the world. The idea of nation, as an 
imagined community, imagined as sovereign and limited (Anderson 1983), 
became increasingly influential in Chinese society at the time, and began 
shaping the perceptions of Chinese collective identity. The selected three 
types of discourses were playing different roles in shaping, promoting and 
popularising these nationalist ideas. Borrowing from Hobsbawm (1990), they 
helped establish the modern Chinese nation first as a ‘programme’ and ‘myth’ 
and then as a ‘reality’. This new understanding of the Chinese nation was 
rooted in a new perception of the Chinese Self, its history and its significant 
Others. 
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Part 2:  
Intellectuals’ Discourses 
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Chapter 4: Nation, Race, Ethnicity, and the 
Han among Intellectuals in Late Qing an 
Early Republican China 
Historically, the writings of Chinese intellectuals played an important role in 
the shaping of public discourses about Han and Chinese identity, as well as 
about nation and nationalism, race and ethnicity. On the one hand, these 
writings directly reflect the different opinions of these scholars as individuals. 
On the other hand, they also indirectly - by either supporting/promoting or 
opposing/criticising - provide an insight into popular ideas about issues of 
identity, nationhood and race in China at the time. 
 
The conflict between the Manchu and the Han had existed for a long time in 
Chinese history, yet became acute after the failures of the Manchu 
government in the wars with the Western powers, which revealed a weakness 
and reluctance of the government to play an appropriate role in foreign affairs. 
This fact was radically criticised by some Han intellectuals, e.g. Zhang Binglin. 
During the period of the late Qing Dynasty, Chinese intellectuals shared 
similar views on and attitudes towards foreign colonial powers. Yet their 
opinions varied In regard to the inner relationship between the Han and other 
groups living within the Chinese territory - especially the Manchu, who were 
then in the position of power. There were two basic camps in the debates on 
ethnic relationship; one was arguing for the integration of and equality 
between the Manchu and the Han, while the other was opposing the Manchu 
court, aiming to restore the Han government (e.g. Chang, 1987 and Zhao, 
2004). 
 
Facing a changing social reality, Chinese intellectuals were deeply influenced 
by traditional perceptions, particularly those rooted in Confucian philosophy. 
Their encounters with the West, e.g. travelling to the West or reading Western 
literature, also had an impact on their ideology. Confronted with the increasing 
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influence of Western nations in China, and their considerable imperial 
ambitions, they were seeking to rescue their country from the Western 
invasion that led to increasing social divisions. The progressively unstable 
social conditions in Chinese society, as well as the intellectuals’ personal 
experiences of Chinese societal instability, altered their opinions and views of 
both the outside world and of China itself. The interrelated perceptions of the 
Other and us, based on the social categories of race, nation and ethnicity, 
expressed in their writings, echoed contemporary discussions of nationhood, 
race and ethnicity among Western academics (Metzger, 1977), and bore the 
imprints of traditional Chinese teachings. 
 
In the following sections, I am going to analyse the writings of three leading 
Chinese intellectuals active during the late Qing and early republican period, 
namely Zhang Binglin, Liang Qichao and Sun Zhongshan. Being the most 
influential intellectuals in China at that time, their discourses (including their 
books and articles on journals and newspapers) were playing an important 
role in shaping  the understanding of the Chinese nation and nationalism, first 
among the elites and then among the masses. As such, these writings should 
be regarded as a significant media that had greatly contributed to the process 
of Chinese nation-building. Although my discussion is confined to the works of 
a limited number of Chinese intellectuals, this does not mean that the Chinese 
construction and representation of Han was determined by these three 
intellectuals exclusively. Instead, the work of these intellectuals should be 
seen as representing different influential - and sometimes related 
perspectives on the Han and Chinese identity. By returning to the original, 
primary sources - namely their writings themselves - I aim to complement and 
move beyond interpretations predominant in the existing secondary literature 
on these thinkers in both Chinese and English. 
 
Existing research in Chinese language on Chinese intellectuals in this 
historical period mostly regards them as divided into two camps: ‘reformists’ 
and ‘revolutionists’ (e.g. Chang, 1987, Zhao, 2004). This distinction is based 
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on their attitude to the Manchu4 government. ‘Reformists’ (who were also 
called baohuang pai [loyalists]) are those who asserted to maintain and 
strengthen the Manchu government, while the ‘revolutionists’ argued that the 
precondition of solving the Chinese problem was to expel the Manchu court 
(Zhao, 2004). However, this division relies entirely on the intellectuals’ 
attitudes towards the Manchu government, and provides a rather limited and 
one-sided understanding and explanation of their ideas as a whole. A close 
reading of the intellectuals’ writings reveals that even an intellectual who 
would most likely be labelled ‘reformist’ could express some revolutionary 
ideas, while the most radical ‘revolutionist’ could also have and express some 
reformist ideas. For example, Zhang Binglin, who is commonly labelled as a 
revolutionist, in his early age, supported Kang Youwei in his efforts to promote 
the bianfa (reform) movement, advocated by the Emperor Guangxu. 
 
In contrast to existing literature on Chinese intellectuals in this period, the aim 
of my analysis is to distinguish between different intellectuals’ positions with 
respect to their conceptions of the Han, and taking into consideration their 
understanding and use of identity categories such as ‘nation’ and race. It is 
important to note that most Chinese intellectuals at that time faced a similar 
dilemma, namely whether to focus on academic research or political aims. 
Most of them opted for the latter, and this is why intellectuals played a 
significant role in major political events in Chinese history. Clarifying the 
relationship between these scholars’ academic research and their political 
ideas is an important aim of my analysis. However, my main analysis is 
focused on their interpretation of the Han, and on studying how and in what 
ways it is related to their understandings of nation, race, ethnicity and their 
interconnections. I argue that these divergent conceptions of the Han can help 
better elucidate the different attitudes toward reform and revolution among 
Chinese intellectuals, and allow for a more differentiated understanding of 
                                            
4
 Manchu is a large Tungusic ethnicity, which originated in Manchuria (today's Northeast 
China). The Manchu arose during the seventeenth century, and conquered the Ming Dynasty 
and established the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912). The Qing Dynasty governmentally ruled 
China until its abolition in 1911 by the Xinhai Revolution, after which the Kuomintang 
(Nationalist Party) became the government of China. 
99 
 
their debates at the time. By linking political positions to different 
understandings of collective identity and difference (or the Self and the Other), 
we can demonstrate that definitions of collective identity are intimately linked 
to the field of politics, and more broadly to the socio-historical context within 
which the intellectuals operated. 
 
The following chapters first discuss each of the chosen intellectuals 
individually. Each chapter starts by briefly outlining some key facts from the 
intellectual’s biography, and then moves on to discussing the key 
characteristics of his thoughts on the Han, nationhood and race, all in relation 
to the shifting political and social context at the time. This is followed by a 
chapter that provides a comparative analysis of the key ideas of the three 
intellectuals, and highlights the key differences and similarities between them. 
 
 
1. Zhang Binglin 
Zhang Binglin (1868-1936) is recognised as one of the most important 
intellectual figures in late Qing and early republican China and is known for 
advocating new perceptions of social reality and new solutions to existing 
social problems in Chinese society. He and his work feature in much of 
existing research on this historical period (e.g. Chow, 1997; Murthy, 2011; 
Shimada, 1990; and Wong, 1989).  
 
His radical and sometimes controversial ideas were debated intensively, and 
also gave rise to confusion. Zhang’s own intellectual complexity and radical 
revolutionary attitude have made it difficult to understand his ideas fully. Some 
of Zhang’s contemporary fellow scholars, for instance Huang Xing5, even 
called him ‘Zhang fengzi’ - that is - Zhang the mad man (Xu, 2004). 
Regardless, it cannot be denied that Zhang made an important contribution to 
the history of the Chinese revolution in many aspects, which is recognised in 
                                            
5
 Huang Xing (1874-1916) was one of the founders of the Kuomingtang (KMT) and the 
Republic of China. His position was next to Sun Zhongshan and they were known as Sun-
Huang during the Xinhai Revolution. 
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more contemporary research on China and its history. 
 
As far as political attitudes are concerned, Zhang Binglin was widely viewed 
as a representative of the intellectuals who promoted the idea of pai-Man 
(expelling the Manchu). Zhang believed that the Han had been suffering 
under the Qing’s government for a long time and concluded that there had 
never been ‘equality between Manchu and Han’ (1977 [1901]: 151). However, 
these convictions were not shared by all Han intellectuals. Many of them 
either remained loyal to the Manchu government, like Kang Youwei, or 
claimed to eliminate the boundary between the Han and Manchu, like Liang 
Qichao, and regarded resistance to foreign invasion as the primary task for 
Chinese people, like Liang Qichao and Sun Zhongshan. 
 
When analysing Zhang’s works - as well as other Chinese intellectuals’ works 
- I noticed the complexity and interconnections between different markers of 
identity and social categories - including nation, race and ethnicity - in the 
construction of self-identity. To put it differently, when examining Zhang’s 
writings, I often encountered biological identity markers - such as ‘smelly’, 
‘barbarian’ and etc. - and it sometimes proved very difficult to clearly 
distinguish between cultural and biological markers. Yet mainstream literature 
on Chinese history leaves one with the impression that the idea of a Chinese 
superiority at the time - which mostly appears in the form of beliefs in Han 
superiority - is rooted primarily in notions of cultural and civilisational rather 
than biological superiority. For instance, Loewe (1966) argues: ‘The principal 
considerations whereby the Chinese have distinguished themselves from 
other peoples have been concerned neither with race, colour nor religion. 
Attention has been fixed simply on the degree of civilisation, as this is 
illustrated by a people’s behaviour and mores’ (248). 
 
Similar views can be found both in older as well as more recently published 
literature about this historical period. For instance, to Zhao (2004) the Self-
image of the Chinese people before the 19th century was ‘culture-centric’ 
rather than nationalistic: ‘A sense of Chinese identity was based on a 
Confucian cultural system of ancestor worship’ (41). Harrison (1969) also 
101 
 
used the term ‘culturalism’ to describe the dominant worldview of China before 
the collapse of the traditional Chinese order that occurred in the 19 th century 
(2). Thus, Han identity could be considered as a form of cultural pride based 
on the assumed superiority of Han standards of civilisation, embodied in 
Confucian ideas. Moreover, Harrison suggests that rather than thinking that 
distinctions between human groups are based in nature, Han people, 
according to the Confucian scheme, believed that ‘all members of the human 
race can be improved by means of education and discipline, and all 
barbarians who can be subjected to these process are to be included under 
the imperial aegis’ (249). This means that once a person considered a 
‘barbarian’ received sufficient Confucian education and behaved completely 
according to the Confucian standard, s/he would and should be included in 
the traditional Han society. Dikötter (1999) instead, made an effort to discuss 
the development of racial thought in China from a historical perspective. 
Although he mainly focused on research on race, he admitted that those 
definitions, e.g. race, nation, ethnicity and etc., ‘possess a high degree of 
flexibility and may vary considerably as a result of the changes in the 
perceptions and the valuations that the ingroup has about outgroups’ (425). 
 
It is indeed true that the idea of cultural superiority - which is more compatible 
with the idea of nation as typically understood today among Western scholars 
- is widely present in Chinese intellectuals’ writings on Han identity. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that racial or ethnical elements, which have 
more to do with biological and physical factors, are entirely absent. My study 
clearly showed the interconnections and overlaps among these ideas. The 
following quote from Han scholar Zhang Binglin’s work is a case in point: ‘The 
smelly enemy Manchu does not belong to the same nation as we do. Thus, 
whether the Manchu government will pursue the reforms or not, whether the 
Manchu government will rescue Chinese lives or not, we should carry out the 
revolution and expel them’ (1977 [1903]: 233). This statement clearly shows 
that Zhang was using biological markers - i.e. markers we typically associate 
with racial discourses - when defining the Chinese nation and considering the 
Manchu a ‘smelly enemy’. In other words, the Chinese nation was identified 
with the Han, and defined in opposition to a biologically - not only culturally - 
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different group, the Manchu. 
 
Another aspect of Zhang’s thinking that speaks in favour of this interpretation 
is his use of the ancient Chinese idea of Hua-yi zhi bian (Hua-yi Distinction). 
Hua-yi zhi bian is a historical concept used to biologically and culturally 
differentiate the classic ‘China’ (Hua/Huaxia, which is regarded as the origin of 
Han) from the ‘Yi’ (barbarians/Others/non-Chinese) (Liu, 2004: 11-12). This 
idea clearly produced a boundary, which was based on the belief in the 
superiority of Han culture and civilisation. However, although the Hua-Yi 
Distinction referred primarily to cultural and civilisational differences, it could 
easily assume more explicitly racial and biological overtones. For example, 
Zhang Binglin referred the Manchu, which was one of the yi groups in China, 
to a ‘smelly’ and ‘barbarian racial group’ (1977 [1903]: 233). The term 
‘barbarian’ was used with reference to a combination of cultural and racial 
markers to differentiate the Manchu from the Han. In the following 
paragraphs, I am going to examine the different identity markers and identity 
categories used by Zhang in more detail, to demonstrate that cultural and 
biological markers of identity were indeed closely intertwined in his work. 
 
Based on the preliminary analysis of Zhang’s works, I have divided the 
development of Zhang’s political thought and the understanding of the 
Chinese social reality into three main stages. The first stage encompasses the 
period between 1894 and 1898. During this period Zhang was an outspoken 
anti-Manchu scholar, but he did not yet argue for the expulsion of the Manchu. 
The second period starts with the beginning of the First Sino-Japanese Warin 
1894 and lasts until the establishment of the early Chinese republic in 1911. 
During this period, Zhang argued in favour of expelling the Manchu as well as 
against Western imperialism. The third stage starts in 1911 and lasts until 
1915. During this period Zhang’s attitudes towards the Manchu softened and 
he expressed a clear desire to establish a Chinese Republic which included 
them. While dividing Zhang’s work in this way I do of course also 
acknowledge that there were important continuities in his thinking across all 
the three periods. However, it makes sense to distinguish between them 
analytically for the sake of the clarity of the argument. 
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1.1 Period I: 1894-1898 
During the first period, Zhang Binglin was widely viewed as a representative 
of anti-Manchu revolutionists (Kallio, 2011: 49). However, it is rarely 
acknowledged that during this same period, Zhang was also actively 
supporting the Bairi weixin (The Hundred Days’ Reform) organised by the 
reformists such as Kang Youwei in 1898. At this stage, Zhang was attempting 
to find an adequate reform that would help the Manchu government to resist 
the threat of Western imperialism. In other words, instead of arguing for the 
expulsion of the Manchu court, Zhang at this time actually agreed that the 
Manchu should continue to be the official government of China. He believed 
maintaining the Manchu government was necessary in order to promote the 
cooperation among all Chinese to resist the increasing impact of Western 
imperialist ambitions on their society. As we will see, this idea appeared again 
in his work after the establishment of the Republic of China in 1911. He 
abandoned anti-Manchuism soon after the Wuchang Uprising and instead 
concentrated his energy on resisting effectively what he considered the threat 
of the Western imperialism. Clearly, the intensity of Zhang’s anti-Manchu 
agenda varied depending on his concerns about the power of Western 
nations in China. 
 
In order to make his views about maintaining the Manchu government publicly 
known, Zhang published a large number of articles in the newspaper 
Shiwubao (The Chinese Progress) during this period. This newspaper was 
sponsored by the Qiangxue hui (Society for Self-strengthening Studies), 
which was one of the organisations formed by intellectuals and government 
officials who were supporting the reform. The Shiwubao mainly published 
articles that discussed the ways of improving and strengthening the Manchu 
governmental power, which also indicates Zhang’s support for the Manchu 
court in this period. 
 
Zhang expressed his towards the Manchu during the first period related to his 
views on the Han and Chinese identity. He intended to provide a framework 
for clarifying boundaries between different human groups by drawing upon 
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both cultural as well as biological factors. He (1977 [1897]) noted, 
‘While human beings vary in their height, colours as well as morals and 
customs, they are all biologically different from animals, and this is 
something shared by all civilised nations [zu]. However, only we own 
the rich territory, elevated morals and righteous characteristics 
bestowed by God, own the complete and advanced moral system, as 
well as the righteous religion, our race [zhong] is the noblest and the 
most honourable’ (8). 
We can see here that, Zhang did not categorise and judge other races 
exclusively with reference to biological factors such as skin colour; instead, he 
admitted the legitimacy of the civilisations of other groups. Nevertheless, he 
clearly attempted to construct a standard moral and cultural hierarchy 
between the Han and all other groups of human beings. Han is here 
constructed as a race (zhong) that sets itself apart through its material wealth 
(rich territory), allegedly ‘god-given’ superior cultural and moral qualities and 
advancement. Zhang sees Han superiority grounded in its cultural attributes - 
the seemingly outstanding - nobility and honour of the Han, and grants them 
the highest position amongst the civilised nations. 
 
When drawing racial boundaries between large-scale human groups, Zhang 
frequently referred to geographical boundaries. For example, he claimed, 
 
‘the world is divided into five continents with clear boundaries. All kinds 
of animals, as well as human beings, exist independently on each 
continent. Therefore, the Caspian Sea and the Ural Mountains should 
be used as the territorial boundary that differentiates Asia from Europe 
and the yellow race from the white race’ (1977 [1897]: 5). 
 
As this quote reveals, geography was along with skin colour an important 
marker of race for Zhang, who suggests here that racial units can be mapped 
onto territorial units. Zhang believed races to be intimately, almost organically 
related to different (clearly identifiable) territories, to the point that he believed 
these territories were literally ‘owned’ by different races. This kind of 
105 
 
understanding, of course, leaves little room for migration and ‘inter-racial’ 
mixing.  
 
Zhang’s writings from this period contained frequent references to the skin 
colour of different races, which was historically a crucial marker of race 
difference in Western race discourses. This is particularly evident in Zhang’s 
arguments about a necessity of Chinese cooperation with other Asian nations 
in the struggle against Western imperialism. Zhang felt strongly that different 
Asian nations belonged to the same yellow race, and needed to unite against 
the white race. The following quote is a case in point: ‘if there is anyone who 
decides to raise a war, this is actually the inner conflict among our yellow 
race, which could only lead us to become the corpses of the white race’ (1977 
[1897]: 6). He even warned that, expelling the Manchu was regarded as a 
priority: ‘the whites will take this opportunity to devour our territory’ (1906 
[1900]: 61). It is clear from these quotations that Zhang was constructing the 
yellow race in opposition to the white race, and called for the cohesion and 
cooperation of the former to protect itself from the threat of the imperialistic 
white race. 
 
Apart from physical and biological elements such as territory and skin colour, 
Zhang also often included cultural factors and more specifically religious 
factors into his discussion of Chinese identity. He additionally believed the 
weakness of the Chinese nation, namely its inability to resist foreign invasion, 
was rooted in the weakening of Chinese traditional religion:  
 
‘foreign religions are brought into China, which have only little 
influence, however, when they come across inequality, they fight by 
using their sword and bow, which is due to the prosperity of their 
church. Chinese Confucian intellectuals stagger on the street without 
relying on anything… Although we have talents; we are not able to 
occupy the official position… The weakness of the race [zhongzu, here 
he actually means Han] is due to the decline of Confucianism’ (1977 
[1897]: 8-9). 
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In the same text, Zhang also argued that ‘we own the complete and advanced 
moral system, as well as the righteous religion’ (ibid). Combined with the last 
quotation, it is not difficult to understand that the religion he referred to here is 
Confucian, and that he sees this religion as the basis of Chinese morals and 
strength.  
 
To conclude, during this period, Zhang Binglin showed a lack of interest in the 
distinctions and conflicts between the Han and the Manchu, and was in favour 
of maintaining and strengthening the Manchu government by promoting 
reform and the unification of the yellow race, in order to resist a Western white 
dominance over China. As a consequence, his writings in this period regularly 
included references to the category of race, and to what he considered the 
similarities and differences between the yellow and the white races. However, 
it would be misleading to conclude that Zhang’s work was somehow more 
explicitly racist in this period, and that he later, when his interest shifted to 
relationships between the Han and the Manchu, became more nationalistic in 
character. Instead, this particular use of the category race in this period was 
linked to his political preferences and the broader political context at the time.  
 
When considering who represented a greater evil for China, the Manchu or 
the Westerners, Zhang clearly believed that it was the latter who represented 
the most dangerous threat. Therefore, he tended not only to regard the 
Manchu court as the legitimate government of China, but even tried to include 
Japan and other Asian countries into the same [yellow] racial group [zhong or 
zhongzu] with China (1977 [1897]: 5). Race was therefore not a category that 
included only the Han, or only the Manchu or the Japanese; instead, it was a 
category that was stretched to include all of these in opposition to the white 
race. By using the category of race and the deictic expression ‘us’ in this way, 
Zhang attempted to call for the assistance of other Asian countries in the anti-
Western struggle. 
 
Zhang’s understanding of Han identity was thus clearly related to the specific 
political context at the time, and echoed the specific social environment in 
which he and other Chinese intellectuals operated. In other words, his focus 
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on defining the Chinese race in opposition to the white race - rather than 
looking into differences between the Manchu and the Han - was in line with 
his tolerance of the Manchu government and his worries about the imperial 
ambitions of the West and their increasing impact on China. In this period, 
therefore, differences between the Han and the Manchu were pushed aside 
due to the presence of a dangerous common enemy - the West. 
 
 
1.2 Period II: 1898-1910 
The beginning of the second period in the work of Zhang was marked by the 
beginning of the First Sino-Japanese War, which destroyed his only hope for 
the maintenance of the Manchu government. Zhang decided to break with the 
Qing court in 1901, when it signed the Boxer Protocol with a number of 
Western countries: Austria-Hungary, Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, 
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Russia, Spain, and the United States. According to 
this unequal treaty, the Qing government was required to pay 450 million taels 
of silver, which is approximately equal to US$ 6.653 billion today (Hurst, 
1972)6. Zhang was disappointed by the weakness of the Qing court. Since 
then, he adopted a more negative attitude towards the Manchu government. 
On the one hand, he criticised it for its poor performance in resisting the 
Western threat; on the other hand, he also condemned the Manchu’s rulers 
for persecuting the Han - for instance during the Boxer Uprising - in order to 
consolidate their political power. It is in this context that his theoretical interest 
shifted from the relationship between the Chinese and the West to differences 
and conflicts between the Manchu and the Han. 
  
The shift in Zhang’s political ideas appears very clearly in his writings. In the 
                                            
6
 The Jiawu War officially named the First Sino-Japanese War between China and Japan, 
started in 1894 and ended in 1895. The Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed afterwards. 
According to some clauses in the treaty, China had to admit the complete independence and 
autonomy of Korea. Meanwhile, China was required to cede the full sovereignty of Penghu 
and Taiwan and pay 200,000,000 Kuping taels to Japan (Hurst, 1972). 
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article Kedi kuangmiu (Correcting the Erroneous Guest Emperor Thesis7), 
published in 1900, i.e. before the signing of the Boxer Protocol, he argued that 
the Manchu government should be maintained and strengthened if the Qing 
emperor acknowledges past mistakes of national oppression and supported 
Confucianism (1977 [1900]: 120). In 1901, however, he published Zheng 
chouman lun (Correct Discourse on Hatred for the Manchu), and in this essay 
he suggested that the Han was the only legitimate master of the Chinese 
territory: 
 
‘We now exclude Manchu, which means that we reclaim our garden 
and house that have been occupied by others in violation of the 
contract. Meanwhile, those three provinces in Northeast China are 
Manchu territory. This is why we argue for excluding Manchu instead of 
wiping out the Manchu’. [1977 {1901}: 94, 97])  
 
In 1902, Zhang organised a protest rally held in one of Tokyo’s parks in Japan, 
and gave a speech in which he emphasised that it had been 242 years since 
the Chinese nation came under Manchu rule. He argued that the downfall of 
the Ming Dynasty 242 years ago was a ‘loss for the Chinese nation [zu]’ 
(Tang, 1996: 125) because the Manchu was an alien nation [zu] comparable 
to the Europeans and the Americans. 
 
This position differs considerably from the one dominant in the first period, 
when Zhang saw the Manchu as part of a wider Self, faced with a common 
enemy - the West. Now he rejected the legitimacy of Manchu rule and 
encouraged the Chinese people to expel the Manchu and fight for the 
restoration of a Han-dominated Chinese nation. Zhang also believed this 
understanding of the relationship between the Manchu and the Han, and the 
associated understanding of the Chinese nation, should be reflected in 
Chinese historiography, as this would allegedly help advocate Han patriotism. 
It is due to this that he suggested to Liang Qichao, who was planning to 
                                            
7
 The Manchu was widely considered not to be the traditional government of China. Zhang 
thus argued that the Qing emperor should be only named a “guest emperor” (1977 [1900]: 
120). 
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systematically compile a Chinese national history, to include a volume about 
race/nation [zhongzu] (1977 [1902]: 168). 
 
Zhang’s understandings of the terms zhongzu (race) and zu (nation) in this 
period become clearly apparent in his attempts to distinguish between 
recovery and revolution. He equated the anti-Manchu movement with the 
recovery, reconstruction or restoration of the lost Chinese state, and not with 
revolution. In line with this, he emphasised the need to use the term guangfu 
(reconstruction/recovery/restoration) rather than geming (revolution) when he 
argued for the necessity of anti-Manchuism: 
 
‘The conflicts within the same race/nation [tong zu] are defined as 
revolution; while the conflicts between different races/nations [yi zu] are 
defined as destruction. Improving the institution and government of the 
same race/nation is named a revolution; while expelling the different 
race/nation means honourable recovery [guangfu]. Given the fact that 
China has been destroyed by the enemy Manchu, we should commit 
ourselves to the honourable recovery instead of revolution’. (1977 
[1903]: 193)  
 
Here he actually claimed the necessity of the thorough exclusion of Manchu 
from the Chinese nation, while some other intellectuals, e.g. Kang Youwei, 
considered that the only method to solve the Chinese social problem was to 
organise a revolution without expelling the Manchu government. Analytically 
rather interesting is that Zhang did not any longer represent the Manchu as 
fellow members of the same yellow race as the Han: they are instead 
constructed as a race/nation that was different to the Han, and could be 
expelled in an honourable attempt to recover the real Han Chinese 
nation/government. 
 
In this period, Zhang tried hard to clarify the distinction between the Han and 
the Manchu further. He now drew a clear racial line of division between the 
Manchu and his own Han race - distinguishing between them from a biological 
perspective and with reference to ideas of their different origins and assumed 
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distinct biological characteristics. The Manchu, were no longer referred to as 
important fellow yellow allies in the fight against Western white imperialism, 
but rather defined by Zhang as the Other: a ‘smelly’, ‘barbarian racial group’ 
(1977 [1903]: 233), which was essentially distinct from the Han. By identifying 
Han and Manchu as two distinct racial groups, Zhang aimed to question the 
legitimacy of their Manchu government and expel the Manchu from China. He 
argued: ‘the exotic Manchu who constitute the current government, are 
actually far removed and distinct from the Chinese (1977 [1899]: 87). The 
Manchu were hereby reconceptualised as an exotic and racially distinct group 
different from the Han, which Zhang defined as the authentic Chinese. 
 
However, although Zhang did clearly refer to physical and racial differences 
between the Manchu and the Han, this was not the main focus of his writing in 
this period. His anti-Manchuism was rather primarily based on his arguments 
about history and culture. According to Zhang, Manchu was the ‘alien’ (ibid) 
rule, which should be opposed since their culture is alien (Xiao, 1975:905). In 
his famous article Zheng chouman lun (Correct discourse on hatred for the 
Manchu) (1977 [1901]: 94, 97), he reviewed the history of Manchu’s violent 
government of the Hanese. Thus, Zhang claimed that Manchu were a violent, 
less civilised, and, most importantly, alien government. He concluded that the 
hatred of the Manchu government was a precondition of the Chinese 
revolution: 
 
‘We Chinese nationals [zhongguo ren] are the masters of the nation 
[guojia]. If the government cannot undertake to discharge itself of all 
the responsibilities of the public/civil servant, and to the contrary, it is 
satisfied with destroying and ravaging the people, then it is no different 
to a rascal and a robber… That is why I said we Chinese cannot claim 
revolution without the hatred of the government. Do we Chinese have 
the inborn characteristics of slaves and the quality of being cows and 
horses? Should we Chinese be benumbed when the government 
nibbles our body and tramples our territory?’ (1977 [1903]: 229). 
 
We can therefore summarise two main reasons that contributed to the forming 
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of Zhang’s anti-Manchu ideas: on the one hand, during the Qing Dynasty, the 
Manchu court dominated, controlled and subjugated the Hanese, and its 
representatives lived a privileged existence segregated from the Han, while 
benefiting from the government policy of political discrimination. Zhang also 
argued that the establishment of Manchu authority involved several cases of 
violent attacks on the Han: ‘the Yangzhou massacre, Jiading massacre, 
Jiangyin massacre and Jinhua massacre [promoted by the Manchu] were 
violence like black vulture eating meat, and doe group robbering houses’ 
(1977 [1899]: 87). On the other hand, in Zhang Binglin’s eyes, the Manchu 
rulers were not only becoming more corrupt and oppressive, they were also 
too weak to defend China’s territory against rapacious Western imperialism. 
 
Zhang’s anti-Manchuism reached its peak between 1904 and 1907. For the 
occasion of the commemoration party in celebration of the establishment of a 
revolutionary newspaper Minbao, he rethought the whole history of China, 
excluding the Yuan Dynasty established by Mongolia and the Qing Dynasty 
established by the Manchu (1977 [1906]: 326) from Chinese history writing. 
He was actually making an effort to establish a pure Han Chinese history. Yet 
again, he claimed that ‘the extinction of Manchu is the fortune and happiness 
to Hanese’ (1977 [1906]: 343). 
 
During this period, Zhang frequently used the term ‘great Han’ (1977: 310, 
336, 343, 345 and etc.) expressing a conception of superiority. He further 
summarised what he considered Manchu’s abuse: ‘The greed of Manchu is 
ten times bigger than that of the Hanese’ (1977 [1908]: 423). One of the core 
values of the Hanese, argued Zhang, was their admiration for intellectuals, 
while the Manchu valued business. This allegedly led to a stronger sense of 
morals among the Hanese, and a mocking attitude towards morals among the 
Manchu. For instance, on one occasion, Zhang described the Manchu as a 
group of ‘horse thieves’ (1977[1908]: 423), who got rich by stealing from 
people’s graves. Indeed, we can see here that Zhang was using both cultural 
and biological markers when distinguishing between the Han and the Manchu, 
though he put more emphasis on cultural elements in their representation. 
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In regard to Zhang’s views about the Han in a more detailed sense, Zhang 
argued that ‘it has been widely accepted that China consists of a number of 
assimilated nations [minzu] and it is hard to define China in a national way, we 
need to consider the majority national group as the main body of the Chinese 
kinship. This is because of the fact that the Chinese kinship originates in 
Chinese culture’ (1982 [1904]: 173). According to Zhang, ‘the majority national 
group’ and ‘the main body of the Chinese kinship’ were respectively referred 
to as the Han and the Han culture, which should be viewed as the standard of 
Chinese civilisation. These ‘Han-centric’ views are clearly reflected also in his 
arguments about Chinese history:  
 
‘From the ancient time, [China] tried hard to construct a culture which 
absorbs alien races [wai zu], set their lineages in order, and made 
effort to civilise them in a Chinese way. Those people [ren] who were 
originally different, after standardisation of the written language and the 
social customs, became one race [zu] and composed the present 
China’. (Zhang 1982 [1904]: 39)      
 
Zhang’s arguments about the need to expel the Manchu government were 
closely intertwined with his arguments about the necessity of a re-
construction of the Chinese national identity as Hanese. He defined the Han 
from a historical perspective and claimed that over time, the Han absorbed 
different alien nations and made them follow the Han moral system. Zhang 
also believed that the Han were actually ‘civilising’ the ‘barbarians’ by making 
them use the Han language and follow Han social customs (1982 [1900]: 2-
7). This view was rooted in his understanding of the hierarchy of civilisations 
in both biological and cultural ways and obviously demonstrated Zhang’s 
perception of cultural superiority of the Han over the Manchu. His attempt to 
contrast both groups as racially distinct, and portray the Manchu as inferior, 
less civilised and weaker in contrast to the superior Han lineage was also 
evident in another example:  
 
‘Although the Han regime is weak at the moment, the people would 
fight for and even die for it since they are of the same origin. The 
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Manchu are however inferior and less civilised, which is why they were 
radically and essentially despised by the people, and thus they will 
definitely be annexed by Europe and America’. (1982 [1900]: 90) 
 
Given his belief that the Manchu were inferior, evil and weak, and would 
crumble under Western imperialism, Zhang called for a re-construction of 
Chinese national identity of the Han - a necessity in his eyes. He summarised 
two key factors in promoting Han patriotism, ‘one is to enhance national 
morality by increasing the confidence using the traditional religions; the other 
is to motivate the national sense/consciousness [zhong xing] and to promote 
patriotism by publicizing/educating the cultural quintessence of China’ (1977 
[1906]: 272). In order to promote patriotism among the Hanese, Zhang 
criticised the theory claiming nation/nationalism is something purely created. 
He argued, ‘without admitting that the nation is something physically existent, 
it is confusing and chimerical to claim patriotism’ (1977 [1907]: 361). 
 
The restoration of the national identity of the Han was very important in 
Zhang’s view. He believed that China could not survive as a nation without 
clearly defining its identity. This definition was based on a sense of national 
identity. Zhang, when he claimed the necessity of advocating the national 
cultural quintessence of the Chinese, understood and explained it as the 
history of the Han. Meanwhile, he referred to the Han language/character to 
explain the Chinese language/character and criticised those ‘Westernisers’ 
who had lost their loyalty to the Chinese nation and race. In the foreword to 
the magazine Hanzhi (Han Flag Periodical) (1977 [1906]), he defined China 
as a pure Han nation, and noted: ‘after the coming of the robber Manchu, Han 
lost its own rules; however, the name of Han is like the contrary of the so-
called Manchu’ (345). His effort to exclude Manchu from the national identity 
of China was closely tied to his attempts to restore a pure Han government 
within the Chinese territory. 
 
As evident from the above, during the second period, Zhang was concerned 
primarily with what he now considered essential - biological and cultural 
differences between the Han and the Manchu. However, this does not mean 
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that he forgot about the threat of Western imperialism altogether. Instead, 
even during the time when he most radically stressed the necessity of 
expelling the Manchu government, he never forgot what he considered as the 
danger of white imperialism, which was - from his perspective - the real 
driving force of modern Chinese nationalism. In some articles, for example, 
Fanzhen lun (Discussion on the Renegade Military Governors of Boarder 
Provinces) (1977 [1899]: 99-100), Zhang frequently referred to the term 
baozhong (The protection of the zhong). In this article, Zhang encouraged the 
Chinese to resist the invasion of the whites (1977 [1899]: 99-100) to promote 
our race (zhong), which he meant to be the yellow race. This is evident in his 
claim that China should treat Japan as the tong zhong (same race), and that it 
was important to incorporate Japan and the Japanese as ‘brothers’ in the 
attempts to resist the invasion from the whites. Zhang argued: 
 
‘The conflict between Japan and “us” is different from and much less 
serious than the deep-seated resentment to Britain and France. It is 
easily understood that Japan is a country that belongs to the same 
race [tongzhong] as ours, which is close to the Eastern China Sea. 
However, the violations of our frontier produced by those European 
people are long-standing, and we are totally out of support without 
Japan, who shares the same destiny with us. In regard to the current 
situation, the hatred between Japan and “us” is far less serious than 
what we have with the white race [bai zhong]. That we brothers fight 
against each other will only benefit others’. (Zhang 1977 [1898]: 54-55)  
 
He therefore appeals to his readers to support cooperation with Japan, and 
even generously give up some Chinese territories and hand them over to 
Japan:  
 
‘…if China becomes more powerful, it will collectively benefit both of 
us; on the other hand, if China will be weak, it only benefits Japan on 
its own, without doing any other good…It is better to let Japan occupy 
the Northern Shandong than let Russia and Germany capture it; it is 
better that we presented it as a gift to Japan than that Japan occupies 
it after war. Then why not present our stagnant regions as a large gift 
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to Japan?’ (55)  
 
Zhang’s idea to ‘present’ some part of Chinese territory as a gift to Japan was 
very novel one and very different from ideas advocated by most other 
Chinese intellectuals at the time. Giving national land to other countries as a 
gift was obviously not an easily accepted opinion. This demonstrates Zhang’s 
serious concern about the threat of Western imperialism. 
 
To conclude, Zhang’s writing in this period was focused primarily on 
distinguishing the Han and the Manchu as racially and culturally distinct 
groups, and promoted the idea that the Han were superior to the Manchu, 
and the only legitimate representatives and rulers of the Chinese nation. This 
was closely linked to his political views in that period. In drawing distinctions 
between the two groups Zhang was using both biological and cultural 
markers, and both the categories of nation and race. At the same time, he 
also occasionally continued to use the word race [zhong] to refer to a larger 
unity including other Asian groups, in particular the Japanese, and distinguish 
between this larger racial unity and the white race. In both cases, the 
distinctions between ‘us’ and them were rooted in his perception of the social 
hierarchy of races, i.e. the biological and cultural superiority of the Han race 
(vis-à-vis the Machu) and the yellow race (vis-à-vis the white race). Such 
racialised ideas echoed Western social sciences research of the time, and the 
development of scientific racism in the West throughout the 19th century. 
 
This flexible use of the category race confirms that the terms race and nation 
were partly interconnected and even interchangeable at the time. Instead of 
treating these terms as distinct and mutually exclusive social categories, 
which refer to clearly distinct kinds of social groups, it is therefore better to 
see them as partially overlapping representations of social identity and 
difference (inclusion and exclusion, belonging and non-belonging) without a 
clearly defined, fixed meaning. Instead of defining the Han by using 
exclusively one of the concepts - be it race, nation or ethnicity - Zhang 
combined various social categories and markers and used them differently 
depending on the context, although each time with the aim to clarify the 
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boundaries between the Self and the Other. 
 
 
1.3 Period III: 1910-1915 
The third period of the development of Zhang’s ideas began in 1910. From 
this year onwards his anti-Manchuism became less radical, and he started 
differentiating between the Manchu government and the Manchu people. He 
explained that anti-Manchuism was aiming to overthrow the Manchu 
government rather than expel all Manchu people (Tang, 1982 [1910]: 520). 
 
The changes in Zhang’s attitude are once again closely related to his 
perception of the rising Western imperialist threat. When considering the 
major threats that the Chinese nation allegedly faced at the time - the Manchu 
on the one hand, and the Western invasion on the other hand - Zhang argued 
that their relative importance had shifted, and that the latter became far more 
serious:  
 
‘It seems that the Manchu was considered as a greater danger than 
the Western threat in the revolution; however the truth is that the 
Westerners are actually ten thousands of times more dangerous than 
the Manchu at this moment’. (1915 [1909] vol 3: 43)  
 
Zhang also believed that other nations that were similarly occupied or invaded 
by Western forces were in a similar situation as the Han: ‘We are concerned 
not only about the Han nation [zu] but also those nations [yi zu] whose 
territories were occupied, whose national rights [minzu zhuquan] were 
usurped and whose people [ren] are enslaved’ (ibid). Among other nations 
suffering under the foreign yoke he mentioned India which was colonised by 
the British Empire, and Vietnam which was colonised by France. This shared 
suffering, argued Zhang, was the basis for a particular form of compassion 
among nationalists from different nations. On one occasion, he even argued 
that: ‘a real nationalist [minzu zhuyi zhe] is the one who sympathises with 
other nations [minzu] that are experiencing the same excruciation as his own 
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nation’ (ibid). Ideas of this kind were characteristic of the third stage of the 
development of Zhang’s representation of Chinese identity and the Han. 
 
Zhang’s understanding of the Han changed as well during this period. As 
demonstrated in the previous section, his nationalist claims about Han 
superiority were initially mainly based on the belief in the superiority of Han 
customs, language and culture. Apart from these cultural markers, he also 
regularly referred to biological markers of difference, such as skin colour, to 
differentiate between the Han and the Manchu. However, after the 
establishment of the Republic of China in 1911, he started associating Han 
identity and Han nationalism with the construction of state, and put less 
emphasis on the cultural aspects of Han identity and on the idea that the Han 
are the only group entitled to govern China. Instead, following Sun 
Zhongshan’s ideas - which will be discussed at a later point in this chapter - 
Zhang started advocating the political unification of the Han, the Manchu, the 
Mongols, and Tibetans. 
 
In this period, Zhang argued that national interests [guojia liyi] were more 
important than personal feelings. He wanted to include as many people as 
possible into the group of ‘Chinese’, and presented this as something that is 
in the interest of the Chinese population as a whole. In his letter to Chinese 
students in Japan in 1910 he noted: ‘the aim of the national revolution [minzu 
geming] is to reconstruct our national identity [zhuquan], and thus prevent 
being captured by others; this neither means massacring all the Manchu and 
making them die sonless nor treating them as slaves’ (1977 [1910]: 519). 
Further on in the same letter, Zhang clearly stated that the Manchu are part of 
the Chinese nation, and even claimed that they should enjoy the same right 
as the Han: ‘Our Manchu are also Chinese, enjoying equal rights of 
undertaking farming, engaging in commercial activities, using language as 
well as being eligible to participate in election’ (ibid). When arguing for the 
equal treatment of the Han and Manchu, Zhang appealed to what he 
considered the values and nature of the Han:  
 
‘It is in our Hanese nature to be peaceful and humane. We have no 
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wish to massacre other nations [zhongzu], nor do we hold prejudices 
against different classes. Given that within our territory, there are 
Mongols, Uyghurs, as well as Tibetans, who are all treated equally, 
why we only unjustly treat the Manchu?’ (1977 [1910]: 520).  
 
Interestingly, the honourable Hanese values Zhang was appealing to - e.g. 
humanness - were the very same values he associated with the Han already 
in the previous period. He earlier claimed that the Han, among all the other 
human groups, was the only civilised zu, with ‘elevated morals and righteous 
characteristics’ (1977 [1897]: 8). However, in the previous period these values 
were used to foster hatred against the Manchu, while now he used them to 
argue for the equal treatment of the Manchu. 
 
Zhang’s national ideas became especially clear after the uprising of the 
Xinhai Revolution (known as the Chinese Revolution) in 1911. During that 
time, Japan showed a clear desire to occupy Manchuria, which was the home 
of the Manchu. In contrast to his early effort to locate the Manchu as a distinct 
racial/national group from Han, Zhang now highlighted the historical 
connection between the Manchu and the Han. On the 1st of November, 1912, 
he wrote in the newspaper Dagonghe ribao: ‘[although] Japan and Russia 
made an utmost effort to penetrate Manchuria, the historical bond between 
[the Manchu and us] cannot be broken’. In his article Lun jiaoyu de genben 
yaocong ziguo zixin fachulai (On How the Foundation of Education Should 
Come from One’s Country and One’s Own Heart) (1977 [1910]: 507), 
although Zhang regarded Han culture as the representative of Chinese 
traditional culture, he had also to some extents affirmed the development of 
Chinese culture during the Qing period that ‘the study of literature, 
mathematics, and li [ritual], which had experienced a long-term darkness, 
brightened during the Qing. The development of histography has reached the 
standard of the Song Dynasty’ (ibid). 
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1.4 Conclusion 
Zhang was regarded as one of the most radical revolutionists in late Qing and 
early republican China, especially due to his anti-Manchu ideas. He made a 
great effort in advocating new interpretations of social reality and new 
solutions to existing social problems. Zhang’s own intellectual complexity and 
radically revolutionary attitude have made it difficult to understand his ideas 
fully, and this is true for many other Chinese intellectuals during the late Qing 
period. However, no matter how much Zhang’s standpoint was changing (in 
line with changing political and social context), he always used various 
identity markers in order to define the Han, the Self and to construct and 
clarify the boundaries between the Self and the Others. 
 
In the first period, Zhang was actively supporting the Bairi weixin (The 
Hundred Days’ Reform, organised by Kang Youwei), in order to help the 
Manchu government to resist the growing influence and power of the West in 
China. Instead of arguing for the expulsion of the Manchu court, Zhang 
actually agreed that the Manchu should continue to be the official government 
of China. He believed maintaining the Manchu government was necessary in 
order to promote the cooperation among all the Chinese to resist Western 
imperialism (1977 [1899]: 86). However, this standpoint was still based on his 
deep belief in Han’s racial and cultural superiority, as the Han were seen as 
the ‘noblest and the most honourable’ of all ethnicities (1977 [1897]: 8). 
Although Zhang was in favour of maintaining the Manchu government, it is 
evident from the quotation above that he undoubtedly believed that the Han 
stood in the highest position in a racial, moral and cultural hierarchy among 
the various groups of human beings. 
 
In the second period, Zhang was disappointed by the increasing weakness of 
the Manchurian Qing court. He adopted a more negative attitude to the 
Manchu government. On the one hand, he criticised the Manchu government 
for its poor performance in resisting the Western threat; on the other hand, he 
also condemned the Manchu’s rulers for persecuting the Han - for instance 
during the Boxer Uprising - in order to consolidate their political power. During 
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this period, Zhang’s construction of the Self and them was frequently shifting: 
he paid much attention to the conflict between the Han and the Manchu; yet 
simultaneously, he never forgot to highlight the danger of the Western taking 
over China. He represented the Manchu and the Han as two distinct 
racial/national groups, and used cultural and biological markers of difference 
to construct the former as inferior to the latter, while calling for an exclusion of 
the Manchu from the Chinese national community. 
 
As we have seen, Zhang’s anti-Manchuism became less radical in the third 
period. He started differentiating between the Manchu government and the 
Manchu people and explained that anti-Manchuism was aimed at 
overthrowing the Manchu government rather than expelling the whole Manchu 
people (1982 [1910]: 520). The changes in Zhang’s attitude can be seen yet 
again closely related to his perception of the Western imperialist threat. When 
considering the major threats that the Chinese nation allegedly faced at the 
time - the Manchu on the one hand, and the Western invasion on the other 
hand - Zhang argued that their relative importance had shifted, and that the 
latter was ‘ten thousands of times more dangerous than the Manchu’ (1915 
[1909]). 
 
 
2. Sun Zhongshan 
Sun Zhongshan (1866-1925) is widely recognised in contemporary China as 
the ‘Father of Modern China’ (Ip, 2008: 327). This indicates the crucial role of 
Sun in the Chinese nation building process, especially in overthrowing the 
Manchu government in 1911. He was the first provisional president of the 
Republic of China, established in 1912. Sun’s effort in promoting the Chinese 
revolution gained him his high reputation in both mainland China and Taiwan. 
 
Distinct from other Chinese intellectuals during the period of late Qing, Sun 
Zhongshan was born and educated in the USA. This unique experience 
contributed to the complexity of his ideas, especially to his attitudes towards 
the West. On the one hand, he was aware of the impact of Western 
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imperialism on Chinese society; on the other hand, in order to achieve his aim 
to establish an anti-Manchu movement, Sun relied to some extent on Western 
help. These two aspects co-influence Sun’s academic and political ideas, 
which showed a considerable diversity and were at times contradictory. 
 
In order to study main patterns and changes in Sun’s ideas, influenced by the 
changing social and political background, I will divide the development of 
Sun’s ideas into three periods. The first period lasted from the outbreak of the 
First Sino-Japanese War to the establishment of the Republic of China in 
1911. During this period Sun defined self-identity in a considerably narrow 
sense and expressed a clear radical attitude towards the Manchu 
government, he argued: the Han was and should be the only representative of 
China. During the second period, between 1911 and 1914, Sun stated that 
‘the purpose of the establishment of the Republic of China is to advocate the 
free power of the trillion of nationals [guomin], which contains the Han, 
Manchu, Mongolia, Hui and Tibet’ (1985 [1911] vol 2: 23-24). The national 
unity of China was his main emphasis during this period. In the third period, 
between 1914 and 1919, Sun proposed that all Chinese people should be 
equally treated without being differentiated by ‘nation [guojia], race [minzu], 
class and religion’ (1985 [1911] vol 2: 106). 
 
 
2.1 Period I: 1890-1911 
The time from the last decade of the 19th century to the establishment of the 
Republic of China in 1911, could be roughly summarised as the first period in 
the development of Sun Zhongshan’s ideas. Sun was deeply disappointed by 
the result of the First Sino-Japanese War in 1894. During the war, the Manchu 
government mobilised only a fairly low level of resistance to the Japanese 
forces. The Manchu court not only totally lost the long-term control over 
Korea, but also lost the Liaodong province to Japan, which was known as the 
origin of Manchuria. In the same year, the China Revival Society was 
established by Sun Zhongshan in Honolulu. Sun called for the exclusion of all 
‘barbarians’ from China, and promoted the restoration and unification of the 
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Chinese nation as the main task of the Chinese revolution: It was up to the 
Chinese to: ‘expel the barbarian, restore China, and establish the united 
government’ (The Second Historical Archives of China, 1994 [1894]: 83).  
 
The Western imperialist threat, which can be considered one of the main 
reasons leading to the fall of the Manchu government, became one of the 
main motivations for public criticisms of the Manchu government, especially 
among radical revolutionists such as Sun Zhongshan. He believed that, the 
inner reforms that took place within the Qing court would not really help to 
save China and the Chinese people. Instead of maintaining and strengthening 
the Manchu government, it was seen as necessary to establish a ‘pure’ China, 
which was based on the rule of the dominant Han and excluded the Manchu. 
Sun Zhongshan was clearly one of those who advocated the establishment of 
such a ‘pure’ exclusively Hanese-Chinese nation at the time. He stated: 
  
 ‘we should promote nationalism among the non-Manchu Chinese, 
which is my lifetime responsibility. Once this spirit (of nationalism) is 
awakened, the Chinese nation will inevitable arouse the power of its 4 
hundred million people, to forever expel the Manchu Dynasty’ (1985 
[1902] vol 3: 2). 
 
In Sun’s eyes, the weakness showed by the Manchu court in the wars with the 
foreign nations, especially the Sino-Japanese War in 1894, contributed to the 
spreading of Han Chinese nationalism and an ardent desire to re-establish a 
pure Han Chinese government. This distinguished Sun’s ideas from those of 
the other two intellectuals I discuss in this chapter, Zhang Binglin and Liang 
Qichao, both of whom initially advocated maintaining and improving the 
Manchu government. It could be concluded that Sun Zhongshan never 
expected anything from the Manchu government throughout his life. 
Furthermore, he never gave any chance to the Manchu court to improve their 
governmental abilities. This is because from the very start, Sun Zhongshan 
refused categorically to accept the Manchu as Chinese nationals: ‘China was 
subjugated by the Manchu for more than 260 years’ (1981 [1906] vol 1: 311-
312). Therefore, ‘Our nationals [guomin] who are patriotic, must make their 
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effort to smash the Manchu to restore our nation [zuguo]. If there is anyone 
who works for the Manchu, he is actually against his nation [zuguo]. China 
should be the Chinese China, but was conquered by the Manchu’ (1981 
[1906] vol 1: 312). In another essay, Sun explained similarly that ‘the true 
meaning of China is the Chinese China, the Chinese politics and should be 
governed by the Chinese’, which requires the expelling of the Manchu and 
restoration of the Han national sovereignty (1985 [1907] vol 1: 233). 
 
As indicated by the above, Sun considered that Chinese people had a strong 
passion for their nation, but a very weak sense of national identity. This 
apparently contradictory phenomenon was addressed by other Chinese 
scholars at the time. For instance, Liang Qichao (another scholar I will discuss 
in the next section) argued that, ‘we Chinese always existed as a uniquely 
independent nation [minzu], which was called by we Chinese “the whole world 
under the sky/heaven” [tianxia] instead of Chinese nation. As there is no 
nation [guo] but the whole world under the sky/heaven [tianxia] instead, how 
can we say nationalism then?’ (1990 [1899]: 270). Indeed, Liang Qichao is 
correct to point to the fact that the Chinese historically referred to themselves 
as ‘the whole world under the sky’. Yet this was due to the fact that at the 
time, they did not constitute a nation in the modern sense of the world. As we 
will show in our analysis of Chinese textbooks, the sense of identity was in 
this period tied primarily to Confucian values, i.e. to religion rather than 
nationhood. Or, to return to Liang Qichao: the lack of national consciousness 
was not simply a consequence of the absence of a national identity label, but 
stemmed from the fact that nationhood as such simply did not exist in its 
modern form in the Chinese context.  
 
Another factor that helps to explain the relative lack of national consciousness 
that Sun notes in his work lies in the Chinese political system at the time. 
Although China had a very long historical tradition of a centralised political 
system, the central government (Qing court) of that time was rather weak 
(Zhao, 2004: 71), which contributed to the instability or relatively late 
development of a consciousness of national identity among the Chinese. In 
the long run, however, the weakness of the Manchu government towards 
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Western powers also provided the basis for Chinese national mobilisation - 
led, among others, by intellectuals such as those explored in this chapter - 
and thereby strengthening the consciousness of a Chinese national identity 
associated with the Han. I will discuss these issues at greater length in my 
analysis of Chinese textbooks. 
 
Sun’s understanding and use of the categories nation and race in his writings 
were closely tied to his political ideas at the time. As evident from the above, 
the remarkable characteristic of this period was Sun’s radical attitude towards 
the Manchu and a strong emphasis on promoting the anti-Manchu movement. 
These attitudes were rooted in his understanding of the Manchu and the 
Chinese. For Sun, the Manchu were first, a foreign group from a biological 
perspective of lineage, and second, a ‘rude’ (1981 [1896] vol 1: 46), 
‘barbarian’ and ‘uncivilised’ (1981 [1903] vol 1: 232), ‘tyrannous’ (1981 [1897] 
vol 1: 172) community from the perspective of culture and morality. Sun here 
constructed the Manchu as a different and separate group from the Hanese 
with reference to both biological racialised markers (lineage), and cultural 
markers of difference (civilisation, barbarism and tyranny). 
 
In one of his essays, Sun wrote: ‘the current occupants of the important posts 
in the throne, the government and the army, all belong to the foreign nation 
[yizu]’ (1985 [1896] vol 2: 224), and also ‘[It is necessary] to entrust China to 
the pure Chinese to govern’ (1985 [1896] vol 2: 236). The term Chinese here 
refers to the Han. These two quotations represented two meanings: one is 
that the Manchu is a foreign nation, which is different from ‘us’ Han; on the 
other hand, they also mean that the Manchu is not and should not be included 
among the Chinese. The following quote provides another example of this 
kind of reasoning, and questions the legitimacy of the Manchu government 
explicitly: ‘The Manchu government is as we always mention totally different 
from the Chinese government. There is no government in China, thus the two 
terms (Manchu government and Chinese government) can never be 
alternatively used. If anyone who directly used the term Manchu government 
(referring to the Chinese government), it is wrong in law’ (1981 [1904] vol 1: 
244). Apart from promoting a clear opposition to the Manchu government, Sun 
125 
 
further claimed it necessary to expel all the Manchurian from ‘our’ territory 
(1985 [1903] vol 2: 250-251).  
 
Sun classified the Manchu as foreign, and as initially referred to them as a 
rude, barbarian, tyrannous, uncivilised nation from the perspective of culture 
and morality. In another verbal attack against the Manchu government, he 
argued: ‘regarding the Manchu thief, which has governed China for more than 
300 years, they view fooling the Hanese as the principle of their government. 
They also suck the blood of the Hanese, bind the hands and feet of the 
Hanese’ (1981 [1897], vol 1: 172). Sun expresses in this passage that he 
considers the Manchu as having a ‘parasitic’ and paralysing status in Chinese 
society, ‘sucking their blood’ and binding the Hanese. The reason Sun felt the 
Manchu government was ‘fooling’ the Hanese was because the Manchu tried 
to promote their own culture as well as their lifestyle in Chinese society, which 
were considered as very distinct from and also inferior to the traditional Han 
customs. Sun believed that this also went against the long-term process of 
national integration between the Han and Others since the minority groups 
were always required to follow the standard of Han civilisation, including the 
culture, lifestyles and etc. 
 
In contrast to the Manchu, Sun believed the Han to be very peaceful, morally 
superior, and civilised. In one essay, he preached that the ‘Chinese [here he 
referred to the Hanese] are the most peaceful nation [zhongzu] in the world’ 
(1981 [1903] vol 1: 219). He also put particular emphasis on the power of 
Chinese cultural morality, and regarded it as the reason for the submission of 
the neighbouring nations to China (ibid). By representing the Han in this way, 
he was clearly constructing a very positive image of the Self (the Han) in 
binary opposition to a very negative image of the Other (the Manchu). In 
Sun’s view, these stark differences between the Han and the Manchu made it 
impossible to support the Manchu government in any shape or form. He thus 
opposed Zhang Binglin’s ideas to protect and maintain the government of the 
guest emperor: ‘it is impossible to protect the “guest emperor” and reconcile 
[ourselves] to be the eternally doomed slaves. The incompatibility between 
the Manchu and the Han is like the difficulty of firing an ice mountain’ (1981 
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[1903] vol 1: 232). 
 
These radical views about the Han and the Manchu were also reflected in 
Sun’s reflections on Han and Manchu history. He constructs it as a history of 
two distinct racial groups that differed substantially in terms of their historical 
heritance, and cultural and moral status. According to him, ‘the Manchu were 
originally a nomadic group and a barbarian and a jianzhong [currish race], 
while we Han own 4000 years of civilisation’ (1981 [1903] vol 1: 232). This 
kind of thinking is characteristic of a long-term traditional self-perception of the 
Hanese, which defines Han culture and the Hanese moral system as the 
superior, proper standard of civilisation against which other groups are 
measured. Although the Manchu constituted the government of China at that 
time, Sun actually believed they were under civilised and culturally inferior to 
the Han. This perceived lack of civilisation was yet another reason that made 
him argue that the Manchu were unfit to govern China. 
 
As evident from the above Sun’s negative attitudes towards the Manchu were 
based on two grounds. One is Manchu’s allegedly violent style of governance 
and more generally oppression of the Hanese, as well as their low status in 
the civilisation hierarchy. The other intertwined argument he makes is that the 
Manchu do not count as Chinese nationals, but are to be considered a distinct 
foreign and inferior race, and thus any Manchu government, no matter how 
advanced, is seen as illegitimate. 
 
Sun’s views about the Westerners were also significantly influenced by racial 
categories. This is clearly evident from the following quote: ‘The territory of 
five continents is mostly swallowed by the white race [bai zhong]. The current 
only survivors are Japan and Manchu’ (1981 [1905] vol 1: 260). Although Sun 
felt that China was threatened of white imperialism, in his opinion, expelling 
the Manchu government and re-constructing a pure Han Chinese government 
should be the guiding principle of the Chinese revolution. In a speech given 
on the occasion of the establishment ceremony of a revolutionary society 
Tongmenghui (the United League of China), Sun claimed: ‘the reason for 
promoting the Chinese revolution is that China is currently conquered by the 
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Manchu… The Qing emperor is from a waizu [exotic nation]. The Hanese who 
are able to clarify zhongzu zhi bian [the national distinction] would never treat 
a thief as his/her father’ (1981 [1910] vol 1: 442-444). Sun believed that after 
expelling the Manchu court, all other problems would be automatically solved 
(1981 [1897]: 172-173). The Manchu were indeed conceptualised as another 
racial/national/ethnical group that essentially differed from the Han. He 
believed that only the Han were meant to be the representatives of the true 
China. 
 
This emphasis on expelling the Manchu, and on sharp differences between 
the Han and the Manchu, is one of the most significant characteristics of 
Sun’s political and academic ideas in this period. Yet surprisingly, Sun is 
famous primarily for his attempt to promote the integration of Han, Manchu, 
Mongolia, Hui and Tibet, which was, as we will see, a key trait of his ideas 
later in his life. In contrast, his proposal to expel the Manchu from ‘our’ 
Chinese territory was less often mentioned and discussed in scholarly texts. 
Distinct from other Chinese intellectuals during the period of late Qing, for 
example, Zhang Binglin and Liang Qichao, who expected to maintain and 
strengthen the governmental power of the Manchu court in their early age, 
Sun Zhongshan never acknowledged the legitimacy of the Manchu court. 
 
 
2.2 Period II: 1911-1914 
The second stage in the development of Sun’s ideas started with the fall of 
the Qing Dynasty and the establishment of the Republic of China in 1911. In 
his view, the purpose of the Republic of China was ‘to advocate the free 
power of the trillion of nationals, which contains Han, Manchu, Mongolia, Hui 
and Tibet, that means the unity of nation’ (1985 [1911] vol 2: 23-24). We can 
easily notice that his attitude to the minority nationalities, especially the 
Manchu, had radically changed. It is difficult to judge if this statement was due 
to the changes of Sun’s national ideas or motivated purely by his political 
considerations at the time. Sun’s shifting ideas could be to some extent 
explained by Brass (1991) theory of ‘ethnic nationalism’ (8), which 
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emphasises the instrumental use of nationalist discourse by political elites. 
According to Brass, nationalism is almost exclusively a product of 
manipulative elites, rather than something that also arises due to the 
particular requirements of modern economies and states. Although Brass’ 
theory is often criticised to be too instrumentalist, and the instrumental 
behaviour of the elites could not be seen as the only source of nationalism, it 
has been clearly demonstrated that intellectuals’ discourses are closely linked 
to the social reforms and changes occurring in Chinese society at that time. 
 
After the ruling power in China was back in the hands of the Han, Sun 
abandoned his former calls for expelling the Manchu from the Chinese 
territory. In one of his writings from this period, he claimed: ‘the Republic of 
China is established today. Whoever belongs to the Manchu, Mongolia, Tibet, 
Tsinghai or Hui, who used to suffer from despotism, gains the national political 
rights, and becomes the owner of the Republic’ (1985 [1911] vol 3: 66). 
Having included the Manchu, Mongolia, Tibet, Tsinghai and Hui in the 
composition of Chinese republican national identity, Sun further argued for the 
necessity of equality, and an unification and assimilation among these 
nations: ‘the current five nations (Han, Manchu, Mongolia, Hui and Tibet) are 
unified and equal’ (1985 [1911] vol 3: 72) and also ‘[we should] strictly 
promote the assimilation among the nations’ (1985 [1911] vol 2: 35). Sun thus 
defined China in the following way: ‘today China from Guangzhou [a Southern 
city of China] to the Manchuria (the Northern China), from Shanghai [an 
Eastern city of China] to the national boundary (in the West), are absolutely a 
single state and a single nation’ (1985 [1911] vol 3: 87).  
 
As I have discussed above, the changes of Sun’s ideas on Chinese 
nationalism were related to the fall of the Qing court and the establishment of 
the Republic of China. He no longer emphasised the cultural/political 
uniqueness of the Han; instead, he clearly opposed the social dominance of 
the Han in Chinese society. Interestingly, Sun’s rejection of Han dominance 
and his attempt to establish a multiethnic political community were actually 
both a representation of his belief in the existence of Han superiority, as I will 
clarify further. Echoing Liang Qichao, Sun made an effort to seek for the 
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historical evidence in order to show that China has long been a multiethnic 
nation, which was very different from his earlier ideas. This shift in Sun 
Zhongshan’s ideas can be explained as a consequence of the nation-building 
effort, and in particular as an instrument of justifying continued control over 
the existing Chinese territory and population. If Sun Zhongshan continued to 
demand the expulsion of the Manchu, this would have potentially meant giving 
up a substantial part of the territory and the population. In contrast, integrating 
the Manchu provided the basis for claiming national unity among a broader 
array of ethnic groups as well as the basis for a strong claim to a larger 
territory. 
 
However, despite these changes, Sun Zhongshan still frequently criticised the 
violent government of the Manchu during this stage: ‘it has been 268 years 
since the Manchu stole China. During this period, [the Manchu’s] 
governmental violence cannot be counted’ (1981 [1912] vol 2: 8). This 
demonstrates that his views about the Manchu government remained 
unchanged, and were still based on the belief that the Han should be the ruler 
of China. 
 
 
2.3 Period III: 1915-1919 
Further changes in Sun’s ideas on Chinese identity were strongly influenced 
by frontier conflicts at the border of the Chinese territory and the increasing 
Western imperialist threat to China. The third stage of the development of 
Sun’s position was inosculated with the second. Following his argument about 
the integration of the Han, Manchu, Mongolia and other minority nationalities, 
Sun further claimed, ‘the Chinese people are all equal, without being 
differentiated by nation, race, class and religion’ (1985, vol 2: 106). 
 
The New Cultural Movement, which became influential in 1919, and which 
imported a large number of competing Western ideologies into China, 
especially the ideas of democracy and freedom, deeply influenced the 
Chinese intellectuals of the time. Many of them (for example, Chen Duxiu, Li 
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Dazhao and etc.) started to pay more attention to constructing a liberal, 
democratic politically unified republic, instead of emphasising the racial or 
ethnical characteristics of the central government. Sun was one of them. He 
also began to criticise Hanism (the Great-Han nationalism):  
 
‘We have finished the task that to expel the Manchu and restore the 
Han, however, this only achieves the passive aim of minzu zhuyi 
[nationalism]. [We] should make our effort from now onwards to 
achieve the positive aim of nationalism. What is the positive aim [of 
nationalism]? It is that the Hanzu [Han nation] should sacrifice its 
lineage and history, as well as its zizun, zida [national pride and 
superiority], be genuine to the people of the Manchu, Mongolia, Hui 
and Tibet, in order to be unified and be fired in the same stove, to 
construct a new Chinese nationalism’. (1985 [1919] vol 2: 335) 
 
Sun showed in this quote, that he considered it as a completed and necessary 
task of Chinese nationalism to have expelled the Manchu government, and 
restored the power of the Han. He was on the one hand promoting the 
integration and assimilation of different groups to achieve national unity, and 
discussed in this respect their equal status. On the other hand, however, it is 
important to note that at the same time, his vision of the Chinese nation was 
clearly based on Han superiority and leadership, which had not changed from 
the beginning. 
 
This was the first time Sun publicly criticised Hanism. It was because of the 
fact that Hanism was widely and deeply accepted among the Chinese 
intellectuals as well as the mass public at the time. Hanism appeared in 
different forms before and after 1911: before 1911, it manifested itself mainly 
in anti-Manchuism; while after 1911, i.e. after the Manchu court was expelled, 
it underpinned calls for the assimilation of minority nationalities, based on the 
acceptance of Han culture and the Han standard of civilisation (for example, 
Zhang Binglin). 
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2.4 Conclusion 
Sun Zhongshan was closer to the core of the Chinese revolution than any 
other intellectual discussed in this chapter, thus his discourses more seriously 
impacted on the process of the Chinese revolution. Although his standpoint 
was changing and adjusted in different periods, to echo wider political and 
social changes in Chinese society, and in order to achieve different political 
aims, he clearly used various social markers in order to define the Han, the 
Self and to clarify the boundaries with those he considered Others. 
 
By discussing the development of Sun’s ideas over time, we could find that 
one of his main themes was the growing range of groups included in the 
category of the Self. At the very beginning, according to Sun Zhongshan, the 
Self only consisted of those he considered pure Hanese, which he then 
represented as the only group that could be considered Chinese. He used 
both biological and cultural markers in clarifying the difference between the 
Manchu and us, and calling for the exclusion of the Manchu from the Chinese 
nation. To him, the Manchu as a group were more deleterious to China than 
the threat of Western imperialism. The emphasis on expelling the Manchu 
was one of the most significant characteristics of Sun Zhongshan’s political 
and academic ideas in his early life. 
 
However, as I hope to have shown, the main focus of his writings changed 
after the establishment of the Republic of China. Instead of supporting the 
anti-Manchu movement, and emphasising the cultural and biological 
uniqueness of the Han, he clearly opposed Han nationalism and promoted 
the establishment of a multi-ethnic Chinese political community including the 
Manchu. 
 
In his third stage, he went further to claim that the Chinese people are all 
equal, without being differentiated by nation, race, class and religion (1994, 
vol 2: 106). To achieve this goal, he suggested that the Han should abandon 
their lineage and history, as well as what he considered their national 
superiority (1985 [1919], vol 2: 335). However, although Sun clearly criticised 
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Hanism and made considerable efforts in promoting the integration between 
the Han and other groups, his vision of the Chinese nation remained to some 
extent based on Han superiority and leadership. 
 
 
3. Liang Qichao 
Liang Qichao (1873-1929) was born in a small village in the Guangdong 
province. Liang showed great intellectual promise as a child. He passed the 
traditional Chinese official examination in the provincial base and obtained the 
title of Juren8 when he was only 16. In 1890, he went to the capital and 
became a student of Kang Youwei, who was one of the most important 
chancellors in the Guangxu Emperor’s court. After having read various 
translations of the works written by Western and Japanese intellectuals, Liang 
became deeply influenced by modern Western ideas in the social sciences. 
Liang shared considerable similarities with Kang Youwei’s political 
standpoints. They both advocated constitutional monarchy and Western 
democracy within the Manchu court as well as Chinese society. Their 
differences arose from the failure of the 100 Days Reform, after which Kang 
Youwei was still loyal to the Qing emperor and government, while Liang 
became more and more a revolutionary rather than a royalist. 
 
The mainstream of Liang’s ideas was made up by two standpoints. Firstly, he 
advocated the fivefold racial classification of mankind, and aimed to clarify 
racial boundaries between human groups in both biological and cultural ways. 
Secondly, Liang was mostly critical of anti-Manchuism, but occasionally 
conceded that anti-Manchu sentiments were justified in some circumstances. 
This set him apart from the other two Chinese intellectuals (Zhang Binglin and 
Sun Zhongshan) discussed in the previous chapters. Since neither Zhang 
                                            
8
 Juren is a title that shows one's capacity as a scholar in the Imperial Examinations. The 
Imperial examinations in Imperial China determined who among the population would be 
permitted to enter the state's bureaucracy. The Imperial Examination System in China lasted 
for 1300 years, from its founding during the Sui Dynasty in 605 to its abolition near the end of 
the Qing Dynasty in 1912. 
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Binglin nor Sun Zhongshan had ever been very close to the core of national 
power in the imperial court, compared to these two intellectuals, Liang 
showed  a strong loyalty to the imperial authority of the Manchu court. 
 
The development of Liang’s representations of the Han was not marked by 
any radical changes. Instead, his perception of the Han developed in a 
continuous line, and referred to interconnected racial, national and ethnic 
markers of difference, rather than following a chronologic pattern. I will hence 
examine Liang’s ideas by discussing central themes in his work, focusing on 
1) his reflections on ‘history’; 2) his discussion of China’s position in the world; 
and 3) his discussion of Chinese national integration and the role Han played 
in it. 
 
 
3.1 Reflections on ‘History’ 
In regard to Chinese history, Liang was looking for historical evidence to show 
that China had long been a united nation. This was his preoccupation 
especially after the establishment of the Republic of China in 1911. To 
respond to the argument on a national distinction between the Han and other 
minority groups, Liang repeatedly emphasised ideas of national integration 
rather than of differences. Many of his efforts were aiming to conclude that the 
concept of the Chinese nation was based on a long-term historical idea of 
unification and required a wide acceptance of what was considered the 
dominant Han culture. 
 
To include the Manchu into the Chinese nation from a historical perspective, 
Liang summarised the development of Chinese history by referring to the list 
of all the dynasties: ‘those so-called Tang, Yu, Xia, Shang, Zhou, Qin, Han, 
Wei, Jin, Song, Qi, Liang, Chen, Sui, Tang, Song, Yuan, Ming, Qing, are 
names of various dynasties’ (1999 [1900]: 410). Here Liang included the Qing 
Dynasty in his concept of Chinese history, following a perspective very 
different to that of Zhang Binglin, who refused to mention the Yuan Dynasty 
(which was established by the Mongols) and the Qing Dynasty (which was 
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established by the Manchu) when summarising the periods of Chinese history. 
This showed Liang’s efforts in seeking evidence to support the argument that 
China had long been a unified multi-ethnic community, by providing a 
historical narrative that presented the different groups, including the Manchu, 
as an integral part of Chinese history. 
 
When reflecting on the history of China, Liang clearly and directly referred to 
racial markers. In his opinion, history and human development were mainly 
constructed by inclusions and exclusions shaped by race: 
 
‘What is history? History is nothing else than the account of the 
development and strife of human races [zhongzu]. There is no history 
without race… I have no idea if we can enjoy the great harmony of 
mankind without being differentiated by racial boundaries in the future. 
However, it is not exaggerated at all to claim that racial conflict 
[zhongzu douzheng] is the most severe problem in the current world… 
The essence of history is to demonstrate and treat the rise and fall of 
every race in the thousands of years while the spirit of history is to 
uncover the reasons for this rise and fall’. (1997 [1901], vol 9: 11-13)  
 
As evident from this quote, Liang perceived history as something created and 
determined by race; and the development and fall of human groups 
essentially as a matter of their ‘racial qualities’. 
 
At the same time, Liang’s views on history and race were also shaped by 
culturalism. Culturalism is a term used to describe the sense of cultural 
superiority held by the Chinese intellectuals for over 2000 years (e.g. Zhao, 
2004: 41). From the early Qin dynasty, the distinction between the Self Huaxia 
(China) and the Other Yidi (Barbarians) was established based on criteria of 
culture and civilisation, which were ‘based on the historical heritage and 
acceptance of shared values’ (Harrison,1969: 2). These culturalist 
understandings are clearly apparent in Liang’s work, and similarly in the work 
of the other two intellectuals I discussed. Liang emphasised more than once 
the persistence of the traditional unity of China, despite the presence of a 
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large number of ‘barbarian’ groups that surrounded it. According to Liang, 
traditional Chinese society was stable and though inner conflicts sometimes 
happened, it had not experienced any serious external threats (1999 [1896]: 
12, see also 1999 [1898]: 235). This lack of serious internal conflicts among 
different Chinese groups he believed to be related to the ‘fact’ that in 
opposition to the Han, other minority groups in China had a vastly inferior 
degree of historical civilisation and culture.  
 
These views demonstrated here are characteristic of Liang’s conception of the 
Hanese historical and cultural superiority and of his perception of minority 
groups as barbarians. For him, Chinese history was actually a process of 
Hanisation, through which the minority groups were more and more 
assimilated into the Han. He argued that ‘even when minority groups 
governed China, they were not able to assimilate China when they entered 
into China; instead, they were assimilated by China’ (1999 [1899]: 257-260). 
In Liang’s view, this was due to the lack of culture and civilisation among 
these minority groups: ‘the exotic nations which used to govern China, which 
were all nomadic inferior groups, were all assimilated by China without 
exception. Their degrees of civilisation were all far lower than that the degree 
of civilisation in our China’ (1999 [1899]: 316). Both of these quotes show that 
according to Liang, all other groups which used to govern China were 
culturally inferior to the Chinese, and were assimilated by China, which he 
constructed as characterised by a higher, superior degree of civilisation. 
 
We can see from the above that, Liang’s historical proposition was influenced 
by his understanding of cultural differences. His definition of civilisation was 
determined by Han culture, which was in his view the only standard of 
civilisation. This perspective will be further discussed in the third part of this 
chapter. 
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3.2 Discussion of China’s Position and its relation to the 
World 
Liang was one of the Chinese intellectuals who first used the term nation 
[minzu]. This word appeared in his Dongji Yuedan (Comments on Japanese 
Books), published in 1899, in which he refers to the dongfang minzu (the 
Eastern nations) and minzu jingzheng (national competition): ‘ten years 
before, the Japanese started to translate a large amount of Western literature 
and followed the Western format and concepts to conduct a world history. In 
the preface of the book, they call themselves donfang minzu [Eastern nations]’ 
(1990 [1899]: 82). 
 
Liang was also influential in introducing Western theories about nation and 
nationalism to Chinese society. Liang Qichao was inclined to emotionally 
support nationalism in China: 
 
‘Nationalism is the brightest, most open and upright, and most justified 
ideology, which allows neither the invasion of other nations, nor the 
invasion initiated of others by our nation. When this doctrine is applied 
to my nation, it means the independence of human beings; when the 
doctrine was applied to the world, it means the independence of 
nations’ (1990 [1901]: 459). 
 
Hence he concluded that ‘it is necessary for us to promote our own 
nationalism, in order to save our nation from the threat of the Western national 
imperialism’ (1990 [1902]: 656). Liang’s attempt of constructing an ideological 
acceptance of nationalism among wider Chinese populace to resist the 
challenges from other nations had clearly showed that Chinese intellectuals 
began to consider their country in a more political and territorial perspective 
as a nation-state, rather than in a cultural sense that had existed among 
Chinese elites in earlier Chinese society. 
 
However, in line with his opposition to the anti-Manchu movement, Liang 
actually paid more attention to the classification of mankind based on racial 
distinctions, and did not have much to say about differences between different 
137 
 
minzu. The concept of race was one of the important perspectives and criteria 
in analysing Societies for many Chinese intellectuals of that time, and it was 
central to Liang Qichao’s reflections on China’s position in the World. In 1898, 
another influential Chinese scholar Yan Fu had provided a theoretical 
introduction of Western Darwinism by translating the book Natural Selection. 
Thereafter, racial and social markers were used by many Chinese 
intellectuals, in order to clarify the differences between China and what they 
considered other races. 
 
Among them Liang repeatedly advocated the racial classification of mankind, 
focusing on biological and cultural factors, and much of his account of human 
society was informed by what would be considered vulgar racialised 
stereotypes in contemporary society. It is noteworthy that in an 1897 article 
Lun zhongguo zhi jiangqiang (A Discussion of the Future Power of China) 
(1989 [1897], vol 2: 13), Liang tried to explain the differences among races 
using (supposedly objective) scientific knowledge. He argued that human 
races were biologically different in microcosmic way and that the ‘xueguan 
zhong zhi weishengwu’ (Microbes in the Blood Vessel) were distinct among 
different races. This argument was an obvious echo of the research and 
developing race theories in the Western natural sciences and social sciences 
at that time. 
 
An antagonism, opposition and battle between what he considered the ‘yellow 
race and the white race formed the core of Liang’s racial classification of 
humans. This racial antagonism underlined his calls for an integration of 
different groups in a racial ‘yellow’ community under Chinese leadership. It 
also informed his attitude to the Manchu government, and his suggestion to 
include it in Chinese history. In this context, Liang argued, that the ‘Western 
threat’ was much more dangerous to Chinese society than the Manchu, and 
that only a united yellow race could resist the threat of white domination:  
 
‘The unskilful fighter, without the awareness of the danger of the large 
exotic nations [yi zhong], concentrated on the wars with the small 
exotic nations, could be compared to the fact that when the snip and 
138 
 
the calm grapple, it is the fisherman who stands to benefit. The bloody 
battle between the yellow race [Huang zhong] and the white race [bai 
zhong] will definitely happen in 100 years… The Chinese population 
counts for 70-80 percent of the population of the yellow race, thus the 
integration of the (yellow) race must be started from China’. (1990 
[1896]: 54) 
 
The conflict and racial struggle that Liang constructs here shaped his 
perception of the yellow race, which he as a result, ‘defined in direct 
opposition to the white race’ (1990 [1896]: 52). He intensively advocated the 
integration of the yellow race in order to resist white domination, and 
emphasised the important role of China and the Chinese population within the 
yellow race: ‘The Chinese population counts for 70 to 80 percent of the of 
yellow race, thus the survival or extinction of the yellow race is determined by 
the survival or extinction of China’ (ibid).  
 
Another example of Liang’s attempts to promote the integration of the yellow 
race in opposition to the white race can be found in an article written by Liang 
in 1901 in which he is referring to the Filipino as members of the yellow race: 
‘the Filipino had wars with the whites for two times and belong to the same 
continent and same race as ours’ (1990 [1901]: 469). Here Liang is trying to 
demonstrate that the Filipino were closer to the Chinese - to the Self - than 
Westerners since they were geographically closer to our territory and shared 
the same racial identity with us. In the same context, Liang also made efforts 
to promote the communication with Japan: ‘The national danger of our China 
has reached the peak today. Anyone who expects the independence of our 
yellow race should obey the following principles… [We should] closely 
communicate with Japan, promote the friendship between two nations’ (1990 
[1898]: 187). 
 
Influenced by the Western idea that different standards of civilisation could be 
ascribed to different human races, Liang argued:  
 
‘The Westerners summarise the different degrees of civilisation into 
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three categories: the first was described as you jiao [civilised], the 
second was described as wu jiao [non-civilised], while the third was 
ban jiao [semi-civilised]’ (1990 [1896]: 150). China is the one which 
was defined by him as semi-civilised. According to Liang Qichao, it is 
undoubted that China is more civilised than the black race in Africa or 
the red race in Australia, and this is evident from its various valuable 
historical cultural relics and traditional standard social rules. However, 
he regarded the yellow race as less civilised than the white race 
because of its allegedly corrupt social morality, the narrow mind of the 
intellectuals, and the stupidity of the ordinary people’ (1990 [1896]: 
150). 
 
These quotes demonstrate Liang’s efforts to classify and interlink racial 
categories with cultural norms to form a system of hierarchical order which 
seemingly reflected natural difference (see Hund, 2008: 171-203). Liang’s 
proposition of defining and describing Others as ‘non-civilised’ barbarians, 
which referred to Australians and Africans, was constructed on the basis of his 
superior sense of Han-culture, as well as its origin. He considered Han culture 
as something in-born which was determined by skin colour and fixed for the 
Han, and distinguished the Chinese from both the far-away Others (Australian 
and African) and closer Others (the Manchu and other minorities in China). 
 
Liang’s construction of a racial hierarchy underlined by biological and cultural 
markers of difference clearly indicates their discursive interconnection and 
overlaps. It also demonstrates the impact of the Western racist ideology of 
White supremacy (e.g. Mills, 1997 and Fredrickson, 1982) on Chinese 
intellectual discourse. Although Liang was very sensitive to the dangers of 
Western imperialism, he shared the belief in White supremacy. In his opinion, 
the Western civilisation consisted of various Western nations and could be 
viewed as a ‘white civilisation’ as a whole, and he considered this civilisation 
to justly hold the highest position in the racially determined world-wide 
hierarchy. Liang believed that the white race was superior in various ways: 
morally, intellectually and culturally. All this completely echoes the thinking 
about racial hierarchies and whiteness that was widespread in the West at the 
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time. It ‘involved numerous patterns of differentiation and status enhancement 
which identified whiteness as a normative indicator for membership in an 
aesthetically as well as morally, intellectually and culturally privileged part of 
humankind’ (Hund, 2008: 202). 
 
 
3.3 Ideas on Chinese National Integration 
In this section, I will mainly discuss Liang’s ideas on Chinese national 
integration, on how Chinese society was shaped, and the role the Han played 
in it. Liang’s basic proposition in regard to Chinese national integration was 
characterised by his invention of twin Chinese terms: da minzu zhuyi (large 
nationalism) and xiao minzu zhuyi (small nationalism). Based on this 
distinction, he advocated the adoption of large nationalism and the 
abandonment of small nationalism, as a means of confronting the threat of 
imperialism. As we will see, this distinction between two types of nationalism 
was also central to his understanding of the relationship between the nation 
and the state. 
 
Anti-Manchuism was one of the most important themes among the Chinese 
intellectuals during the late Qing period. Liang had also contributed to some of 
the anti-Manchu discourses. For instance, in one of his essays he argues that: 
‘in order to awaken the spirit of nationalism, it is unavoidable for “us” to fight 
against the Manchu. Anti-Manchuism is the best idea for current China, 
comparable to the anti-Tokugawa movement in Japan’ (1990 [1920]: 62).  
 
Although the above quotation shows Liang’s involvement in anti-Manchu 
discourse, it cannot be understood in isolation. It is important to consider that 
Liang to some extent also tried to question those who promoted anti-
Manchuism and treated it as the principle of solving all the problems in 
Chinese society: ‘The current Chinese intellectuals, irritated by the closed-
door policy of the Manchu government, promoted the claims to exclude the 
Manchu government and clarify the boundaries between the Manchu and the 
Han. Is this really beneficial to China?’ (1990 [1896]: 52). He further claimed it 
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to be important for the prosperity of Chinese society to ‘overlap the 
boundaries between the Manchu and the Han’, which is ‘absolutely the first 
step for achieving self-improvement’ (1990 [1896]: 53). In response to other 
Chinese intellectuals, e.g. Zhang Binglin, who showed a radically critical 
attitude towards the Manchu government, as well as the Manchurians, Liang 
asked: ‘of the current Han and Manchu, which is a superior nation while which 
is an inferior one? There is no standard answer to the question’. (1990 [1896]: 
51) 
 
Moreover, when the revolutionaries (e.g. Zhang Binglin) repeatedly made 
efforts to construct and clarify racial differences between the Han and Manchu 
with reference to physical and cultural anthropology, Liang Qichao tried to 
oppose Zhang Binglin’s construction of racial differences between the Han 
and the Manchu; instead he constructed the Han and the Manchu as sharing 
the same racial identity as members of the yellow race. Liang Qichao 
suggested: ‘the Qing Dynasty was originated from the Tungus… Compared 
with the white, brown, red and black races, they definitely belong to the yellow 
race as us’ (1997 [1901] vol 9: 13). He further argued:  
 
‘It has been said that the Manchu and we [here he referred to the Han] 
are completely different races, which is however not a strict truth. In 
fact, the Manchu has been definitely assimilated into “us” in four out of 
the six elements which are applied to the criteria of defining a race. In 
the remaining two elements, it is not easily at all for anyone to draw a 
conclusion that they and we are different... We therefore conclude that, 
judging from the sociological definition of race, the Manchu has already 
assimilated into the Han and has been sufficiently qualified to be one of 
the members of our mixed nation’. (1997 [1902] vol 19: 21) 
 
However, Liang’s attempts to include the minority groups in his construction of 
a Chinese national community and identity in his discourses do not mean that 
he believed in the equality of all national groups. Although he claimed that it 
was hard to conclude if either the Han or the Manchu were superior (1990 
[1896]: 51), he simultaneously (1990 [1896]) and frequently pointed out that 
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groups other than the Han were historically inferior. As argued earlier in this 
chapter, he believed that minority groups actually had a lower degree of 
civilisation and culture to speak of, and that they had instead assimilated into 
the Han civilisation. This demonstrates that according to Liang all other 
groups, including those that used to govern China, were to be considered 
culturally inferior to the Han Chinese, and were rightly assimilated by the Han. 
In other words, the precondition of the equality he was taking about was the 
prior assimilation of all minorities into Han civilisation. 
 
Although Liang suggested that the Hanese needed to some extent to give up 
their cultural privilege in order to achieve the national integration of the 
Chinese nation, he seemed at the same time convinced that the Han were 
culturally superior. In this respect, the principle of a unification of the 
traditional Chinese nation for Liang involved the acceptance of the dominance 
of Han culture, as well as its standard of civilisation. He argued: ‘There are 
various nations within China, though with the same origins of the academic 
ideas, which is the acceptance of being the posterities of the yellow Emperor’ 
(1990 [1902]: 563). However, the boundary between China and other 
communities belonging to the yellow race defined by him was not fixed or 
static; instead, it was open to changes, adaptation, and an inclusion of the 
Other, if the other ethnic groups adopted Han Chinese culture and behaved 
like the Han Chinese. For Liang, once they totally accepted the Han culture 
and its moral system, they became Chinese. In other words, the process of 
Chinese national assimilation was actually a process of Hanisation.  
 
To Liang Qichao, Hanese China was constructed by its cultural contents, and 
the Han was the only civilised group in traditional China, while all the other 
entities in the region were only uncivilised barbarians, which were never 
equally viewed. Liang was worried about a lack of national consciousness 
among the Chinese - noting:  
 
‘there have been hundreds of millions of people lived in this guojia 
[country] for several thousands of years, and until today they have not 
had a name for their country yet. Even the word, zhongguo [China], is 
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what peoples from other zu [races] call us, which is not what the 
people in this country have used to name themselves’ (1990 [1900]: 
15).  
 
To solve this problem of a lack of national consciousness in China, Liang 
promoted a new kind of nationalism. He attributed the key factor of the 
development of the West to the spread of nationalism in Europe: ‘Since the 
16th century, the development of Europe as well as the world was due to 
nothing else but the enormous power of nationalism’ (1990 [1902]: 656). The 
military weakness of the Chinese brought about a consciousness of the 
weakness of culture and sciences in China. The Chinese intellectuals at that 
time had to seek for some new ideas to foster the Chinese revolution. 
 
Liang’s understanding of nationalism is of particular interest to us, among 
other things also because it yet again demonstrates how closely intertwined 
the categories of nation and race were at the time. Liang explained the term 
nationalism as showing a close link to race, culture and religion: 
 
‘What is nationalism [minzu zhuyi]? It is defined by the same race 
[zhongzu], same language, same religion, same customs as well as 
the attitude viewing each other as compatriots. Nationalism is an 
expectation to establish and organise an independent and complete 
government, in order to seek for the common good and to join force to 
resist the violation from other groups’ (1990 [1902]: 656). 
 
Similarly to his ideas about race, Liang’s ideas about nationalism were also 
strongly influenced by Western thinking. Liang’s understanding of nationalism 
was related directly to Johann Caspar Bluntschli’s (1808-1881) thesis of ‘No 
State, No Nation’. Bluntschli argued that: 
 
‘[T]he Nation comes into being with the creation of the State. It is the 
consciousness, more or less developed of political connection and 
unity which lifts the Nation above the People. A Nation which leaves its 
own country may be imagined as continuing to be a Nation, but only 
provisionally so, until it succeeds in forming a new State in a new 
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country. Again, the Nation may precede the State’ (1885: 86). 
 
From 1899 to 1903, Liang published various articles introducing and 
promoting Bluntschli’s theories in the newspaper Xinmin Congbao, e.g. 
Guafen weiyan (The Prophecy of Chinese division) (1990 [1899]: 30), Guojia 
sixiang bianqian yitonglun (The Discussion on the Changes of the Similarities 
and Differences in National Ideas) (1990 [1901], 94-95) and Zhengzhixue 
dajia bolunzhili zhi xueshuo (The Theory of Political Scientist Bluntschli) (1990 
[1903]). While being influenced by Western theories, Liang’s national ideas 
were of course also shaped also by China’s experience arising from the 
modern frustration with the West and the social struggles and unrest within 
Chinese society. Whether revolution or reform, a democratic republic or a 
constitutional monarchy, in Liang’s views these were all means and strategies 
to build a modern ‘nation-state’. This was the main focus of Liang’s ideas, and 
building a state - using whatever means - was to him the core goal for China: 
 
‘The meaning of freedom refers to the group’s freedom, rather than the 
individual’s freedom ... The value of individual freedom lies in the 
promotion of the rich and powerful national-state’ (1984 [1902]: 227). 
 
The supremacy of state over nation and society allowed Liang Qichao to 
argue against the divisive racialist republican revolution directed against the 
Manchu Dynasty. His ideal of a Chinese nation, including the Han, Manchu, 
Mongo, Xinjiang and Tibet, as well as the rest of minority nationalities in the 
country, represents the origin of contemporary dominant national values that 
are shared by Chinese academics to this day. 
 
Liang thus conceptually clarified the term nation and state by differentiating 
the two different degrees of nationalism. As mentioned earlier, he 
distinguished between da minzu zhuyi (large nationalism) and xiao minzu 
zhuyi (small nationalism), and argued: ‘small nationalism is used to describe 
the opposition between Han and other national groups within China while 
large nationalism is used to describe the opposition between the united China 
consisted of all the nations and all the foreign nations (guowai zhi zhuzu) 
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(1990 [1903]: 1069-1070). He thus advocated the adoption of large 
nationalism and the abandonment of small nationalism, as a means of 
confronting the threat of imperialism. He claimed:  
 
‘It is the fact that the Manchu has been fully assimilated into China, 
although this is the issue neither the anti-Manchuists nor me are 
pleased to mention… there is now seldom a Manchurian within China 
who can speak and write Manchurian language… [Thus], the 
construction of the Chinese state has nothing to do with anti-
Manchuism’ (1990 [1903]: 1069-1070).  
 
In line with his support for ‘large nationalism’ Liang believed that China was a 
unified nation composed of various groups. He argued for the necessity to 
diminish the boundary between the Han and Manchu. This is because he 
believed the key reason of the weakness of Chinese society was the conflict 
between the Han and Manchu: 
 
‘the weakness of China, is not due to the Manchu government, instead, 
it is because of the Manchu governing China which resulted in the 
deep boundaries between the Manchu and the Han. The Chinese 
nationals are suspicious and jealous of each other due to the 
boundaries between the Manchu and the Han’ (1990 [1900]: 424). 
 
He thus advocated the social equality of all the Han and Manchu, as well as 
other minority groups (ibid), to resist the invasion from foreign nations. 
However, as argued earlier, Laing’s vision of national integration was based 
on the very idea of Han’s cultural and racial supremacy, and dominance. 
When he claimed that the ‘Chinese state should allow the merging of 
Manchuria, Mongolia, Turkestan, Miao and Tibet, to construct a large nation, 
which accounts for one third of the world population’ (1990 [1903]: 1070), he 
simultaneously predicted and looked forward to complete Han domination:  
 
‘If this dream comes true, this large nation will be definitely centred on 
the Hanese and it will be undoubtedly in the control of the Hanese. It is 
not worth arguing about this. In order to achieve this goal, we have to 
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temporarily abandon the narrow revanchist nationalism, and make use 
of the Manchurian… In the future, there will be only two possibilities: 
the Han and Manchu may be both reduced to the slaves; otherwise 
Han will definitely become the kernel of the national-state’ (ibid). 
 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
In this section, I have mainly studied three main themes apparent in Liang 
Qichao’s work. The first is his reflection on ‘history’. In order to construct a 
Chinese identity, Liang made an effort to seek historical evidence to show that 
China has long been a united nation. Responding to the argument about 
distinctions between the Han and other minorities, he repeatedly emphasised 
ideas of national integration rather than of differences. In line with this, he was 
stating that Chinese history was a history of unification and integration, 
premised on the assimilation of all minority groups into Han culture. 
 
The second focus of this chapter was Liang’s discussion of China’s position 
and its relation to the West. Liang showed a widely critical attitude to Western 
civilisation and imperialism, but also uncritically reproduced stereotypical 
racialised ideas of white supremacy. On the one hand, he was very sensitive 
to the danger of Western imperialism. He considered that the Western threat 
was much more dangerous to Chinese society than the Manchu and that only 
a united yellow race could resist the threat of white domination (1990 [1896]: 
54). On the other hand, Liang admired Western civilisation and believed it 
rightly enjoyed the highest position in the racially determined world-wide 
hierarchical order. 
 
The third focus was Liang’s ideas on Chinese national integration. Liang 
Qichao tried to oppose Zhang Binglin’s construction of racial differences 
between the Han and the Manchu; instead he constructed the Han and the 
Manchu as sharing the same yellow racial identity. However, Liang’s attempts 
to include the minority groups in his construction of a Chinese national 
community do not mean that he believed in the equality of all the national 
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groups. Although he claimed that it was hard to conclude if either the Han or 
the Manchu were superior (1990 [1896]: 51), he believed minorities were 
essentially without a higher degree of civilisation and culture like the Hanese 
were (1990 [1896]: 12). Although Liang suggested that the Hanese needed to 
some extent to give up their cultural privilege in order to achieve the national 
integration of the Chinese nation, he seemed at the same time convinced that 
the Han were culturally superior. In this respect, the principle of the unification 
of the traditional Chinese nation for Liang involved the acceptance of the 
dominance of Han culture, as well as its standard of civilisation (1990 [1902]: 
563). Liang’s basic proposition in regard to Chinese national integration was 
characterised by his invention of twin Chinese terms: da minzu zhuyi (large 
nationalism) and xiao minzu zhuyi (small nationalism), based on which he 
thus advocated the adoption of large nationalism and the abandon of small 
nationalism, as a means of confronting Western imperial ambitions in relation 
to China. 
 
 
4. Similarities and Differences 
As Liang Qichao said in 1898, ‘the 4000-years dream of our nation was 
actually awakened by the Jiawu War [The First Sino-Japanese War]’ (1999 
[1898]: 234). My comparative study on the national, racial, and ethnic ideas in 
the work of three Chinese intellectuals thus mainly focuses on the period of 
1895-1919, during which the Chinese nation and its people were struggling 
for survival. Chinese society had experienced a substantial reform in both 
physical and spiritual ways. The traditional Chinese moral system that had 
been in place for more than 2000 years for the first time met the powerful 
challenge of Western ideas. The ideology of nationalism, introduced from the 
West and Japan, had shown its value of increasing national power and 
achieving more benefits in the international affairs. Chinese intellectuals who 
were playing a central role in spreading the modern Western ideologies in 
Chinese society had therefore re-considered the construction of identity of 
their country. They published numerous books and articles on newspapers to 
promote their national and political claims, which had created a significant 
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contribution to the process of Chinese nation-building. These factors and 
massive social changes in Chinese society make this period of Chinese 
history a particularly significant period when analysing Chinese intellectuals’ 
perceptions of nation/race, the Han and Chinese identity. 
 
This section of the chapter aims for a direct summative comparison of the 
three intellectuals’ representations of Han and Chinese identity, and consists 
of three parts. In the first and second part, I will respectively discuss Chinese 
intellectuals’ attitudes towards the Manchu and the West, to analyse in what 
ways Han identity was constructed and represented in opposition to the 
constructed Other. The third part of the chapter will mainly focus on the 
construction of Han superiority in national and racial ways, and the role 
played by the Han within the Chinese national community. 
 
 
4.1 The Han and Anti-Manchuism 
Anti-Manchuism played an important role in the Chinese intellectuals’ 
discourses during the late Qing period. It contributed to the formation of a 
racial consciousness among the Chinese people and stimulated some 
significant revolutionary movements, which cumulated in the 1911 Revolution, 
which ended the Manchu government and brought about the establishment of 
the Republic of China. 
 
The conflict between a long-term tradition of and belief in Han superiority in 
Chinese society, and the fact that the whole of China was governed by the 
Manchu, which was considered to be an exotic, foreign group, had existed for 
long and became increasingly radical after the end of the First Sino-Japanese 
War. The Chinese intellectuals were disappointed by the weakness showed 
by the Manchu court in response to the invasion of the West. They thus 
promoted anti-Manchu ideas in different ways by referring to different 
perspectives and theories, some of which were related to traditional Chinese 
culture while others were a product of their encounter with modern Western 
ideas. 
149 
 
In regard to anti-Manchuism, Zhang Binglin and Sun Zhongshan adopted a 
more radical attitude, though neither of them held this attitude throughout their 
life. Both Zhang and Sun directly and rigorously advocated the necessity of 
expelling the Manchu government. Zhang and Sun argued that it was 
necessary to draw a distinction between the Manchu and the Han in both 
biological and cultural ways, although the latter was often given more 
attention. 
 
Zhang Binglin argued that irreconcilable conflicts existed between the 
Manchu and the Han. In his article Bo Kang Youwei lun gemingshu (The 
Refutation on Kang Youwei’s Work: The Discussion on the Revolutionary), he 
presented a clear anti-Manchu argument. This is a famous typical anti-
Manchu article, which enjoyed great popularity among the Chinese public at 
that time. He explicitly criticised Manchu traditional culture as barbarian: ‘the 
Manchurian devils’ warship is not the religion of jiaoqiu9; the Manchurian hair 
style is not the traditional Chinese patrician style; the Manchurian language is 
not formal but a lingua from a dismal and remote area’ (1977 [1903], vol 1: 
199). 
 
Zhang adopted an even more radical attitude to the Manchu in another of his 
articles Zheng chouman lun (Correct Discourse on Hatred for the Manchu) 
(1960 [1901]). Here he presented the Manchu as a different nation outside the 
Chinese people, and thereby excluded them from his construction of Chinese 
identity. Stating that the Manchu were illegally ruling China, he explained that 
when the government that is established by a nation, is robbed by another 
nation, it is more than fair to rebel (94). 
 
In order to promote resistance to what he considered Manchu oppression, 
Zhang wrote: ‘nationalism is prosperous during the 20 th century. The smelly 
enemy Manchu does not belong to the same race/nation [zhong] as we do. 
Thus, whether the Manchu government will pursue the reforms or not, 
whether the Manchu government could rescue Chinese lives or not, we 
                                            
9
 Jiaoqiu means the traditional Chinese empire fete to their ancestors. 
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should carry out the revolution to expel them’ (1977 [1903]: 233). Sun went 
even further in aiming to expel the Manchu by claiming that the Manchu ‘was 
originally a nomadic group and a barbarian and a currish race’ (1981 [1903] 
vol 1: 232). He thus opposed Zhang Binglin’s ideas to protect and maintain 
the Qing government, which according to him belonged to a guest emperor, 
and considered the tension between the Manchu and the Han was something 
insurmountable (ibid). We can see that both Zhang and Sun constructed the 
Other Manchu in a racial way by contrasting them with the Self Han. 
 
The idea of cultural superiority was one of the main characteristics shared by 
Chinese intellectuals of that time, which will be discussed in detail in the 
following part. Both Sun and Zhang referred to racial markers to construct a 
difference between the Han and the Manchu, which included both biological 
and cultural elements. Race for Sun is culturally charged, hierarchically 
structured, and closely linked to concepts of culture and civilisation. In Sun’s 
opinion, Han racial superiority was grounded in their supreme culture and 
civilisation, and the concept of racial inferiority of the Manchu, based on what 
he labelled as their ‘barbarian’ racial status. Sun distinguished between the 
two in terms of a racial differentiation, in which cultural and biological markers 
are interrelated. 
 
Zhang was the one who was most radical in advocating Han culturalism: 
 
‘(All) are human beings; though they vary in their heights, colours as 
well as morals and customs. [However], only we [here he refers to the 
Hanese] own the rich territory, elevated morals and righteous 
characteristics bestowed by God. Thus, we Han race/species [zhong] 
is the noblest and the most honourable’ (1977 [1897]: 8). 
 
This quote shows Zhang’s racialised perception of the Han. It also echoes 
Sun’s vision of the Han as a culturally superior race, compared to the 
Manchu, and also any other groups in the world. 
 
Sun also highlighted the allegedly dominant role of biological features in the 
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composition of Chinese national identity. He put emphasis on the role of 
‘lineage’, and thereby defined Chinese identity in a racialised way in line with 
the predominant modern discourses on race popular in the West at the time. 
He argued that ‘the forming of a minzu is influenced by all sorts of complex 
factors, among which lineage is the most important element. The Chinese are 
yellow because of the yellow lineage. The lineage will eternally pass to 
generation to generation from the ancestor’ (1981 [1904]: 210-212). It is 
farfetched to equate the Chinese to the yellow race. This passage clearly 
indicates that Sun’s concept of the Chinese puts a strong emphasis on race. It 
in fact corresponds with his hierarchical concept of the Han and the Manchu, 
as two different races to which he attributes different superior and inferior 
cultural characteristics. 
 
However, unlike Sun, Zhang Binglin drew a special distinction between the 
Manchu public and Manchu government. In Zheng chouman lun (Correct 
Discourse on Hatred for the Manchu), he showed an even more radical 
attitude towards the Manchu. He represented the Manchu as both a different 
minzu (nation) and zhong (race) outside the Chinese people, and thereby 
excluded them from his construction of Chinese identity. This attempt to 
socially exclude the Manchu as an outside threat was linked to an ideological 
call for a revolt against the allegedly ‘evil outsiders’ (1978 [1901]: 94). 
 
It has been demonstrated from the previous analysis and the quotes above 
that Zhang regarded the Manchu as an external invader who was ruling China 
without any legitimacy, and constantly robbed Han territory. He therefore 
argued that it would be ‘more than fair’ for the Hanese to overthrow the 
Manchu government. 
 
It seems that Sun showed a comparatively greater tolerance in dealing with 
the relationship between Han and Manchu identity (and other groups within 
the Chinese territory). However, this tolerance was actually limited, insofar as 
it was created on the basis of an assumed Han superiority and also 
considered the Manchu an ‘outside group’. In regard to the Chinese 
population, Sun suggested that ‘there are 400 million in total, among which … 
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the total amount of “outside group” people (including Manchu, Tibet, Mongolia 
and Turkic) is no more than 10 million’ (Institution of the Party History of 
Kuomintang, 1973: 2). Thus, ‘we could say these 400 million Chinese are 
totally Hanese, who are sharing the same lineage, same language, same 
religion, same customs that absolutely belong to a specific nation [minzu]’ 
(1973: 2). In this way, the national integration Sun was promoting was not 
based on equality and cultural integration among different groups within 
China. Instead, he promoted unification at the expense of non-Han people 
and minority groups. 
 
Liang’s views on the relationship between the Han and the Manchu were 
considerably different from the ones advocated by Zhang and Sun. In his 
article Lun bianfa bi zi ping manhan zhi jie shi (The Discussion on the 
Recovery of the Boundary between the Manchu and the Han is the 
Precondition of Reform) (1898), Liang clearly stated that, ‘there might be 
numbers of slightly different ethnicities [zuqun] within a nation [minzu]; but 
also numbers of greatly different ethnicities outside the nation’ (1936 [1898]: 
80). He combined nationalism with the loyalty to the Guangxu Emperor, and 
even regarded the loyalty to the Guangxu Emperor as the precondition of 
nationalism. Liang saw ‘the equality between Man and Han’ as the priority of 
social reform (1990 [1898]: 77-92). According to him, there was no essential 
difference between the Manchu and the Han. Instead, he believed that 
Chinese society was challenged by outside groups, who differed from both 
the Han and the Man, and were considered a threat to society. 
 
However, Liang’s proposition to form an alliance between the Han and the 
Manchu does not suggest that he completely ignored the conflict between 
them. Rather, Liang’s attitude to include the Manchu in the composition of the 
Chinese nation was more based on a practical and realistic approach. In the 
same article, he noted, ‘the identical conflicts epidemically increased in these 
years…those who are specialised in war, are well aware of the importance of 
conjoining the inner groups in order to compete against the outside groups, 
thus they put enough emphasis on the communication with the inner groups. 
[In contrast], those who are blindfold to the threat of outside groups, and 
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focus on the enemy within the inner group, could well be described as 
creating a conflict between the snip and the calm, which only benefits the 
fisherman’ (1990 [1898]: 80). He also noted, that ‘the Chinese population 
stands for 70 to 80 percent of the Asian population. Thus, the integration of 
identity of the Asian should be started with the integration of the identity of 
China’ (1990 [1898]: 88). Both of these two quotations show his support for 
the cooperation between the Han and other minority groups. 
 
To summarise, both Sun and Zhang were in favour of expelling the Manchu 
and excluded the Manchu from the Chinese race/nation, though their attitudes 
changed over time. Sun was initially an ardent supporter of expelling the 
Manchu court from Chinese territory, but he reconsidered and altered his 
opinion after the establishment of the Republic of China, and argued for the 
integration of all the national groups within Chinese society, in order to resist 
Western imperialism. Zhang’s attitude was to some extent constantly 
changing. In his early stage, he argued it would be right to maintain the 
Manchu government (although the Manchu emperor was a guest emperor). 
Later on in his career, he clearly argued that the object of the Chinese 
national revolution is to expel the Manchu (1999 [1908]: 426-428). He 
changed his views again to promote national integration and national equality 
after the establishment of the Republic of China. Liang Qichao instead held a 
basic standpoint that the Manchu should always be included in the 
construction of Chinese identity as well as Chinese history. 
 
We can see from the above that, although these three intellectuals 
emphasised different factors, (i.e. Sun Zhongshan paid special attention to the 
relationship between territory and national identity, while Zhang Binglin was 
more focused on the cultural uniqueness of the Han, and Liang instead 
showed a more tolerant attitude towards the Manchu in a social way), they all 
adopted the same markers (biological, cultural, historical) in interpreting the 
Self and them. In defining the Han Self in opposition to the Manchu Other, all 
of them tended to use the same social categories (nation, race and 
sometimes ethnicity) to distinguish between the Han and Manchu, although 
they held different political views. All of them also constructed the Han as 
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culturally and racially superior. A detailed discussion of how the three authors 
construct the Han will follow at the beginning of part 3. 
 
 
4.2 The Attitude to the West 
After the outbreak of the First Opium War in 1839, the West played an 
important role in the reforms of Chinese society. On the one hand, more and 
more Chinese noticed the necessity to study Western advanced technologies 
in both civil and military industries; on the other hand, modern Western ideas 
in social scientific research, especially the development of more systematic 
Western discourses on nation and race had a considerable impact on 
Chinese intellectuals. Meanwhile, the relationship between the Han and the 
West, the Chinese nation and the West as well as the East and the West, 
were widely discussed by Chinese intellectuals during the late Qing period. 
 
Zhang provided a framework for clarifying the boundaries between what he 
considered to be different races, referring to colours and geographical 
boundaries as markers of racial differentiation. He accordingly racially 
differentiated the Asians and the Europeans and linked the territorial boundary 
between Asia and Europe to a racial boundary (1977 [1897]: 5). He 
considered that it would be necessary to enhance the cooperation with other 
Asian countries which belonged to the same yellow race, in order to resist the 
threat of Western imperialism. Therefore, according to him, any attempts of 
raising an ‘inner conflict’ would result in a worse position in relation to the 
white race (1977 [1897]: 6). He even warned that, if we regard the expelling of 
the Manchu as our main task, ‘the white will take this opportunity to devour 
our territory’ (1906 [1900]: 61). This quote comes from the period when he 
had a less negative disposition towards the Manchu.  
 
A similar idea was held by Liang Qichao. Liang also argued that, the world 
was categorised into different groups by racial markers. Liang was one of the 
Chinese intellectuals who repeatedly advocated the racial classification of 
mankind, focusing on biological factors, and much of his account of mankind 
155 
 
was suffused by what can be considered vulgar stereotypes. For example, 
Kang Youwei, who was Liang Qichao’s teacher and one of the most 
acclaimed scholars of the late Qing period, dehumanised and inferiorised the 
African drastically as having ‘the looks of pigs, with iron faces, silver teeth, 
slanting jaws, full breasts and long hair, look like an ox from the front’ and also 
‘their hands and feet are dark black, they look stupid like sheep and swine’ 
(1956 [1902]: 118-122). He further advocated the intermarriage of whites and 
yellows with blacks, since he felt this could lead to a ‘purification of mankind’ 
and contributed to an ‘improvement of the races’ (ibid).  
 
It is worth noting that in an 1897 article Lun zhongguo zhi jiangqiang (A 
Discussion of the Future Power of China) (1997 [1897] vol 2: 13). Liang tried 
to explain the differences among races using his own scientific knowledge. He 
argued that the races were biologically different in a microcosmic way and 
that the ‘xueguan zhong zhi weishengwu’ (Microbes in the Blood Vessel) were 
distinct among different races. This argument was an obvious echo of 
research in the Western natural sciences and social sciences at that time.  
 
However, despite these general similarities in their perceptions of world-wide 
racial hierarchies, the authors differed in the emphasis they put on various 
markers of difference. For instance, in discussing the distinction between the 
Self (which sometimes referred to the Han, but more often to China as a 
whole) and the West, Zhang Binglin mainly focused on biological factors and 
political needs for the integration of the Eastern nations in order to oppose the 
Western imperialism. However, Liang also paid attention to cultural elements. 
He argued: 
 
‘the Westerners summarise the different degrees of national civilisation 
into three categories: the first is a civilised (nation), the second is a 
non-civilised (nation), while the third is a semi-civilised (nation). China 
is a nation [guo] that is semi-civilised. There is no doubt that China is 
more civilised than the black in Africa or the red in Australia due to its 
various valuable historical cultural relics and traditional standard social 
rules. However, (it is obviously) less civilised than the whites because 
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of the corrupt social morality, the narrow mindset of the intellectuals, 
and the stupidity of the ordinary people’ (1999 [1896]: 150). 
 
As this quotation suggests, Liang considered China to be less civilised than 
the West because he used the Western definition and criteria of ‘civilisation’. 
 
In contrast to Zhang and Liang, Sun, who was educated in America, and kept 
a close relationship with a few governments of Western countries, initially 
considered the Manchu to be a more dangerous threat to Chinese society 
than Western imperialism, and even made efforts in seeking Western help for 
the Chinese revolution. For example, in one of his letters to his family (1985 
[1900]), he noted ‘I will gain the support from the Japanese Embassy when I 
go back to China this time’ (199). However, after the failure of these efforts, 
he became disappointed with the West and shifted his focus to promoting the 
Chinese revolution on its own. 
 
It is shown in the above discussion that, although the three intellectuals 
emphasised different elements in regard to the West, and even expressed 
preference for different attitudes towards the West, they all used similar 
markers, both biological and cultural, in clarifying the distinction between the 
Self (the Chinese, the Han, the yellow race) and the Western Other. 
 
 
4.3 Constructing Han Superiority and the Chinese National 
Community 
Although Liang, Zhang and Sun developed different political ideas about the 
relationship between the Han and the Other - largely due to distinct political 
convictions they held - all of them represented the Han as superior to the 
other groups. Zhang and Sun clearly shared and promoted a perception of 
Han superiority based on a combination of racial and cultural markers. They 
both referred to the Han as a superior race, and grounded their perception of 
Han superiority in the idea that the Han had a long tradition of civilisation and 
culture. At the same time, they also pointed towards biological and physical 
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differences or lineage when they distinguished the Han and the Manchu. 
Liang also promoted an ideology of Han supremacy, but mainly emphasised 
some similarities and communalities between the Han and other groups. 
Instead of arguing for different lineages of the Han and the Manchu, he 
claimed they shared the same history and memory: 
 
‘Some say that there is no patriotic sense among “us” Chinese, which 
is not the truth. If it seems that the Chinese have no consciousness of 
nationalism [minzu zhuyi], it is due to the fact that they have no idea 
about what is a nation [minzu guojia]. China was always united. It was 
surrounded by various small barbarian groups without civilisations and 
cultural heritages as well as national regimes, and without being 
recognised as nations. Hereby we [here he means the Chinese] never 
equally viewed them as nations as “us”’ [i.e. China]’ (1990 [1899]: 270). 
 
Although not supported by empirical evidence, the above quotation provides 
an interesting and partially correct insight into the evolution of Chinese 
national consciousness. According to Liang, the consciousness of Chinese 
identity was not clearly present until modern times, when the perception of the 
Other was highlighted and strengthened. We could therefore argue that it is 
only when the Chinese were faced with the threat from modern Western 
imperialism that the need arose for the promotion of nationalism and national 
consciousness in its modern sense of the word, especially after the 
establishment of the Republic of China. I will return to this issue again in my 
analysis of Chinese textbooks from the late Qing and early republican period. 
 
The tendency to claim cultural superiority was one of the most important 
ideas shared by Chinese intellectuals for over 2000 years. From the early Qin 
dynasty, the distinction between the Self - ‘Huaxia’ (China) and the Other - 
Yidi (Barbarians), based on perceived cultural and civilisational differences, 
historical heritage and values, was rather common (Harrison, 1969: 2). 
Among these three intellectuals, Zhang was the one who was most radical in 
advocating Han culturalism; as mentioned earlier, he believed the Han were 
‘the noblest and the most honourable’ race (1977 [1897]: 8). Sun 
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Zhongshan’s views were similar, and he used several culturalist arguments to 
contest the legitimacy of the Manchu government. 
 
In contrast to Sun and Zhang, Liang Qichao showed more moderation in 
advocating Han superiority in both cultural and social ways. He even argued 
that it was necessary to overcome the boundaries between the Manchu and 
the Han and believed the Manchu Dynasty formed an integral part of Chinese 
history. Yet although Liang claimed the Hanese should abandon their social 
superiority in order to achieve Chinese national integration, it is not difficult to 
find the evidence to prove his belief in a cultural superiority of Han. To him, 
the precondition of a unification of the traditional Chinese nation was the 
acceptance of the dominance of Han culture, as well as its standard of 
civilisation. In his view, the boundary between China and the Other 
(‘barbarian’) groups was not fixed or static; rather, these groups could be 
included in the Chinese population, if they adopted Chinese culture and 
behaved like the Chinese (which in this context meant Han culture and 
Hanese behaviour). Once they totally accepted the Han culture and its moral 
system, they became Chinese. This means that Liang in fact promoted a 
complete cultural assimilation of other groups. 
 
Despite differences in their interpretations of the status of the Han in the 
Chinese nation, Zhang, Sun and Liang shared similar views about the Han as 
a part of the yellow race. All of them were clearly aware of the increasingly 
challenging threat of Western imperialism to Chinese society, and promoted a 
racialised perception of the Chinese and Westerners. For example, Liang 
argued: ‘the bloody battle between the yellow race and the white race will 
definitely happen in 100 years… The Chinese population accounts for 70-80 
percent of the population of the yellow race, thus the integration of the 
(yellow) race must start from China’ (1990 [1896]: 54). Sun also noted ‘day 
and night [I am] worried about the decline of the yellow race day and night; (I) 
feel heartache about the weakness of China’ (1985 [1902], vol 3: 2). Zhang 
went even further to argue that Asian countries should treat each other as 
teeth and lips (1977 [1897]: 2), so integrated parts of one organic body In the 
process of depicting the Western Other, all three intellectuals made an effort 
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in the construction of the Han and wider Chinese identity, by promoting the 
cooperation among the yellow race, which according to them had to be led by 
the dominant Han Chinese. 
 
Another significant similarity shared by Zhang, Sun and Liang was that all of 
them deeply believed that the Han would dominate the Chinese nation, as 
well as the yellow race in the future. For instance, Liang noted the ‘Chinese 
state should allow the merging of Manchuria, Mongolia, Turkestan, Miao and 
Tibet, to construct a large nation, which accounts for one third of the world 
population … If this dream comes true, this large nation will definitely be 
centred around the Hanese and it will undoubtedly be under the control of the 
Hanese’ (1990 [1903]: 1070). Similarly to Liang, the two others also 
constructed the Han as superior with reference to other groups in what they 
perceived to be the yellow race. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
My comparative study on the works of three intellectuals illustrates that 
although their political standpoints varied; they were all using similar social 
categories and markers in defining the Self and constructing boundaries 
between the Self and the Other. Most importantly, their changing ideas about 
the Han and the Chinese effectively constituted competing ideas of, and 
programmes for, Chinese nation-building 
 
In regard to the early stage of their work, Zhang Binglin and Sun Zhongshan 
were obviously more radical in the discussion on the relationship between the 
Manchu and the Han. Both of them clearly promoted the anti-Manchu 
movement, while Liang Qichao instead argued to eliminate the boundary 
between the Han and Manchu. However, although Liang Qichao argued in 
favour of cooperation between the Manchu and the Han, he to some extent 
used the same markers as Zhang and Sun did in defining the distinction 
between the Manchu and the Han. Although Liang claimed the Hanese 
should abandon their social superiority in order to achieve the national 
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integration of the Chinese nation, his belief in Hanese cultural and moral 
superiority was also clearly shown. According to him, the only way to achieve 
the unification of traditional Chinese society was the complete acceptance 
and adaptation of the Hanese cultural and moral system by other groups 
within China. Meanwhile, this was the only way for other groups within the 
Chinese nation nations to achieve ‘civilisation’, which was defined and 
standardised by Hanese culture. 
 
In their late stage, on the other hand, all three intellectuals showed a clear 
support for national integration among different groups within Chinese society. 
Among them, Sun Zhongshan and Liang Qichao went furthest and argued 
that the Han should abandon their social and cultural superiority. This is 
particularly evident in Liang’s support for ‘large nationalism’, i.e. united-
Chinese nationalism, and his critical attitude toward ‘small nationalism’, i.e. 
Han nationalism (e.g. 1990 [1903]: 1069-1070). Liang argued for the 
overriding importance of large nationalism because of the threat of Western 
imperialism, which corresponded with calls for a stronger state to defend the 
Chinese nation. He therefore argued that the Chinese nation-state should 
also include Manchuria, Mongolia, Turkestan and Tibet. It is worthy to mention 
that Liang wrote his essay on large nationalism and small nationalism in 
1903, when both Zhang Binglin and Sun Zhongshan were still opposed to this 
idea. However, less than ten years later, they both changed their position on 
the matter to support this idea.  
 
Arguably, the different ideas promoted by the Chinese intellectuals can be 
seen as different visions of the Chinese nation, and hence as different 
‘programmes’ for Chinese nation-building - some premised on the expulsion 
of the Manchu while others on their inclusion. The divisive nationalist ideas of 
the late Qing era made sense at the time as a tool of reform and republican 
revolution, i.e. as a tool that helped bring down the Manchu court and turn the 
Chinese empire into a modern state. However, as the state was established, it 
became apparent that ethnic division and exclusion presented a threat to its 
unity, and even the most radical intellectuals started airing more conciliatory 
ideas in the interest of national stability and territorial unity. In the interest of 
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nation-building, nationalist exclusion gave way to national unity and 
integration. This shift can be seen as a very good example of Hobsbawm’s 
(1990) argument about nations and nationalist ideas being a product of 
particular elite power interests, tied to the establishment of a territorial state. 
As he argues: ‘Nations only exist as functions of particular kind of territorial 
state or the aspiration to establish one’ (9). Indeed, as imperial rule gave way 
to a modern nation-state, and the once oppositional intellectual elites gained 
positions of power, their views on the position of the Han vis-à-vis other ethnic 
groups changed accordingly.  
 
 
 
  
162 
 
 
 
 
Part 3:  
Textbooks and Dictionaries  
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Chapter 5: Nation, Race, Ethnicity and the 
Han in Chinese School Textbooks in Late 
Qing and Early Republican China 
The second focus of my empirical research turns to the sphere of education, 
and more specifically to some of the most important school textbooks on the 
subject of history published in China between 1895 and 1920. This was a 
period that was crucial not only for the formation of modern ideas of Chinese 
identity and the role of the Han in Chinese society, but also for the formation 
of a modern national historical narrative. As Liu and Hilton (2005) argue, 
historical narration is central to the construction of identity: 
 
‘History provides “us” with narratives that tell “us” who we are, where 
we came from and where we should be going. It defines a trajectory 
which helps construct the essence of a group’s identity, how it relates 
to other groups, and ascertains what its options are for facing present 
challenges. A group’s representation of its history will condition its 
sense of what it was, is, can and should be, and is thus central to the 
construction of its identity, norms and values. Representations of 
history help to define the social identity of peoples, especially in how 
they relate to other peoples and to current issues of international 
politics and internal diversity. Taking group’s representations of their 
history into account can help “us” understand why countries will react 
differently to a challenge where their common interests are ostensibly 
the same’ (537). 
 
Being one of the most important public representations of history, history 
textbooks can therefore provide important insights into how a people’s identity 
is created, maintained and changed. In my analysis, historical narration 
emerges as a powerful tool in constructing identity, with implications for action 
(Rime, 1997). 
 
One of the main reasons for politicians being able to make use of history, is 
that history in the creation of narratives, is that history can never speak for 
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itself; instead, in can be only described through interpreters’ tongues. 
Therefore, it provides a way of connecting the individual to a larger collective, 
by which the consciousness of identity is constructed. However, this 
construction is not fixed and unchangeable; instead, it is an ‘open-ended 
drama’ (Laszlo, 2003), since the different components of historical 
representations can be challenged by constituent groups and may be 
renegotiated (Liu & Hilton, 2005: 540). 
 
This flexibility and malleability of historical narratives is confirmed by my 
analysis, which shows that the representations of Chinese history found in 
textbooks published in the late Qing period differed markedly from those 
appearing in the textbooks from the early republican era. To demonstrate this, 
my analysis focuses on three key themes appearing in textbooks from both 
periods. The first is the origin of the Chinese nation, and more specifically, the 
question of whether the Chinese nation originated from the West or from 
within China. The second theme is the signification of minzu and the position 
of the Han vis-à-vis the minzu. Finally, the last theme is the interpretation of 
the role of minority groups in relation to the Han and to China as a whole. 
These themes broadly correspond to three questions: 1) who are ‘we’; 2) 
what are ‘we’ and 3) who are ‘they’/the Others? As I will show in my analysis, 
answers to these questions and understandings of the Self and the Other in 
Chinese textbooks were changing with time, in line with the transformation of 
the social context. 
 
It is also important to note that the analysis presented in this chapter covers a 
historical period during which the Chinese education system underwent a 
profound transformation that laid the basis of the modern Chinese education 
as we know it today. More than 100 years ago, on the 2nd of September 1905, 
the Qing government promulgated a decree proposed by the Guangxu 
Emperor: since the year of bingwu10, the provincial examination known as the 
keju was abolished as well as all the yearly examinations in all provinces. In 
                                            
10
 Bingwu is one of the branch year names in the traditional Chinese calendar, which 
corresponds to the year of 1903 in the Gregorian calendar. 
165 
 
traditional Chinese society, the keju examination system was the most 
important channel for selecting talented people within Chinese society. The 
keju system deeply influenced various social spheres, including education, 
elections, politics, economy, culture and even customs and psychological 
aspects. In imperial China, the keju system was used as the major 
mechanism by which Chinese intellectuals could obtain access to the national 
bureaucracy. In addition, it was also an efficient tool by which the central 
government was able to capture the loyalty of local-level institutions. 
 
Due to the importance of the keju system this chapter starts by explaining its 
general characteristics, the changes it underwent during the late Qing period, 
and reasons for its abolishment. This will be followed by the analysis of 
textbooks, divided into two periods: the first period is from 1895 to 1911, 
during which most of the Chinese history textbooks were translations of 
Western and Japanese works, and only a limited number of these were edited 
by Chinese authors. The second period is from 1911 to 1919, during which 
Chinese scholars were well aware of the propaganda function of education 
and advocated the use of textbooks edited by Chinese authors. However, 
given the lack of reliable historical sources in Chinese, the authors of 
textbooks still had to rely somewhat on Western historical works. 
 
 
1. The Keju System 
1.1 The Main Characteristics of the Keju System 
Keju, refers to the imperial examinations in Imperial Chinese society, which 
determined who among the population would be allowed to get access to the 
state’s bureaucracy. The system of keju was established in 605 during the Sui 
Dynasty (581-618). It had lasted for over 1300 years until it was abolished 
near the end of the Qing Dynasty. During the rise of Chinese feudal society, 
the keju exam effectively contributed to a centralisation of political power, 
which therefore promoted the stability of the bureaucratic structure. 
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Under the keju system, the Chinese educational curriculum was organised in 
accordance with the four subjects of jing (Chinese classic texts) shi (historical 
works) zi (philosophical works) and ji (literary works). The jing texts refer to 
the pre-Qin Chinese texts, all of which were written in classical Chinese. The 
jing was an essential component of traditional Chinese culture, and the sishu 
wujing (Four shu [Books] and Five jing [Classics], which were chosen by Zhu 
Xi in the Song Dynasty, as the subjects of mandatory study), were also the 
main content of the keju examination. Confucian scholars, who wished to 
become government officials, were required to pass and receive high marks in 
the keju examination with no exception. Any political discussion was full of 
references to this background, and one could not be one of the literati, or 
even a military officer, without knowing them. Chinese students were required 
to memorise these classics in order to ascend in the social hierarchy (Gu, 
2008). 
 
Prior to the keju system, most appointments in the imperial bureaucracy were 
based on recommendations from prominent aristocrats and local officials. The 
Wu Emperor in the Han Dynasty started a basic form of the imperial 
examinations, in which local officials would select candidates to take part in 
an examination of the Confucian classics, from which he would select officials 
to serve by his side. The Yang Emperor in the Sui Dynasty established a new 
category of recommended candidates for the jinshike (madarinate) in 605 CE, 
which marked the first time that an examination system was explicitly 
instituted for a category of local talents. This is generally accepted as the 
beginning of the imperial examination system keju (Ren and Xue, 2003). 
Theoretically, the keju examination provided a considerably fair mechanism 
for those ordinary people who expected to participate in the government. Any 
male adult in China, regardless of his social status, could become a high-
ranking government official by passing the imperial examination. There are 
large numbers of examples in Chinese history showing that individuals 
climbed to political prominence from a very low social status through success 
in the imperial examination (ibid). 
 
In imperial China, the keju system played an important role in tightening the 
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relationship between the central bureaucracy and local-level elites. It was 
used as the major mechanism by which the central government was able to 
capture the loyalty of local-level institutions. On the other hand, the loyalty of 
local-level elites contributed to and maintained the integration of the state and 
cultural uniformity (Tian, 2005: 74). 
 
 
1.2 Educational Reforms during the Late Qing Period 
Wang Ermin (2003 [1976]) described the historical period from 1840 to 1900 
in China, as a process of ‘absorption, fusion, budding and metamorphosis’ of 
‘new concepts’ (xin gainian), and further argues that this period of 60 years is 
‘an important time of transition that brewed modernity, and also a unique 
development of academic thought’ (1-21). It not only determined the 
development of the modern Chinese academic basic pattern, but also shaped 
the narrative patterns of people’s understanding of the ‘past’ and ‘present’. 
According to Liu (2002: 2), different methods of classification led to the 
different classification in Chinese society of modern academic concepts in the 
process of transformation of modern knowledge. Moreover, knowledge of the 
nature of disciplines and disciplinary boundaries are all greatly distinct from 
traditional academia. 
 
The main target for changes in the educational system was the content of the 
examination. Although bagu wen (the Eight-legged Essay), which was the 
main entry of the keju examination, was widely criticised by the Chinese 
intellectuals in the Ming and Qing Dynasties, it was not changed until the end 
of the First Sino-Japanese Warin 1894. The unprecedentedly serious national 
crisis, as well as the rising tide of political reforms, contributed to the 
abolishment of bagu wen (Elman, 2002). During the period of bairi weixin (the 
Hundred Days’ Reform), bagu wen was finally abolished, while shiwu celun (a 
discussion on current affairs) was included in the content of the examination, 
which involved astronomy, geography, manufacturing, sound, light, chemical, 
electrical and other disciplines, as well as Western educational, financial, 
military organisation, business and legal systems. This was a major reform of 
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the old keju examination, and since then, Western scientific and cultural 
knowledge became central to examination content. 
 
During the Late Qing period, the abolishment of the keju was closely linked to 
the rapid emergence of modern xuetang (schools), which was one of the most 
important markers of the development of the Chinese educational system. 
After the keju was abolished in 1905, the number of schools around the 
country increased dramatically: there were only 8277 schools in China 
nationwide in 1905; the number reached 23,856 in 1906 and rapidly rose 
further to 59,117 in 1909 (Zhu, 1989). 
 
After the abolishment of the keju system, development in the field of 
education was also reflected in the establishment and gradual improvement of 
the new academic system. A new law on degrees was introduced: renyin and 
kuimao were promulgated in August 1902 and January 1904. For the first 
time, China had an established academic system in the modern sense, in 
which the degrees of primary, middle and high schools were clearly 
categorised. In addition to general education, various kinds of special 
education were also included, such as the Educational School, the 
Administrative Law School, as well as some specialised schools, such as 
agriculture, industrial, medicine, gymnastics, arts and police schools. In 1906, 
the Qing court defined the new educational objectives in the following way: 
loyalty to the Qing court, Confucian beliefs, sufficient attention paid to public 
spheres, military and physical education. This marked the change in the focus 
of education from traditional Confucianism that consisted of encompassing - 
rituals to practical, specialisation oriented transition. The new schools did not 
simply focus on the moral philosophy and the political philosophy of 
education, but also paid attention to vocational and modern scientific 
knowledge. While Confucianism continued to exist as the national religion, it 
lost its dominant status in the educational field, and it was reduced to being 
only one among an array of subjects (Ichisada, 1976). 
 
In order to ensure a smooth progress of transition to the modern schools, 
specialised education administration and management systems were also 
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established. Xuebu (The Study Department), established in 1905, was the 
highest executive body in the country’s education management (Yang, 2001: 
271). 
 
 
1.3 The Reasons for the Abolishment of the Keju Examination 
There were two main factors that contributed to the reform and abolishment of 
the keju system: the internal will for change among Chinese elites, and 
external challenges from the West. Internal factors were discussed in the 
section above. In the following paragraphs I will mainly focus on the external 
factors. 
 
As scholars were keen to participate in the keju exam, the attraction of the 
keju became the most powerful obstacle for Western missionaries attempting 
to disseminate their religious ideas. At the General Missionary Meeting in 
1869, it was seriously discussed whether Chinese Christians should be 
allowed to participate in the keju examinations. As both of the provincial and 
metropolitan examinations lasted nine days and included weekend exams, 
participants were in conflict with the church on the weekends. Moreover, most 
Western missionaries believed that the content in the keju exam would 
negatively impact the understanding of the true meaning of Christianity. Thus, 
most of them did not allow Chinese Christians to participate in the keju exams 
in China (Hartwell, 1869: 217-220). However, these Western missionaries in 
China also knew well that most Chinese scholars would definitely participate 
in the keju exam, and that they could play an important role in contributing to 
the spreading of Christianity in China. Hence, some Western missionaries 
would distribute the Bible and other Christian handouts before the time of 
entry into provincial examinations, in order to make an effective impact and 
generate more Christian recruitment among the Chinese students (Hill, 1888: 
282-283). 
 
On the other hand, Western missionaries also established some church 
schools in order to teach Western knowledge, which challenged the weak keju 
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system, and accelerated the disintegration of the imperial examination 
system. 
 
While missionaries’ influence on the Chinese keju examination system was 
considered rather minor and gentle, consisting of a kind of ‘cultural infiltration’, 
the Western military forces had exerted a violent and direct influence on the 
keju. In 1900, the baguo lianju11 (Eight-nation Alliance) entered Beijing, and 
burned down Beijing gongyuan (Beijing Imperial Examination School), which 
was a concrete symbol and visible expression of the invisible keju system. In 
the capital Beijing, the gongyuan was one of the largest buildings, second 
only to the imperial palace. During the late 19th century and early 20th century, 
Westerners had been well aware of the imperial examination system and the 
gongyuan and of the importance of Chinese scholars, and knew that this 
attack would have an enormous impact. According to the Boxer Protocol 
signed in 1901, Western powers had forced the Qing government to cancel 
the keju examination in some provinces as a punishment (Wang, 1957: 1012). 
 
Some Western scholars argued that there is no direct connection between the 
signing of the Boxer Protocol and the abolishment of the keju system (Franke, 
1960: 67-68). However, after the Beijing gongyuan (examination hall) was 
burned, the keju examination had to take place in the Henan gongyuan from 
1902 to 1904, which had never happened during the history of the keju exam. 
The normal operation of the keju, including the rules, content and forms was 
largely disrupted by the threat of the Western military, which indicated the 
demise of the keju system. We can therefore conclude that the signing of the 
Boxer Protocol actually played an important role in the abolishment of the keju 
exam, even if the causal link between the two was not direct. 
 
 
                                            
11
 Baguolianjun (The Eight-Nation Alliance) was a military alliance made up of Austria-
Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, 
which consisted of approximately 45,000 international troops. After the campaign, the Qing 
government was made to sign the Boxer Protocol in 1901 (O’Conner, 1973). 
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2. Period I: 1894-1911 
In 1902 and 1904, the Qing government successively promulgated the qinding 
xuetang zhangcheng (Authorized School Regulation) and the zouding 
xuetang zhangcheng (Contemporary School Regulation) and also named 
yinyan xuezhi (Yinyan Education System) in order to promote an education 
reform. According to these new regulations, the length of primary education 
(including elementary school and high school) was nine years and the length 
of secondary education was five years, which amounted to fourteen years in 
total. History as a curriculum was set in both primary and secondary schools, 
which was respectively arranged as ‘History’ in elementary primary schools 
and ‘Chinese History’ in high primary schools and ‘History’ in secondary 
schools. Qu and Tang (1991) argued that this curriculum was built to ‘explain 
the reasons of strength and weakness, rise and fall, as well as enhancing 
troop morale of Chinese’ (3). 
 
However, providing adequate textbooks for history teaching proved to be a 
challenge. The comment made by Bai (1997) is indicative in this respect: ‘The 
format of comprehensive history textbooks in contemporary China, is actually 
copied from the West, which is inherently, non-Chinese’ (208). Although Bai 
may have exaggerated the situation, it was true that cultural communication 
between China and the West, and especially Japan and the West at the end 
of the 19th century strongly influenced the writing and editing of history 
textbooks in China. At the time of the keju system, historical education was 
not systematically designed. After the abolishment of the keju exam and the 
establishment of modern schools, history teaching and history textbooks had 
to be developed almost from scratch. Initially, most schools adopted 
translated textbooks based on those brought to China from Japan or the 
West. It was only after the proclamation of the Republic of China in 1911 that 
Chinese literature began to be used as the source of school history textbooks, 
even though Japanese and Western sources remained influential as well.  In 
this first part of my analysis, I will focus on the period before 1911. 
 
At the time, Chinese traditional scholars firmly believed in the existence of 
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national boundaries between yi (barbarians/non-Chinese) and xia (or 
Hua/Huaxia, which is regarded as the origin of Han) (Liu, 2004: 11-12), which 
was discussed in detail in the last chapter. Most of them believed that the Han 
nation was the only truly civilised culture, while all other cultures were seen as 
barbarian and less developed. One of the consequences of this idea was the 
lack of interest in foreign historical knowledge. Although there were some 
Western works translated into Chinese by foreign missionaries, most of them 
were about technology and natural sciences, while only a few focused on 
history. According to the Reading List of Western Books (xixue shumubiao) 
published in 1896 by Liang Qichao, there were only 25 books which could be 
categorised as historical. It is understandable that it was difficult for the 
Chinese intellectuals at that time to comprehensively understand the world 
and its history using such a limited number of Western books. Moreover, 
some intellectuals criticised the quality of these translated works. For 
example, Tu argued (1897: 17) that the information provided in the translation 
works was out of date and was usually related to religion, since most of these 
works were translated by missionaries, and were therefore unable to inspire 
Chinese wisdom. Ye (1996) summarised four shortcomings of the translations 
as follows: a) they were unsuitable for teaching and learning; b) they were 
unsuitable as an outline of political science; c) the content was hard to 
comprehend; d) they were full of conflicting views and contradictions (358). 
 
Despite these negative views, Chinese schools had little choice but to use 
translated textbooks, because the amount of reliable local historical sources in 
China at the time was very limited. For example, according to the 
announcement made by xuebu (the Chinese Education Department) in 1907, 
‘there has seldom been any suitable textbooks for history as a curriculum, 
thus we have to leave it as a blank until there are some excellent works 
coming out and we will then make another announcement’ (quoted in Wang, 
1957: 56). It was further explained in the announcement that, ‘there is no 
reliable version of history textbooks available for analysis currently, even the 
limited number of existing relevant literature was translated from the foreign 
works. We therefore have to use the existing foreign textbooks to satisfy the 
educational needs’ (57). Using the translated Western history textbook to 
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address the needs of domestic needs was therefore legally approved. 
 
Another reason that led to the widespread use of the translations from the 
West and Japan, as well as the lack of Chinese historical textbooks, was that 
many Chinese intellectuals were suffering from a strong sense of frustration 
and weakness from the failure of the Hundred Days’ Reform in 1898. Some of 
them were fascinated by Western works and strived to promote Western 
Enlightenment. Meanwhile, they completely denied the value of Chinese 
culture and civilisation, and some even argued for the Chinese language to be 
substituted by Esperanto. This attitude was radically distinct from the long-
existing national pride of the Han, which regarded the Han as the only 
standard of civilisation. This phenomenon was criticised by some scholars, for 
instance by Liu Shipei (1906), who argued: ‘when they view the current things, 
there is nothing bad if it is foreign while there is nothing good if it is domestic. 
Thus the only concern of them is whether they look like foreigners when they 
try their best to pretend to be’ (300).  
 
Since the late 19th century, Chinese students who had studied abroad made 
a great effort in organising educational institutions and translating the foreign 
history textbooks, in order to meet the Chinese educational needs. During that 
period, the organisations which made a great contribution included, for 
instance, Huiwen Society, Dongwen Society, and Guangzhi Society, while the 
most significant publications were Shangwu Press (The Commercial Press) 
and Wenming Bookstore (The Civilisation Bookstore). During the early 20th 
century, the Chinese translation industry was very active and a massive 
number of works were published, especially translations of foreign political 
and historical textbooks. However, while publishing translated Western and 
Japanese books soon proved to be a lucrative business, quality was often 
lacking. Seeking quick profits, publishers often employed translators without 
adequate qualifications, and as a consequence, the quality of translations was 
rather low. This phenomenon was criticised by some scholars. For instance, a 
representative of the Qunyi Society (1903) argued critically: 
 
‘...translators with little understandings of the book, who randomly 
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focused on some of the terms in haste and finished the work 
imprudently, can never negotiate with the authors. Some even 
regarded commercial benefits as the only target, entirety ignoring 
social decency, which only leads to a large number of translations that 
are far from being readable and that make little contribution to the 
inspiration of nationals’ consciousness’ (27). 
 
Due to such problems, a very limited number of Chinese translations of 
Western history textbooks were officially validated before the Chinese 
Revolution in 1911. The following table includes all the officially approved 
translations of Western history textbooks, which were widely adopted by most 
schools across the country and therefore exerted a considerable impact on 
Chinese education. These are also the textbooks I analyse in the remainder of 
this section, focussing on the three themes identified earlier. 
 
TABLE 5:1 A list of main Chinese school textbooks published during the late 
Qing period 
Publication 
Time 
Title Author/Editor Publishing Press 
1899 Dongyang shiyao (The 
Summarised History of 
Asia), 
Kuwabara Jitzuzõ 
(Japanese), 
translated by Fan 
Bingqing 
The Commercial Press 
1899 Zhina tongshi (The General 
History of China) 
Naka Michiyo 
(Japanese), written 
in Chinese 
The Study Society of 
Eastern Literature 
1902 Zhina shiyao (The 
Summarised History of 
China) 
Ichimura Sanjirõ 
(Japanese), 
translated by Chen 
Yi 
The Guangzhi Bookstore 
1903 Zhina siqiannian kaihuashi 
(A History of 4000 Years 
Chinese Civilisation) 
Chinese boy 
(Pseudonym) 
The Chinese Translating 
Press. 
 
1903 Zhina wenmingshi (The 
History of the Chinese 
Shirakawa Jiro and 
Kokufu Tanenori 
The Jinghua Bookstore 
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Civilisation). 
 
(Japanese) 
1904 Zuixin zhongguo jiaokeshu 
zhongguolishi (The Latest 
Middle School Textbook: 
Chinese History) 
Xia Zengyou The Commercial Press 
1906 Zhongguo lishi jiaokeshu 
(The Textbook of Chinese 
History) 
Liu Shipei The Quintessence Press 
1908 Zhongxue zhongguolishi 
jiaokeshu (The Middle 
School Textbook: Chinese 
History) 
Zhang Qin The Wenming Bookstore 
1908 Benguo shi (The National 
History) 
Shen Engao The Chinese National 
Company 
1909 Xinbian zhongguolishi 
quanshu (The New Editition 
of Comprehensive Chinese 
History) 
Zhang Yunli The Commercial Press 
1909 Zhongguo lishi duben (A 
Reading Book of Chinese 
History) 
Wu Zengqi The Commercial Press 
 
 
2.1 The Origin of China 
Consideration of the origin of the nation is one of the main focuses in national 
historiography of the 19th century and early 20th century. This approach 
focuses on the constitution of the national group, and aims to identify the inner 
characteristics of the group members (e.g. their somatic appearance, 
language, culture etc.), based on which it is allegedly possible to identify and 
trace the same, or similar, supposedly objective characteristics of members of 
the nation over space and time. On the basis of this, Chinese historians in the 
19th century and the early republican era sought to analyse the relationship of 
their nation and other nations, and thereby also contributed to the 
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development of a sense of the Chinese collective Self and its Others. It is not 
a coincidence that this theme became prominent in national historiography 
precisely at a time when both international and intra-national conflicts were 
particularly acute, both in China and on a global scale. As Heinrich von 
Treitschke (1874, cited in Lawrence, 1979), a German nationalist historian 
and politician noted, 
 
‘War is political science par excellence. Over and over again has it 
been proved that it is only in war that a people becomes in very deed a 
people. It is only in the common performance of heroic deeds for the 
sake of the Fatherland that a nation becomes truly and spiritually 
united’ (17). 
 
At the time, most scholars, including Chinese intellectuals, were writing or 
editing historical books from a nationalist perspective. As Stefan Berger 
(1999) noted, ‘the nineteenth century witnessed the increasing 
professionalization of historical writing’, which was closely linked with ‘the task 
of nation-building’ (10), and therefore showed ‘remarkable zeal in 
demonstrating the uniqueness of their particular nation-state’ (12). Ronard 
Suny (2001) further concluded that even historians not directly involved in 
nation-building endeavours were often ‘deeply affected by the emerging 
discourse of the nation’ and generally did not question ‘the progressive 
evolution of peoples into nations, and the claim that nations had a unique right 
to sovereignty and political representation’ (346). Thus, the construction and 
conceptualisation of Chinese national identity cannot be unearthed from the 
study of various written sources in its national historiography.  
 
Regarding the school textbooks in history, my first concern is the origin of 
China and the Chinese. The origin of the Chinese was narrated in a wide 
range of fairy tales, but there were hardly any reliable historical resources 
recorded in Chinese. One of the scholars dealing with this topic, Lu (1987 
[1933]) argued that there was little reliable evidence of the origins of the 
Chinese nation. He considered that the Chinese people had a lack of 
knowledge about foreign countries in the past, and regarded their nation as 
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tianxia (the entire world). However, ‘the comprehension of the outside world 
has been strengthened and the Chinese started to recognise that China is 
only one of the nations in the world’ (7), and more importantly, to acknowledge 
that other nations with their own civilisations exist (ibid). 
 
In regard to the discussion of the origin of the Chinese nation, which was 
equally referred to as the origin of the Han, tuzhu shuo (nativeness) and wailai 
shuo (foreignness) are the only theories that have been considered. The 
scholars in the first camp claimed that the Han originated within the territory of 
China, while the rest argued that the territory was originally occupied by 
barbarians who were subsequently replaced by the incoming Han. This view, 
regarding the Han as an exotic immigrant to Chinese territory, dominated the 
discussion of the origin of the Chinese nation during the period from the late 
Qing to the early 1930s. 
 
One of the most important works discussing the origin of the Chinese nation is 
the French sinologist Terrien de Lacouperie’s (1845-1894) Western Origin of 
the Early Chinese Civilization from 2,300 B.C. to 200 A. D. (1894). 
Lacourperie considered that the origin of the Chinese was a branch of a group 
he called ‘Bark’: 
 
‘Everything in Chinese antiquity and traditions points to a Western 
origin … Nakhunte (modern: Nai Hwang ti), the first leader of the Bak 
tribes who reached China, had led his people into Chinese Turkestan, 
and then along the Kashgar or Tarym river, reaching after a time 
eastward of the Kuenlun, “the Flowery land”, a name which its great 
fertibility had long merited to the lands of future China … The Bak 
tribes though under the general command of one chief, were divided 
into several branches … some of the Bak tribes must have separated 
from the whole body, and travelled northwards near the upper course 
of the Yenissei, where inscriptions apparently in the writing of the time 
have been found … It appears from all the comparative evidence and, 
the break in the traditions and social connection that it is in the XXIIIrd 
century B.C. that the Bak tribes, future civilisers of China, branched off 
from the vicinity of Elam and Babylonia, and migrated eastwards’. (4-7)  
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Lacouperie cited hundreds of similarities in the fields of an astronomical 
calendar, language, science and technology, invention and the political 
system between China and Babylon, and therefore concluded that Chinese 
civilisation resulted from emigration from Babylon. His idea was rapidly 
echoed by some Japanese scholars, e.g. Shirakawa Jiro and Kokufu Tanenori 
(1903), as well as Kuwabara Jitzuzõ (1899) and Ichimura Sanjirõ (1902). 
 
The book Dongyang shiyao (The Summarised History of Asia) written by 
Japanese sinologist Kuwabara Jitzuzõ (1899), was recommended by Liang 
Qichao: ‘this book was the latest to be published, and therefore it has 
benefited from all the other works’ (1990 [1899]: 84). Kuwabara defined the 
origin of the Han as ‘an immigrated group from Babylon to the mainland, 
which settled down by the yellow River and thrived across the Chinese 
territory’ (1909 [1899]: 15). He went further to argue, ‘the yellow race trekked 
from North-West of Babylon, decided to end their journey in shu (Sichuan 
Province in current China)’ (15). Kuwabara here clearly used racial markers to 
define the Han since he constructed the Han as being a part of the yellow 
race. He identified three explanations of the origin of Han: some thought the 
group passed through Qinhai, which was located in the Northern part of Tibet; 
others considered that the group travelled through shu and afterwards settled 
down alongside the Yangtze River; while the rest claimed that the ancestor of 
the Han followed the flow of the yellow River and eventually settled down in 
shu (ibid). Kuwabara believed that the Yellow Emperor was born in and had 
grown up in Babylon, led one of the ethnic groups emigrating towards the 
East, and had arrived at the yellow River in 2280 AC finally (ibid). 
 
Another Japanese work Zhina shiyao (The Summarised History of China) 
written by Ichimura Sanjirõ (1902) supported Kuwabara’s ideas: ‘The Hanese 
immigrated from North-West, further multiplied their descendants, travelled 
towards the South and excluded the Miao nationality progressively, and 
eventually dominated the entire China’ (4). Although Ichimura did not clearly 
point out the origin of the Hanese (which was clarified by Kuwabara as 
Babylon), he considered the Han as a group which immigrated from 
elsewhere. 
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Among Chinese scholars who supported Lacouperie’s arguments was Jiang 
Zhiyou, who published Zhongguo renzhongkao (The Investigation into the 
Origin of the Chinese) in the Xinmin Congbao (New Citizen Journal) in 1903. 
In this article, Jiang thoroughly explored Lacouperie’s work, and tried to 
provide evidence from the records of ancient Chinese history to support 
Lacouperie’s theories. This theory, claiming that Chinese people emigrated 
from another territory was widely accepted in school textbooks during the late 
Qing period and the early Republic. 
 
For example, Liu Shipei, in his Zhongguo lishi jiaokeshu (The Textbook of 
Chinese History), published in 1906, clearly supported the claim that the Han 
Chinese originated from Babylon: 
 
‘The Han was originated from Chaldea of Babylon, which was known 
as tai di in the ancient works. They went over the Kunlun Mountain 
(presently known as Pamirs), crossed daxia (presently located in the 
Mid Asia) and eventually resided in the middle of China. For that 
reason, the name Huaxia used by the West was sourced from the 
Flower Kingdom of the Kunlun12’ (300). 
 
Liu further made an effort to explore relevant Western literature to find clues 
echoing the corresponding contents, including the fields of academia, 
technology, writing character and literature, within the traditional Chinese 
society. By identifying the similarities and interconnections between Chinese 
and Babylonian cultures, Liu concluded that the Han originated from Babylon 
(ibid). Liu’s thinking thus corresponded with Kuwabara’s ideas, and used 
similar comparative methods to demonstrate that the human race (and the 
Han) originated in the West. 
It is also worth noting that these debates about Chinese national history and 
origin went hand-in-hand with the geographical repositioning of China on the 
                                            
12
 The West described the origin of Hua as that when immigrating towards the East, the 
founder of China was inspired by the Kunlun Mountain and addressed his nation as ‘Hua’ 
nation, which was kept and passed down, successively to his generations, and finally named 
Hua. 
180 
 
world map. After the outbreak of the Opium War in 1839, the Qing government 
had no choice but to accept the fact that China was only one of many nations 
in the world. However, due to the long-term policy of seclusion by the Qing 
court, most Chinese intellectuals had very little knowledge and understanding 
of the wider social landscape outside China. 
 
The Chinese geographer Xu Jiyu’s book (1849) Yinghuan zhilve (A Short 
Account of the Maritime Circuit) made a great impact on many intellectuals, 
including Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao, in helping them understand the 
geographical composition of the world (Drake, 1975). The Qing court’s failure 
of the First Sino-Japanese War generated a deep sense of crisis, which led 
Chinese intellectuals to re-place China into an expanded wider social 
landscape. Of particular interest to my analysis is the fact that this new 
interpretation of China as well as the world was strongly shaped by racial 
stereotypes. For instance, the renowned Chinese scholar Yanfu, who had 
studied in Britain, simply equated Asia with the yellow race, and Europe with 
the white race (1986 [1898]). 
 
The theory of wailai shuo dominated Chinese academia until the early 
republic. Some scholars suggested that the wide acceptance of wailai shuo 
resulted largely from the admiration of the Western civilisation. They argued 
that the theory of wailai shuo can be considered as an attempt to link the 
traditional Chinese ancestor worship with the West, in order to create a sense 
of equality between China and the West by highlighting the similarities 
between Chinese and Western civilisations (e.g. Lu, 2001 & Sun, 2004). 
Other scholars went further to claim that there could not be any consideration 
of the origin of the nation before Chinese civilisation had been included in the 
national order of the West (Sun, 2004). 
 
To conclude, we can see that the narrative about the origins of China and the 
Han that dominated school textbooks in the late Qing period can be linked to 
the wider social context at the time. Due to China’s declining international 
status, it was the first time that Chinese civilisation, which was based on Han 
cultural and moral standard, was radically challenged. Some scholars (e.g. 
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Kohl & Fawcett, 1995) distinguish between two different kinds of elites: 
professional historians and political scientists, who usually attempt to provide 
a ‘dispassionate’ record of the past, versus politicians and opinion leaders, 
who on the other hand, always seek to ‘persuade the public of the correctness 
of policies they advocate’ (Liu & Hilton, 2005: 541). In the case I am studying, 
these two types of intellectuals were mostly working together, by claiming the 
necessity of national integration, in order to serve the shared goals - to save 
Chinafrom the Western threats by creating and promoting a consciousness of 
collective identity. To that end, however, they also needed to overcome the 
tension between the sense of political inferiority and that of traditional cultural 
superiority. One could argue that the theory of wailai shuo helped resolve this 
tension by relating the powerful West to China, both racially and culturally. 
 
 
2.2 The Meaning of minzu:  Position of the Han 
At the end of the Qing Dynasty, history textbooks often used the term minzu to 
identify and categorise social groups. The history textbooks of the late Qing 
consistently mentioned the term minzu as an important historical actor, and 
made a great effort to discuss and explain the term. However, Japanese and 
Chinese-edited textbooks from this period differed significantly in their 
understanding of minzu and in the role they accorded to the Han. While 
Japanese textbooks considered the Han to be only one of the groups in the 
larger Chinese population, Chinese-edited textbooks suggested the Han were 
the most powerful and influential of the groups. Furthermore, there were also 
some significant differences among the Chinese-edited textbooks themselves. 
In the following paragraphs I shall briefly outline these differences.  
 
For example, in Shina shiyō (The Summarised History of China), Ichimura 
Sanjirõ (1902) listed five renzhong (national groups), namely Miao, Han, 
Mongol, Manchu and Hui, to describe the Chinese minzu. In this context, the 
Han are listed as only one of the national groups. A similar understanding can 
be found in Dongyang shiyao (The Summarised History of Asia), written by 
Kuwabara Jitzuzõ (1899). Kuwabara categorised the various groups in 
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Japanese history as representing the ‘Asian race’, which ‘was permanently in 
domination regardless of any social changes’ (15). In order to demonstrate the 
detailed categorisation of Asian groups in Kuwabara’s book, I offer the 
following chart. 
 
FIGURE 5:1 Kuwabara Jitzuzõ’s categorisation of the Asian groups 
(drawn by the author) 
 
 
 
Kuwabara saw the Asian Race as being divided into two major groups: the 
Chinese and the Syberian. The former consisted of the Hanese, the Tibetian, 
the China Jiaozhi, and the latter consisted of the Japanese, the Tungusian, 
the Mongolian and the Turkish. The construction of his categorisation of the 
yellow race was not comprehensively explained; nevertheless, he used 
various social markers in identifying the yellow race, e.g. territory boundaries, 
collective origin, and etc. He further explained the racial hierarchy within Asian 
groups in this way: the Han, Tungus, Mongol and Turkey were the most 
important renzhong in Asian history, while the rest were considered less 
significant. His standard of judging the importance of minzu was based on 
whether those minzu had governmentally dominated the Chinese mainland. 
Kuwabara considered the Han to be the most important zhong in Asian 
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history, which originally inspired the Asian civilisation. However, he denied that 
the Han was the dominant nation in Chinese history; and instead, he thought 
the above-mentioned five national groups as having ruled China in sequence 
(1899: 6-8). 
 
In contrast, Chinese edited history textbooks provided a different 
understanding of the Han, the role of minority groups, and of the relationship 
between the Han and the remaining minorities. In Zhina siqiannian kaihuashi 
(A History of 4000 Years of Chinese Civilisation) (1903), the author provides a 
detailed description of both physical and spiritual characteristics of the various 
renzhong in China. This can serve as a telling example of how the description 
of the various renzhong in Chinese-edited textbooks differed from the one in 
Japanese textbooks: 
 
‘The Miao was the most ancient group and had been inhabitants of the 
Yangze River, Huai River and its environs, who were the most 
obstreperous amongst others. The Hanese, who are widely considered 
as the initiators of China, occupy the largest portion of Chinese 
territory. Although the Han later experienced rises and downfalls, most 
of the emperors in various dynasties were Hanese, which is why the 
Han dominate the Chinese mainland and exerts a great influence on 
Chinese society. Compared to other minority groups, the Hanese are 
the most educated and intelligent group. The Mongolian was the most 
violent group and obsessed with destruction. It became weak and less 
aggressive as a result of Russian superstition of religion which fooled 
them. The Manchu’s appearance was very close to the Hanese, but 
more vivacious in some respects. The Hui are little different from the 
Han nowadays, yet they believes in Moslemism’ (5-7). 
 
The book Zhina siqiannian kaihuashi (A History of 4000 Years of Chinese 
Civilisation) (1903) is based on the Japanese textbook Shina shiyō (The 
Summarised History of China) (Ichimura, 1902), but was edited considerably 
by the Chinese editor. Although the renzhong listed in the former book were 
the same as those in the latter, the narrative in the Chinese version was 
significantly different from the one in the Japanese original. Ichimura briefly 
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introduced the origin, composition and development of each renzhong, 
without any evaluation and judgment. Instead, in the book Zhina siqiannian 
kaihuashi (A History of 4000 Years of Chinese Civilisation) (1903), the 
author’s evaluation and criticism of all the other minority groups was fully 
based on the Han being set as representing the highest standard of 
civilisation. The Han civilisation was seen as the only standard of cultural and 
civilisational judgment, the Han moral system was viewed as the only 
standard of social virtue. This construction of Han-centred narration, which 
established a clear social hierarchy in the relationship between the Han and 
minorities based on the constructed superiority of the former, and the 
constructed inferiority of the latter, was widely seen evident in Chinese edited 
history textbooks during the late Qing period.  
 
In Xia Zengyou’s (1904) Zuixin zhongguo jiaokeshu zhongguolishi (The Latest 
Middle School Textbook: Chinese History), we encounter another version of 
this Han-centred narration. Here the terms China and the Han are used 
virtually interchangeably, and other groups do not feature at all. In Xia 
Zengyou’s opinion, the Han were not only the dominant nation, but also the 
unique pure ethnic group in China. In the discussion of the origin of China, he 
investigated the origin of the Han without mentioning any of the remaining 
minority groups. For example, he noted, ‘with regard to the origin of China, it 
was named as the Han by the Xiongnu13 during the Han Dynasty’ (3). This 
textbook, which had been re-published six times between 1904 and 1907, 
was widely admired by some of the most influential Chinese scholars at that 
time. For example, Liang Qichao (2003 [1903]) praised Xia Zengyou’s work as 
‘a fresh view of Chinese history’ (68). Due to such endorsements, this 
textbook likely had considerable impact in Chinese school education during 
the late Qing period. 
 
The different understandings of the Han outlined above were related to 
                                            
13
 The Xiongnu were a confederation of nomadic tribes from Central Asia with a ruling class of 
unknown origin. The identity of the ethnic core of the Xiongnu has been a subject of varied 
hypotheses, since only a few words, mainly titles and personal names were preserved in the 
Chinese historical sources. 
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different understandings of the term minzu. The shift of the term and the 
meaning it referred to can be generally summarised in two different ways. On 
the one hand, minzu was sometimes used to refer to all the nations within 
Chinese territory, or in Chinese history, or in China. The Han were just one of 
such minzu. As seen, this meaning was mostly adopted by Japanese edited 
textbooks. For example, in Kuwabara’s (1899) work, although he claimed that 
the Han were the most important group in the Asian history, he did not argue 
that the Han were the dominant group in Chinese history. On the other hand, 
the term minzu could sometimes refer to a collection of nations, among which 
the Han hold an absolute dominance, e.g. the term Zhonghua minzu (the 
Chinese nation). For example, Liu Shipei (1906), in his Zhongguo lishi 
jiaokeshu (The Textbook of Chinese History), mentioned other minzu within 
the Chinese territory when he discussed national integration and separation in 
the Chinese context. However, when he was discussing zhongguo renmin 
(Chinese people), he used the term minzu only to refer to the Han. 
 
These differences between Japanese-edited and Chinese-edited textbooks 
suggest the growing influence of Chinese Han-centred nationalism at the 
time, arguably prompted by the challenge of the West and the (perceived) 
need for national unity among Chinese intellectuals. Japanese historical 
narratives were therefore adapted to suit the political context and ambitions of 
the Han-dominated elites. As some of the examples discussed suggest, these 
nationalist narratives were also closely intertwined with racial thinking.  
 
 
2.3 Minority Groups 
The construction of the Self is always intertwined with the construction of the 
Other. For the Chinese national Self, the minority groups’ sometimes 
constituted the Other and in textbooks the understanding of minorities and 
their role was changing hand-in-hand with the shifts in the representations of 
the Han. 
 
The long established Chinese cultural tradition was based on the assumption 
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of a natural hierarchy of ethnicities within China, with Han Chinese placed at 
the top, and minorities at the bottom. In various dynasties, some Hanese 
criminals were made to settle in the territory of those minorities, usually as a 
form of punishment. Moreover, hanhua (Hanisation) was widely accepted by 
elites as well as the Han public, as the only way of achieving civilisation for 
those minority groups. Han intellectuals considered that it was up to them to 
bring a higher form of life to those minorities, which was believed to be 
embodied in the Han cultural and moral system. 
 
These Han-centric cultural assumptions exerted an impact on Chinese editors 
of textbooks. This becomes clearly evident if we compare the portrayal of the 
relationship between the Han and minority groups in Japanese editions with 
those that appeared in Chinese editions. For example, the event of wuhu 
luanhua (The wuhu Uprising Jin Dynasty) was pointed out by most Chinese 
history textbooks for its importance. Wuhu was a Chinese term referring to the 
five northern minority tribes, which rose up against the Jin Dynasty (265-420) 
of China, and therefore delimited the territory of the Jin Dynasty (a Hanese 
regime established to the south of Huai River). The wuhu Uprising was always 
hereby seen as one of the most devastating events in Chinese history, since it 
introduced a fairly long period during which China was divided. 
 
However, different from Chinese editors, who presented the Han as a group 
enjoying a higher social status than the hu (barbarians), Japanese-edited 
textbooks tended to treat the Han and other groups as equals. For instance, in 
Shirakawa’s (1903) and Kuwabara’s (1899) books, the regimes established by 
the Han and hu (barbarians) were both ‘states’. Moreover, Kuwabara included 
the hu (barbarian) into China jiaozhi (minority groups within China), while 
Shirakawa (1903) paid a lot of attention to those hu heroes who successfully 
obtained some parts of the territory of the mainland which had belonged to the 
Jin Dynasty, by admiring them as ‘the heroes with braveness and intelligence’ 
(1903: 40). Shirakawa’s narration of this part of Chinese history was based on 
an external angle, without the belief that the Han should be the core of the 
nation. Instead, he placed the Hu and the Han in an equal position. 
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Some Chinese intellectuals therefore argued that Shirakawa’s work was 
actually an effort in promoting Japanese domination in Asia, by questioning 
Han’s dominant role in China and driving a wedge between the Han and the 
minorities. For instance, Fu (2002 [1931]) considered that Japan was actively 
participating in the construction of the world in order to enhance its position in 
world history. To become the dominant country in Asia, the first task to be 
completed was to replace the traditional Han domination of China. Therefore, 
Fu criticised Shirakawa’s work for hardly containing any clues in tracing the 
origin of the national subject of China; instead, it seemed more like a territory 
carved up by different world powers (Fu, 2002 [1931]). 
 
In contrast, the narratives provided by Chinese edited textbooks were 
influenced by Han-centred nationalism, which defined the Han as the 
traditional and unique representative of Chinese civilisation as well as the 
kernel of China. For example, in Zuixin zhongguo jiaokeshu zhongguo lishi 
(The Latest Middle School Textbook: Chinese History), Xia Znegyou (1904) 
described the enthronement of the Xiongnu emperor - i.e. the emperor of a 
confederation of nomadic tribes from Central Asia - in very negative terms, 
referred to it as a wei (puppet) regime, and described it as a process as full of 
intense pain of subjugation and humiliation. Zeng Kunhua’s (1903) book 
Zhongguo lishi (Chinese History) provided another case in point. Zeng listed 
Han, Mongol, Tungus, Turkish, Tibetian and Miao as the ethnic groups which 
played a role in Chinese history. He used the term benzu (our nation) to refer 
to the Han, and argued that Chinese history was actually the history of the 
Han. In contrast, the other five nations were named as waizu (alien nation). 
Based on this, Zeng argued in an organic analogy that the Han and other 
groups hold ‘naturally’ different positions in the social hierarchy of Chinese 
society: ‘Han is the main trunk of China, while the remaining five minorities 
are the branches. Chinese history was therefore constructed by the 
combination of trunk and branches’ (18). 
 
We could argue that such continued exclusion and exoticisation of the 
minorities in China served as a reminder of the supposed cultural and moral 
superiority of the Han. 
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3. Period II: 1911-1919 
By the end of the late Qing era, Chinese intellectuals and cultural elites more 
generally were convinced that history education, compared to other subjects 
taught in school, should play a significant role. They believed that the 
compiled and translated versions of history textbooks, such as those used in 
the late Qing period, were not particularly effective in fulfilling this role, and 
insisted that it was an essential requirement for Chinese students to use 
history textbooks that were written by Chinese authors. The continued use of 
Japanese textbooks was seen as a cultural threat, as it could gradually 
indoctrinate the Chinese primary and secondary school students with 
Japanese scholars’ conception of history and their values and ultimately 
achieve cultural colonisation. Such ideas were evidence of the rising wave of 
modern patriotism in Chinese school history education in this period. 
 
A report written in 1910 by a group of Chinese scholars provides a good 
example of this growing influence of patriotism in history teaching. The report 
sought to demonstrate the great negative impact that existing textbooks had 
on education and national consciousness, because of their reliance on the 
translations. In this report, Pan Shusheng (1910) argued, ‘there are various 
types of history school textbooks in China, though most are copied from 
Western literature that has been cut and modified. However, none of these 
textbooks is suitable for contemporary Chinese education.’ (21) Therefore, 
one of the unavoidable results of using these textbooks will be that foreigners 
might have destroyed all of ‘us’ (23). Pan linked the function of school 
textbooks to the cultivation of a national character and the maintenance of 
national continuity in China. 
 
This idea was shared by Qian Mu (1913), who wrote that the ‘history lesson is 
the important subject of national education, which is designed for the 
formation of national character of a specific nation instead of any other nation’ 
(57). He continued, ‘we have our own national culture and customs while 
other nations have theirs, thus the information brought by other nations to 
their nationals are definitely not for our students’ (57). Pan and Qian’s were 
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not alone in sharing such ideas. Rather, their understanding of history and its 
role was very similar to ideas taken for granted among some of the most 
influential European historians at the time. For instance, according to the 
German scholar Friedrich Meinecke (1862-1954), the social sciences should 
attempt to uncover ‘the general characteristics of nations’ and it is the 
responsibility of the historian to ‘concentrate more on observing the particular 
features of an individual nation as faithfully and precisely as possible’ (1970 
[1907]: 10). As evident from the works written by Chinese intellectuals at this 
time they (just as Meinecke and other European historians) perceived history 
writing as a patriotic mission. To use Meinecke’s words again: historians 
believed that it was their responsibility to construct the nation as a legitimate 
object and to enable recognition of the nation-state as the ‘supreme value and 
final goal of history’ (Meinecke, 1970 [1907]: 21). 
 
After the establishment of the Republic of China in 1911, this growing 
patriotism in history education was soon translated into concrete policy 
measures. With regards to the educational aims of the middle school, the 
government promulgated the Putong jiaoyu zanxing banfa tongling (Interim 
Regulation on the Orders of General Education) (1912), in which it was stated 
that the ‘thrust of the historical education is to introduce the important events 
and social changes in history,  the evolution of nations, the rise and fall of 
other nations, with extra emphasis on the revolution of the political system as 
well as the foundation of the establishment of the Republic of China’ (23). This 
Interim Regulation also prohibited any further use of the textbooks used in the 
late Qing period. Instead, a new set of textbooks was published, which were 
mostly written by Chinese authors. These textbooks are listed in the following 
table and constitute the basis of the analysis that follows. 
 
TABLE 5:2 A list of main Chinese school textbooks published during the early 
republican period 
Publication 
Time 
Title Author/Editor Publishing Press 
1913 Xinzhu benguoshi (The 
Newly Edited National 
Zhao Yusen The Commercial 
Press 
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History) 
1914 Xinzhi benguoshi jiaoben 
(The Newly Edited History 
Textbook) 
Zhong Yulong The Zhonghua 
Book Company 
1923 Baihua benguoshi (A 
General Discussion on 
National History) 
Lu Simian The Commercial 
Press 
1925 Chuzhong benguoshi (The 
National History Textbook 
for Junior High School) 
Jin Zhaozi The Zhonghua 
Book Company 
1926 Xinzhongxue benguo lishi 
cankaoshu (The New 
Racial Theory: the 
Reference on National 
History) 
Jin Zhaozi The Zhonghua 
Book Company 
1931 Minzu yu gudai zhongguo 
shi (Nation and the History 
of Ancient China) 
Fu Sinian Hebei Education 
Press 
1933 Zhongguo minzushi (A 
History of the Nations in 
China) 
Lu Simian Encyclopaedia of 
China Publishing 
House 
 
 
3.1 The Origin of China 
As explained in the previous section, the theory of wailai shuo (foreignness) 
was the dominant theory of the origin of China in late Qing textbooks. After the 
establishment of the first republic, influenced by data provided by 
archaeological research, and also by changes in the international 
environment, the wailai shuo theory was gradually replaced by the tuzhu shuo 
(nativeness) theory. Scholars advocating the tuzhu shuo theory such as the 
Scottish Sinologist John Ross (1842-1915), who wrote the book The Origin of 
the Chinese People (1916), claimed that the Chinese emanated from and 
multiplied their descendants within the mainland. This gradually became the 
dominant position in this field of study after the establishment of the Republic 
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of China in 1911. The question of the origin of China and the Chinese was 
addressed also by the famous British scholar Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), 
even though his conclusions were ambiguous in that: ‘…where the Chinese 
came from is a matter of conjecture. Their early history is known only from 
their own annals, which throws no light upon the question.’ (1923: 18) 
However, he afterwards argued: ‘It seems certain that, when Chinese history 
begins, the Chinese occupied only a small part of what is now China, along 
the banks of the yellow River (ibid)’. He also highlighted the uniqueness of 
Chinese culture in that ‘the traditional civilisation of China had developed in 
almost complete independence of Europe, and had merits and demerits quite 
different from those of the West’ (10). 
 
The theory of wailai shuo did actually exist before the establishment of the 
Republic of China. A significant example on this topic was Zhina tongshi (The 
General History of China), written by a Japanese sinologist Naka Michiyo 
(1903). In this book, he pointed out that the Chinese national awakening 
started at a very early stage, compared to the rest of the nations in South-
West Asia. The ancestors of the Hanese, who were a group of aboriginal 
people living in tribes, addressed themselves, as well as this land, as Huaxia 
(8). Naka was convinced that the Han were the native residents, experienced 
an early national awakening, and were advanced well ahead of nearby 
groups, especially in their standard of manners and music, which formed its 
own style and mature civilisation. He therefore concluded that, the Han group 
was sufficiently equipped to be defined as a nation (9). However, although 
Naka wrote his book already in 1903, Chinese intellectuals have not paid 
much attention to his arguments. 
 
In the 1920s, the theory of the wailai shuo was increasingly criticised in some 
of the Chinese textbooks. For example, Jin Zhaozi (1925), in his book 
Chuzhong benguoshi (The National History Textbook for Junior High School), 
showed a clear critical attitude towards the claim that the Chinese originally 
derived from elsewhere. Similarly, He Bingsong, who was very critical of the 
theory of the wailai shuo as well as Western research on the Chinese origins, 
noted in his Zhonghua minzu qiyuan zhi xin shenhua (The New Myth of 
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Chinese Origins) (1990 [1929]): 
 
‘The European are awed by the long history of China and its significant 
status in the world, and therefore they let their imagination run riot and 
claim that the Chinese culture has originated from the West, in order to 
prove Westerners’ contribution to China’ (170). 
 
He therefore criticised the Chinese scholars’ adoption of the wailai shuo: ‘the 
Westerners arrogance is shown in all their academic research … Some 
scholars in our country, indiscriminately adopt Western theories, which only 
results in falling into the trap of imperialism without consciousnesses (ibid). In 
his opinion, the theory of the wailai shuo was not only a misrepresentation of 
Chinese origin, but also, more importantly, a representation of Western 
imperialism that has offended Chinese culture. 
 
Thereafter, some Chinese scholars, who used to be firmly convinced of wailai 
shuo, shifted towards support for tuzhu shuo. For example, Lu Simian, who 
made a great effort in seeking the evidence to support wailai shuo in his book 
Baihua benguoshi (A General Discussion on National History), published in 
1923, later fundamentally changed his proposition to promote tuzhu shuo: 
‘Han was the major minzu that lived in the zhongyuan (the central plain of 
China), with the independence of its unique language, custom and culture. 
This minzu originally resided alongside the yellow River and the Yangtze 
River, and afterwards explored in all four cardinal directions’ (1987 [1933]: 1). 
He even felt guilty about having previously supported wailai shuo (ibid: 8). 
 
In the study of Chinese origins, one of the main concerns is the tracing of 
ancestors. Huang-di, also named as the yellow Emperor, is a legendary 
Chinese sovereign and cultural hero present in Chinese mythology. He was 
widely regarded as the ancestor of all Huaxia Chinese. During the early period 
of the first republic, the claim that all of the Chinese nations shared the same 
origin, identifying the yellow race, as well as the ancestor of the yellow 
Emperor, was widespread within the Chinese academy. For example, Zhong 
Yulong, in his Xinzhi benguoshi jiaoben (The Newly Edited History Textbook) 
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(1914) argued: ‘all of Han, Manchu, Mongol, Hui and Tibet belong to the 
yellow race, with the same origin’ (1). 
 
As argued earlier, the rise of the wailai shuo theory is viewed by some 
Chinese scholars as the reflection of a feeling of failure among Chinese 
people. The establishment of the idea that the Chinese came from the West 
was based on the belief in and complete acceptance of the ideology of 
Western superiority, which was represented in national, racial and ethnical 
ways. In contrast, the shift to the tuzhu shuo theory occurred in the early 
republican era, and thus was linked to the establishment of authority and 
legitimacy of the new government. The new historical narrative of Chinese 
origin served to underscore this new governmental power, authority and 
legitimacy.  
 
 
3.2 The Meaning of minzu:  Position of the Han 
The understanding of the term minzu in textbooks, published during the early 
Republic of China was closely linked to the concepts of wuzugonghe (the 
Republic of Five Races) and zhonghua minzu (Chinese nation). Wuzugonghe 
was one of the major principles upon which the Republic of China was 
originally founded. This principle emphasised the harmony of the five major 
ethnic groups in China as represented by the coloured stripes of the Five-
Coloured Flag of the Republic: the Han (red), the Hui (white), the 
Manchurians (yellow), the Mongolians (blue) and the Tibetans (black). In most 
textbooks, the national groups within the Chinese territory, including the five 
nations mentioned, were conceptualised as a minzu. This use of the term 
minzu suggest equality among all five groups, and is a sign of the recognition 
of all ethnic groups in China as constituting the Chinese nation, which was 
established and widely accepted after the establishment of the Republic of 
China. 
 
From this perspective, the textbooks published in the early republican era 
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clearly differed from those published in the late Qing era. They were also 
rather critical of the Han-centred narratives that were prominent in late Qing 
textbooks while promoting national unity. For example, Zhong Yulong (1914) 
argued:  
  
‘most of our national history works are focused on the Han, with 
obvious prejudices towards other nations. This book will view 
wuzugonghe as the principle, with equal attention to the development 
and integration of the Manchu, the Hui, the Mongol and the Tibet. Even 
for those conflicts between them and Han, I will not judge by 
preference, in order to strengthen the emotion between these five 
nations, and to promote national integration’ (1) 
 
Nonetheless, despite the emphasis put on the importance of national 
integration, the Han continued to be represented as culturally superior to other 
Chinese minzu. For example, in Xinzhi benguoshi jiaoben (The Newly Edited 
History Textbook), Zhong (1914) noted:  
 
‘The Han, the Manchu, the Mongol, the Hui and the Tibet commonly 
belong to the yellow race, and shared the same origin. They all 
immigrated from the West in groups, among which the Han was 
brought by the yellow Emperor… Compared to the other four nations, 
the Han owned the best location of territory and the most brilliant 
culture, which can be never reached by any other minority groups’ (3). 
 
Although Zhong admitted that the five nations shared the same origin, his 
argument was based on a concept of Han cultural superiority, which was very 
similar to the traditional ideas of Han’s domination in Chinese society. 
Although the establishment of the Chinese republic went hand-in-hand with a 
more inclusive approach to other groups, and hence with more inclusive 
historical narratives, these narratives still maintained a sense of traditional 
cultural and civilisational hierarchies. 
 
It is important to note that this (partial) shift away from Han-centred narration 
and Han-centred nationalism is very similar to developments noted in some of 
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the intellectuals’ writings from the same period, discussed in the previous 
chapter. Zhang Binglin and Sun Zhongshan were both initially seeking to 
differentiate the Manchu and the Han using a variety of racial and cultural 
markers, and claimed that only the Han were the true representatives of 
Chinese culture and civilisation. However, their attitude changed to some 
extent at a later stage, even though their belief in the supremacy and 
leadership qualities of the Han remained. Arguably, this shift in intellectual 
discourses had an impact on textbooks and their historical narratives as well. 
 
This also means that the textbooks were perhaps influenced more by ideas 
promoted by Zhang Binglin and Sun Zhongshan than those promoted by 
Liang Qichao, who was one of those Chinese intellectuals who disagreed with 
Zhong’s ideas and argued for a broader, more inclusive definition of the 
Chinese nation. 
 
 
3.3 Minority Groups 
In line with a changed understanding of the Chinese minzu the treatment of 
individual groups within the larger Chinese nation changed as well. Contrary 
to the late Qing textbooks, which regarded the Han as the only pure Chinese, 
the early republican textbooks acknowledged the contribution made by the 
minorities to national integration and the development of the Chinese nation. 
This also meant that the understanding of the role of different nations in the 
origin of the Chinese nation as a whole changed: the theory of monogenism 
was gradually replaced by the theory of national assimilation. More attention 
was paid to the significance of a collective identity of the various nations in 
China especially after the establishment of the first Republic. 
 
The concept of national assimilation was understood and interpreted in 
different ways at different times. However, its main doctrine was that of Han’s 
cultural superiority. It was originally equated with the process of Hanisation, in 
which minority groups were gradually included into Han by fully accepting and 
adapting its advanced civilisation. The process of Hanisation is 
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monodirectional, which means that the Han cultural and moral system was the 
only social standard of ‘being civilised’. In short, whether and how much 
people behaved like the Han, was the only ruler measuring the level of 
civilisation. On the other hand, the impact of minority groups onto the Han 
was described in a fairly negative way, including warfare and destruction. 
Those minority groups which had not been included in the Han were therefore 
excluded from Chinese history. 
 
National assimilation was explained in various ways by Chinese intellectuals 
discussed in the previous chapter. Liang Qichao (2003 [1903]) introduced and 
promoted the concept of nationalism in the early 20th century based on 
national assimilation. He had also seen the existence of assimilation between 
some Chinese nations over a long period of time and the fact that ‘China had 
an outstanding power of assimilation and had been approved by the Eastern 
and Western historians’ (13). It is the assimilation between nations that made 
up Chinese history. Liang summarised that between Chinese nations various 
kinds of relations were established. The Northern Wei nation was an 
exception and was hardly swayed by assimilation whereas the Dong Hu 
nation virtually had no difference when compared to Han. Liang’s idea of 
national assimilation claims that a number of Chinese nations were 
assimilated by the Han. 
 
Ideas such as Liang’s were echoed in early republican textbooks. For 
example, Zhao Yusen (1913) listed six different nations in China in his Xinzhu 
benguoshi (The Newly Edited National History), namely, Han, Mongol, 
Eastern Hu, Turkic, Tangut and Miao. The description of these nations was 
almost identical to that of historians from the Qing Dynasty apart from its 
emphasis on their status vis-à-vis each other and the Han: ‘the 
interrelationship and organisation among these nations contributed to the 
unity and formation of a unique country as a whole’ (2-3). He further 
prominently claimed the homology in regard to the origin of all the nations 
within Chinese territory and even argued that all the existing nations in the 
world shared the same origin. They became distinct from each other by the 
differentiation of their physical appearance and skin colour after branching out 
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and being influenced by various climates in different regions (3). For the 
people of China, he said: ‘they are differentiated by being split into six different 
nations along with the ownership of different residential locations’ (4). 
However, he argued that those who read history should understand that 
despite being six separate nations, they were still closely related. The author 
further claimed, ‘it is the most glorious and fortunate to have all four hundred 
million people united as a whole to form a country’ (7). Zhao therefore 
concluded that, all the minzu within China were and should be sharing the 
same origin, and were only differentiated by the variation in their locations. 
According to him, the six nations originated from the same source, could 
therefore never be separated. 
 
Zhao Yusen’s evaluation and interpretation of historical events and processes 
was rooted in this understanding of assimilation. His treatment of the wuhu 
Uprising is a case in point: rather than being wholly negative, as the 
descriptions of the event in late Qing era textbooks were. Zhao’s account of 
the event was more ambiguous. He stated that the ‘ancient period’ was the 
most crucial period for the formation of the Chinese nation and the 
assimilation of other nations with the Han. The ‘ancient period’ was divided 
into four phases, and the wuhu uprising happened in the fourth. According to 
the author, the wuhu uprising created substantial damage to Chinese culture. 
Nevertheless, it also exerted a significant impact on the formation of the 
Chinese nation, ultimately promoting national integration (53). 
 
Zhong Yulong, in his Xinzhi benguoshi jiaoben (The Newly Edited History 
Textbook) (1914), narrated the event of the wuhu uprising in a related manner, 
linking it to wuhu tonghua (wuhu assimilation) and Hanhua (Hanisation). He 
noted: 
 
‘After the wuhu uprising, Chinese language had been vitiated with the 
mixture and interlacement of languages of the Manchu, Mongol, Hui, 
Tibet and other minority groups, which marked the decay of the Han 
culture. However, the event of wuhu uprising simultaneously 
contributed to the interconnections and the national integration. There 
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was hardly any local and national culture of the Manchu, Hui, Mongol, 
Tibet and other minority groups, as a result, they had been inevitably 
assimilated into the Han culture after they entered into the mainland of 
China, since the Han culture is definitely more powerful and advanced’ 
(57).  
 
Hence, he concluded that the ‘invasion’ of the wuhu to the mainland, brought 
considerable catastrophe to the Han culture and resulted in the decay of Han. 
At the same time, in his opinion, it initiated and catalysed the integration of 
Han and the five minority groups. In other words, these five minority groups 
had been eventually assimilated into the Han (ibid). National integration 
during this period was thus linked to the process of Hanisation, which was 
monodirectional in only allowing the minorities to accept and follow the 
‘superior’ Han culture. 
 
To sum up, the narratives in early republican textbooks were more inclusive of 
the different groups, but still rested on the idea of Han superiority. The authors 
of these textbooks started to acknowledge the existence of ethnic and cultural 
minorities in Chinese history, though they considered that the contribution 
made by these minorities to Chinese civilisation was less significant compared 
to that by the Han. The national identity constructed by these scholars was 
thus borne out of the coexistence and aggregation of all the nations in China, 
which echoed the particular political exigencies of the time. As Liu and Hilton 
(2005) argued, ‘ethnic and national identities are often formed when disparate 
groups unify to achieve some shared goal, such as defending themselves 
against a shared opponent’ (544). This statement is directly applicable to 
changes in historical narratives we have noted in this chapter. Facing a 
common enemy prompted Chinese intellectuals to abandon the more radical 
version of Han-centred nationalism and instead adopt a somewhat more 
inclusive approach. 
 
They attempted to construct a new historical angle that allowed as many 
nations as possible to participate and be involved in the national agenda and 
the re-definition of the national identity, which was to some extent distinct from 
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the traditional Han-centred cultural discourses, that had hitherto prevailed, 
while at the same time maintaining the doctrine of Han superiority and 
leadership. 
 
However, these changes made no attempt to challenge the notion of an 
uniqueness of Han culture and its dominance in Chinese civilisation. Instead, 
these representations were only used as a tool in positioning the identity of 
minority groups in relation to the Han nation. In the cases of textbooks 
discussed above, categorisation as a member of a multi-ethnic united 
Chinese state was not voluntarily chosen by the minority group; rather, Han 
intellectuals regarded it as a necessity of promoting an alliance with different 
minorities in reaction to the increasing Western imperialist threat. 
 
Although minority groups were described and categorised in different ways by 
scholars, it is not difficult to recognise that they made a potential agreement 
on vehemently believing that the non-Han are subjects of China, and should 
be grateful to be so. Moreover, combined with powerful political slogans, this 
even enhanced the legitimacy of the sense of superiority of the Han, 
prompting all the allegedly less civilised minorities to achieve a Han-defined 
national integration, with a celebration of those minorities being civilised. The 
effort made by the Han to achieve national integration was widely praised in 
history textbooks. However, the intent was to strip native peoples of their own 
culture and make them ‘civilised’ in Hanese terms. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have examined the representations of the Han in school 
textbooks during the period of late Qing and early republican China. As we 
have seen, the narratives found in late Qing textbooks were distinct from 
those found in early republican era, and these differences can be linked to 
changes in the wider social and cultural context as well as to changing 
political conditions. 
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The first layer of my analysis focused on the treatment of the origin of the 
Chinese nation. The theory of wailai shuo (foreignness), which claims that the 
Chinese territory was originally occupied by the barbarians, and was 
subsequently replaced by the incoming Han, was dominant in late Qing era. 
In early republican textbooks, this opinion was gradually replaced by the 
tuzhu shuo (nativeness) theory, which considers that the Hanese originated 
within the territory of China. Being one of the main focuses in national 
historiographical research during the 19th century and early 20th century, the 
consideration of the origin of the nation was seen as a useful mechanism of 
analysing the inner characteristics of the group members, and the constitution 
of the national group. The dominance of the wailai shuo theory, which 
considered that the Chinese originated from the West, has to some extent 
challenged the long-term superiority of Chinese culture. However, it could be 
also shown that the acceptance and promotion of the wailai shuo theory by 
Chinese school textbooks authors were an effort to relate the ‘powerful’ West 
to China, in order to strengthen the consciousness of cultural superiority of 
the Han and China that had experienced a considerable threat in modern 
times. 
 
In the late 1920s, along with the dominant usage of Chinese edited textbooks 
in the Chinese education system, some scholars started to criticise the theory 
of the wailai shuo as actually a Western perspective that tried to present the 
prosperity of Chinese culture as something that China owes to the West (e.g. 
Jin, 1925; He, 1990 [1929]). The gradual replacement of the dominance of the 
wailai shuo theory by the tuzhu shuo in Chinese school textbooks has shown 
a change of Chinese scholars’ attitude towards the West during the late Qing 
and early republican period. By linking this change to the intellectuals’ 
discourses that have been analysed in the last chapter, it can be found that 
Chinese scholars’ sensitivity to the Western threat had been strengthened 
after the establishment of the Republic of China in 1911. 
 
The second theme I have discussed in this chapter was the meaning of the 
Chinese term minzu and how it was associated with the Han. Here I noted the 
transition from the initial equation (in Chinese-edited textbooks) between the 
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Han and Chinese minzu to a more inclusive definition which acknowledged 
other groups as minzu as well and considered them part of the larger Chinese 
minzu. Despite this shift to a more inclusive definition of the Chinese minzu, 
the perception of Han superiority in the social hierarchy of Chinese society 
was not fundamentally changed. In all the textbooks edited by the Chinese I 
have analysed, when the term minzu was applied to the Han, the Han were 
constructed as the most powerful and influential minzu in China without any 
exception. 
 
The last theme considered was the interpretation of other ethnic groups in 
China. I noted a shift from highly exclusive Han-centred narratives to more 
inclusive narratives, based on the notion of national assimilation - which, 
however, still assumed Han superiority. This shift is in line with the shift in the 
meaning of Chinese minzu and its relationship with the Han. This is not a 
surprise, since the construction of the Self (in this case, the Han/the Chinese) 
is always intertwined with the construction of the Other (in this case, other 
groups in China). 
 
The analysis suggests some clear parallels with discourses found in 
intellectuals’ discourses discussed in the previous chapter. As in intellectuals’ 
discourses, textbooks presented the Han as superior to other groups. This 
tendency persisted despite a shift to more inclusive definitions of Chinese 
nation and an emphasis on national integration in the early republican era. 
This pattern - namely, a shift towards a more inclusive definition of the 
Chinese nation, yet underscored with a continued belief in Han superiority 
and centrality - is very similar to the developments noted in Zhang Binglin and 
Sun Zhongshan’s writings from the same period, analysed in the previous 
chapter. Both of them were seeking to differentiate the Manchu and the Han 
by using various racial and cultural markers before the establishment of the 
Republic of China, and changed their standpoint to claim the inclusion of the 
Manchu as part of ‘us’ afterwards. Nevertheless, their belief in the superiority 
of the Han remained. 
 
As with the changes in intellectuals’ discourses, changes noted in school 
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textbooks from the late Qing and the early republican era can be seen as 
evidence of the process of Chinese nation-building. The dominance of the 
more inclusive, multi-ethnic notion of the Chinese nation can be seen as an 
instrument of national integration and nation-building after the establishment 
of the Chinese republic, where the key aim was to maintain national unity in 
order to enhance loyalty to the new republic, as well as to justify its claim to 
existing (imperial) Chinese territory. The growing importance of the link 
between the Chinese Self, state and territory - an integral element of a 
modern, national sense of belonging - was evident also in the changing 
narratives of national origin in the Chinese-edited school textbooks. Arguably, 
the replacement of the wailai shuo theory by the tuzhu shuo, i.e. the rise of 
narratives emphasizing the nativeness of the Chinese people and their 
historic link with the Chinese territory, can thus also be seen as an instrument 
in Chinese nation-building. 
 
The results of my analysis of textbooks also suggest that during the early 
republican era, school textbooks began to be used as tools of modern 
Chinese national imagination - thereby confirming Anderson’s (1983) 
argument about the central role of print media in the spreading and 
consolidation of national communities. By means of reading the same 
textbooks, pupils across China became acquainted with the same historical 
narratives and the same perceptions of the Han and the Chinese. Even 
though these pupils did not know each other in person, they could assume 
that each and every one of them formed an ‘imagined community’, imagining 
themselves and other as members of the same Chinese nation.     
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Chapter 6: The Han in Chinese Dictionaries 
in Late Qing and Early Republican China 
This chapter turns to another important source of public representations of the 
Han and discourses on race and nation during the chosen period, namely 
dictionaries. Similarly to textbooks, dictionaries functioned as means of 
promoting, simplifying, spreading and popularising discourses on race and 
nation, and therefore offer further insight into the relationship between popular 
and elite notions of belonging in late Qing and early republican China. The 
chapter starts with a general discussion of the genesis and role of dictionaries 
in modern society, which provides a definition of dictionary, an introduction to 
Chinese dictionaries in terms of their history, types and structures, and a 
discussion of the social role played by dictionaries, especially with regard to 
their function of bridging the gap between elite and popular discourses. 
 
The main body of this chapter will be an investigation of Chinese dictionaries 
in two periods, namely the late Qing period, and the early republican period. 
The discussion of the late Qing period will mainly focus on the prominent 
Kangxi zidian (Kangxi Dictionary), which was an influential grand dictionary 
that has contributed to the standardisation of pronunciation, meaning and 
format of characters in Chinese lexicography, and also played an important 
role in developing Chinese classical and historical literature and philosophy. 
Liu Heyun (1986) evaluated the significance of the Kangxi zidian as an 
‘outcome of times, and an influential grand collection of existing Chinese 
character books’ (100). The second part of the analysis examines the early 
republican era and focuses on a group of dictionaries that were most 
influential in this period, including the Shehui kexue da cidian (Dictionary of 
Social Sciences), and the Zhonghua da zidian (Simplified Chinese). 
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1. The Role and Genesis of Dictionaries in Modern 
Society 
1.1 The Definition of Dictionary 
The definitions of dictionaries in lexicography vary even more frequently than 
the definitions in dictionaries. Some authors have tried to provide a more 
general definition. For example, Samuel Johnson defined dictionary at the 
beginning of the 20th century as ‘a book containing the words of any language 
in alphabetical order, with explanations of their meaning’ (cited in Boswell, 
1907: 822). One of the most important functions of a dictionary (in some 
dictionaries, it is exclusively defined as the unique function of a dictionary) is 
that of providing references to their readers. For example, in the Collins 
Dictionary of the English Language (2nd ed., 1986), the dictionary has been 
defined as ‘a reference book that consists of an alphabetical list of words with 
their meanings and parts of speech, and often a guide to accepted 
pronunciation and syllabification, irregular inflections of words, derived words 
of different parts of speech, and etymologies’; ‘a similar reference book…’ and 
also ‘a collection of information or examples with the entries alphabetically 
arranged’ (cited in Hanks, et al. 1986). 
 
A similar definition of dictionary was provided by The Oxford English 
Dictionary (2nd ed., Vol. IV, 1989: 625), which has highlighted a dictionary’s 
function of implication: 
 
‘A book dealing with the individual words of a language (or certain 
specified classes of them), so as to set forth their orthography, 
pronunciation, signification and use, their synonyms, derivation and 
history, or at least some of these facts: for convenience of reference, 
the words are arranged in some stated order, now, in most languages, 
alphabetical; and in larger dictionaries the information given is 
illustrated by quotations from literature’. 
 
However, these attempts to define the term dictionary do not satisfy everyone; 
instead, scholars consider that there is NO perfect definition of dictionary. 
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Béjoint (2004), for example, assumed that ‘it is certainly unreasonable to 
expect a general dictionary to provide a definition of dictionary that can satisfy 
the specialist’ (9). He attributed the reason for varying definitions of ‘dictionary’ 
to the fact that each author is writing from his/her own point of view and 
aiming to serve a particular group of readers (ibid). 
 
Béjoint (2004) additionally discusses the function of dictionaries and is critical 
of the assumption that dictionaries are composed of ‘a series of separate, 
independent paragraphs that [are] not designed for continuous reading’ (10). 
He further explains that the basic structure of a dictionary is characterised by 
different levels of entries/sub entries, which are related to each other and 
designed to be read in connection with one-another, and compared (ibid). This 
is due to the fact that a dictionary is designed for consultation instead of 
continuous reading, and meant to help the user to verify a particular piece of 
information without a comprehensive reading regarding the topic. Therefore, 
the text in dictionaries was in his opinion, ‘fragmentary’ and ‘superficial’ and 
he criticised dictionaries as only designed as an inferior guidebook for ‘lazy’ 
people rather than those readers who tend to do serious reading (10). 
 
In regard to the structure of dictionaries, European lexicographers decided to 
start from the leftmost letter when they began using the alphabetical order as 
the basis for the arrangement of words. The conveniences brought by the 
alphabetical order in locating words were admitted by the public. On the other 
hand, however, this order has been heavily criticised especially by structuralist 
linguists since this mechanism of alphabetical arrangement has ignored the 
internal connection among the words that are logically related to each other 
(Gold, 1979). 
 
Some scholars, therefore, suggested to arrange words in dictionaries 
onomasiologically rather than alphabetically. A reference work, in which words 
are arranged semantically, is called a thesaurus or lexicon. One of the most 
famous examples among Western dictionaries is probably the Thesaurus 
written by Peter Mark Roger (1852), which was influenced by the Western 
encyclopedic tradition. The main characteristic of this dictionary was that 
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words were grouped together according to their semantic links. However, this 
type of dictionary has also been criticised for being inconvenient, since it is 
based on an organisation of human knowledge that is subjective, bound to 
vary from author to author, as well as from reader to reader. Moreover, most 
semantically arranged dictionaries are equipped with an alphabetical index to 
facilitate consultation, e.g. Roger’s Thesaurus. Thus, the alphabetical order in 
organising dictionaries is in no danger of being replaced by any other forms. 
As Malkiel (1962) argued: ‘the alphabetical arrangement, though strictly 
conventional, is so overwhelmingly dominant that the ordinary person 
associates with this familiar sequence the very genre of the dictionary’ (17). 
 
The definitions and debates about the functionalities and structures of 
dictionaries discussed so far are applicable primarily to dictionaries written in 
Indo-European languages and produced mostly in the West. As argued in the 
following section, Chinese dictionaries developed in a somewhat different 
fashion. Before we consider their ideological, social and cultural functions in 
relation to changing notions of belonging in China, we need to highlight some 
of the characteristics that make Chinese dictionaries distinct from Western 
ones.  
 
 
1.2 Chinese Dictionaries: Structure, Types and a Brief 
Historical Introduction 
The collation or lexicographical ordering of a dictionary generally depends 
upon its writing system. For a language written in an alphabetic order, 
dictionaries are usually ordered alphabetically. Due to the characteristics of 
the Chinese script - namely the use of characters or logographs instead of an 
alphabet - Chinese dictionaries are not arranged in an alphabetical order. As a 
result, some of the Western definitions of dictionaries are not applicable to 
Chinese dictionaries. For example, Samuel Johnson (1755) defined dictionary 
as ‘a book containing the words of any language in alphabetical order, with 
explanations of their meaning’ (203). To Johnson, not having an alphabet is 
not to the Chinese’s credit, and he even declined to acknowledge Chinese 
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dictionaries as dictionaries because of their non-alphabetical form (ibid). In 
contrast, - Robert L. Collison (1982), a more contemporary scholar critically 
claimed that already about two thousand years ago Chinese dictionaries had 
made some significant achievements, yet their achievements had been totally 
ignored by the West until recently (20). This might relate to the mechanism of 
Chinese characters, which were based on hieroglyphs that represent certain 
meanings from the characters’ structure, without implying the pronunciation. In 
other words, Chinese characters are constituted in a logosyllabic way instead 
of relying on a system of alphabets of compact. A character usually represents 
one syllable and may be a word on its own, and also a part of a polysyllabic 
word. 
 
In terms of their form and organisation, Chinese dictionaries can be divided 
into two groups: zidian (character dictionary) and cidian (phrase dictionary). 
The former type of dictionaries, zidian, is focused on the explanation of single 
characters; while the later type, cidian, is edited to explain the meaning of 
phrases that are combinations of characters. In fact, the Kangxi zidian was 
the first Chinese book titled with zidian, and the term zidian was exclusively 
referred to as the Kangxi zidian during the Qing Dynasty (Liu, 1983: 1). 
 
A different typology of Chinese dictionaries was suggested by Liu Yeqiu 
(1983), who identified three types. I will briefly discuss these three types by 
comparing them with Western dictionaries: 
 
Graphically Organised Dictionaries 
A good example of a graphically oriented dictionary is the Shuowen jiezi 
(Explaining Article and Analysing Compound Characters), a famous Chinese 
book edited in CE100-121, in which entries are arranged by characters 
through a system of 540 bushou (section header) radicals14 . The Kangxi 
                                            
14
 A Chinese bushou (section head, radical) refers to the semantic elements of a specific 
character, always representing the originally internal meaning of the character. For example, 
the character (shu, means tree) and  (lin, means forest) share the bushou (mu, 
means wood), which contains the internal implication of wood. 
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zidian (Kangxi Dictionary) is another work included in this type. It was edited 
in 1716, complied with the requirements of Kangxi Emperor of the Qing 
Dynasty, and was regarded as the standard dictionary of traditional Chinese 
characters, popularising the system of 214 radicals. The format and structure 
of graphically organised Chinese dictionaries are very similar to European 
dictionaries in the sense that they are both ordered according to the form of 
entries rather than their meaning. In European dictionaries, this formal basis 
of ordering is provided by the alphabetical order, i.e. the entries are grouped 
by letters, starting with A. In Chinese graphically organised dictionaries the 
formal basis of ordering is provided by a system of hundreds of section 
header radicals, while characters are arranged according to these. As most 
Chinese characters are semantic-phonetic ones, the radical method is usually 
effective, thus it continues to be widely used in the present day. 
 
Semantically Organised Dictionaries 
An example of a semantic dictionary in Chinese society is Erya (Approaching 
Correctness), which is viewed as the oldest extant Chinese dictionary and a 
pre-Qin compilation of glosses to classical texts in the academic sphere. It 
contains lists of synonyms arranged into 19 semantic categories (e.g., a 
section explaining the meaning of all words referring to plants, a section 
explaining all words referring to animals etc.). This type of ordering existed in 
Western dictionaries as well, for example, in the Thesaurus of Peter Mark 
Roget (1852). However, this type of dictionary cannot work on its own unless 
it is combined with a graphic structure. In traditional Chinese semantically 
organised dictionaries, words are organised in a graphic order under each 
entry or sub-entry. As discussed earlier, the consultation of such dictionaries is 
not easy, since the logic of arranging entries into semantically related groups 
can be very subjective and varies greatly from author to author, as well as 
from reader to reader. 
 
Phonetically Organised Dictionaries  
This type of dictionary collates its entries by syllable rime and tones, and 
comprises the so-called rime dictionary. The first surviving rime dictionary is 
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the Qieyun (Cutting Rimes) edited in CE601 during the period of  the Sui 
Dynasty, which was viewed as the standard of pronunciation for Middle 
Chinese. Phonetically organised dictionaries can be found in the West as well, 
for example, Diane Frank’s Gabby’s Word Speller Phonetic Dictionary: Find 
Your Word by the Way It Sounds (2008). One of the clear limitations of this 
type of dictionaries relies on their requirement of the knowledge of rime. 
 
 
1.3 A Brief History of Chinese Dictionaries 
The history of Chinese dictionaries can be traced back over two millennia to 
the Eastern Zhou Dynasty (Norman, 1988: 170-180). The origin of the 
Chinese dictionary has been a subject of controversy among different 
scholars. For example, Liu (1983) considered that Yijing (Classic of Changes, 
one of the oldest of the Chinese classic texts, the origin of which can be 
traced back to the 3rd to the 2nd millennium BC [Stamps, 1980: 207]) should 
be viewed as the first Chinese dictionary that was arranged according to the 
structure of dictionary. In Zhou’s (1999) opinion on the other hand, Yijing 
should be regarded as the first Chinese dictionary - being not a Chinese 
language dictionary, but a dictionary on a specific subject instead. Other 
scholars (Liu, 1983) have argued that ancient zishu (character books) should 
be considered the earliest type of Chinese dictionary. An example is the 
character book Shizhoupian, which was written in the court of the Xuan 
Emperor during the Zhou Dynasty (827-782 BC). Although the content of 
Shizhoupian is impossible to trace, at least 223 terms contained in another 
more famous dictionary Shuowen jiezi had been collected from the former 
(Wang, 1983: 257). If Shozhoupian is the earliest type of the Chinese 
character dictionary, the origin of the Chinese phrase dictionary can, 
according to Wang be associated with the Cangjiepian, which was named 
after the inventor of Chinese writing CangJie (Wang, 1983: 279). The 
Cangjiepian was edited by Li Si and used as character textbook for children, 
and helped to standardise Xiaozhuanshu (small seal script, an archaic form of 
Chinese calligraphy) during the Qin Dynasty (221-207 BC) (Yong et al. 2006: 
112-113). 
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Despite the long history of Chinese dictionaries, systematic inquiry into the 
history of Chinese lexicography is something of a novelty, and only started 
developing in the last quarter of the twentieth century. Zhongguo cishu shihua 
(A Narrative History of Lexicography in China) by Fang Houshu (1979) is the 
first serious monograph concerned with dictionary research in China and 
covers a wide time span. It also initiated a whole series of academic articles 
and works on Chinese dictionaries (Yong & Peng, 2008: 3). While this growing 
body of work recognises the importance of the traditional Chinese dictionary 
in Chinese history as well as its impact on the Chinese society as a whole, in-
depth research dealing with specific aspects of dictionaries and their profound 
cultural and social role in shaping public opinion is lacking. The aim of this 
chapter is to fill a part of this research gap by examining the representations 
of the Han and the Chinese, and more broadly the discourses about race and 
nation, as they appear in Chinese dictionaries of the late Qing and early 
republican period. 
 
The late Qing period after the first Sino-Japanese War (1894) to the Republic 
of China (1911-1949) represents a particularly interesting time in the history of 
Chinese dictionaries. As mentioned earlier, this was a significant period during 
which China experienced an important transformation from feudal society to a 
modern society with a modern government. Western ideas played a central 
role in altering traditional Chinese culture, as well as in influencing the 
Chinese social moral system. Chinese notions of belonging, self-perceptions 
and perceptions of other peoples were changing as well. On the one hand, 
the idea of Han superiority, especially in respect to the Hanese cultural and 
moral system, was still strongly present. However, the Western challenge 
pushed the Chinese to acknowledge their weakness in technologies and 
international status. It is reasonable to expect that all these social changes 
had an impact on Chinese dictionaries and on definitions of the Han, nation, 
race and related terms provided in them. As Yong and Peng (2008: 296) 
argued, the lexicon of a language is always the medium which is most 
susceptible to any change in society, whether political, technological, ethical 
or of any other type. 
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Of particular importance to my analysis of dictionaries during the Qing 
Dynasty is the phenomenon of wenziyu (Literary Inquisition). This 
phenomenon made many of the Chinese intellectuals involved in the 
production of literature - but dictionaries in particular - very cautious and wary 
of any critical discussion of terms related to society and culture to prevent 
themselves from being caught and punished by the Qing court. As the 
Chinese scholar Gu Mingdong (2003) explains, the cases of wenziyu were 
particularly serious during the Qing Dynasty: 
 
‘In Chinese history, there are numerous cases of wenziyu (Literary 
Inquisition). The late Chinese dynasty, the Qing, is especially notorious 
for this phenomenon. As an ethnic minority who conquered the 
previous Ming dynasty, the Qing rulers were so sensitive to their alien 
position that they practically became paranoid about the denotations 
and connotations of the two Chinese characters: Ming (bright) and 
Qing (clear)’ (126). 
 
During the Qing Dynasty, the wenziyu had a deeply negative impact on 
various social spheres of Chinese society, including education, elections, 
politics, economy, culture and even customs and attitudes. The intellectuals 
and even their families sometimes could be convicted by the court and 
suffered serious corresponding punishments, for example, being sentenced to 
death or exile. A single word or phrase considered offensive by the ruler could 
be enough to trigger a prosecution. As a result, the Chinese intellectuals 
during the Qing period were generally trying to avoid mentioning any sensitive 
terms in their works, including dictionaries. It is also worth noting that at the 
same time, the content of the keju exams was exclusively focused on 
Chinese classics rather than the discussion of current political and social 
affairs, for broadly similar reasons. As I show further on, the threat of the 
Literary Inquisition had a significant impact on the context of late Qing 
dictionaries. 
 
The development of Chinese dictionaries after 1911 was characterised by 
significant changes in their type and content. There are two dictionaries that 
212 
 
can be regarded as the most representative works during this period: namely 
Zhonghua da zidian and Ciyuan. The Zhonghua da zidian (Simplified 
Chinese), firstly published in 1915, is considered to be the first large-scale 
Chinese language dictionary after the publication of the Kangxi zidian (1904 
[1716]), and also marks a transition from traditional Chinese characters books 
to modern language dictionaries (Yong, 2006: 408-409). The other key 
dictionary from this period, Lu Erkui’s (1915) Ciyuan (Sources of Words) was 
an outstanding effort in Chinese lexicography and can be considered the first 
cidian (word dictionary) in a modern sense (Yong, 2008: 409-410). These two 
dictionaries included a range of new terms stemming from the development of 
both natural and social sciences at the time, including those linked to modern 
notions of race and nation and thus directly relevant to my research. Due to 
these changes, Chinese lexicography as a whole experienced a new lease of 
life during this period, resulting in a great variation in the type, scale, content, 
function, and compilation levels of dictionaries and an expansion of the 
influence dictionaries exerted in the social, cultural, and academic spheres. 
 
 
1.4 Analytical Framework 
Similarly to the intellectuals’ and textbooks’ discourses, the discourses in 
Chinese dictionaries are developing along with societal and historical 
changes. As such, dictionaries can also provide an insight into the changing 
nature of public discourses about the Han, the Chinese, race and nation. 
Unlike the writings of intellectuals, however, dictionaries - along with 
textbooks - can also be seen as a ‘bridge’ between elite and popular 
discourses, since they are explicitly designed to make ideas and meanings 
available and accessible to the broader public. In addition, compared to the 
discourses in intellectuals’ works, and to some extent also compared to 
school textbooks, the power of definition exerted by dictionaries is much 
stronger. This is due to the fact that users tend to assume that their 
dictionaries are ‘both authoritative and beyond subjectivity’ (Moon, 1989: 
158).  Most readers do not notice that the information contained in the 
dictionaries is transient, and instead believe that the information provided by 
213 
 
the dictionaries is timeless, eternally correct. This explains the fact that some 
families keep the same dictionaries for generations. 
 
Due to this powerful and authoritative function of definition, the dictionaries 
are also often seen as instruments of ideological control (Moon 1989; Benson, 
2001), particularly in totalitarian and authoritarian regimes (Veisbergs, 2002). 
Mengham’s (1993) description of the 18th century dictionary provides a good 
example of such an understanding of dictionaries as instruments of social 
control: 
 
‘The lexicographer would determine what should be included in, and 
what should be excluded from, a body of knowledge that the pragmatic 
user of his work would learn to regard as the foundation of a national 
language and culture. The body of knowledge would be subject to 
stratification, thus helping to inculcate a sense of rank and respect for 
privilege identified by degrees of breadth of command over language-
use. The dictionary could become an instrument of social control, 
dispensed indirectly and fostering assumptions that need not be 
insisted upon too forcibly’ (112). 
 
By analogy, we can also treat Chinese dictionaries as an instrument of social 
and ideological and control, and, more specifically, as a means of controlling 
popular discourses about the Self and the Other, belonging and exclusion. By 
studying the definitions of the Han, the Chinese, race, nation and related 
terms in Chinese dictionaries, we can therefore gain an insight into the 
popularisation and spreading of racial and national ideologies during the late 
Qing and early republican period, and into the processes of selection and 
stratification of publically available knowledge at the time. By comparing these 
definitions to those found in intellectuals’ writings and textbooks, we shall also 
gain an understanding of which definitions of the Chinese Self and its Others 
were accorded privileged status in public discourses, and hence became 
taken for granted definitions of who the Han and the Chinese are. To achieve 
these aims, the remainder of this chapter focuses on representations of the 
Han, Chinese identity, and the Other in specific dictionaries. I will discuss 
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some of the most important dictionaries published during the period of the 
First Sino-Japanese War to the establishment of the Republic of China (1911-
1949). The list of dictionaries I will focus on is provided in the following table. 
  
TABLE 6:1 A list of main Chinese dictionaries published during the early 
republican period 
Year of Publishing Name of Book 
1904 [1716] Kangxi zidian 
(Kangxi Dictionary) 
1915 Shehui kexue da cidian 
(Dictionary of Social Sciences) 
1915 Zhonghua da zidian 
(Simplified Chinese) 
1921 Zhonghua zhuyin zidian 
(Chinese Phonetic Dictionary) 
1923 Guoyu putong cidian 
(Ordinary Dictionary of National Language) 
1924 Biaozhun guoyin shiyong xin zidian 
(Dictionary of National Pronunciation for Students) 
1929 Xinqiao zidian 
(Xinqiao Dictionary) 
1933 Xiaoxuesheng de zidian 
(Dictionary for Primary Students) 
1935 Xuesheng biaozhun zidian 
(Standard Dictionary for Students) 
1936 Biaozhun guoyin xuesheng zidian 
(Dictionary of National Pronunciation for Students) 
 
 
I will study in what ways the authors of Chinese dictionaries constructed and 
represented Han identity by analysing how they defined specific terms, 
including Han, zhong (race), and ren (human being), zu and minzu 
(ethnicity/nation) and guo (state). More specifically, the analysis will focus on 
three aspects of dictionary representation: 1) the definitions of the Han; 2) the 
definitions of ren; 3) the definitions of zu and zhong; 4) the definitions of guo 
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(state) and other relevant phrases. In relation to each of these aspects, I will 
discuss both continuities as well as changes in representation over time 
across the late Qing and early republican period. 
 
Before providing an analysis of dictionaries from the late Qing period, I will 
first provide a description of the wenziyu (Literary Inquisition), i.e. the official 
prosecution of intellectuals due to their writings or speeches. 
 
Due to the inquisition, Chinese scholars involved in producing literature, 
including dictionaries, were very cautious and avoided including any terms 
relating to social phenomena, especially those terms that could be linked to a 
controversial anti-Manchu position or a controversial understanding of the 
Han. This was the main reason behind the fact that only a very limited number 
of dictionaries produced during the Qing period included the terms relevant to 
my analysis of representations of the Han and Chinese identity. I therefore 
decided to focus on the Kangxi zidian, originally published in 1716, which was 
the main dictionary of the period and which continued to be reprinted through 
the late Qing period (the version used for my analysis was published in 1904). 
My decision reflects on this grand dictionary’s historical significance in 
standardising the pronunciation, meaning and format of Chinese characters, 
but also takes into account the fact that the Kangxi zidian was edited by the 
Manchurian rulers, which allows me to analyse how the Han have been 
represented from a different standpoint by the Manchu - the Other. 
 
My analysis of developments in the early republican period opens with a 
discussion of the academic movement xixuedongjian (Western Learning), 
which played an important role in shaping Chinese modern culture. Among 
other things, this movement was responsible for introducing modern Western 
ideas of race, nation and ethnicity, which also exerted an influence on 
dictionaries published in the early republican era as discussed in the second 
part of my analysis. 
 
Several influential dictionaries were published during the early republican era. 
For example, the publishing of Zhonghua da zidian (Simplified Chinese, also 
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known as Chinese Great Dictionary) (1915), edited by Xu Yuangao and 
others, was the first step in the establishment of the new format of Chinese 
character dictionaries after the publication of the Kangxi zidian. This dictionary 
marked an important watershed in the historical development of Chinese 
dictionaries that had marked the end of old Chinese character books and the 
birth of modern Chinese dictionaries (Yong, 2006: 408-409). Another 
important dictionary published during the early republican period was Shehui 
kexue da cidian (Dictionary of Social Sciences) (Gao et al. 1929), which 
provided a comprehensive explanation of some modern terms of Western 
origin that appeared in modern China. This dictionary included terms and 
explanations from a group of dictionaries and encyclopedias originally written 
in different languages, including Chinese, Japanese and English15 during the 
early republican period. Along with other dictionaries listed in the table, these 
dictionaries constitute the focus of my analysis.  
 
 
2. Period I: The Late Qing Period 
2.1 Wenziyu (Literary Inquisition) 
The nature of political rule established in Qing China had a profound impact 
on Chinese cultural production, including the production of dictionaries. The 
relationship between political power and culture during this period can be 
clearly demonstrated by examining the phenomenon of wenziyu (Literary 
Inquisition) and its stifling impact on the development of Chinese culture 
throughout the whole Qing Dynasty. This directly led to a decline in the 
production of different literary forms, including dictionaries, which was 
relevant to political discussion. The wenziyu refers to the official persecution 
of intellectuals for their writing in imperial China, which flourished during the 
Ming and Qing Dynasties. Such persecution was used by many emperors in 
                                            
15
 These dictionaries and encyclopaedia included the Encyclopedia of Social Reform (Blise, 
1897), the Dictionary of Socialism (Rappaport, 1924), the Shehui wenti cidian (Dictionary of 
Social Problems) (Chen, 1929), and the Shehui yundong cidian (Dictionary of Social 
Movements) (Wang, 1930). 
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feudal China in order to further suppress Chinese intellectuals and strengthen 
the centralised power of the imperial court. Although literary censorship was 
not created by the Qing court, it reached its peak during this period (Liu, 
1988). The number and severity of convictions as well as the intensity of 
suffering caused by them were at their highest levels under Qing rule, 
especially under the court of Yongzheng and the reign of the Qianlong 
Emperor, i.e. the third and fourth emperors of the Qing Dynasty (ibid). As 
Wang (2002) explains, ‘The cases of wenziyu have experienced a significant 
increase during the reign of Emperor Yongzheng. Seven important wenziyu 
cases happened in 14 years of his reign. In addition, the number of wenziyu 
cases gradually increased to 130 during Qianlong’s reign’. (91) 
.  
The key targets of the persecutions were publications - sometimes even 
single words - that were considered offensive to the rules, or challenged their 
legitimacy. Many scholars and their relatives fell victim to wenziyu due to 
writings that were not even meant to be anti-government but were 
nonetheless perceived as such. The Qing emperors were especially sensitive 
to anti-Manchu thoughts among the Han Chinese. During the regime of 
Yongzheng and Qianlong (the third and fourth emperors of the Qing Dynasty), 
several prominent Chinese scholars were persecuted. One of the most 
famous cases was the mingshi an (Case of the history of the Ming Dynasty) 
under the reign of Emperor Kangxi, in which about seventy people were killed 
and even more exiled (Wong, 2000: 275). Another interesting case of wenziyu 
involved a poet who used the term qing feng, which means clear wind in 
Chinese, and who had been severely punished since this term contained the 
word qing - considered by the Qing rulers to be offensive to their government 
(Gu, 2003: 126). Chinese intellectuals, who either lost their creative drive 
because of the wenziyu or were too intimidated to write anything that could 
subject them to conviction, made henceforth no considerable efforts in 
producing works including dictionaries, dealing with social or political facts. 
For this reason, ‘literary gentlemen with aspiration and integrity were nowhere 
to be found’ in this period, since even a single unintentional word might bring 
unexpected disasters (Liu, 1988: 731). 
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The wenziyu had therefore a considerably negative - and restricting impact on 
Chinese culture during the Qing Dynasty, and hampered the development of 
Chinese dictionaries. Even for the limited number of dictionaries or reference 
books published during this period, the writers involved were very cautious 
and often focused primarily on explaining words related to the realm of nature 
and natural sciences rather than society and culture. Nevertheless, it was 
also during the Qing Dynasty that an earlier officially sanctioned and well-
established dictionary made a great contribution to the development of 
Chinese lexicography, namely, the Kangxi zidian (Kangxi Dictionary) (Liu, 
1986: 100), which will be discussed in the following section. 
 
 
2.2 The Kangxi zidian (Kangxi Dictionary) 
In the eyes of Chinese feudal authorities, the main task was to promote 
Chinese culture, and to that end they invested in the production of literature in 
order to popularise Confucianism. The key aim of the works published in 
feudal times, including dictionaries, was to provide a systematic standard 
explanation of Confucianism for the wider audience (Yong, 2008: 137). 
Therefore, Chinese dictionaries published under the feudal government, 
instead of being a systematic index of collection of words, were only a 
fragmented collection of different quotations from Chinese classic text. The 
Kangxi zidian was no exception. 
 
In 1710, Emperor Kangxi assigned the compilation of the Kangxi zidian to a 
team of scholars, including Zhang Yushu16 (1642-1711) and Chen Tingjing17 
(1639-1712). The dictionary was completed and published in 1716, with the 
                                            
16
 Zhang Yushan was one of the most trusted chancellors in Kangxi’s court. In contrast to 
other chancellors, who were in permanent conflicts with each other to enhance their status in 
the court, Zhang’s career developed smoothly without experiencing any serious difficulties. 
Untill his death in 1711, he had never experienced a serious failure in his official career. 
 
17
 Chen Tingjing was the teacher of the Emperor Kangxi. In the second year after Kangxi’s 
edict of the complement of the Kangxi zidian (1710), Zhang Yushu died of illness. Chen took 
charge of the remaining work on his own. 
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preface written by Emperor Kangxi himself. This dictionary builds on the 
tradition of previous character dictionaries. In particular, it is based on the 
revision and enlargement of Mei Yingzuo’s Zihui (The Comprehensive 
Dictionary of Chinese Characters) 18  and Zhang Zilie’s Zhengzitong (The 
Rectified Dictionary of Chinese Characters)19. In Emperor Kangxi’s view ‘the 
Zihui is overly simple while the Zhengzitong is, by contrast, excessive’ (Yong 
& Peng, 2008: 299-300). He commanded that a new dictionary should be 
compiled to ‘amend the above two dictionaries and establish an everlasting 
paradigm for dictionary compilation’ (ibid). 
 
The Kangxi zidian was the first officially published dictionary with the title 
zidian (character dictionary) in the history of dictionary-making in China. It 
contains 47,035 character entries, categorised into 42 volumes and grouped 
into 214 radical sections. The entries in the dictionary are organised into 
groups of rhyme diagrams, each of which occupies one volume. The Qing 
scholar Zhou Zhongfu evaluated the contribution of the Kangxi zidian as ‘the 
fruit of the philological studies in both ancient and modern times and the peak 
of culture through all previous dynasties’ (cited in Yong, 2008: 301). He also 
argued that ‘none of the succeeding scholars involved in the study of Chinese 
characters could go beyond the Kangxi zidian’ (ibid). Over the 200 years 
since its publication, the prominent value of the Kangxi zidian has been 
maintained until the present time. The Kangxi zidian, as an influential grand 
dictionary has contributed to the standardisation of pronunciation, meaning 
and format of characters in Chinese lexicography. It also played a major role 
in developing a standard, systematic description of Chinese classical and 
                                            
18
 The Zihui (Literal Lexicon) is a Chinese dictionary published in 1615 during the late Ming 
Dynasty, edited by Mei Yingzuo. This dictionary was seen as significant due to its 
arrangement of radicals, which provided the foundation for subsequent Chinese dictionaries 
organised by the order of radicals (Liu, 1994: 29). 
 
19
 The Zhengzitong (Correct Character Mastery) was originally edited by Zhang Zilie and 
published in 1627 during the Ming Dynasty as a supplement to the 1615 Zihui dictionary. Liao 
Wenying renamed it as Zhengzitong and published it by referencing his own name in 1671 
during the Qing Dynasty (Liu, 1992). 
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historical literature, and of the diversity of schools of Chinese philosophy 
(Yong, 2006: 328-329). 
 
There have been numerous different versions of Kangxi zidian that were 
published after its first publication. It was republished several times, including 
during the reign of the last Qing emperor Xuantong, the early period of the 
Republic of China, and also after the establishment of the People’s Republic 
of China in 1949. After the completion of the Kangxi zidian, it was not revised 
until 1827, when Daoguang Emperor decreed to modify the mistakes in 
Kangxi zidian. This was also the only revision of Kangxi zidian before the 
establishment of People’s Republic of China in 1949 (Liu, 1986: 100). The 
version of the Kangxi zidian being analysed here was published during the 
Emperor Guangxu period in 1904, which was the same version that was 
edited by Wang Yinzhi in 1827. 
 
From the point of view of the aims of this dissertation, the Kangxi Dictionary 
provides important insights into the officially sanctioned representations of the 
Han and related terms such as ren, zhong and guo during the late Qing era. 
As demonstrated in the following pages, these representations bear the 
imprint of ethnic relations in China at the time, and were strongly influenced 
by the powerful position of the Manchu - the Han’s most important Other. 
 
2.2.1 The Definition of Han in the Kangxi zidian 
The term Han was defined in the Kangxi zidian in various ways (1904: 697). It 
was firstly related to some geographical meanings, e.g. Han River, 
Hanyang20. Han was also explained as an ignoble man, with a reference to 
the book Chuogenglu (Retirement to the countryside), which was a private 
history of the late Yuan Dynasty (1279-1368). 
 
In the Kangxi zidian, Han was never defined in a sense of social community, 
whether in racial, national or ethnical ways. The same phenomenon applies to 
the term Manchu as well. The intentional avoidance of relating either Han or 
                                            
20
 Hanyang is a city in the present Hubei province in China. 
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Manchu to a social category was a result of Manchu emperors’ efforts to avoid 
addressing the relationships between the Manchu and the Han. 
 
As some authors argue, the Manchu were, by that time, fully assimilated into 
the Han. This is also the view of Rhoad (2003), who suggested that, 
 
‘The Manchus became an all-but-forgotten people by the beginning of 
the nineteenth century. It is widely believed that they had become so 
assimilated into the culture of the majority Han population that they 
were no longer identifiable as a separate and distinct group’ (9). 
 
Central to this assimilation was the transformation of the baqi (Eight Banners). 
The baqi (Eight Banners) were administrative divisions designed to place all 
the Manchurian troops, which were constructed according to pre-existing 
lineage or tribal connections, in their respective membership. It provided a 
basic framework for the Manchu military organisation and was created for a 
more centralised military force. The baqi originated exclusively from the 
Manchurian; it included some people from other ethnicities afterwards, like the 
Hanese, who were given Manchurian surnames by the Manchu emperors. 
The inclusion of Hanese into the baqi largely contributed to the national 
integration between the Han and Manchu. At the same time, this inclusion 
also led to the loss of their distinctive Manchurian identity (Rhoads, 2000: 9-
11). 
 
It has been shown in the previous chapters that the Han intellectuals were 
making numerous efforts to distinguish themselves from the Manchu during 
the late Qing and the early republican period. In regard to the Manchurian 
governors, although they had shown hardly any tolerance towards literature 
that could be regarded as promoting Han identity, it was a fact that they had 
completely accepted the classical cultural system. The keju examination 
system, which was most importantly a political mechanism of selecting 
talented people to participate in national governance, was based on the 
examination of Han classics. The Kangxi zidian, which was officially 
sanctioned for public use by the Qing court, was written in Han characters. In 
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addition, the definitions and explanations of the terms included in the Kangxi 
zidian, were a collection of references to Hanese classics. 
 
In other words, being a powerful tool in the enhancement of the national 
language and culture, the 1904 edition of Kangxi zidian - although it had 
carefully avoided mentioning any sensitive elements that could be applied to 
social categories and the difference between these groups - was to some 
extent a reflection of Manchu’s acceptance of the Han perspective on Chinese 
society. 
 
2.2.2 The Definition of ren in the Kangxi zidian 
The term ren (human beings) was explained in the following ways in the 
Kangxi zidian (1904: 91): 
 
‘the most honorable species in the entire world … a kind of benevolent 
beings, which are merciful to other species … the morality of the 
heaven and earth, the watershed of ghosts and gods’ (91).  
 
It can be seen from the explanations of the term ren in the Kangxi zidian that 
the editors made no effort to subdivide ren into different groups such as races 
or nations. The criteria differentiating the human beings from other (non-
human) ‘species’ were chosen from a perspective that can be seen as 
reflecting a traditional Chinese cosmology and philosophical thinking that 
could be explained as tianrenheyi (The Unity of Heaven and Man), which was 
focused on the harmonious relationship between the Heaven/universe and 
Man. According to the definition of ren in the Kangxi zidian, the status of 
human beings was superior to that of other ‘species’ - they were described as 
‘most honourable’ as well as ‘benevolent’ and ‘merciful’ to other beings - 
which implies a hierarchical understanding of the world and relationships 
between species. However, this idea is derived from the traditional Chinese 
cultural and philosophical system, and is not linked to a racial differentiation 
among different human groups themselves. 
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2.2.3 The Definition of zhong in the Kangxi zidian 
In the Kangxi zidian, the term zhong (1904: 850) was on the one hand used to 
refer to agricultural products, such as cereal, grain and vegetables. It was 
also used to describe farmers’ seemingly unsophisticated look, using quotes 
from the book Zhuangzi21. 
 
Besides, zhong was defined as ‘the family’, using a quote from the book 
Shiji22: ‘[he] was worried the Qin court will murder his whole zhong [family] if 
he could not succeed’ (1904: 850). 
 
On the other hand, and more interestingly in the context of this analysis, the 
Kangxi zidian also used the term zhong to refer to the Qiang ethnicity using a 
quote from the book Houhan23: ‘Wuwei County, north of the border with the 
Huns, south of the border with zhong Qiang, where most people have 
abandoned their fields because they are afraid of pirates’ plunder and abuse’ 
(1904: 850). The Qiang are an ethnic group of China, which had been living 
mainly in the northwestern part of the present Sichuan province. It is 
important to note that in regard to the explanation of the term zhong in the 
Kangxi zidian, using the term Han was avoided. Instead, the term zhong is 
used to refer to other ethnic groups living in the Chinese territory. What is also 
telling is the fact that in this quote, the Qiang (but also the Huns, another 
ethnic group in China) are indirectly described as ‘pirates’, and contrasted 
with ‘the people’ who ‘abandoned their fields’. This negative description is in 
line with perceptions of the Qiang among the Han intellectuals at the time, 
                                            
21
 Zhuangzi was an influential Chinese philosopher who lived in the 4
th
 century BC during the 
Warring States Period, which is concluded with the victory of the state of Qin in 211 BC. His 
thoughts were summarised by later generations of scholars in a book titled Zhuangzi. 
 
22
 Shiji (The records of the grand history) was a famous Chinese historical work, written by 
Sima Qian, from 109 BC to 91 BC. As the first systematic Chinese historical text, Shiji 
profoundly influenced Chinese historiography and prose. 
 
23
 Houhan (The history of the later Han) was one of the official Chinese historical works, 
which was compiled by Fan Ye in the 5
th
 century, using a number of earlier histories and 
documents as sources. It covered the history of Eastern Han from 25 to 220 AD. 
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which grouped the Qiang together with other ‘barbarians’ or yi (e.g. Wang, 
2007). As explained in the chapter about intellectuals’ discourse, these 
perceptions were rooted in ancient Chinese ideas. From the ancient Chinese 
idea of Hua-yi zhi bian (Hua-yi Distinction) to Chinese intellectuals’ discourses 
and dictionaries published during the late Qing period, the image of ethnic 
minorities in China had hardly experienced any significant change. They were 
always perceived as barbarian, inferior, rude and uncivilised. This can be 
clearly demonstrated from the traditional Chinese idea of Hua-yi zhi bian 
(Hua-yi Distinction) that has been discussed in the previous chapter, which 
was a historical concept differentiating the Han from the Yi 
(barbarians/Others/non-Chinese) in both biological and cultural ways. 
 
The definition of zhong in the Kangxi zidian therefore suggests that the 
Manchurian authorities had at least in part adopted the racial hierarchies and 
perceptions of the Other and the Self as used by the Han intellectuals. 
Ironically, for the Han intellectuals, the Manchu themselves were considered 
barbarian and of the same status as the Qing and other non-Han groups. 
 
2.2.4 The Definition of guo in the Kangxi zidian  
In the Kangxi zidian, the term guo was used as a synonym of jiuzhou (the 
Nine Provinces), a term which is often used as a reference to China as a 
whole 24  and other types of territorial divisions in China. For example, a 
quotation from the ancient book Zhouli (The Rites of Zhou) was included in 
the description of the term guo to identify the meaning of the term guo by 
stating that, ‘the guo has been divided into nine provinces’ (1904: 218).  
 
The meaning of the term guo representing different administrative levels from 
central to local within ancient China, which can be found in the Confucian 
                                            
24
 Jiuzhou (the Nine Provinces) is a term used in ancient Chinese histories to refer to 
territorial divisions during the Xia and Shang dynasties, and has later on come to symbolically 
represent China. 
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book Li25 (ritual propriety) as well: ‘A shu consists of 5 guo; a lian consists of 
10 guo; a zu consists of 20 guo; a zhou consists of 210 guo’ (1904: 218). The 
terms shu, lian, zu and zhou are all used to refer to different levels of territorial 
divisions in China. 
 
Apart from referring to different administrative levels (that can be a union, a 
nation, or a province) and size of territory, guo had been also adopted by the 
Kangxi zidian as the equivalent of the English term state. For example, the 
quotation from the book Zhouli (The Rites of Zhou) was used to explain the 
term: ‘a guo that has won the battle towards another guo is defined as the 
guo of victory’ (1904: 218). Another sentence quoted from the book Zhouli 
noted, ‘distinct totems are used to represent different images when different 
guo send their envoys: the guo which is surrounded by mountains would use 
the image of tiger; the guo which is full with soil field would use the image of 
human being; the guo which is surrounded by river would use the image of 
dragon’ (ibid). The examples provided also suggested that guo were closely 
tied to a sense of identity and belonging, as well as exclusion, since some 
guo were presented as ‘our’ and others as ‘their’ or alien. The following quote 
from the book Zuozhuan26 (Commentary of Zuo) in the Kangxi zidian is a 
case in point: ‘the guo which lives beyond the scope of jiuzhou are alien guo’ 
(ibid). 
 
To sum up, compared to the narrow definitions of the term Han and min, 
zhong, the term guo had been explained in a deeper and broader way and 
was clearly related to a sense of (territorialised) identity and belonging, as 
                                            
25 Li is a classical Chinese word which encompasses an abstract idea instead of a definitive 
object. It is therefore translated into English in various ways. Henry Rosemont and Roger 
Ames’ translation of Li into “ritual propriety” is adopted in this thesis. It is other times 
explained as customs, etiquette, morals, the standard of proper behaviour, etc. (Mattice, 
Ashton & Kimber, 2009: 8). 
 
26
 The Zuozhuan is a book among the earliest Chinese works of narrative history, which 
covers the period from 722 to 468 BC, and was one of the most important sources for 
analysing the history of the Spring and Autumn Dynasty. 
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well as exclusion. 
 
The results of my analysis of the definitions of the Han, ren, zhong and guo in 
the Kangxi zidian can be explained by reference to different factors. First, in 
the late Quing period the import of Western concepts of race and nation had 
only started and they were not yet widely used in Chinese officially sanctioned 
public discourse. Second, and most importantly, due to the threat of literary 
inquisition scholars were wary of linking the terms Han or Manchu to social 
groups. Nonetheless, this avoidance should not lead us to conclude that 
Chinese people in this period lacked an awareness of Han identity or an 
awareness of collective belonging and exclusion. Due to the intensity of the 
conflict between the Manchu and the Han during the late Qing period, the 
identity of the Han became an issue that could not be avoided. Also, as my 
discussion of the terms guo and Qiang ethnicity have shown, even late Qing 
dictionaries included traces of modern forms of belonging and exclusion, and 
hence contributed to their spreading and popularisation among the broader 
population. 
 
 
3. Period II: 1911-1949 
With the establishment of the Republic of China in 1911, Chinese intellectuals 
had recognised that the Kangxi zidian, which was originally published in 1716, 
could not satisfy the need for academic research nor education of the public 
adequately. Influenced by social changes occurring during the early 20 th 
century, and by the emergence of a large number of new ideas and new 
knowledge, as well as by the increasing influence of Western political and 
scientific culture, Chinese dictionaries published after the establishment of the 
Republic of China were considerably different from those published during the 
Ming and Qing Dynasties. One of the most visible changes was the 
appearance of several modern terms borrowed from the modern Western 
sciences, including gongye (industry), jingji (economics), wenhua (culture) 
and other (Yong, et al. 2006: 407-409). 
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The introduction of terms borrowed from the West was part and parcel of a 
much longer historical process known as xixuedongjian (Western learning). 
Due to the importance of Western ideas for early republican-era dictionaries, I 
shall first provide a brief discussion of xixuedongjian. 
 
Having witnessed the success achieved by the Western countries, an 
increasing number of Chinese intellectuals started to study Western 
knowledge in order to strengthen the Chinese national power. One of the 
most influential intellectuals during the late Qing period, Kang Youwei referred 
in his chronicle to the importance of Western leaning. He considered it 
necessary and beneficial for the Chinese government to integrate new 
Western theories and political ideas into Chinese society, and argued for the 
necessity of translating Western knowledge into Chinese:  
 
‘There are only a very limited number of Western books that have been 
translated into Chinese. The books translated by Fu Lanya are all 
focused on medicine, which can be evaluated as useless. The most 
outstanding Western books are political literature that contains a large 
number of new ideas and theories, which could not be found in China. 
The establishment of a specific department dealing with the translation 
issues is therefore the most necessary task’. (1992: 14) 
 
Prompted by such fascination with Western knowledge, an academic 
movement xixuedongjian (Western learning) developed among the Chinese 
intellectuals, which played a significant role in the development of Chinese 
modern culture in various fields. Western learning refers to a process through 
which modern Western academic thoughts were brought to China, using a 
variety of media from newspapers and books to new forms of education. This 
process started in the late sixteenth century, under the Ming Dynasty (1368-
1644) and was initially associated with Jesuit missionaries who used Western 
science as an instrument of evangelization (Jami, 2011: 13). During the Qing 
Dynasty, Chinese started acknowledging the value of Western knowledge and 
their attitude was transformed from an initial rejection and resistance to a 
gradual acceptance. Some of them even claimed the necessity of a complete 
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‘Westernisation’, which would consist of understanding the whole system of 
Western technologies and culture, and applying them to Chinese society 
(Wang, 2003: 3-7). 
 
In the process of Western learning, Western philosophy, astronomy, physics, 
chemistry, Medicine, biology, political sciences, geography, sociology, 
economics, law, history, applied technology, literature and art, were widely 
introduced into Chinese society and had a great impact on Chinese 
academics. As part of this movement, the modern ideas of race, nation and 
ethnicity had also been imported and explained to the Chinese people by 
Chinese intellectuals, who were introducing and translating the literature of 
modern Western Social Sciences. 
 
Western learning was a widely used term in Chinese society during the end of 
the Qing period. The process of Western learning started with the translations 
of Western academic books, which were considered to be the medium for an 
initial introduction of key concepts, contents and ideas of Western sciences to 
the Chinese. In contrast to scholars in the Ming Dynasty, Chinese intellectuals 
in the Qing period, who had been brought up with Chinese traditional culture 
and values, would mostly not abandon the traditional learnings when they 
incorporated Western ideas into their thoughts. Instead, they made an effort 
to absorb what they considered to be the strengths of Western knowledge to 
complete their original structure of culture (Sun, 2008: 24-27). 
 
The Western learning movement during the late Qing Dynasty was 
prominently associated with educational reform, starting with the 
yangwuyundong (The Modernisation Movement) in 1861, which was a 
movement aimed at emulating foreign technologies and industry, in order to 
modernise various spheres in China, e.g. engineering, chemistry, the military 
etc. (Jiang, 1997). In regard to educational reform, the Qing court introduced 
several new policies. For example, outstanding Chinese students were sent 
abroad to study advanced Western technologies and a large amount of 
Western literature was translated into Chinese. In addition, some modern 
study organisations were established. The setup of subjects in the new 
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educational system was marked by and emphasise on Western literature and 
technologies, in contrast to the old content which was focused on the bagu 
wen (The Eight-legged Essay) (Zhu, 1989). 
 
The Western learning movement played a key role in preparing the intellectual 
grounds for broader changes that transformed the traditional Chinese 
understanding of identity, and introduced new perspectives in social sciences 
and various aspects of social life. Moreover, the increasing recognition of 
Western culture in China also weakened the strict literary censorship 
conducted by the Qing court. All these factors also laid the basis for the 
development of new Chinese dictionaries after the establishment of the 
Republic of China. We should also note, however, that the spreading of ideas 
originating from modern Western Social Sciences did not mean a wholesale 
abandonment of traditional cultural ideas based on Confucianism. As we will 
see from the following analysis, some elements of traditional Chinese culture 
were still playing an important role in the dictionaries published during the 
early republican period, even though they were adapted to fit ideas borrowed 
from the West. 
 
Another issue worth considering when discussing the impact of Western 
learning on modern Chinese dictionaries during the early republican era is the 
role of Japanese translations. According to some authors (e.g. Murphy, 2010: 
53), several Chinese terms in contemporary dictionaries were borrowed from 
Japanese translations, and had become an integral part of the Chinese 
language during the late Qing and early republican period. These borrowed 
terms allegedly comprised half of the neologisms in contemporary 
dictionaries, including terms such as minzu (nation), lishi (history), shehui 
(society) and others. However, some Chinese scholars, for example, Yong 
and Peng (2008), deny this and instead argue that it is difficult to establish 
whether these new terms were indeed borrowed from Japanese translations, 
or were home-made terms (331). 
 
After this brief overview of relevant historical processes and contexts 
influencing the early republican dictionaries, I shall now proceed with the 
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analysis of the dictionaries themselves. I will mainly focus on the definitions of 
three terms, namely, zu and minzu, and Han. I will show how these terms are 
defined and explained in terms of group identities associated with notions of 
nation, race and ethnicity, and how this contributed to the construction of 
perceptions of the Self and the Other in Chinese society. 
 
 
3.1 The Definition of zu in Dictionaries of the Early Republican 
Period  
The Chinese’ will to establish a modern national state was not apparent until 
the beginning of the 20th century, and when it emerged it was seen as a 
response to Western imperial threats (Kuhn, 2002: 1). The term zu was often 
used by Chinese intellectuals in the early republic to refer to a powerful social 
body that was capable of resisting the Western Other. As such, this term 
embodied Western views of the political self and was closely related to 
national, racial and ethnic signifiers. Due to this, zu is one of the most 
important terms to be analysed in Chinese dictionaries during the early 
republic period. 
 
During the early republican period, the term zu was in many Chinese 
dictionaries used to refer to lineage. For example, one of the explanations of 
zu in Zhonghua da zidian (Simplified Chinese) was ‘family, the father and son, 
descendants’ (Xu et al. 1915: , 203). In the Zhonghua zhuyin zidian (The 
Chinese Phonetic Dictionary) (Sun et al. 1921), the term zu was explained in 
a similar vein as ‘the relationship of cognation and affinity, e.g. jiuzu27 and 
                                            
27
 According to the definition in Sanzijing (Trimetric Classic, written in the 13
th
 century and 
attributed to Wang Yinglin, which was one of the Chinese classic texts), jiuzu refers to nine 
different consanguineous relations that an individual had with other people, including great-
great-grandfather, great-grandfather, father, self, children, grandchildren, great-grandson, and 
great-great-grandson. These relations, under Confucian principles, were bonded by filial piety, 
which meant that all the members in this network of relations were responsible for crimes 
committed by any others due to guilt by association, because of their unabated strict loyalty to 
each other. It also provided a consanguineous loyal foundation for the entire family that 
should be responsible in supporting each other in the case of a rebellion against an invader. 
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sanzu 28  (1921: , 34), which means different levels of relationship in a 
specific family. Another example can be found in the Guoyin biaozhun baihua 
cidian (The National Standard Vernacular Dictionary) (Fang, 1924), in which 
the term zu was exclusively referring to relatives or family: ‘zu means the 
members in a family with lineage connections’ (217). 
 
However, dictionary definitions of zu in this period did not refer only to lineage; 
in addition, zu also became linked to larger social categories, such as nation 
and ethnicity. In this context, national identity was constructed in relation to 
different social groups, and several dictionaries used the term zu in 
combination with Han. For example, in the Zhonghua zhuyin zidian (Chinese 
Phonetic Dictionary) zu was explained as ‘shared nation, e.g. Han zu and 
Latin zu’ (Sun et al. 1921: , 34). Likewise, in the Biaozhun guoyin xuesheng 
zidian (Standard Chinese Phonetic Student Dictionary) and in also the 
Zhonghua jiben jiaoyu xiao zidian (Dictionary of Chinese Primary Education) 
(Wu, 1947: 143), zu was explained as minzu (nation) (Zhang et al. 1934: , 
35). Such overlapping of familial lineage and national belonging in definitions 
of the term zu echoed prominent theories of race and nation in the Western 
social sciences of this time, which also interpreted large-scale collectives such 
as nations as akin to familial relationships. 
 
In the Zhonghua da zidian (Simplified Chinese), zu was also explained with 
reference to predominantly racially defined categories: ‘[it refers to] 
categories, which are for example used in so-called Aryan, Teutonees and 
Slavdom’ (Xu et al. 1915: , 203). The term Aryan was an important term in 
this period, and was linked to racial thinking. The term was also at the centre 
of Nazi Germany’s racial ideology, which idiosyncratically emphasised the 
importance of racial purity, and strong beliefs in the superiority of a Germanic 
Aryan race. In line with this, Hitler (1943) believed that ‘all the human culture, 
                                            
28
 The interpretation of the term san zu was distinct in different Chinese works. The inclusion 
of parents, brothers and wives was a kind of definition. In some other works, it was defined as 
father, mother and wives. Besides, it was sometimes understood as the relationship among 
father, son and grandson (Ma & Zhou, 2002).  
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all the results of art, science, and technology that we see before us today, are 
almost exclusively the creative product of the Aryan’ (290). 
 
However, such links between zu and race were rare in early republican 
dictionaries. Apart from the example just quoted, these dictionaries did not link 
zu to race, nor did they associate race with zhong. Also, even though the 
Zhonghua da zidian links zu to race, it never combines zu with words such as 
bai (white), hei (black) or huang (yellow) - as in ‘white race’, ‘black race’ etc. In 
this respect, early republican dictionaries differed significantly from 
intellectuals’ discourses at the time, where zu is repeatedly used to refer to 
race. 
 
Finally, early republican era dictionaries also used the term zu with reference 
to non-Han ethnic groups, and represented zu as associated with the general 
Chinese term zhong. For example, in the Xiaoxuesheng de zidian (The 
Dictionary for Primary School Students) (Fang & Su) from 1933, the term was 
explained as based on ‘a shared common zhong, e.g. the Han, the Manchu, 
the Mongolian, the Hui and the Tibetan’ (145). 
 
 
3.2 The Definition of minzu in Dictionaries of the Early 
Republican Period 
The Shehuikexue da cidian (Dictionary of Social Sciences) (Gao et al. 1929) 
used the phrase ruoxiao minzu (small and weak nations) as an example in the 
definition of the term minzu: 
 
‘Ruoxiao minzu (small and weak nations) refer to colonial, semi-
colonial nations, as well as other regimes that are independent in name 
only, and the internal government of which is interfered by imperialism. 
They are also known as the oppressed nations. The rapid development 
of the local imperialism is the reason leading the aggression towards 
those small and weak as the imperialist countries have no other choice 
but seeking foreign markets, a cheap labor force and raw materials. 
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When the development of capitalism reaches the highest stage - stage 
of financial capitalism, they have to rely on the foreign conquered 
regions to consume domestic surplus capital. Therefore, the use of 
violent force to conquer the small and weak nations is a necessary task 
for imperialists’ (474). 
 
This quote clearly illustrates that this Chinese dictionary had not only started 
to use modern Western notions of nation, but had also developed a critical 
perspective on Western colonialism, imperialism and capitalism by marking it 
as aggressive and exploitative. The detailed data on the size of territory that 
had been occupied by European countries and America was also provided to 
demonstrate the scale of Western imperialist expansion. For example: ‘the 
United Kingdom since 1870, had obtained Baluchistan … In addition, [the 
British] had also occupied the New Guinea Islands … the total size of regions 
listed is equal to a hundred times of their domestic territory’ (475). 
 
The same dictionary also included a definition of the term minzu zhuyi 
(nationalism). The editors noted that, ‘the meaning of minzu zhuyi 
(nationalism) can be regarded as a request of achieving equality with the 
Western powers, and an equal status in the international environment’ (Gao, 
et al. 1929: 139). The term minzu zhuyi (nationalism) in this dictionary was 
associated with two meanings with reference to a speech given by Sun 
Zhongshan in year 1924: 
‘ 
The term minzu zhuyi (nationalism) contains two aspects of meanings: 
the one is the self-liberation of the Chinese nation; the Other is the 
equality of all the national groups within the Chinese territory. In regard 
to the first aspect, the aim of minzu zhuyi (nationalism) is to achieve a 
free and independent status of the Chinese nation in the world… In 
regard to the second aspect, the Manchu had a superiority status to 
other nations in China before the Chinese Revolution, which has been 
overthrown after the Chinese Revolution. The equality and integration 
of all the nations in China can be therefore achieved’ (ibid). 
 
It can be seen from the quote above that one dimension of this definition of 
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nation and nationalism is clearly the attempt to claim China’s identity as a free 
and independent sovereign nation-state, which should be achieved by ‘self-
liberation’. The quote also relates the term minzu zhuyi to an attempt to 
include ‘all the national groups within the Chinese territory’ into a larger 
Chinese national community and presents this as something that could not be 
achieved before the end of the Manchu court. This definition of minzu zhuyi is 
evidently based on intellectuals’ discourses analysed earlier in this 
dissertation, and is also marked by an anti-Manchu stance and an attempt to 
foster cross-ethnic national integration, both of which were key tenants of 
intellectuals’ discourses in the early republican era. In relation to this it is also 
worth noting that the dictionary entries avoided addressing differences among 
groups in the Chinese territory, even though this was a time when differences 
among groups were becoming increasingly pronounced thanks to 
independence movements (e.g. in Tibet). Along with the emphasis on cross-
national integration evident in the quote above, this brushing over of internal 
fractions and differences can be seen as part and parcel of broader efforts at 
national unification at the time. These efforts were led by political and 
intellectual elites and also shaped dictionary definitions of the early republican 
era. Still, this emphasis on integration does not mean that all groups were 
integrated into the wider Chinese national self under common terms. As 
shown further on in the analysis, the Han were clearly seen as the primary 
bearer of Chinese identity.  
 
Another concept linked to the term minzu in some dictionaries during this 
period was the term guojia (state). The term guojia (state) was used for the 
first time and was also most comprehensively explained in the Shehuikexue 
da cidian (Dictionary of Social Sciences) (Gao et al. 1929). It was defined 
here as the following: 
 
‘Guojia (State), according to a description of modern sociologists, 
refers to a political organ of the human social organisation. There are 
four elements relevant to the analysis of the term: 1) the human group 
involved in the activities should have the same purposes; 2) the 
ownership of a certain size of land is essential; 3) it presupposes the 
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existence of some public authorities that represent and implement the 
public will; 4) it should be ruled and controlled by a supreme force of 
domination’ (500). 
 
The term guojia is here closely linked to political rule and ownership of 
territory, which is associated with a common belonging to a group of people, 
and the need for a ‘supreme force of domination’. The Shehui kexue da cidian 
also identified three types of relationships that can lead to constructing a 
guojia (state). In relation to this the dictionary also discussed the role of 
classes, drawing on Engels’ and Lenin’s ideas: 
 
‘A group of distinct relationships can be considered in regard to the 
origin of states: 1) [a state] can emerge from the lineage relations; 2) [a 
state] can emerge from the religious relations; 3) [a state] can also 
emerge from the economic relations… However, according to the 
socialists’ recent investigation, state is an authority dominated by a 
class that suppresses the other class. This can be applied to either 
monarchies or bourgeois democratic countries. This is Engels’ theory. 
In this way of thinking, Lenin has therefore concluded that state will 
disappear. The general idea of his theory is that the proletarian state is 
built on the basis of abandoning the classes; the elimination of state is 
happening simultaneously with the disappearance of classes’ (ibid). 
 
These definitions of minzu, minzu zhuyi and guojia, were evidently influenced 
by a range of political concepts and theories developed in modern Western 
social sciences research and political debates at the time. Politics was 
becoming increasingly significant in defining a nation and creating a sense of 
belonging, which set these definitions apart from earlier attempts at defining 
boundaries between groups, which were rooted in traditional Chinese 
culturalism and based primarily on distinctions between civilised and 
uncivilised groups. Moreover, the quote emphasises the importance of 
economy and class struggle as factors contributing to the shaping, 
development and critique of the modern nation-state, drawing on Engel’s and 
Lenin’s arguments. This quote suggests that the adoption of Western ideas of 
state, nation and race went hand in hand with the adoption of modern political 
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ideologies, including those based on Marxist thinking. 
 
As many aspects of early republican China, these dictionary definitions cannot 
be understood without considering the impact of Western ideas. As argued by 
Kirby (1997), the early republican period was ‘defined’ and ‘shaped’, and 
should ‘ultimately be interpreted - according to the nature of its foreign 
relations’ (433). As my analysis suggests, this argument applies also to the 
content of dictionaries. However, we should also be wary of overemphasising 
the reliance of early republican dictionaries on Western sources. Despite 
prominent links with Western ideas, the explanations of terms analysed here, 
especially the term zu, were still relying on quotes from Chinese classics as 
examples. 
 
 
3.3 The Definition of Han 
Like their late Qing equivalents, Chinese dictionaries published during the 
early republican era often explained the term Han as a name of the river on 
the heaven. For example, in the Zhonghua zhuyin zidian (Chinese Phonetic 
Dictionary) (Sun, 1921), Han was firstly explained as ‘the name of a river’ and 
‘the river in heaven’ ( : 34). In the Zhonghua da zidian (Simplified Chinese) 
(Xu, et al. 1915), one of the explanations of the term Han was also ‘the river in 
heaven’ ( : 164). The reference of ‘the river in heaven’ was present also in a 
wide range of dictionaries published in the second decade after the 
establishment of the Republic of China, for example, in Wang Songtang’s 
Zhonghua xinzidian (1947) and in Yang’s Shiyong da zidian (Practical Large 
Dictionaries) (1945). This definition of Han as ‘the river in heaven’ originated 
from the Shijing (The Classic of Poetry), which is known as the earliest 
existing collection of Chinese poems and songs (Idema & Lloyd, 1997). 
 
Another widely used definition of the term Han in the dictionaries published 
during this period was ‘the name of the dynasty’ (for example, Zhonghua 
zhuyin zidian [Chinese Phonetic Dictionary] [Sun, 1921, : 34 and Zhonghua 
da zidian [Simplified Chinese] [Xu, et al. 1915, : 164]). The term Han was 
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also explained as the name of different places in the Chinese territory. For 
example, in the Zhonghua zhuyin zidian (Chinese Phonetic Dictionary) (Sun, 
1921), it was explained as relating to ‘the name of Han river’ and also ‘the 
name of the city Hankou’ ( : 34). The same definitions were also adopted by 
the Xiaoxuesheng de zidian (The Dictionary for Primary School Students) 
(Fang & Su, 1933: 234) and the Xuesheng biaozhun zidian (Standard 
Dictionary for Students) (Wang, 1935: 371). 
 
However, in contrast to late Qing dictionaries, early republican dictionaries 
also defined the Han as a particular social group, using terms such as zu or 
zhong. Yet, when such definitions appeared, they were often confusing and 
did not provide a good sense of whether zu or zhong were meant to refer to 
ethnicity, nation or race. 
 
For instance, in some definitions, the term Han was presented as 
synonymous with the term China, and consequently excluded other 
nationalities. For example, in the Zhonghua da zidian (Simplified Chinese), 
the term Han was explained as ‘China’s name by alien zu’ (Xu et al. 1915: , 
164). According to the definition of the term Han in the Xuesheng biaozhun 
zidian (Standard Dictionary for Students) (Wang, 1935), ‘Han zu is the name 
of huazu [Chinese nation]’ (269). It could be inferred from these quotes that 
the term Han was meant to refer to the Chinese nation. Several examples 
from other dictionaries confirm this. For instance, in the Xiaoxuesheng de 
zidian (The Dictionary for Primary School Students) (Fang & Su, 1933), Han 
was defined as the other name of the Chinese nation, while ‘Hanwen’ (the 
Han language) was defined as ‘another name for Chinese language’ (234). 
Another example could be found in Xuesheng biaozhun zidian (Standard 
Dictionary for Students) (Wang, 1935) which states that Han ‘is the name of 
the Chinese nation’ and ‘Han language is equal to Chinese language’ (371). 
Likewise, the Zhonghua xinzidian (New Chinese Dictionary) (1947) states that 
‘Han means Chinese people or Hanese’ ( , 222), while in Zhai Jianxiong’s 
Cidian jinghua (Dictionary Essence) (1947), the term Hanxue (Sinology) was 
defined as ‘the study of Chinese culture’ ( , 606). These quotes clearly show 
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that the early republican era dictionaries equated the Chinese nation with the 
Han, Hanese language and Han culture, implying an exclusion of other ethnic 
minorities.  
 
However, at least some dictionaries from this period provided a somewhat 
wider range of definitions of the Han. For example, in Wang Songtang’s 
(1947) Zhonghua xinzidian (New Chinese Dictionary), Han was defined as: 1) 
‘the name of China’, ‘the Chinese, e.g. the Han language’ and ‘the Chinese 
people’, but also as 2) ‘the name of zu, e.g. the Han, the Manchu’ ( , 222). In 
the first definition, the term Han is used as a synonym of the Chinese and is 
also linked to language. On the other hand, in the second definition, Han is 
seen as a group with equal status to the Manchu. By combining these two 
definitions we can conclude that the Chinese nation was seen as related 
exclusively to the Han, while the Manchu were excluded. Yet, the second 
definition also suggests that the Han were seen as equals of, rather than 
superior to, the Manchu. This understanding departs from the traditional 
sense of Han superiority, which has long served as the key marker of 
belonging and exclusion in the Chinese context. A similar example can be 
found in Fang and Su’ Xiaoxuesheng de zidian (The Dictionary for Primary 
School Students) (1933), which states that ‘the Han, the Manchu, the 
Mongolian, the Hui and the Tibetan are sharing a common zu’ (145). In this 
quote, the Manchu, as well as other ethnic minorities in China, were included 
into a wider social group that shared a common belonging of a zu. Still, this 
definition made no effort to relate the Manchu and other ethnic minorities to 
the construction of a unified Chinese nation. 
 
To conclude, my analysis on the dictionary entries for the term Han suggests 
that the dictionaries published after the establishment of the Republic of China 
in 1911 perpetuated a sense of dominance of Han culture. Although the 
emphasis on the civilisational and cultural superiority of the Han virtually 
disappeared, the belief in the dominant position of the Han was not 
challenged. Rather, dictionaries suggested that the Han were the unique 
representative of all that is Chinese, while people from other ethnic minorities 
in China were excluded from the construction of Chinese identity. The 
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occasional references to the Han as a group of equal status as other groups 
in China did not change this fundamentally. Rather, their presence suggests a 
(limited) degree of ambiguity in dictionary definitions, similar to the ambiguity 
and multiplicity of meanings and arguments found among Chinese 
intellectuals.   
 
 
4. Conclusion 
As we can see from the analysis presented in this chapter, the dictionary 
definitions of Han, zu, and related terms changed significantly over the course 
of the late Qing and early republican periods. In the late Qing era, and 
specifically in the Kangxi zidian, the terms Han and Man (Manchu) were not 
connected to a social group at all, and off all other terms present, only 
definitions of guo included clear traces of modern ideas of belonging and 
exclusion such as those promoted by the Han intellectuals at the time. An in-
depth analysis of some of the entries in the Kangxi zidian also revealed 
evidence of traditional ideas about Han superiority such as those found in 
intellectuals’ works. I therefore suggested that the Kangxi zidian had to some 
degree adopted the traditional Hanese way of defining the minority ethnicities 
as barbarian, even though this was not applied to the Manchu. On the whole, 
however, such similarities with intellectuals’ discourses were rather limited. 
This was largely a result of Manchu emperors’ efforts in evading the 
discussion of boundaries between the Manchu and the Han, and strict rules 
related to the wenziyu (Literary Inquisition), and the fact that Han intellectuals 
had little influence over the production of officially sanctioned dictionaries. 
Instead, their ideas, influenced by modern notions of belonging and 
exclusions linked to notions of ethnicity, race and nation, were spreading 
primarily through newspapers and study societies, and as we have seen, 
partly through textbooks. 
 
During the early republican era, this situation changed dramatically. Ideas 
promoted by Han intellectuals and inspired by Western social sciences and 
political thinking now echoed in dictionaries. The change in definitions of the 
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Han provides a particularly telling example of this shift. In early republican era 
dictionaries, this term became directly linked to a social group, and not only 
that, this group was seen as synonymous with China. Ideas of Han 
superiority, which played only a minor role in the Kangxi zidian, but were 
amply present in intellectuals’ discourses I have analysed, were now very 
prominent. At the same time, however, early republican era dictionaries also 
embraced the idea of wuzugonghe, which suggested that the Han, the 
Manchu and other groups share the same zu and belong to the same group. 
As already mentioned, such ideas were originally promoted by one of the 
three influential Chinese intellectuals, and then popularised among Chinese 
scholars and in other cultural spheres, including school textbooks.   
 
To conclude, my analysis on the dictionary entries for the term Han and 
related terms suggests that the dictionaries published after the establishment 
of the Republic of China in 1911 were influenced by the Chinese intellectuals’ 
understanding of Chinese identity and the Han, as well as by the 
corresponding perceptions of the Other. This means that dictionaries helped 
disseminate and popularize modern notions of ethnicity, nation and race, as 
developed in intellectuals’ discourses. Along with that, the dictionaries also 
helped perpetuate and disseminate beliefs in the dominant status of the Han 
in Chinese society and assumptions about the Han culture as the standard 
and representative of Chinese culture as a whole.  
 
As such, dictionaries were, alongside intellectuals’ discourses and school 
textbooks, an important instrument of nation-building, popularizing a modern 
understanding of the Chinese imagined community. Several elements 
appearing in the early republican dictionaries (but not evident in late Qing 
dictionaries) testify to that. First, early republican dictionaries presented the 
Han as a social group, defined in modern national and/or racial terms. 
Second, although the Han were often equated with the Chinese, other 
definitions suggested a more open, inclusive understanding of the Chinese 
Self, comparable to the one found in intellectuals’ discourses and textbooks 
from the same period. Most importantly perhaps, the early republican 
dictionaries also, for the first time, included definitions of the term state, which 
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was unmistakably modern and rooted in nationalism, in the sense that it linked 
the state with the nation and with territory.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
The notion of the Han (Han ren) as a particular social group has existed for 
centuries since the Han Dynasty (206 BC - AD 220). However, it was only in 
the modern era, and more precisely during the late Qing and early republican 
periods, that the Han came to be seen as social group defined in terms of 
nationhood, ethnicity and race. As shown in my dissertation, this 
transformation was a result of both internal and external factors, namely both 
internal political, social and cultural changes within China as well as the 
influence of Western political powers and ideas. To put it differently: the 
transformation was a result of both ‘native thought’ and ‘Western influence’ (cf. 
Dikötter, 1992: 65). This dissertation has traced the transformation in the 
perceptions of the Han - as well as the related representations of China and 
the Chinese, and other Chinese ethnic groups - through an in-depth analysis 
of three types of empirical sources: intellectuals’ discourses, history textbooks 
and dictionaries. I have argued that these changing discourses formed an 
integral part of the process of Chinese nation-building.  
 
In this chapter, I shall provide an overview of key conclusions derived from the 
analysis of these three types of sources, outlining key developments and 
changes visible in these discourses over the course of the late Qing and early 
republican periods. Throughout this chapter, I will also reflect on similarities 
and differences between the three types of sources and on what they can 
teach us about the nature of transmission and popularisation of modern 
understandings of the Han and associated modern perceptions of the Chinese 
Self and its Other(s) in the late Qing and early republican era. More 
specifically, I will reflect on how these discourses were tied to the process of 
nation-building in modern China. 
 
 
1. The Late Qing Period 
One of the most telling results of my analysis of the late Qing period was the 
disjunction between intellectual’s discourses on the one hand, and texbooks 
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and dictionaries on the other hand. This was particularly evident with regard to 
the representations of the Han and their relationship with the Manchu. In 
intellectuals’ discourses, this was a central issue, while in the other two 
sources; the Han were mentioned only sporadically, if at all. Furthermore, 
intellectuals’ discourses were marked by openly negative or at least critical 
attitudes towards the Manchu, which was not the case for the other two types 
of sources. The following paragraphs examine these elements into more 
detail and discuss their causes.  
 
 
1.1 Intellectuals 
The idea of anti-Manchuism was playing a dominant role among Hanese 
intellectuals during the late Qing period – in fact, it was the Manchu, rather 
than the West, who were the main Other of the Chinese Self for them. An 
important factor that contributed to the negative attitude towards the Manchu 
in the late Qing era was the tension between a long established tradition of 
and belief in Han superiority in Chinese society, and the fact that the whole of 
China was governed by the Manchu, which was considered to be an exotic, 
foreign group. This tension intensified after the First Sino-Japanese War. The 
failures experienced by the Qing court and the country as a whole in relation 
to the West, as well as the signing of treaties, followed by a large number of 
reparation and other heavy losses, prompted heavy criticism of the Manchu 
among Chinese intellectuals, especially among Hanese scholars. Another 
factor fuelling negative attitudes towards the Manchu were strict cultural and 
social rules promoted by the Qing court, due to which it was difficult for the 
Han people, as well as other ethnicities, to get access to the government; the 
zhuangyuan (very best scholar in the keju system) were usually Manchu, and 
the wenziyu (Literary Inquisition) stifled any open criticism, however mild. 
 
The hostility and open enmity between the Han and the Manchu has reached 
its peak among the Han intellectuals during the late Qing stage. At that point, 
a wide range of articles appeared which questioned and criticised the 
legitimacy of the Qing government. As shown in my analysis of the writings of 
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two key intellectuals from this period, Zhang Binglin and Sun Zhongshan - 
these articles, promoted anti-Manchu ideas in different ways by using different 
perspectives and theories, some of which were related to traditional Chinese 
culture, while others were a product of the encounter with modern Western 
ideas, especially theories of nation, race and ethnicity. The Manchu were 
designated as a national, ethnic and/or racial Other, and as such they were 
seen unfit to rule China. 
 
During the late Qing era, the three intellectuals I have discussed in my 
analysis developed different political ideas about the relationship between the 
Han and their main Others, yet they all shared the assumption that the Han 
are superior to other groups. This was a very influential idea which had largely 
shaped their construction of the Han Self as well as the Chinese Self. All 
these three intellectuals also shared similar views about the Han as a part of 
the yellow race and promoted a racialised perception of the Chinese and 
Westerners. What differed was the way in which they defined Han superiority. 
 
Zhang and Sun clearly promoted a perception of Han superiority based on a 
combination of racial and cultural markers. Apart from regarding the Han as a 
culturally civilised superior group, both of them used biological and physical 
lineage and differences when they constructed the identity of the Self (the 
Han) by defining the boundaries with the Other. Liang Qichao, however, 
mainly emphasised similarities and communalities between the Han and other 
groups, and downplayed differences, especially in relation to the Manchu. On 
different occasions he argued that the Han and the Manchu shared the same 
history and memory, and claimed it was necessary to overcome the 
boundaries and tensions between the two groups. Although he believed that 
the levels of civilisation achieved by the Han and Manchu varied, he was also 
adamant that both of them belonged to an ‘always united’ China (1990 [1899]: 
270). Nevertheless, despite his emphasis on similarities and on the need for 
national integration, his writing made clear that this integration would 
effectively mean Hanisation. According to Liang, the non-Han ethnicities were 
all ‘nomadic inferior groups’, which could be only assimilated by the Han 
without exception (1999 [1899]: 316). However, he also claimed the Hanese 
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should abandon their social superiority in order to achieve Chinese national 
integration, meaning that the process of national integration and assimilation 
should go hand-in-hand with growing equality among the groups. 
 
Regardless of their differences vis-à-vis the Manchu, however, the discourses 
of the three intellectuals shared some basic key features: 1) they were not 
satisfied with the government of the current Qing court; 2) they were seeking 
different ways of re-defining and re-constructing the national identity of China; 
and 3) the Han nation, compared to other minority ethnicities, is culturally 
superior. Arguably, the national imagination promoted by Chinese intellectuals 
in this period was aimed primarily at contesting the existing power structure, 
and urging for reform. Especially in the cases of Zhang and Sun, the ideas of 
nation and nationalism were applied in a way that allowed them to argue 
against existing ruling (Manchu) elites, and in favour of a Han-led revolution 
and establishment of a modern national state linked to and owned by the Han. 
In Liang’s case, nationalist ideas were used as an instrument for justifying 
reform, rather than complete overthrow, of the Qing court. In both cases, 
however, the Manchu appeared as the main Other of the Chinese (which were 
identified with the Han). 
 
 
1.2 School Textbooks 
Compared to intellectuals’ discourse, school textbooks and dictionaries 
published during the late Qing era included little discussion of the Manchu as 
such, or their differences vis-à-vis the Han. This is not a surprise, because the 
ruling Manchu had control over the production of textbooks and dictionaries at 
this time; and by then, they were largely assimilated into Han culture. 
Nevertheless, a close analysis of narratives of specific events revealed that 
even in this period one could find traces of pro-Han thinking in some school 
textbooks. An example of this was the description of the historical event in 
Chinese history named wuhu luanhua (The wuhu Uprising, in the Jin Dynasty) 
in Chinese edited textbooks and those edited by Japanese authors. The 
Japanese author Shirakawa’s (1903) narration on this part of history was 
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based on an external angle that treated all Chinese groups, including the Han 
and the Manchu, as equals. In contrast, Chinese editors were guided by the 
belief that the Han were the traditional and unique representative of Chinese 
civilisation and the core of China. They therefore considered that other 
ethnicities in China were waizu (alien nation) while only the Han were benzu 
(our nation) (Zeng, 1903). 
 
Such Han-centred ideas were also present in some of the school textbooks 
published during the late Qing period - namely textbooks edited by Chinese 
authors, as opposed to those edited by Japanese authors. For example, 
Kuwabara Jitzuzõ (1899), a Japanese scholar, categorised the Asian race into 
two major groups, namely Chinese and Syberian. According to him, the Han, 
as other ethnic groups in China, was only one of the groups in the larger 
Chinese population. In contrast, in the Zhina siqiannian kaihuashi (A History of 
4000 Years of Chinese Civilisation) (1903), edited by a Chinese author, the 
Han are described as the dominant, largest, most influential and ‘Compared to 
other groups … the most educated and intelligent group’ (6-7). A similar 
narrative can be found in Xia Zengyou’s (1904) Zuixin zhongguo jiaokeshu 
zhongguolishi (The Latest Middle School Textbook: Chinese History), which 
described the Han only as the dominant nation, but also the unique pure 
ethnic group in China.  
 
The Han-centred narration, premised on a clear social hierarchy with the Han 
as the highest standard of culture and civilisation, was clearly evident in 
Chinese edited history textbooks published during the late Qing period. It is 
therefore not surprising that these textbooks were praised by Chinese 
intellectuals at the time. For instance, Liang Qichao (2003 [1903]) praised 
Xia’s work as ‘a fresh view of Chinese history’ (68). However, compared to the 
writings of intellectuals, textbooks presented such narratives in a more matter-
of-fact way, as something that is self-evident, and also largely avoided openly 
negative descriptions of the Manchu. 
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1.3 Dictionaries 
Similarly to late Qing era textbooks, dictionaries published in the same period 
included virtually no trace of anti-Manchu attitudes, largely due to the wenziyu 
(Literary Inquisition) policies promoted by the Qing emperors. In fact, the main 
dictionary published in this period, the Kangxi zidian (1903 [1716]) did not 
even use the term Man (Manchu) as a reference to a social group of any kind 
whether in racial, national or ethnic terms. The same applied to the term Han 
as well. The intentional avoidance of relating either Han or Manchu to a social 
category implied Manchu emperors’ efforts in evading the discussion of 
boundaries between the Manchu and the Han. Nonetheless, even here, a 
close analysis of other terms unearthed traces of traditional assumptions 
about Han superiority. For instance, to demonstrate the meaning of the term 
zhong, the Kangxi zidian used a quote from a traditional Hanese book 
Houhan, in which the zhong Qiang and Hun were described as ‘pirates’ which 
forced the local population to abandon their fields (1904: 850). Although there 
was no mention of the Han as such, this stereotypical description of the zhong 
Qiang and Hun is an integral element of long established notions of Han 
superiority. We could therefore suggest that the Kangxi zidian had to some 
degree adopted the traditional Hanese standard of defining the minority 
ethnicities as barbarian, even though this was not applied to the Manchu. 
 
In contrast to intellectuals’ writings published in the late Qing era, the Kangxi 
zidian (1903 [1716]), included virtually no trace of Han-centred discourse. The 
term Han, just as the term Manchu, was not used as a reference to a social 
group of any kind whether in racial, national or ethnic terms. As explained 
earlier, this was a result of the literary inquisition and the tight control exerted 
by the Qing court over the production of dictionaries. Nonetheless, ironically, 
the explanations of terms in Kangxi zidian consisted of a collection of quotes 
from classic Han literature, which indirectly demonstrates the Qing’ court’s 
acceptance of Han culture and its dominance in Chinese society. 
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1.4 Summary 
On the whole, we can conclude that the anti-Manchu attitudes found among 
Chinese (Han) intellectuals did not find their way into textbooks and 
dictionaries published in this period. This is understandable, given that the 
publication of these texts was regulated by the Qing court. However, what is 
perhaps more surprising is that the Manchu, despite having control over the 
educational and publishing system, did not really use this system to actively 
promote themselves and their legitimacy using nationalist or racial arguments. 
For instance, they did not promote history textbooks that would present a pro-
Manchu version of Chinese history in which the Manchu would be presented 
as a legitimate ruler of the Chinese nation. Perhaps this was in part due to the 
fact that they were a minority (and by then a largely assimilated minority) and 
hence could not use nationalist or racial arguments to this effect. One could 
also argue, however, that modern nationalist and racial thinking did not seem 
to matter to the Qing rulers, because the legitimacy of their rule was not 
based on nationalist ideals (e.g. cultural similarity between rulers and the 
ruled), but on feudal-era ideas of divine selection and dynastic succession.  
 
The late Qing era was thus a period when nationalism as a discourse was 
limited primarily to the discourses of the intellectual elites, and was not yet 
consciously used as a tool for collection mobilisation and loyalty at mass level 
via textbooks and dictionaries. Furthermore, among the intellectual elites, 
nationalist discourse was Han-centred and excluded the Manchu. As such, 
this pre-republican era nationalism was used as an ideological tool to 
challenge the legitimacy of Machu rule.  
   
 
2. The Early Republican Period 
After the establishment of the Republic of China in 1911, representations of 
the Chinese nation and the role played by the Han changed considerably. In 
contrast to the Qing course, the new republican government started exploiting 
the various modern state institutions as propaganda instruments. They have 
effectively used these institutions as powerful mechanisms of defining and re-
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defining the framework of national territory, politics, culture and economic. 
Similar with other nation-states in which one nation plays a dominant role in 
the governance of the country, the republican government ought to build and 
define the national identity by legitimising and promoting a specific culture and 
language - Han culture, which at the same time involves the marginalisation of 
minority cultures. 
 
As we have seen, the perception of the Han as the most advanced and 
culturally dominant group in Chinese society was a prominent element in 
intellectual discourses already in the late Qing era. As we will see, this 
element persisted in intellectuals’ discourse also after the establishment of the 
Republic of China, as well as spread into textbooks and dictionaries. 
However, because of the political need to promote national integration vis-à-
vis the common external threat, namely Western imperialism, claims about 
Han superiority now became more subdued and often appeared in 
conjunction with calls for greater harmony and even equality among groups. It 
is also necessary to consider the fact that the early republican era was a time 
when differences among other minority groups in China were becoming 
increasingly pronounced due to independence movements (e.g. in Tibet), 
Chinese elites had to seek a way to ease the tension between the newly 
established republican regime and other minority groups in China, in order to 
include as many members as possible into a Chinese unity, to oppose the 
Western threat. Traditional beliefs in Han superiority therefore had to be 
adapted and linked to modern ideas of national integration and state building. 
   
 
2.1 Intellectuals 
Compared to school textbooks and dictionaries, which require an institutional 
infrastructure and systematic work carried out by a group of professionals, the 
intellectuals are able to immediately respond to specific socio-culture 
contexts. It should therefore not be a surprise that intellectuals’ discourses 
changed almost immediately after, and even slightly before, the establishment 
of the Chinese Republic, while changes in the other two types of sources took 
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longer. As I have shown in Chapter 4, all three intellectuals have started 
supporting national integration after the establishment of the Republic of 
China. This had consequences for their perceptions of the Han as well, and 
their relationship with the Manchu and other minorities. 
 
On the whole, the balance now shifted in favour of Liang Qichao’s ideas, and 
both Zhang Binglin and Sun Zhongshan adopted a less negative attitude 
towards the Manchu. According to their understanding, the most dangerous 
threat to Chinese society after the establishment of the Republic of China was 
the military imperialist threat from the West. They therefore made efforts in 
adopting different social markers, including nation, race and ethnicity, to 
construct the identity of the Western Other, which was differentiated from and 
could be seen as a danger to ‘us’. Anti-Manchuism became less radical and 
was replaced by an emphasis on Chinese national integration involving all 
ethnic groups. 
 
In order to interpret the West as the Other and differentiate it from the Chinese 
Self, intellectuals in this period all adopted biological and cultural markers, 
and drew on the idea of nation and nationalism. In this context, anti-Manchu 
attitudes were no longer considered of importance. Zhang Binglin, for 
example, compared the relative level of danger coming from the Manchu and 
the West and concluded that the latter was ‘actually ten thousands of times 
more dangerous than the Manchu at this moment’ (1915 [1909] vol 3: 43). He 
went further to promote ‘national revolution [minzu geming]’ in order to 
‘prevent being captured by others’ (1977 [1910]: 519). Here he referred to the 
Westerners as the Other, which would ‘capture’ the Chinese territory. Similar 
ideas could be found in Sun Zhongshan’s discourse several years later, who 
claimed the necessity of ‘constructing a new Chinese nationalism’, in order to 
solve the frontier conflicts at the border of the Chinese territory and the 
increasing Western imperialist threat to China (1985 [1919] vol 2: 335). 
 
Zhang Binglin and Sun Zhongshan, who frequently promoted Han superiority 
and referred to racial markers of difference to differentiate between the Han 
and the Manchu and the remaining groups in China, started associating Han 
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identity and Han nationalism with the construction of the state, which was 
supposed to include the Manchu and other minority groups in China, and they 
also put much less emphasis on directly claiming the cultural and political 
uniqueness of the Han. Furthermore, they even clearly opposed the social 
dominance of the Han in Chinese society (Hanism, or Great-Han nationalism), 
and claimed equality between the Han and other minority groups. Their 
understanding of Chinese identity and the construction of the Self were now 
very similar to Liang Qichao’s ideas of ‘large nationalism’.  
 
These changes are a perfect example of the Chinese ‘imagined community’ 
as defined by Benedict Anderson, namely as an imagined community that is 
‘imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign’ (1991: 49). The modern 
Chinese nation was now imagined not only in cultural terms, as the Han were 
in the late imperial era, but also in political terms, as a sovereign nation that 
had the right to govern itself, rather than being governed by others (be it the 
West or Japan). It was also imagined as a limited community, and the link 
between this community and its territorial border were becoming increasingly 
important to collective imagination as well.  The sudden inclusion of the 
Manchu as a part of the Chinese nation also offers a good demonstration of 
Hobsbawm’s and Gellner’s arguments about the artificial, constructed nature 
of nations. Indeed, borrowing from Gellner (1964: 69) we could argue that 
Chinese republican nationalism was not the awakening of a pre-existing 
Chinese nation to self-consciousness. Instead, it invented a nation where it 
did not exist – or, more precisely, it invented a Chinese nation that was no 
longer exclusively limited to the Han and defined in cultural or civilizational 
terms, but was a political community that included other ethnic minorities and 
tied to its own modern state and territory.  
 
 
2.2 School Textbooks 
The shift of regarding the West rather than the Manchu as a more threatening 
Other that needed to be opposed was also evident also in the school 
textbooks published after the establishment of the Republic of China. In 
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regard to the origin of the Chinese nation, the theory of wailai shuo 
(foreignness) was gradually replaced by the tuzhu shuo (nativeness). The 
former theory can be interpreted as an effort to relate the ‘powerful’ West to 
China, while the latter was clearly an attempt to sever the connection with the 
West and establish China as an independent entity. The perception of the 
West as the most important and threatening Other also underscores Sun 
Zhongshan’s idea of wuzugonghe (the Republic of Five Races), which exerted 
considerable influence on Chinese school textbooks during the early 
republican era. The idea of wuzugonghe emphasised the harmony of the five 
major zu (the Han, the Hui, the Manchu, the Mongolia and the Tibet), all of 
which formed part of the Chinese nation and contributed to national unity. It is 
not difficult to conclude that the most dangerous threat to this unity is the 
West. 
 
Such ideas - especially Sun Zhongshan’s idea of wuzugonghe (the Republic 
of Five Races), and hence the belief in the necessity of achieving national 
integration, echoed also in school textbooks and dictionaries published in the 
early republican period. However, in contrast to intellectuals’ writings, the 
format of textbooks and dictionaries meant that national integration was not 
something that was explicitly argued for, but rather something that was 
presented as an uncontroversial fact.  For instance, in Zhong’s (1914) Xinzhi 
benguoshi jiaoben (The Newly Edited History Textbook), the Manchu, the 
Mongol, the Hui and the Tibet were simply defined as belonging to the yellow 
race and ‘sharing the same origin’ with the Han (3). At the same time, 
traditional beliefs in the superiority of Han Culture persisted. For instance, 
taking an example from the same textbook, the pride of Han culture and 
civilisation became clearly evident in the following comparison between the 
Han and the remaining groups in China: ‘compared to the other four nations, 
the Han owned the best location of territory and the most brilliant culture, 
which can be never reached by any other minority groups’ (3). As in 
intellectuals’ discourses, a more inclusive approach to other minority groups 
thus went hand-in-hand with a sense of traditional cultural and civilisational 
hierarchies. 
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2.3 Dictionaries 
Finally, the construction of the West as the Other is evident also in Chinese 
dictionaries published during the early republican era. For instance, the terms 
zu and minzu were sometimes used as social categories to refer to other 
human groups in the world. An example can be found in the Shehuikexue da 
cidian (Dictionary of Social Sciences) (Gao et al. 1929), in which ruoxiao 
minzu (small and weak nations) were defined as ‘colonial, semi-colonial 
nations, as well as other regimes that are independent in name only, and the 
internal government of which is interfered by imperialism’ (474). In addition, 
this dictionary also adopts a critical perspective on Western colonialism and 
imperialism, and presents it as an act of aggression and exploitation. Another 
clear example, taken from the same dictionary, can be found in its definition of 
the term minzu zhuyi (nationalism), which is explained as ‘a request of 
achieving equality with the Western powers, and an equal status in the 
international environment’ (Gao et al. 1929: 139). This quote clearly refers to 
‘the Western powers’ as a target in the process of struggling for ‘an equal 
status in the international environment’, and hence as an important Other. 
 
Similar trends were identified in the dictionaries published in the early 
republican era. The terms zu and minzu were widely used as synonymous 
with China, referring to a powerful social body that was capable of resisting 
the Western Other (e.g. Sun et al. 1921: , 34). Also, some dictionaries 
adopted the idea of wuzugonghe and used the term zu to refer to both the 
Han and the Manchu, and sometimes to other groups. A clear example can be 
found in Fang and Su’s Xiaoxuesheng de zidian (The Dictionary for Primary 
School Students) (1933), which states that ‘the Han, the Manchu, the 
Mongolian, the Hui and the Tibetan are sharing a common zu’ (145). In this 
quote, the Manchu, as well as other ethnic minorities in China, were included 
into a wider social group that shared a common belonging of a zu. 
 
At the same time, however, several dictionaries defined or used the term Han 
as the name of China and things Chinese. For example, one dictionary stated 
that ‘Han zu is the name of Huazu [Chinese nation]’ (Wang, 1935: 269); while 
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another claimed that ‘Hanwen’ (the Han language) is ‘another name for 
Chinese language’ (Fang & Su, 1933: 234). In a third dictionary, the term 
Hanxue (Sinology) was defined as ‘the study of Chinese culture’ (Zhai, 1947: 
, 606). This slippage between the terms China and Han suggests that the 
Han were still constructed as the unique or dominant representative of China, 
implying an exclusion or subordination of other ethnic minorities.  
 
 
2.4 Summary 
On the whole, early republican era school textbooks and dictionaries were 
clearly underpinned by the notion of the West as the key Other, but in contrast 
to intellectuals’ discourses in early republican China, school textbooks and 
dictionaries rarely offered a direct critique of Western imperialism. Arguably, 
this was due to the characteristics of them as a particular type of cultural 
products. Intellectuals’ discourses are more personal, direct and they 
frequently try to persuade the audience to support their standpoint. School 
textbooks and dictionaries, however, are considerably more neutral in 
narration. They do not offer arguments and claims, but ‘objective’ definitions 
and descriptions that are presented in a matter-of-fact way. Nevertheless, 
despite these differences in the style of representation and narration used, the 
construction of the West as the Other in relation to ‘us’ Chinese is evident in 
all three types of sources I have investigated from the early republican era. 
 
To conclude, the early republican era was the period when intellectuals’ ideas 
and discourses about the Han Self started exerting a greater influence on 
school textbooks and dictionaries. This also meant that modern notions of 
nation, race and ethnicity now started circulating among the wider Chinese 
population (i.e. beyond intellectuals and political elites). Although aspects of 
traditional Chinese notions of identity and differences, i.e. the belief in the 
cultural and civilisational superiority of the Han, persisted, they became 
incorporated into modern ideas of national belonging and racial exclusion. 
Arguably, such continuities with older discourses of the Han Self and its 
Others also helped popularise modern notions of belonging among the wider 
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population. In short, during the early republican era, Chinese nation-building 
started in earnest, as a large-scale mass exercise of inculcating a new sense 
of the Chinese self through mass education and mass communication.  
 
Of course, when making such inferences, I need to be mindful of the nature of 
my sources, and the limits it imposes on my conclusions. Although textbooks 
and dictionaries do offer insight into what the wider (literate) population read 
at the time, it does not say much about how they interpreted or understood 
these modern ideas. To examine the popularisation and dissemination of 
these modern ideas further, it would therefore be interesting to examine other 
types of sources, for instance, personal diaries or school exams.    
 
 
3. Conclusion 
Apart from providing a better understanding of the nature of dissemination of 
modern notions of the Han Self and its Others, as well as the notions of 
identity and belonging, my analysis also enabled me to draw further general 
conclusions about the process of nation-building carried out by different types 
of discourses in late Qing and early republican China.  
 
First, my research demonstrated the flexible interconnections and sometimes 
even interchangeability between the notions of nation, race and ethnicity. 
Instead of being regarded as distinct social categories, these terms were used 
as interlinked representations of social identity, whose meanings often shifted 
and overlapped. I shall hope that my analysis has showed that to understand 
the actual uses of these discourses it is necessary to examine them together 
and in historical context - rather than in isolation. 
 
Second, my analysis confirmed that the sense of identity is not static, but 
rather changes in order to respond to the different orders of changing society. 
In particular, the perceptions of the Han (and the broader Chinese) Self and 
its Others changed in line with the shifting political and cultural environment, 
both internal (political and cultural reforms in Chinese society) and external 
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(Western imperialism). The changes became apparent first and most 
obviously in intellectuals’ discourses, while textbooks and dictionaries 
changed at a slower pace. 
 
Third and most important, the discourses about the Han and the Chinese 
played a key role in the process of building a modern Chinese nation. In the 
late Qing period, exclusivist nationalist discourses were used by the 
intellectual elites as an ideological tool to legitimate reform and ultimately also 
the overthrow of imperial Manchu rule. In the early republican period, 
nationalist ideas were again used as an ideological tool, but this time with a 
different set of aims - to consolidate national unity and integration, legitimate 
republican rule, justify control over territory, and resist Western imperial threat. 
Because of these different political aims, the content of nationalist discourses 
changed as well, and became more inclusive. In this sense, using 
Hobsbawm’s (1990: 9) words, different ideas about the Chinese nation existed 
as ‘functions of a particular kind of territorial state or the aspiration to establish 
one’. Finally, the ruling elites also started spreading these modern nationalist 
Chinese discourses among the masses by means of school textbooks (used 
in the context of a thoroughly reformed and modernised education system) 
and dictionaries.  
 
  
257 
 
Bibliography and sources 
1. Primary Sources 
Chen, S. (1929) Shehui wenti cidian (Dictionary of Social Problems), 
Shanghai: Minzhi Bookstore. 
Chinese Boy (Pseudonym) (1903) Zhina siqiannian kaihuashi (A History of 
4000 Years Chinese Civilization), Shanghai: The Chinese Translating Press. 
Editors Group of Zhonghua Book Company (eds.) (1986) Sun Zhongshan 
quanji (The Complete Collection of Sun Zhongshan’s Discourse), Shanghai: 
Zhonghua Book Company. 
Fang, B. (1924) Guoyin biaozhun baihua cidian (Standard Vernacular 
Dictionary of National Pronunciation), Shanghai: The Commercial Press. 
Fang, D. & Su, L. (1933) Xiaoxuesheng de zidian (Dictionary for Primary 
Students), Shanghai: Zhixin Bookstore. 
Fu, S. (2002 [1931]) Minzu yu gudai zhongguo shi (Nation and the History of 
Ancient China), Hebei: Hebei Education Press. 
Gao, X. et al. (eds.) (1915) Shehui kexue da cidian (Dictionary of Social 
Sciences), Shanghai: Shijie Bookstore. 
He, B. (1990 [1929]) ‘Zhonghua minzu qiyuan zhi xin shenhua’ (The New 
Myth of Chinese Origins), in He Bingsong Lunwenji (A Collection of He 
Bingsong’s Works), Beijing: The Commercial Press. 
Ichimura, S. (1902) Yi, C. (trans.) Shina shiyō (The Summarized History of 
China), Shanghai: Guangzhi Bookstore. 
Institute of Modern History, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (ed.) (1981) 
Sun Zhongshan quanji (Complete Works of Sun Zhongshan), Beijing: 
Zhonghua Book Company. 
Institution of the Party History of Kuomintang (ed.) (1973) Guofu quanji 
(Completed Works of Father of the Nation), Taibei: Institution of the Party 
History of Kuomintang. 
Jin, Z. (ed.) (1925) Chuzhong benguoshi (The National History Textbook for 
Junior High School), Shanghai: Zhonghua Book Company. 
Jin, Z. (ed.) (1926) Xinzhongxue benguo lishi cankaoshu (The New Racial 
258 
 
Theory: the Reference on National History), Shanghai: Zhonghua Book 
Company. 
Kang, Y. (1956 [1901]) Da tong shu (The Book of Great Unity), Beijing: 
Ancient Books Publishing House. 
Kang, Y. (1956 [1902]) ‘Qing junmin hezhi man han bu fenjie’ (Empire and the 
People should corporately Govern Man and Han) in The Chinese Historical 
Research Institute (ed.) The Modern China Historical Materials - muxu 
Movement (2), Shanghai: The Shanghai People Press. 
Kuwabara, J. (1899) Dongyang shiyao (The Summarized History of Asia), 
Shanghai: The Commercial Press. 
Li, H. (ed.) (1984) Liang Qichao xuanji (The Selection Works of Liang 
Qichao), Shanghai: The Shanghai People Press. 
Li, S. (2008) Kangxi zidian ji qi yinyong shuowen yu guibu zhi tanjiu (An 
Investigation on the References and Radicals in Kangxi Dictionary), Taibei: 
Huamulan Chubanshe. 
Liang, Q. (1900 [1903]) Yinbingshi heji (Collected Writings from the Ice-
Drinker’s Studio), Shanghai: Zhonghua Book Company. 
Liang, Q. (1997) Liang Qichao wenji (The Collection of Liang Qichao’s 
Works), Beijing: Yanshan Publishing House. 
Lu, S. (1923) Baihua benguoshi (A General Discussion on National History), 
Shanghai: The Commercial Press. 
Lu, S. (1987 [1933]) Zhongguo minzushi (A History of the Nations in China), 
Beijing: Encyclopaedia of China Publishing House. 
Luo, J. (1985) Guofu nianpu (Chronological Biography of the Father of the 
Republic), Taibei: Institution of the Party History of Kuomintang. 
Ma, H. (1988) Kang Youwei dazhuan (A Detail Biography of Kang Youwei), 
Liaoning: The Liaoning People Press. 
Ma, J. (1923) Guoyu putong cidian (Ordinary Dictionary of National 
Language), Shanghai: Zhonghua Book Company. 
Michiyo, N. (1903) Zhina tongshi (The General History of China), Shanghai: 
The Study Society of Eastern Literature. 
Pan, S. (1910) Jiaokeshu yu jiaoyu jinhua zhi guanxi (The Relationship 
between Textbooks and the Evolution of Education), jiaoyu zazhi (The 
Magazine of Education), Vol 2 (5): 21-27. 
259 
 
Qian, M. (1913) Zhongxue xiaojiaoke yongshu zhi shangqu (A Discussion on 
the School Textbooks for Middle Schools), Jiaoyu zazhi (The Magazine of 
Education), Vol 5 (7): 56-61. 
Shen, E. (1908) Bengguo shi (The National History), Beijing: The Chinese 
National Company. 
Shen, P., Fan, Z. & Zhang, P. (1999) Liang Qichao quanji (Complete Works of 
Liang Qichao), Beijing: Beijing Press. 
Shirakawa, J. & Kokufu, T. (1903) Zhina wenmingshi (The History of the 
Chinese Civilisation), Shanghai: Jinghua Bookstore. 
Sun, Y. (1921) Zhonghua zhuyin zidian (Chinese Phonetic Dictionary), 
Shanghai: Zhonghua Book Company. 
Sun, Z. (1927) Sanmin zhuyi (The Three Principles of the People), Shanghai: 
The Commercial Press. 
Sun, Z. (1929) ‘The Principle of Nationalism’, in ElieKedourie (ed.) (1971) 
Nationalism in Asia and Africa, Britain: George Weidenfeld and Nicolson Ltd. 
Tang, G. (ed.) (1982) Zhang taiyan quanji (Completed Works of Zhang 
Taiyan), Shanghai: Renmin Publishing House. 
Tang, Z. (1996) Zhang Taiyan zhuan (A Biography of Zhang Taiyan), Taipei: 
Taiwan Commercial Press. 
Tang, Z. (ed.) (1977) Zhang Taiyan zhenglun xuanji (The Selection of Zhang 
Taiyan’s Political Discoursess), Shanghai: Zhonghua Book Company. 
Tu, S. (1949) Biaozhun guoyin shiyong xin zidian (New Country Pronunciation 
and Practical Standard Dictionary), Shanghai, Jinan: Dofang Shushe. 
Wang, B. (1930) Shehui yundong cidian (Dictionary of Social Movements), 
Shanghai: Mingri Bookstore. 
Wang, S. (ed.) (1986 [1898]) Baozhong cunyi (The Additional Meaning of 
Protecting the Race), The Collection of Yanfu’s Work, Vol 1, Beijing: 
Zhonghua Book Company. 
Wang, W. (1935) Xuesheng biaozhun zidian (Standard Dictionary for 
Students), Shanghai: Dazhong Bookstore. 
Wu, Z. (1909) Zhongguo lishi duben (A Reading Book of Chinese History), 
Shanghai: The Commercial Press. 
Xia, Z. (1904) Zuixin zhongguo jiaokeshu zhongguo lishi (The Latest Middle 
School Textbook: Chinese History), Shanghai: The Commercial Press. 
260 
 
Yan, F. (1959) Yanfu shiwen xuan (A Collection of Yanfu’s Poems and 
Articles), Beijing: People’s Literature Press. 
Yang, Y. et al. (1945) Shiyong da zidian (Practical Large Dictionary), 
Shanghai: Zhonghua Book Company. 
Zeng, K. (1903) Zhongguo lishi (Chinese History), Tokyo: Dongxin Translation 
Society.  
Zhang, B. (1897) Lun xuehui you dayiyu huangren ji yi baohu (A Discussion of 
the Benefit of Study Societies for the Yellows and They should be Urgently 
protected), in Tang, Z. (ed.) (1977) Zhang Taiyan zhenglun xuanji (The 
Selection of Zhang Taiyan’s Political Discourses), Shanghai: Zhonghua Book 
Company. 
Zhang, B. (1897) Lun yazhou yi ziwei chunchi (A Discussion of the 
Relationship among Asian Countries should be Like Tongue and Teeth), in 
Tang, Z. (ed.) (1977) Zhang Taiyan zhenglun xuanji (The Selection of Zhang 
Taiyan’s Political Discourses), Shanghai: Zhonghua Book Company. 
Zhang, B. (1898) Shang Li Hongzhang shu (A letter to Li Hongzhang), in 
Tang, Z. (ed.) (1977) Zhang Taiyan zhenglun xuanji (The Selection of Zhang 
Taiyan’s Political Discourses), Shanghai: Zhonghua Book Company. 
Zhang, B. (1899) Fanzhen lun (Discussion on the Renegade Military 
Governors of Boarder Provinces), in Tang, Z. (ed.) (1977) Zhang Taiyan 
zhenglun xuanji (The Selection of Zhang Taiyan’s Political Discourses), 
Shanghai: Zhonghua Book Company. 
Zhang, B. (1899) Kedilun (The Guest Emperor Thesis), in Tang, Z. (ed.) 
(1977) Zhang Taiyan zhenglun xuanji (The Selection of Zhang Taiyan’s 
Political Discourses), Shanghai: Zhonghua Book Company. 
Zhang, B. (1900) Kedi kuangmiu (Correcting the Erroneous Guest Emperor 
Thesis), in Tang, Z. (ed.) (1977) Zhang Taiyan zhenglun xuanji (The Selection 
of Zhang Taiyan’s Political Discourses), Shanghai: Zhonghua Book Company. 
Zhang, B. (1901) Bo Kang Youwei lun gemingshu (The Refutation on Kang 
Youwei's Work: The discussion of the Revolution), in Tang, Z. (ed.) (1977) 
Zhang Taiyan zhenglun xuanji (The Selection of Zhang Taiyan’s Political 
Discourses), Shanghai: Zhonghua Book Company. 
Zhang, B. (1901) Zheng chouman lun (Correct Discourse on Hatred for the 
Manchu), in Tang, Z. (ed.) (1977) Zhang Taiyan zhenglun xuanji (The 
261 
 
Selection of Zhang Taiyan’s Political Discourses), Shanghai: Zhonghua Book 
Company. 
Zhang, B. (1903) Bo gemingboyi (The Refutation of the Refutation of 
Revolutionary), in Tang, Z. (ed.) (1977) Zhang Taiyan zhenglun xuanji (The 
Selection of Zhang Taiyan’s Political Discourses), Shanghai: Zhonghua Book 
Company. 
Zhang, B. (1903) Gemingshu xu (The Preface of the Book The 
Revolutionaries by Zou Rong), in The Selection of Zhang Taiyan’s Articles 
(1981), Shanghai: The Remin Press. 
Zhang, B. (1904) Bianfa zhenyan (The Proverbs of the Reform), in The 
Selection of the Zhang Taiyan’s Political Discourse (1977), Shanghai: 
Zhonghua Press. 
Zhang, B. (1906 [1900]) Qiushu, Tokyo: The Tokyo Press. 
Zhang, B. (1906) Dongjing liuxuesheng huanying huiyan shuoci (Speech at 
Welcome Meeting Held by Chinese Students in Tokyo), in Tang, Z. (ed.) 
(1977) Zhang Taiyan zhenglun xuanji (The Selection of Zhang Taiyan’s 
Political Discourses), Shanghai: Zhonghua Book Company. 
Zhang, B. (1906) Hanzhi fakanxu (Foreword to The Han Flag Periodical), in 
Tang, Z. (ed.) (1977) Zhang Taiyan zhenglun xuanji (The Selection of Zhang 
Taiyan’s Political Discourses), Shanghai: Zhonghua Book Company. 
Zhang, B. (1906) Minbao yizhounian jinian zhuci (The Felicitation for the 1st 
Anniversary of the Minbao), in Tang, Z. (ed.) (1977) Zhang Taiyan zhenglun 
xuanji (The Selection of Zhang Taiyan’s Political Discourses), Shanghai: 
Zhonghua Book Company. 
Zhang, B. (1907) Guojialun (A Discourse on State), in Tang, Z. (ed.) (1977) 
Zhang Taiyan zhenglun xuanji (The Selection of Zhang Taiyan’s Political 
Discourses), Shanghai: Zhonghua Book Company. 
Zhang, B. (1908) Manzhou zongdu qintun zhenkuan zhuang (The Indictment 
of Manchurian Governor’s Misappropriation for the Relief Fund), in Tang, Z. 
(ed.) (1977) Zhang Taiyan zhenglun xuanji (The Selection of Zhang Taiyan’s 
Political Discourses), Shanghai: Zhonghua Book Company. 
Zhang, B. (1908) Paiman pingyi (Level-headed Discussion of Anti-
Manchuism), Minbao (Min Newspaper), Vol 21, No. 8. 
Zhang, B. (1911) Zhi liuri manzhou xuesheng shu (A Letter to the Manchurian 
262 
 
Students in Japan), in Tang, Z. (ed.) (1977) Zhang Taiyan zhenglun xuanji 
(The Selection of Zhang Taiyan’s Political Discourses), Shanghai: Zhonghua 
Book Company. 
Zhang, Q. (1908) Zhongxue zhongguolishi jiaokeshu (The Middle School 
Textbook: Chinese History), Beijing: The Wenming Bookstore. 
Zhang, Y. (1909) Xinbian zhongguolishi quanshu (The New Edition of 
Comprehensive Chinese History), Shanghai: The Commercial Press. 
Zhang, Y. & Chen, J. (eds.) (1904 [1716]) Kangxi zidian (Kangxi Dictionary), 
Shanghai: Jinzhang Bookstore. 
Zhao, Y. (1913) Xinzhu benguoshi (The Newly Edited National History), 
Shanghai: The Commercial Press. 
Zhong, Y. (1914) Xinzhi benguoshi jiaoben (The Newly Edited History 
Textbook), Shanghai: Zhonghua Book Company. 
Zhu, S. & Zhang J. (1958 [1909]) Guangxu chao donghua lu (The Historical 
Record of Guangxu’s Era), Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. 
  
263 
 
2. Secondary Sources 
Algeo, J. (1990) ‘American Lexicography’, in Hausmann, Ur. F. et al. (eds.) 
Wörterbücher: Ein international Handbuch zur Lexikographie 2: 1987-2009, 
Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co. 
Ames, R. T. & Rosemont, R. Jr. (1999) The Analects of Confucius: A 
Translation (Classics of Ancient China), New York: Ballantine. 
Anagnost, A. (1997) National Past-times: Narrative, Representation, and 
Power in Modern China, Duke and London: Duke University Press. 
Andersen, M. L. & Collins, H. P. (2006) Race, Class, and Gender: An 
Anthology, 6th Edition, Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing. 
Andersen, M. L. (2006) ‘Race, Gender, and Class Stereotypes: New 
Perspectives on Ideology and Inequality’, Norteamérica. revista Académica, 
Centro de Investigaciones cobre América del Norte. 
Anderson, B. (1991) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and 
Spread of Nationalism, London: Verso. 
Anthias, F. & Yuval-Davis, N. (1992) Racialized Boundaries: Race, Nation, 
Gender, Colour, and Class and the Anti-racist Struggle, London: Routledge. 
Arnason, J. P. (2006) Understanding Intercivilizational Encounters, Thesis 
Eleven, Vol 86: 39-53. 
Atwill, D. G. & Atwill, Y, Y. (2009) Sources in Chinese History: Diverse 
Perspectives from 1644 to the Present, Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall. 
Bai, R. (1997) Lishi jiaoxue wenti (The Problems of History Teaching), Beijing: 
The Science Education Press. 
Bai, S. et al. (2003) Zhongguo huimin minzushi (A History of Chinese 
Muslim), Vol 2, Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. 
Bailey, P. J. (2001) China in the Twentieth Century, 2nd edition, Malden: 
Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 
Balibar, E. & Wallerstein, I. (1990) Rasse - Klasse - Nation: Ambivalente 
Identitäten, Hamburg: Argement Verlag. 
Banton, M. (1998) Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: the Social Organization of 
Cultural Differences, 2nd edition, Bergen: Universitetsforlaget. 
Banton, M. (1998) Racial Theories, 2nd edition, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
264 
 
Barnes, B. & Bloor, D. (1982) ‘Relativism, Rationalism and the Sociology of 
Knowledge’, in Hollis, M. & Lukes, S. (eds.) Rationality and Relativism, 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Barnhart, C. L. (1962) ‘Problems in Editing Commercial Monolingual 
Dictionaries’, in Householder, F. W. and Saporta, S. (eds.) Problems in 
Lexicography: Report of the Conference on Lexicography Held at Indiana 
University, November 11-12, 1960, Bloomington: Indiana University. 
Bauman, Z. (1992) ‘Soil, Blood and Identity’, The Sociological Review, Vol 40 
(4): 675-701. 
Bedeski, R. E. (1981) ‘State Building in Modern China: The Kuomintang in the 
Prewar Period’, China Research Monographs, No. 18,  University of California 
Institute of East Asian Studies. 
Béjoint, H. (2004) Modern Lexicography: An Introduction, New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Bell, B. W. (1989) The Afro-American Novel and Its Tradition, Amherst: The 
University of Massachusetts Press. 
Bennett, T. (2007) ‘Intellectuals, Culture Policy: the Technical, the Practical 
and the Critical’, in Critical Trajectories: Culture, Society, Intellectuals, Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing. 
Berger, P. L. & Luckmann, T. (1966) The Social Construction of Reality: A 
Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge, London: Penguin. 
Berger, S. et al. (eds.) (1999) Writing National Histories: Western Europe since 
1800, London: Routledge. 
Bergère, M-C. (1994) Sun Yatsen, Lloyd, J. (trans.) (1998) Stanford: Stanford 
University Press.  
Bernasconi, R. & Lott, T. L. (eds.) (2000) The Idea of Race, Indianapolis & 
Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. 
Bickers, R. & Tiedemann, R. G. (eds.) (2007) The Boxers, China. And the 
World, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, INC. 
Bickers, R. (2011) The Scramble for China: Foreign Devils in the Qing Empire, 
1832-1914, London: Penguin Group. 
Blise, W. D. (1897) The Encyclopedia of Social Reform, New York: Funk & 
Wagnalls. 
265 
 
Bluntschli, J. K. (1885) The Theory of the State, Oxford: Clarendon Press.  
Bo, W. et al. (2004) ‘Genetic Evidence Supports Demic Diffusion of Han 
Culture’, Nature, Vol 431: 302-305. 
Bolt, C. (1984) ‘Race and the Victorians’, in Eldridge, C. C. (ed.) British 
Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century, London: Macmillan - now Palgrave. 
Boswell, J. (1907) The Life of Samuel Johnson, London: Pitman. 
Branscombe, N. R. et al. (eds.) (1999) Social Identity, Oxford: Blackwell. 
Brantlinger, P. (1985) ‘Victorians and Africans: the Genealogy of the Myth of 
the Dark Continent’, Critical Inquiry, Vol 12: 166-203. 
Brass, P. R. (1991) Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison, 
Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
Breisach Ernst (2007) Historiography Ancient, Medieval and Modern, 
Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
Browne, I. & Misra, J. (2003) ‘The Intersection of Gender and Race in the 
Labour Market’, Annual Review of Sociology, Vol 29: 487-513. 
Brubaker, R. (2004) Ethnicity without Groups, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Brubaker, R. and Laitin, D. (1998) ‘Ethnic and Nationalist Violence’, Annual 
Review of Sociology, Vol, 24: 423-52. 
Bruner, J. (1990) Acts of Meaning, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Bulag, U. E. (2010) ‘Good Han, Bad Han: the Moral Parameters of 
Ethnopolitics in China’ in Thomas, S. et al. (eds.) Critical Han Studies: The 
History, Representation, and Identity of China’s Majority, Berkeley, Los 
Angeles & London: University of California Press. 
Bulmer, M. (1986) ‘Race and Ethnicity’, in Burgess R. G. (ed.) Key Variables 
in Social Investigation, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Calhoun, C. J. (1993) ‘Nationalism and Ethnicity’, Annual Review of 
Sociology, Vol 19: 211-239. 
Calhoun, C. J. (1997) Nationalism, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press. 
Carter, B. and Fenton, S. (2010) 'From Re-thinking Ethnicity to not Thinking 
Ethnicity', Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, Vol 40(1): 1-18. 
Castells, M. (2010) The Power of Identity, 2nd edition, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. 
266 
 
Chalmers David J. (eds.) Toward a Science of Consciousness III: The Third 
Tucson Discussions and Debates, USA: The MIT Press. 
Chang, H. (1987) Chinese Intellectuals in Crisis: Search for Order and 
Meaning, 1890-1911, Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Chang, S. H. & Gordon, L. H. D. (1991) All Under Heaven: Sun Yat-sen and 
His Revolutionary Thought, Stanford: Hoover Institute Press. 
Chen, L. (1994) Zhonghua minzu yanjiu chutan (Preliminary Research on the 
Zhonghua minzu), Beijing: Zhishi Publishing House. 
Chen, Y. (2008) Geming zheren: Zhang Taiyan Zhuan (Revolutionary 
Philosopher: The Bibliography of Zhang Taiyan), Zhejiang: Zhejiang Renmin 
Publication. 
Cheow, E. T. C. (2006) Sino-Japanese Relations: Conflict Management and 
Resolution, Washington, D. C.: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road 
Studies Program. 
Chesneaux, J., Bastid, M. & Bergère, M. (1976) China from the Opium Wars 
to the 1911 Revolution, Destenay, A. (tran.) (1977), Hassocks: Harvester 
Press. 
Chow, K. (1997) ‘Imagining Boundaries of Blood: Zhang Binglin and the 
Invention of the Han ‘Race’ in Modern China’, in Dik tter, F. (ed.) The 
Construction of Racial Identities in China and Japan: historical and 
contemporary perspectives, London: Hurst. 
Chow, K. et al. (eds.) (2001) Constructing Nationhood in Modern East Asia, 
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.  
Chow, T. (1964) The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modem 
China, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Christopher, H. R. (1997) Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism: National Identity 
and Status in International Society, London: Routledge. 
Cinnirella, M. (1996) ‘A Social Identity Perspective on European Integration’, 
in Breakwell, G. & Lyons, E. (eds.) Changing European Identities: Social 
Identities: Social Psychological Analysis of Social Change, Oxford: 
Butterworth-Heinemann. 
Clements, P. H. (1915) The Boxer Rebellion: A Political and Diplomatic 
Review, Vol 66 (1-3). 
Cohen, P. A. (1997) History in Three Keys: The Boxers as Event, Experience, 
267 
 
and Myth, New York: Columbia University Press. 
Collins, P. H. (1998a) ‘It’s All in the Family: Intersections of Gender, Race, and 
Nation’, Hypatia, Vol 13 (3): 62-82. 
Collins, P. H. (1998b) ‘Intersections of Race, Class, Gender and Nation: Some 
Implications for Black Family Students’, Journal of Comparative Family 
Studies, Vol 29 (1): 27-36. 
Collins, P. H. (2000) Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, 
and the Politics of Empowerment, 2nd Edition, New York & London: Routledge. 
Collison, R. L. (1982) History of Foreign Language Dictionaries, London: 
Wiley-Blackwell. 
Connelly, F. M. & Clandinin, D. J. (1990) ‘Stories of Experience and Narrative 
Inquiry’, Educational Researcher, Vol 19 (4): 2-14.  
Connor, W. (1994) Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Conroy, H. (1960) The Japanese Seizure of Korea, 1868-1910: A Study of 
Realism and Idealism in International Relations, Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press. 
Crenshaw, K. (1991) ‘Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, 
and Violence against Women of Colour’, Stanford Law Review, Vol 43 (6, 
July): 1241-1299. 
Crossley, P. K. (2008) ‘The Late Qing Empire in Global History’, Asia in World 
History, 1750-1914, Vol 13 (2): 4-7. 
Curtin, P. (1960-1963) ‘“Scientific” Racism and the British Theory of Empire’, 
Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, Vol 2: 40-51. 
Davis H.W.C. (1914) The Political Thought of Heinrich von Treitschke, London: 
Constable. 
Day, G. & Thompson, A. (2004) Theorizing Nationalism: Debates and Issues 
in Social Theory, New York, Pulgrave Macmillan. 
Deacon, D. et al. (1999) Research Communications: A Practical Guide to 
Methods in Media and Cultural Analysis, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Dieckhoff, A. and Gutiérrez, N. (eds.) (2001) Modern Roots: Studies of 
National Identity. Ashgate: Aldershot, England.  
Dik tter, F. (1990) ‘Group Definition and the Idea of “Race” in Modern China 
(1793-1949)’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol 13, Issue 3: 420-432. 
268 
 
Dikötter, F. (1992) The Discourse of Race in Modern China, London: Hurst & 
Company. 
Dik tter, F. (1994) ‘Racial Identities in China: Context and Meaning’, China 
Quarterly, Vol 138, June 1994: 404-412. 
Dikötter, F. (1997) The Construction of Racial Identities in China and Japan: 
Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, London: Hurst. 
Dill, B. T. et al. (2009) Emerging Intersections: Race, Class and Gender in 
Theory, Policy, and Practice, New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press. 
Drake, F. W. (1975) China Charts the World: Hsü Chi-Yü and His Geography 
of 1848, Cambridge, MA: East Asian Research Centre. 
Dru C. G. (1998) Making Majorities: Constituting the Nation in Japan, Korea, 
China, Malaysia, Fiji, Turkey, and the United States, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press. 
Duara, P. (1995) Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning narratives of 
modern China, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Dugger, W. M. (1996) ‘Four Modes of Inequality’, in Dugger, W. M. (ed.), 
Inequality, Radical Instituationalist Views on Race, Gender, Class, and Nation, 
Westport, CT, London: Greenwood Press. 
Dyer, R. (1997) White, New York: Routledge. 
Eastlake, F. W. & Yoshi-aki, Y. (1897) Heroic Japan: A History of the War 
Between China and Japan, London: Sampson Low, Marston & Company. 
Elleman, B. & Kotkin, S. (eds.) (2009) Manchurian Railways and the Opening 
of China: An International History, Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 
Eller, J. D. (2002) From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: An Anthropological 
Perspective on International Ethnic Conflict, Ann Arbor: The University of 
Michigan Press. 
Elman, B. (2002) A Cultural History of Civil Examinations in Late Imperial 
China, London: University of California. 
Entman, R. & Rojecki, A. (2001) The Black Image in the White Mind: Media 
and Race in America, London: University of Chicago Press. 
Eriksen, T. H. (2002) Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspective, 
London: Pluto Press. 
Esherick, J. W. (1987) The Origins of the Boxer Uprising, Berkeley: University 
of California Press. 
269 
 
Esman, M. J. (1994) Ethnic Politics, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University 
Press. 
Fairbank, J. K. (1978) The Cambridge History of China, Vol 10, Late Ch’ing 
1800-1911, Part 1, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Fairclough, N. (1995) Media Discourse, London, New York, Sydney and 
Auckland: Arnold. 
Fang, H. (1979) ‘Zhongguo cishu shihua’ (A Narrative History of Lexicography 
in China), Cishu yanjiu (Lexicography), Vol 1: 221-232 
Fang, H. (1983) Zhongxi jiaotong shi (A History of the Communication 
between the East and West), Taipei: The Chinese Cultural Press. 
Fei, X. (1989) Zhonghua minzu de duoyuan yiti geju (The Pattern of Diversity 
in Unity of the Chinese Nation), Beijing: The Press of Minzu University of 
China. 
Fei, X. (1999) Fei Xiaotong’s Academic Research, Beijing: Qunyan 
publication Inc. 
Fenby, J. (2009) The Penguin History of Modern China: The Fall and Rise of 
a Great Power, 1850-2009, London: Penguin Books. 
Fenton, S. (1999) Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspective, 
London: Pluto. 
Ferdinand, P. (2007) ‘Ethnosymbolism in China and Taiwan’, in Leoussi, A. S. 
& Steven Grosby, S. (eds.) Nationalism and Ethnosymbolism: History, Culture 
and Ethnicity in the Formation of Nations, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press. 
First Historic Archives of China & Fujian Normal University (eds.) (1998) 
Qingmo jiaoan (Late Qing Religious Cases), Beijing: Zhonghua Book 
Company. 
Fogel, J. A. & Zarrow, P. G. (eds.) (1997) Imagining the People: Chinese 
Intellectuals and the Concept of Citizenship, 1890-1920, New York: M. E. 
Sharpe, Inc. 
Forsby, A. B. (2011) ‘An End to Harmony? The Rise of a Sino-Centric China’, 
Political Perspectives, Vol 5 (3): 5-26. 
Foucault, M. (1980) The History of Sexuality, Vol 1, New York: Vintage. 
Franke, W. (1960) The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese 
Examination System, Harvard: Harvard University Press. 
270 
 
Fredrickson, M. G. (1982) White Supremacy: A Comparative Study in 
American and South African History, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Frost, C. (2006) The Worth of Nations, Morality and Nationalism, New York: 
Routledge. 
Frye, M. (1992) Wilful Virgin: Essays in Feminism, 1976-1992, London: 
Crossing Press. 
Furth, C. (1976) ‘The Sage as Rebel: the Inner World of Chang Ping-lin’, in 
The Limits of Change: The Conservative Alternatives of Republican China, 
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. 
Galton, F. (1909) Essays in Eugenics, London: Eugenics Education Society. 
Gao, C. (2007) Qingmo minguo shiqi zhonghua minzu zijue jincheng yanjiu 
(The Study of the Consciousness of the Chinese Nation during the Late Qing 
and Early Republican Period), Beijing: The Central University for Nationalities 
Press. 
Garner, S. (2007) Whiteness: An Introduction, Trowbridge: The Cromwell 
Press. 
Garner, S. (2009) Racisms: An Introduction, London: SAGE. 
Geeraerts, D. (1989) ‘Principles of Monolingual Lexicography’, in Hausmann, 
F. J. et al. (eds.) Encyclopaedia of Lexicography, Vol 1: 287-296. 
Geertz, C. (ed.) (1962) Old Societies and New States, New York: The Free 
Press. 
Gellner, E. (1964) Thoughts and Changes, London: Weidenfeld and Nicloson. 
Gellner, E. (1985) Nations and Nationalism, Ithaca & New York: Cornell 
University Press. 
Gellner, E. (1997) Nationalism, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 
Gladney, D. C. (1993) ‘Ethnic Identity in China: The New Politics of 
Differences’,  in Joseph, W. A. (ed.) China Briefing, Boulder: Westview Press. 
Glazer, N. & Moynihan, D. P. (1975) Ethnicity Theory and Experience, 
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. 
Gold, D. L. (1979) ‘The Ordering of Lexemes in a Dictionary’, in Michell, G. 
(ed.) Papers of the Dictionary Society of North America, London, Ontario: The 
University of Western Ontario. 
Grasso, M. Corrin, J. P. & Kort, M. (2009) Modernization and Revolution in 
China: From the Opium Wars to the Olympics, Armonk, New York: M.E. 
271 
 
Sharpe. Inc. 
Gray, J. (2002) Rebellions and Revolutions: China from the 1800s to the 
1980s, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Gries, P. H. (2006) ‘China and Chinese Nationalism’, in Delanty, G. and 
Kumar, K. (eds.) The SAGE Handbook of Nations and Nationalism, London, 
Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: SAGE Publications. 
Griffin, L. J. (1992) ‘Temporality, Events, and Explanation in Historical 
Sociology’, Sociological Methods and Research, Vol 20 (4): 403-427. 
Griffin, L. J. (1993) ‘Narrative, Event-structure Analysis, and Causal 
Interpretation in Historical Sociology’, American Journal of Sociology, Vol 98 
(5): 1094-1133. 
Grosby, S. (1994) ‘The Verdict of History: The Inexpungeable Tie of 
Primordiality – A response to Eller and Coughlan’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 
Vol 17(1): 164-171. 
Grosfoguel, R. (2004) ‘Race and Ethnicity or Racialized Ethnicities? Identities 
within Global Coloniality’, Ethnicities, Vol 4: 315-336. 
Gu, D. (2003) ‘Literary Openness: A Bridge across the Divide between 
Chinese and Western Literary Thought’, Comparative Literature, Vol 55 (2): 
112-129. 
Gu, J. (2008) Jin shi zi ji gaiyao (The General Introduction of jin, shi, zi, ji), 
Shanghai: The Press of East China Normal University. 
Guillaumin, C. (1995) Racism, Sexism, Power, and Ideology, London, New 
York: Routledge. 
Gunaratnam, Y. (2003) Researching “Race” and “Ethnicity”: Methods, 
Knowledge and Power, London: Sage. 
Hacking, I. (2002) Historical Ontology, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press. 
Hacking, I. (2006) ‘Making up People’, London Review of Books, Vol 28 (16): 
23-26. 
Halbwachs, M. (1980) [1950] The Collective Memory, Translated by Francis, J. 
D. & Vida, Y. D., New York: Harper & Row Colophon Books. 
Hall J. A. (2003) ‘Conditions for National Homogenizers’, in Ökirimli, U. (ed.) 
Nationalism and Its Future, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Hall, J. A. (1993) ‘Nationalism: Classified and Explained’, Daedalus, Vol 122 
272 
 
(3): 1-28.  
Hall, J. W. (1989) The Cambridge History of Japan: The Twentieth Century, 
Cambridge University Press. 
Hall, S. (1996) ‘The Problem of Ideology: Marxism without Guarantees’, in 
Morley, D. and Chen, K. (eds.) (2003) Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in 
Cultural Studies, London: Routledge. 
Hall, S. (2000) ‘Conclusion the Multi-cultural Question’, in Hesse, B. (ed.) 
Multiculturalisms: Diasporas, Entanglements, Transruptions, New York: St. 
Martin’s Press. 
Han, J. & Li, Y. (1985) Hanwen ‘minzu’ yici kaoyuan ziliao (The Empirical 
Investigation on Chinese Term minzu), Beijing: The Chinese Research 
Institute of Social Sciences. 
Hanks, P. et al. (eds.) (1986) Collins Dictionary of the English Language, 
2ndEdition, London: Collins. 
Hardin, R. (1995) ‘Self-interest, Group Identity’, in Breton, Al. et al (eds.) 
Nationalism and Rationality, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Harding, G. L. (1915) ‘The Peril of China’, The Century Magazine, July 1915. 
Hardy, B. (1977) ‘Narrative as a Primary Act of the Mind’, in Meek, M. et al. 
(eds.) The Cool Web: The Pattern of Children’s Reading, London: The Bodley 
Head. 
Hardy, B. (1987) Dylan Thomas's Poetic Language: The Stream That is 
Flowing Both Ways, Cardiff: University College Cardiff. 
Harrell, S. (ed.) (1997) Defining Ethnicity in China, Seattle and London: The 
University of Washington Press. 
Harrell, S. (2001) Ways of Being Ethnic in Southwest China, Seattle: 
University of Washington Press. 
Harrison, J. (1969) Modern Chinese Nationalism, Hunter College of the City of 
New York: Research Institute on Modern Asia. 
Hartwell, C. (1869) ‘The Relation of Christians to the Examinations’, The 
Chinese Recorder and Missionary Journal, Vol. 1 (11): 217-220. 
Hass, E. (1986) ‘What is Nationalism and Why Should We Study It?’, 
International Organization, Vol 40 (3): 707-744. 
Hearn, J. (2006) Rethinking Nationalism: A Critical Introduction, Hampshire: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
273 
 
Hechter,  M. (2000) Containing Nationalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Heinz‐Georg, M. (1999) ‘Racism, Social Darwinism, Anti-semitism and Aryan 
supremacy’, The International Journal of the History of Sport, Vol16(2): 23-41 
Higginbotham, E. (1992) ‘African-American Women’s history and the 
Metalanguage of Race’, Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, Vol 
17 (2): 251-274. 
Hill, D. (1888) ‘The Coming Triennial Examinations, to the Editor of The 
Chinese Recorder and Missionary Journal’, The Chinese Recorder and 
Missionary Journal, Vol 16 (6): 282-283. 
Hinsley, F. H. (1973) Nationalism and the International System, New York: 
Oceana Publications. 
Hobsbawm, E. & Ranger, T. (eds.) (1983) The Invention of Tradition, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Hobsbawm, E. J. (1990) Nations and Nationalism since 1780, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Holsti, O. R. (1969). Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and 
Humanities, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company. 
Howard, R. C. (1962) ‘Kang-Youwei, His Intellectual Background and Early 
Thought’, in Wright, A. F. & Twitchett, D. (ed.) Confucian Personalities, 
Stanford: Stanford University Press.  
Howell, A. & Fan, C. C. (2011) ‘Migration and Inequality in Xinjiang: A Survey 
of Han and Uyghur Migrants in Urumqi’, Eurasian Geography and Economics 
Vol 52 (1): 119-139. 
Hsü, I. C. Y. (1995) The Rise of Modern China, New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Huang, L. L. et al. (2004) ‘The Double Identity of Chinese Taiwanses: A 
Dilemma of Politics and Identity Rooted in History’, Asian Journal of Social 
Psychology, Vol 7 (2): 149-189. 
Huang, P., Luo, H. & Xu, B. (2002) Shehuixue, renleixue xin cidian (The New 
Dictionary of the Sociology and Anthropology, Jiling: The People Press. 
Huang, Z. (1964) Yihetuan yundong shiliao congbian (The Collection of 
Historical Sources on the Boxer Uprising), Vol 1, Shanghai: Zhonghua Book 
Company. 
Hume, D. (1974 [1741/1742]) Essays - Moral, Political and Literary, Oxford: 
274 
 
Oxford University Press. 
Hund, W. D. (2003) Inclusion and Exclusion: Dimensions of Racism, 
Zeitschriftzur Geschichte der Neuzeit, Heft: Vol1: 6-19. 
Hund, W. D. (2006) Negative Vergesellschaftung. Dimensionen der 
Rassismusanalyse, Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot. 
Hund, W. D. (2007) "Rassismus", Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag. 
Hund, W. D. (2008) Die weiße Norm: Grundlagen des Farbrassismus (The 
White Norm: Foundations of Colour Racism), in Cuerpos Anómalos. (ed.). v. 
Max S. Hering Torres, Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia 2008: 171-
203. 
Hurst, M. (ed.) (1972) Key Treaties for the Great Powers: 1814-1914, Newton 
Abbot: David and Charles. 
Hutchinson, J. & Smith A. D. (eds.) (1994) Nationalism, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Hutchinson, J. & Smith A. D. (eds.) (1996) Ethnicity, Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Huxley, T. H. (1893) Evolution and Ethnics, London: Macmillan. 
Ichijo, A. & Uzelac, G. (2005) When is the Nation? Towards an Understanding 
of Theories of Nationalism, London & New York: Routledge. 
Ichisada, M. (1976) China's Examination Hell: The Civil Service Examinations 
of Imperial China, New York: Weatherhill. 
Idema, W. L. & Lloyd, H. (1997) A Guide to Chinese Literature, Issue 74, 
Centre for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan. 
Ip, E. C. (2008) ‘Building Constitutional Democracy on Oriental Foundations: 
An Anatomy of Sun Yat-Sen’s Constitutionalism’, Historia Constitucional, No. 
9: 327-339. 
Isiksal, H. (2002) ‘Two Perspectives on the Relationship of Ethnicity to 
Nationalism: Comparing Gellner and Smith’, Turkish Journal of International 
Relations, Vol 1 (1): 1-15. 
J. Kennedy, M.A. (1968) Asian Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, London, 
Melbourne, Toronto: St. Martin’s Press. 
Jami, C. (2011) The Emperor’s New Mathematics: Western Learning and 
Imperial Authority during the Kangxi Reign (1662-1772), Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
275 
 
Ji, X. (1997) Dongxi wenhua yilun ji (Essays on Eastern and Western 
Cultures), Vol 1: 83-84, Beijing: Economic Daily Press. 
Jian, D. (1997) ‘Yangwu yundong yanjiu de huigu’ (A Review of the 
Modernization Movement), Lishiyanjiu (Historical Research), Vol 2: 114-128. 
Jiang, T. (2005) Zhongguo jindaishi (The Modern History of China), Shanghai: 
The Shanghai Press of Ancient Books.  
Johnson, S. & Walker, J. (1755) A Dictionary of the English Language, 
London: William Pckering. 
Jones, S. (1997) The Archaeology of Ethnicity: Constructing Identities in the 
Past and Present, London and New York: Routledge Press. 
Jordan, W. J. (1968) White over Black: American Attitudes toward the Negro, 
1550-1812, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 
Kallio, J. (2011) ‘Tradition in Chinese Politics: The Party-state's Reinvention of 
the Past and the Critical Response from Public Intellectuals’, FIIA Report, Vol 
27: 1-151. 
Kang, F. H. (2006) ‘The Boxer Indemnity - “Nothing but Bad”’, Modern Asian 
Studies, Vol 40 (3): 663-690. 
Karl, E. R. (1998) ‘Creating Asia: China in the World at the Beginning of the 
Twentieth Century’, The American Historical Review, Vol 103 (4): 1096-1118. 
Karl, R. and Zarrow, P. (2002) Rethinking the 1898 Reform Period - Political 
and Cultural Change in Late Qing China, Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press. 
Kirby, W. C. (1997) ‘The Internationalization of China: Foreign Relations at 
Home and Abroad in the Republican Era’, The China Quarterly, No. 150: 433-
458. 
Knox, R. (1862 [1850]) The Races of Man, London: Renshaw. 
Kohl, P. L. & Fawcett, C. (eds.) (1995) Nationalism, Politics, and the Practice 
of Archaeology, New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Kuhn, P. A. (2002) Origins of the Modern Chinese State, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press. 
Kwong, L. S. K. (2000) ‘Chinese Politics at the Crossroads: Reflections on the 
Hundred Days Reform of 1898’, Modern Asian Studies, Vol 34 (3): 663-395. 
Lacouperie, T. de. (1894) Western Origin of the Early Chinese Civilisation 
from 2,300 B.C. to 200 A.D., Or, Chapters on the Elements Derived from the 
276 
 
Old Civilisations, London: Asher & Co. 
Laitinen, K. (1990) Chinese Nationalism in the Late Qing Dynasty: Zhang 
Binglin as an Anti-Manchu Propagandist, London: Curzon Press. 
Landau, S. I. (1985) ‘The Expression of Changing Social Values in 
Dictionaries’, Dictionaries, Vol 7: 261-269. 
Larsen, K. W. (2008) Tradition, Treaties, and Trade: Qing Imperialism and 
Choson Korea, 1850-1910, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia 
Centre. 
Laszlo, J. (2003) ‘History, Identity, and Narratives’, in Laszlo, J. & Wagner, W. 
(eds.) Theories and Controversies in Societal Psychology, Budapest: New 
Mandate. 
Lawrence, E. (1982) ‘Just Plain Common Sense: the “Roots” of Racism’, in 
The Empire Strikes Back, London: Hutchinson & Co. (Publishers) Ltd. 
Lawrence, S. (1979) ‘The Revival of Narrative: Reflections on a New Old 
History’, Past and Present, Vol 85: 3-24. 
Li, B. & Zheng, Y. (2001) Wuqiannian zhongguoshi (5000 years of Chinese 
History), Mongol: Inner Mongolian People's Publishing Corporation. 
Li, C. (1928) The Formation of the Chinese People: An Anthropological 
inquiry, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Liao, Y. (1981) Yihetuan yundong shi (The History of the Boxer Uprising), 
Beijing: Renmin Publishing House. 
Lin, Y. (1963) ‘Guanyu “minzu” yici de shiyong he yiming wenti’ (The Usage 
and Translation of the Term ‘Nation’), The Historical Research, Vol 2: 173-
192. 
Liu, H. (1986) ‘Lun Kangxi zidian de lishi gongxian’ (The Historical 
Contribution of the Kangxi zidian), Journal of Central China Normal University 
(Humanities and Social Sciences), Vol 4: 100-109. 
Liu, J. H. and Hilton, D. J. (2005) ‘How the Past Weighs on the Present: 
Social Representations of History and Their Role in Identity Politics’, British 
Journal of Social Psychology, Vol 44: 537-556. 
Liu, L. (1984) Kangxi de wenhua zhengce (The Cultural Policies of Emperor 
Kangxi), (Gugong bowuyuan yuankan (The Publication of National Palace 
Museum), Vol, 1: 17. 
Liu, S. (1906) Zhongguo lishi jiaokeshu (The Textbook of Chinese History), 
277 
 
Beijing: The Quintessence Press. 
Liu, X. (2004) Frontier Passages: Ethnopolitics and the Rise of Chinese 
Communism, 1921-1945, Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Liu, Y. (1983) Zhongguo zidian shilue (A Historical Outline of Chinese 
Dictionaries), Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. 
Liu, Y. (1988) Zhongguo wenhuashi (A Cultural History of China, Vol. 2), 
Shanghai: Encyclopedia of China Publishing House 
Liu, Z. (1992) Shilun hanzu bushou de lishi yanbian (A Review on the 
Historical Changes of Chinese Characters’ Radicals), Zhenjiang gaozhuan 
xuebao, Vol 3: 21-22. 
Loewe, M. (1966) Imperial China: The History Background to the Modern Age, 
London: George Allen and Unwin LTD. 
Lu, J. (ed.) (2001) Xingbie, zhengzhi yu jituan xintai (Gender, politics and 
group consciousness), Taipei: Rye Field Press. 
Lu, Y. et al. (eds.) (2000) Shandong daxue yihetuan diaocha ziliao huibian 
(Collection of Shandong University Survey Materials on the Boxers), Jinan: 
Shandong University Press. 
Ma, R. (2001) Ping Anthony Smith guanyu minzu de lunshu (Anthony Smith’s 
Analysis of Nation), Zhongguo shehui kexue (Social Sciences in China), Vol 
1: 141-151. 
Ma, R. (2004) Minzu shehuixue: shehuixue de zuqun guanxi yanjiu (Sociology 
of Ethnicity: Sociological Study of Ethnic Relations), Beijing: Peking University 
Press. 
Ma, R. (2007) ‘A New Perspective in Guiding Ethnic Relations in the 21st 
Century: De-politicization of Ethnicity in China’, Asian Ethnicity, Vol 3: 199-218 
Ma, S. (1957 [1899]) Zhonghua diguo duiwai guanxishi (The History of 
Chinese Foreign Relations), Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company. 
Ma, Z. & Zhou, L. (2002) Zhongguo gudai wenhua zhishi qutan (A Discussion 
of the Ancient Chinese Culture), Taibei: Daoshi Publishing House. 
Mackerras, C. (2004) ‘What is China? Who is Chinese? Han-minority 
relations, legitimacy and the state’, in Gries, P. H. and Rosen, S. (eds.) State 
and Society in 21st Century China: Crisis, Contention and Legitimation, New 
York: Routledge. 
Mackerras, C. (2008) China in Transformation, 1900-1949, 2nd Edition, New 
278 
 
York: Pearson Longman. 
Maddison, A. (1998) Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run, OECD 
Development Centre. 
Mahoney, J. & Rueschemeyer, D. (eds.) (2003) Comparative Historical 
Analysis in the Social Sciences, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Maines, D. R. (1993) ‘Narrative’s Moment and Sociology’s Phenomena: 
Toward a Narrative Sociology’, The Sociological Quarterly, Vol 34 (1): 17-38. 
Malesevic, S. (2006) Identity as Ideology: Understanding Ethnicity and 
Nationalism, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Malik, K. (1996) The Meaning of Race: Race, History and Culture in Western 
Society, London: Macmillan. 
Malkiel, Y. (1962) ‘A Typological Classification of Dictionaries on the Basis of 
Distinctive Features’, in Householder, F. W. and Saporta, S. (eds.) Problems 
in Lexicography: Report of the Conference on Lexicography Held at Indiana 
University, November 11-12, 1960, Bloomington: Indiana University. 
Mattice, S. A., Ashton, G. & Kimber, J. P. (eds.) (2009) Comparative 
Philosophy Today and Tomorrow, Newcastle: Cambridge Scholar Publishing. 
Mayall J. (1990) Nationalism and International Society, Cambridge, New York 
& Melbourne: Cambridge University Press. 
Meinecke, F. (1970 [1907]) Cosmopolitanism and the National State, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Memmi, A. (1991 [1957]) Colonizer and the Colonized, Boston: Beacon Press. 
Meng, H. (2006) Zhongguo wenxue zhong de xifangren xingxiang (The 
Discussion of the Image of the Westerners in the Traditional Chinese 
Literature), Anhui: The Anhui Educational Press. 
Mengham, R. (1993) The Descent of Language: Writing in Praise of Babel, 
London: Bloomsbury. 
Metzger, T. A. (1977) Escape From Predicament: Neo-Confucianism and 
China's Evolving Political Culture, New York: Columbia University Press. 
Miles, R (1989) Racism, London and New York: Routledge. 
Miles, R. & Brown, M. (2003) Racism, New York: Routledge. 
Miller, D. (1995) On Nationality, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Mills W. C. (1997) The Racial Contract, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Mitchell, W. (1981) On Narrative, Chicago, IL.: Chicago University Press. 
279 
 
Moon, R. (1989) ‘Objective or Objectionable? Ideological Aspects of 
Dictionaries’, English Language Research, Vol 3: 59-94. 
Moscovici, S. (1988) ‘Notes towards a Description of Social Representations’, 
Journal of European Social Psychology, Vol 18 (3): 211-250. 
Mosse, G. (1985) Nationalism and Sexuality: Respectability and Abnormal 
Sexuality in Modern Europe, New York: Howard Fertig. 
Mosse, G. L. (1988) The Culture of Western Europe, Boulder, CO: Westview. 
Mou, A. (1997) Yihetuan dikang lieqiang guafenshi (The History of the Boxers’ 
Resistance of the Western Carving-up), Beijing: Economy and Management 
Publishing House. 
Mulholland, J. & Dyson, S. M. (2001) ‘Sociology, “Race” and Ethnicity’, in 
Culley, L. & Dyson, S. (eds.) Ethnicity and Nursing Practice, London, 
Palgrave. 
Murphy, A. (2010) ‘Traveling Sages: Translation and Reform in Japan and 
China in the Late Nineteenth Century’, Studies on Asia, Series IV, Vol 1 (1): 
29-57. 
Murthy, V. (2011) The Political Philosophy of Zhang Taiyan: The Resistance of 
Consciousness, Danvers: Brill. 
National Bureau of Statistics of China (2010) National Bureau of Statistics of 
China, retrieved from: http://www.stats.gov.cn, last accessed on 19 February 
2013. 
Nicholls, J. (2003) ‘Methods in School Textbook Research’, International 
Journal of Historical Learning, Teaching and Research, Vol 3 (2): 11-26. 
Nnoli, O. (1995) Ethnicity and Development in Nigeria, Aldershot: Avebury. 
Norman, J. (1988) Chinese, New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Nyiri, P. and Breidenbach, J. (eds.) (2005) China Inside Out: Contemporary 
Chinese Nationalism and Transnationalism, Budapest: Central European 
University Press. 
O’Connor, R. (1973) The Spirit Soldiers: A Historical Narrative of the Boxer 
Rebellion, New York: Putnams. 
O'Conner, D. (1973) The Boxer Rebellion, London: Robert Hale & Company. 
Omi, M. (2001) ‘The Changing Meaning of Race’, In Smelser, N. J., Wilson, 
W. J. & Mitchell, F. (eds.) (2001) America Becoming: Racial Trends and Their 
Consequences, Vol I: 243-263. 
280 
 
Özkirimli, U. (2000) Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction, London: 
Macmillan. 
Özkirimli, U. (2005) Contemporary Debates on Nationalism: A Critical 
Engagement, Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillian. 
Paine, S. C. M. (2003) The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895: Perception, 
Power, and Primacy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Pareto, V. (1963) The Mind and Society: A Treatise on General Sociology, 
New York: Harcourt Brace. 
Pelissier, R. (1963) The Awakening of China, 1793-1949, Kieffer, M. (trans.) 
(1967), London: Secker & Warburg. 
Pennebaker, J. W. et al. (eds.) (1997) Collective Memories of Political Events: 
Social Psychological Perspectives. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Peterson, G. (1997) Power of Word: Literacy and Revolution in South China, 
1949-96, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press. 
Pickering, M. (2001) Stereotyping: the Politics of Representation, New York: 
PALGRAVE. 
Plamenatz, J. (1973) ‘Two types of Nationalism’, in Kamenka, E. (ed.) 
Nationalism: The Nature and Evolution of an Idea, London: Edward Arnold. 
Polkinghorne, D. (1988) Narrative Knowing and the Human Sciences, New 
York: State University of New York Press. 
Purcell, V. (1963) The Boxer Uprising: A Background Study, London: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Pye, L. W. (1996) ‘How China’s Nationalism was Shanghaied’, in Unger, J. 
(ed.) Chinese Nationalism, Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe. 
Qu, X. & Tang, L. (eds.) (1991) Zhongguo jindai jiaoyu ziliao huibian  - xuezhi 
yanbian (Compilation of Modern Education in China), Shanghai: Shanghai 
Education Press.Rankin, M. B. (1997) ‘State and Society in Early Republican 
Politics, 1912-18’, The China Quarterly, No. 150: 260-281. 
Rappoport, A. (1924) Dictionary of Socialism, London: T. F. Unwin. 
Ratcliffe, P. (2004) ‘Race’, Ethnicity and Difference: Imagining an Inclusive 
Society, Buckingham: Open University Press/McGraw Hill. 
Reicher, S. & Hopkins, N. (2001) Self and Nation, London: Sage. 
281 
 
Ren, L. & Xue, X. (2003) Zhongguo gudai guanli kaoxuan zhidushi (A History 
of the Examination Systems for the Chinese Imperial Mandarinate), Qingdao: 
The Qingdao Press. 
Renan, E. (1990 [1882]) ‘What is a Nation’, in Bhabha, H. K. (ed.) Nation and 
Narration, London: Routledge. 
Rex, J. & Mason, D. (eds.) (1986) Theories of Race and Ethnic Relations, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Rhoads, E. J. M. (2000) Manchus & Han: Ethnic Relations and Political 
Power in Late Qing and Early Republican China, 1861-1928, Seattle: The 
University of Washington Press. 
Rime, B. (1997) ‘How Individual Emotional Episodes Feed Collective 
Memory’, in Pennebaker, J. W. et al. (eds.) Collective Memory of Political 
Events, Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Robinsons, M. (1993) ‘Enduring Anxieties: Cultural Nationalism and Modern 
East Asia’, in Befu, H. (ed.) Cultural Nationalism in East Asia: Representation 
and Identity, Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 
Berkeley. 
Rodzinski, W. (1979) A History of China, Oxford: Pergamon. 
Ross, J. (1916) The Origin of the Chinese People, Malaysia: Pelanduk 
Publication. 
Rowe, W. T. & Brook, T. (2009) China’s Late Empire: The Great Qing (History 
of Imperial China), Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press. 
Ruane, J., & Todd, J. (2004) ‘The Roots of Intense Ethnic Conflict May Not in 
Fact be Ethnic: Categories, Communities and Path Dependence’, Archives 
Europeenes de Sociologie, Vol 45(2), 209-232. 
Rui, Y. (1972) Zhonghua guozu jie (Understanding the Zhonghua State), in 
Zhongguo minzu jiqi wenhua lungao (The Discussion of the Chinese Nation 
and its Culture), Vol 1, Taibei: Yiwen Publishing Company. 
Russell, B. (1923) The Problem of China, London: George Allen and Unwin. 
Safran, W. et al. (1998) ‘Nationalism and Ethnoregional Identities in China’, 
Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol: 4(1-2) Spring Summer: 1-180. 
Said, E. (1978) Orientalism, New York: Viking. 
Sanda, A. O. (ed.) (1976) Ethnic Relations in Nigeria: Problems and 
282 
 
Prospects, Ibadan, Nigeria: The Department of Sociology. 
Sautman, B. (2001) ‘Peking Man and the Politics of Paleoanthropological 
Nationalism in China’, The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol 60 (1): 95-124. 
Schiffrin, H. Z. (1970) Sun Yat-sen and the Origins of the Chinese Revolution, 
Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 
Schiffrin, H. Z. (1980) Sun Yat-sen, Reluctant Revolutionary, Boston: Little, 
Brown. 
Schoppa, R. K. (2000) The Columbia Guide to Modern Chinese History, New 
York: Columbia University Press. 
Schoppa, R. K. (2006) Revolution and its Past: Identities and Change in 
Modern Chinese History, Upper Saddle River: Pearson Education. 
Scott, J. & Marshall, G. (2009) A Dictionary of Sociology, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Shan, W. (2010) ‘Comparing Ethnic Minorities and Han Chinese in China: Life 
Satisfaction, Economic Well Being and Political Attitudes’, East Asian Policy, 
Vol 2 (2): 13-22. 
Shils, E. A. (1957) ‘Centre and Periphery: Essays in Macrosociology’, 
Selected Papers of Edward Shils, Vol II: 111-126, Chicago, Illinois: University 
of Chicago Press. 
Shimada, K. (1990) Fogel, J. A. (trans.) Pioneer of the Chinese Revolution: 
Zhang Binglin and Confucianism, Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Silverstein, P. (2005) ‘Immigrant Racialization and the New Savage Slot: 
Race, Migration, and Immigration in the New Europe’, Annual Review of 
Anthropology, Vol 34:363-384. 
Simpson, J. A. & Weiner, E. S. C. (eds.) (1989) The Oxford English Dictionary, 
2nd Edition, Oxford: Clarendon. 
Smedley, A. (1993) Race in North America: Origin and Evolution of a 
Worldview, Boulder, CO: Westview. 
Smith, A. D. (1983) Theories of Nationalism, 2nd Edition, New York: Holmes & 
Meier Publishing. 
Smith, A. D. (1991) National Identity, London, Reno, Las Vegas: University of 
Nevada Press.  
Smith, A. D. (1996) ‘The Nation: Real or Imagine?’, Nations and Nationalism, 
Vol 2 (3): 357-370. 
283 
 
Smith, A. D. (1998) Nationalism and Modernism, London: Routledge. 
Smith, A. D. (2001) Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History, Cambridge: Polity. 
Smith, A. D. (2009) Ethno-Symbolism and Nationalism, London: Routledge. 
Spence, J. D. (1990) The Search for Modern China, London: Hutchinson. 
Spencer, P. and Wollman, H. (eds.) (1988) Nations and Nationalism: A 
Reader, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
Stamps, J. (1980) Holonomy: A Human System Theory, Seaside, CA: 
Intersystems. 
Stauæs, D. (2003) ‘Where have All the Subjects Gone? Bringing Together the 
Concepts of Intersectionality and Subjectification’, Nordic Journal of Feminist 
and Gender Research, Vol 2: 101-110. 
Stephan, F. & Ward, S. (1994) ‘Deconstruction: Making Facts in Science, 
Building Cases in Law’, American Sociological Review, Vol 59 (4): 481-500. 
Stimpson, C. (1988) Where the Meanings are: Feminism and Cultural Spaces, 
New York: Methuen. 
Stone, J. (1985) ‘Ethnicity and Stratification: Mexican-Americans and 
European Gastarbeiter in Comparative Perspective’, in Connor, W. (ed.) 
Mexican Americans in Comparative Perspective, Washington DC: The Urban 
Institute Press. 
Stone, L. (1979) ‘The Revival of Narrative: Reflections on a New Old History’, 
Past and Present, No. 85: 3-24. 
Stone, L. (1987 [1979]) The Past and the Present Revisited, London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Su, W. & Liu, T. (2000) Yihetuan yanjiu yibainian (A Century of Boxer 
Studies), Jinan: Qilu Book Society. 
Sun, J. (2008) Wanqing zhi xizheng dongjian ji bentu huiying (The Western 
Political Learning during the Late Qing and the Local Responses), Shanghai: 
Shanghai Shijie Publishing Company. 
Sun, L. (2004) Qingji minzu zhuyi yu huangdi chongbai zhi faming (Late 
Qing Nationalism and the Invention of the Cult of the Yellow Emperor), Guilin: 
Guangxi Normal University Press. 
Suny, R. G. (2001) ‘Constructing Primordialism: Old Histories for New 
Nations’, Journal of Modern History, Vol. 73: 862-96. 
284 
 
Suny, R. G. (2001) ‘History’, in Motyl, A. J. (ed.) Encyclopedia of Nationalism, 
Vol. 1, San Diego, Cal.: Academic Press, 335-58. 
Taguieff, P. A. (1985) ‘L’identitéfrançaise au miroir duracisme différentialiste’, 
in Espace 89, L’Identite Francaise, Paris: Editions Tierce. 
Taguieff, P. A. (2000) Die Macht des Vorurtels, Der Rassismus und sein 
Double, Hamburg: Hamburger Edition. 
Tamir, Y. (1993) Liberal Nationalis, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Tamir, Y. (1996) ‘Reconstructing the Landscape of Imagination’, in Caney, S. 
et al. (eds.) National Rights, International Obligations, Boulder, Col.: Westview 
Press. 
The Editing Team of The Selected Research Literature on Zheng He’s Travel 
to the West (2005) Zhenghe xia xiyang yanjiu wenxuan 1905-2005 (The 
Selected Research Literature on Zheng He’s Travel to the West 1905-2005), 
Beijing: The Haiyang Press. 
The Second Historical Archives of China (ed.) (1994) Zhonghua minguoshi 
dang’an ziliao huibian (Compilation of Archival Sources for the History of the 
Republic of China), Jiangsu: Jiangsu Ancient Books Publishing House. 
Thompson, R. R. (ed.) (2003) ‘The Lessons of Defeat: Transforming the Qing 
State after the Boxer War’, Modern Asian Studies, Vol 37 (4): 769-862. 
Tian, S. (2005) Keju de libi ji qingchao feichu keju de jiaoxun (The Advantages 
and Disadvantages of the keju System and the Values of the Abolishment of 
the keju During the Qing Dynasty), Journal of Northwest Normal University, 
Vol 42 (1): 73-78. 
Tosh, J. (1982) The Pursuit of History: Aims, Methods and New Directions in 
the Study of Modern History, London and New York: Longman. 
Townsend, J. (1992) ‘Chinese Nationalism’, Australian Journal of Chinese 
Affairs, Vol 27: 108-109. 
Tseng, M. (Zeng, J. in Chinese) (1887) ‘China - The Sleep and Awakening', in 
Xu, Z. (ed.) (1992) The Development and Distinctions of the Democratic 
Ideas during the Late Qing Period, Taibei: The Press of Culture, History and 
Philosophy. 
Tsu, J. (2005) Failure, Nationalism and Literature: the Making of Modern 
Chinese Identity, 1895-1937, Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Tyrell, M. (1996) ‘Nation-states and States of Mind: Nationalism as 
285 
 
Psychology’, Critical Review, Vol. 10 (2): 233-50. 
Van Dijk, T. A. (1985) Handbook of Discourse Analysis, Vol 2, London: 
Academic Press. 
Vaughan, F. (1999) ‘Essential Dimensions of Consciousness: Objective, 
Subjective, and Intersubjective’, in Hameroff, S. T. et al. (eds.) Toward a 
Science of Consciousness III, The Third Tucson Discussions and Debates, 
Cambridge: MIT Press/ Bradford Books. 
Veisbergs, A. (2002) ‘Dysphemism and Euphemism in Latvian - Influence of 
Nazi German and Soviet Russian Parlance’, Language, Literature and 
Translation - Manipulations, Humanities and Social Sciences Latvia, Vol 1 
(34): 5-33. 
Villard, F. (2010) ‘“Class”, “Race” and Language: Imagining China and the 
Discourse on the Category “Han” in the Writing of Marxist Revolutionary Qu 
Qiubai (1899-1935)’, Asian Ethnicity, Vol 11 (3): 311-324. 
Vološinov, V. N. (1986) Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press. 
Wade, P. (2001) ‘Racial Identity and Nationalism: A Theoretical View from 
Latin America’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol 24 (5): 845-865. 
Wallerstein, I. M. (1987) ‘The Construction of People-hood: Racism, 
Nationalism, Ethnicity’, Sociological Forum, Vol 2 (2): 373-388. 
Wallman, S. (ed.) (1979) Ethnicity at Work, London: Macmillan Press. 
Wan, G. (1929) Xinqiao zidian (Xinqiao Dictionary), Shanghai: Zhonghua 
Book Company. 
Wang, D. D. & Wei, S. (eds.) (2005) Dynastic Crisis and Cultural Innovation 
from the Late Ming to the Late Qing and Beyond, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 
and London: Harvard University Press. 
Wang, E. (2003 [1976]) Zhongguo mingcheng suyuan jiqi jindai quanshi (The 
Origin of the Name China and Its Modern Discourses and Explanations), in 
Zhongguo jindai sixiang shilun (The Discussion of the History of Chinese 
Modern Ideas), Beijing: The Press of the Social Sciences Literature. 
Wang, G. (1973) ‘Nationalism in Asia’, in Kamenka, E. (ed.) Nationalism: The 
Nature and Evolution of an Idea, London: Edward Arnold. 
Wang, J. (2002) ‘A Study on the Psychosis of the Lower Intellects in the 
Flourishing Period of the Qing Dynasty from the Official Documents of the 
286 
 
Words Control, The Northern Forum, Vol 6(176): 91-94.  
Wang, M. (2001) Manzi, Hanren yu qiangzu (Barbarian, Hanese and Qiang 
Ethnicity), Taibei: Sanmin Bookstore. 
Wang, S. (1988) Shilun baohuanghui de xingzhi (The Discussion of the 
Nature of the Chinese Empire Reform Association), Journal of Shanghai 
Normal University (Philosophy & Social Sciences Edition), Vol 2: 135-146. 
Wang, T. (1982) Zhongwai jiuyuezhang huibian (Compilation of the Old 
Domestic and Foreign Testaments), Vol 1, Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing 
Company. 
Wang, T. (ed.) (1957) Zhongwai jiuyue huibian (The Collection of National and 
Foreign Policies), Beijing: Lianhe Publishing House. 
Wang, Y. C (1966) Chinese Intellectuals and the West, 1872-1949, USA: 
University of North Carolina. 
Watkins, C. (2000) The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language, 4th edition, New York: Houghton Mifflin. 
Weber, M. (1958 [1914]) ‘The Nation’, in Gerth, H. H. & Mills, C. W. (eds.) 
From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, New York: Oxford Galaxy. 
Weikart, R. (2003) ‘Progress through Racial Extermination: Social Darwinism, 
Eugenics, and Pacifism in Germany, 1860-1918’, German Studies Review, 
Vol 26 (2): 273-294. 
Wierzbicka, A. (1995) ‘Dictionaries and Ideologies: Three Examples from 
Eastern Europe’, in Kachru, B. B. & Kahane, H. (eds.) Cultures, Ideologies 
and the Dictionary: Studies in Honor of LadislavZgusta, Lexicographica Series 
Maior 64, Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag. 
Wigger, I. (2009) ‘The Interconnections of Discrimination: Gender, Class, 
Nation, and Race and the “Black Shame on the Rhine”’, European Societies, 
Vol. IV: 553-582.  
Wilhelm, R. (1931) Introduction to Tai Chi-t’ao, Die Geistigen Grundlagen des 
Sun Yat-senismus, Berlin: Wuenfel. 
Wilkinson, E. (2000) Chinese History: A Manual, Revised and Enlarged, 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Windrow, H. (2005) ‘From State to Nation: The Forging of the Han Through 
Language Policy in the PRC and Taiwan’, New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politics, Vol: 37(2) Winter: 373-422. 
287 
 
Wong, K. C. (2000) ‘Black’s Theory of the Behavior of Law Revisited IVL the 
Behavior of Qing Law’, International Journal of the Sociology of Law, Vol 28 
(4): 327-374. 
Wong, Y. (1989) Search for Modern Nationalism: Zhang Binglin and 
Revolutionary China, 1869-1936, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. 
Wong, Y. (1989) Search for Modern Nationalism: Zhang Binglin and 
Revolutionary China, 1869-1936, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Wu, Q. (2004) Liang Qichao zhuan (The Biography of Liang Qichao), Beijing: 
The Tuanjie Publishing House. 
Wu, X. A. (2011) ‘Historical Linkage and Political Connection: 
Commemoration and Representation of Sun Yat-sen and the 1911 Revolution 
in China and Southeast Asia, 1946-2010’, in Lee, L. T. & Lim, H. G. (eds.) Sun 
Yat-sen, Nanyang and 1911 Revolution, Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies Press. 
Xiao, G. (1975) A Modern China and A New World: Kang Youwei, Reformer 
and Utopian, Seattle and London: University of Washington Press. 
Xiao, Y. (2002) ‘Liang Qichao’s Political and Social Philosophy’, in Cheng, C. 
& Bunnin, N. (eds.) Contemporary Chinese Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell. 
Xiong, Y. (1994) Xixue dongjian yu wanqing shehui (The Dissemination of 
Western Learning and the Late Qing Society), Shanghai: Shanghai People’s 
Publishing House. 
Xu, S. (2004) Zhang taiyan zhuan (Zhang Taiyan’s Bibliography), Tianjin: 
Baihua Literature and Art Publishing House. 
Xu, Y. Lu, F. & Ouyang, F. (eds.) (1915) Zhonghua da zidian (Simplified 
Chinese), Shanghai: Zhonghua Book Company. 
Yang, N. (ed.) (2001) Kongjian, jiyi, shehui zhuanxing (Space, Memory, Social 
Transformation), Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Publishing House. 
Ye, H. (1996) Lun yishu zhibi (A Discussion of the Shortcomings of Translated 
Books), in Li, N. (ed.) Zhongguo kexue fanyi shiliao (Historical Sources of 
Chinese Scientific Translation), Hefei: University of Science and Technology 
of China Press. 
Yeh, W. (1994) ‘Middle County Radicalism: The May Fourth Movement in 
Hangzhou’, The China Quarterly, No. 140: 903-925. 
Yip, P. (2000) The Chinese Lexicon: A Comprehensive Survey, London and 
288 
 
New york: Routledge. 
Yong, H. & Peng, J. (2008) Chinese Lexicography: A History From 1046 BC to 
AD 1911, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Young, C. (1965) Politics in Congo: Decolonisation and Independence, 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Young, J. (1993) The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning, 
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Young, R. J. C. (1995) Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race, 
New York: Routledge. 
Yu, D. (1996) Aiguo zhuyi yu zhongguo jindai shixue (Nationalism and 
Modern Chinese History), Beijing: Chinese Social Sciences Press. 
Zarrow, P. (2005) China in War and Revolution, 1895-1949, London: 
Routledge. 
Zarrow, P. (ed.) (2006) Creating Chinese Modernity: Knowledge and Everyday 
Life, 1900-1940, New York: Peter Lang. 
Zgusta, L. (1971) Manual of Lexicography, The Hague: Mouton. 
Zhang, N. & Wang, R. (eds.) (1963) Xinhai geming qianshi nianjian shilun 
xuanji (A Selection of Polemical Writings from the Decade Preceding the 
Revolution of 1911), Vol 2 (I), Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company. 
Zhang, W. et al. (1936) Biaozhun guoyin xuesheng zidian (Dictionary of 
National Pronunciation for Students), Shanghai: Zhonghua Book Company. 
Zhao, J. Z. (2009) Historical Dictionary of Modern China (1800-1949), 
Woronoff, J. (Series ed.) (2008) Historical Dictionaries of Ancient Civilizations 
and Historical Eras, Lanham: Scarecrow Press. Inc.  
Zhao, S. (2004) A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern 
Chinese Nationalism, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Zheng, Y. (1999) Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China: Modernization, 
Identity and International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Zhu, Y. (1989) Zhongguo jindai xuezhi shiliao (The Historical Sources of 
Modern Chinese Educational System), Shanghai: The Press of East China 
Normal University. 
Zimmer, O. (2002) ‘Boundary Mechanisms and Symbolic Resources: Towards 
a Process-oriented Approach to National Identity’, Nations and Nationalism, 
Vol 9 (2): 173-193. 
289 
 
Zubaida, S. (1978) ‘Theories of Nationalism’, in Littlejohn, G. et al. (eds.) 
Power and the State, London: Croom Helm. 
 
  
290 
 
Appendix 1: A Chronology of Key Events in 
Late Qing and Early Republican China 
 
Year 
 
Key Events 
  
1839 Lin Zexu arrested more than 1,700 opium dealers, and destroyed 1.2 
million kilograms of opium, which has foreshadowed the eruption of 
the Opium War. 
 
1840 British army bypassed Canton and went forward to Xiamen in North, 
then sailed to Tianjin, which was closed to the capital of Qing 
dynasty. Chinese armies were undermanned and badly trained thus 
British spent approximately 6 months fighting with the Chinese 
armies and successfully forced the compromise of Qing government. 
  
1842 Qing government was compelled to sign on the Treaty of Nanjing on 
board Pottinger's vessel, HMS Cornwallis on 29 August 1842. 
  
1843 Hong Xiuquan established his religion and political organisation God 
Worshippers (Bai shangdi hui). 
 
1851 Hong Xuquan revolted in Guangxi province, and declared the 
foundation of the ‘Heavenly Kingdom of Transcendent Peace’ 
(Taiping Tianguo). 
 
1853 Taiping forces managed to take Nanjing and turned it into the capital 
of their movement, and issued the Land System of the Heavenly 
Dynasty to manage the land they owned. 
 
1856 The eruption of the Second Opium War. 
 
1858 Qing government respectively signed the Treaties of Tianjin, with 
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France, UK, Russia, and the United States. Kang Youwei was born. 
 
1860 The armies of Anglo-French took Tianjin and Beijing. The Qing court 
signed treaties of Beijing with UK, France and Russia.  
 
1861  Qing court made an alliance with foreign armies to suppress 
the movement of Taiping Tianguo. 
 Zeng Guofan established the Anqing Military Institute (Anqing 
junxiesuo), which was the first military industry of 
Westernisation Group (yangwu pai). 
  
1864 The movement of Taiping Tianguo failed in the cooperate 
suppression made by Qing government and foreign armies. 
  
1868 Zhang Binglin was born. 
 
1872 Li Hongzhang set up the Ship Business Soliciting Bureau in 
Shanghai, which was the first industry created by the yangwu pai 
(Westernisation Group). 
 
1873 Liang Qichao was born. 
 
1876 The Qing government signed the Treaty of Yantai with UK. 
 
1881 The Qing government signed the Treaty of Yili with Russia. 
 
1883 The eruption of the Sino-French War. 
 
1885 The Qing government signed the New Treaty between China and 
France. 
 
1888 Kang Youwei submitted the first petition to Guangxu Emperor to 
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present the importance of political reform. 
 
1890 Kang Youwei wrote Kongzi gaizhi kao (Confucius As a Reformer) and 
Xinxue weijing kao (Textual Research of the False Classics of New 
Study), both of which were highly praised by Liang Qichao. 
 
1893 Kang Youwei established the Qiangxue hui (Society for Self-
strengthening Studies) in Shanghai. Zhang Binglin joined the study 
society afterwards. 
 
1894 The eruption of the First Sino-Japanese War. Sun Zhongshan 
established Xingzhong hui (the Society for the Revival of China) in 
Honolulu and swore the following oath: ‘Expel the foreigners, revive 
China, and establish a unified government’, which was summarised 
as ‘Three Principles of People’. 
 
1895  The Qing government signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki on 
17th April. According to the treaty, the Qing court was required 
to pay Japan 200 million Kuping taels as reparation with the 
allowance of Japanese ships operating on the Yangtze River. 
 Liang Qichao consorted with Kang Youwei in Beijing. 
 
1896 Liang Qichao established the Shiwubao (The Chinese Progress) in 
Shanghai, and published series articles explaining his political ideas 
of reform. 
 
1897 Yanfu published his translation of Evolution and Ethnics. 
 
1898 In response to the Hundred Days Reform, Guangxu Emperor 
promulgated the prescript dingguo shizhao (Imperial Order of 
National Issues) and promoted reform. The reform only lasted for 103 
days under the suppression and palace coup led by Cixi. The people 
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involved were sentenced to death. Kang Youwei escaped to Hong 
Kong, while Liang Qichao fled to Japan. Liang’s exile to Japan 
allowed him to speak freely and exercise his intellectual autonomy. 
 
1899  The Boxer Rebellion erupted in Shandong province. Liang 
Qichao travelled and studied in Hawaii. 
 Kang Youwei was in alliance with Chinese immigration in 
Canada, and established the Baohuanghui (Protect the 
Emperor Society). The emperor he referred to was Guangxu. 
 Zhang Binglin, responding to Liang Qichao's invitation, went to 
Japan to make acquaintance with Sun Zhongshan. 
 
1900 The Boxer Rebellion was suppressed by an alliance of eight 
countries, including Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
 
1901 The Qing government signed The Boxer Protocol with the Eight-
Nation Alliance, plus Belgium, Spain and Netherlands. 
  
1902  Kang Youwei wrote and The Book of Great Harmony which 
was considered to be one of his most remarkable 
achievements. This book was greatly admired by the Chinese 
intellectuals at that time. 
 Zhang Binglin published Bo Kang Youwei lun gemingshu (The 
Refutation on Kang Youwei’s Work: The Discussion on the 
Revolutionary), on the Su Newspaper. 
 Liang Qichao established Xinmin Congbao (New Citizen 
Journal) in Japan to promote his idea of constitutional 
monarchy. He also published his collected work Yinbingshi heji 
(The Ice-Drinker’s Studio). At the same time, Liang Qichao 
began to disagree with Kang Youwei’s on political proposition 
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and attempts. 
 
1903 Zou Rong published Gemingjun (The Revolutionaries), prefaced by 
Zhang Binglin. Because of their radical political views, both of them 
were arrested because of the case of Su Newspaper. 
 
1905  The Tongmenghui (the United League of China) was 
established by Sun Zhongshan in Tokyo. 
 The Qing government formally declared the abolishment of the 
tradition examination system keju. 
1906  Kang Youwei published articles in New York, to oppose the 
revolutionary activities in China. His main assertion was to 
maintain the domination of Qing government. 
 Zhang Binglin made a public speech to state the importance of 
‘national cultural characteristics’ and promoted nationalism. 
 
1907  Sun Zhongshan led uprising in Chaozhou, Huizhou, Qinzhou 
and Zhennanguan. 
 Zhang Binglin published articles to oppose imperialism and 
emphasised the importance of national unity. 
 
1911  Sun Zhongshan and Huang Xing launched Guangzhou 
uprising and failed. 
 On the 10th October, the eruption of the Nanchang Uprising, 
which was regarded as the beginning of the Chinese 
Revolution, had ended the Qing government and successfully 
established the Republic of China. 
 
1912  The reformers declared a provisional government. Sun 
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Zhongshan was elected as the provisional president. The new 
government published the Provisional Constitution of the 
Republic of China. 
 Qing monarch was decreed on the 12th February. 
 Yuan Shikai, a leading imperial official, self recommended as 
the president of the Republic of China. 
 Liang Qichao refused the Yuan Shikai's appointment to be the 
deputy minister of Justice Department. 
 
1913  After the failure of the Second Revolution, which aimed to 
oppose Yuan's leadership, the political power of Yuan was 
gradually strengthened. 
 Kang Youwei wrote articles to call for the end of the conflicts 
within the country and maintain a unity to oppose Western 
invasion. 
1915  Yuan Shikai accepted the Twenty-One Demands made by 
Japan, which required China to make a considerable 
concession in various economic fields of the country. Yuan 
Shikai imposed himself as the monarch of the Republic of 
China in December. 
 Cai E organised National Army in Yunnan, to oppose the 
leadership of Yuan Shikai. 
 Chen Duxiu established the journal Xinqingnian (New Youth) 
and published various articles to promote modernity in China. 
Chen claimed the importance of Mr De (democracy) and Mr 
Sci (Science), which was considered to be the origination of 
the Xinwenhua yundong (New Cultural Movement). 
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1916  Yuan Shikai passed away. 
 Li Yuanhong replaced him as the president of the republican 
government. The real power of the government was in the 
hands of Prime Minister Duanqirui.  
 The French officials expanded the area of French Concession 
(zujie) in Tianjin, which experienced serious resistance of the 
workers in Tianjin. The French had to give up their intentions. 
 
1917  Zhang Xun restored the Qing imperial government and elected 
Puyi as the emperor. This movement failed after 12 days. 
 Duan Qirui declined the National Congress and the Provisional 
Constitution of the Republic of China. 
 Sun Zhongshan launched the movement in Guangzhou to 
oppose Duan Qirui. This movement was strongly supported by 
Kang Youwei while definitely opposed by Liang Qichao. Since 
then, Kang Youwei had split up thoroughly. 
 
1918  Luxun published the Kuangren riji (A Madman’s Dairy), which 
summoned the people to overthrow the old society and rules. 
 Li Dazhao published articles to praise the Bolshevik 
Revolution of October. 
 
1919 May Fourth Movement, the primarily stage of which was the New 
Culture Movement in 1917, constituted the major attempt at re-
considering the Chinese culture and traditions. 
 
1921 The establishment of the Communist Party of China. 
 
1925  Sun Zhongshan passed away. 
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 Jiang Jieshi became the new leader of the Guomindang (the 
Nationalist Party). 
 
1931 Japanese troops in northern Manchuria destroyed one of their rail 
lines and accuse the Chinese, which led to Japanese annexation of 
Manchuria. 
 
1937 The eruption of the Second Sino-Japanese War. 
 
1945  The Second-Japanese War ended with the end of the World 
War II. 
 The republic of China becomes a permanent member of the 
United Nations’ Security Council. 
 
1949  The end of civil war in China.  
 Jiang Jieshi and the Guomindang troops moved to Taiwan. 
 The establishment of a new government – the People’s 
Republic of China. 
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Appendix 2: Boxer Protocol  
Peking, 7th September 1901 
Peace Agreement between the Great Powers and China 
THE PLENIPOTENTIARIES of ... [Deutschland, Österreich-Ungarn, Belgien, 
Spanien, USA, Frankreich, England, Italien, Japan, Holland, Russland und 
China (Li Hongzhang und Yikuang)] have met for the purpose of declaring 
that China has complied with the conditions laid down in the note of the 22nd 
December, 1900, and which were accepted in their entirety by His Majesty the 
Emperor of China in a Decree dated the 27th December, 1900. 
 
ARTICLE Ia. 
By an Imperial Edict of the 9th of June last, Tsai Feng, Prince of Ch'ün, was 
appointed Ambassador of His Majesty the Emperor of China, and directed in 
that capacity to convey to His Majesty the German Emperor the expression of 
the regrets of His Majesty the Emperor of China and of the Chinese 
Government for the assassination of His Excellency the late Baron von 
Ketteler, German minister. 
 
Prince Ch'ün left Peking the 12th of July Jut; to carry out the order which had 
been given him. 
 
ARTICLE Ib. 
The Chinese Government has stated that it will erect on the spot of the 
assassination of his Excellency the late Baron von Ketteler, commemorative 
monument worthy of the rank of the deceased, and bearing an inscription in 
the Latin, German, and Chinese languages which shall express the regrets of 
His Majesty the Emperor of China for the murder committed. 
 
The Chinese Plenipotentiaries have informed his Excellency the German 
Plenipotentiary, in a letter dated the 22nd July last, that an arch of the whole 
width of the street would be erected on the said spot, and that work on it was 
begun on the 25th June last. 
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ARTICLE IIa. 
Imperial Edicts of the 13th and 21st February, 1901, inflicted the following 
punishments on the principal authors of the attempts and of the crimes 
committed against the foreign Governments and their nationals: 
 
Tsai-I, Prince Tuan, and Tsai-Lan, Duke Fu-kuo, were sentenced to be 
brought before the Autumnal Court of Assize for execution, and it was agreed 
that if the Emperor saw fit to grant them their lives, they should be exiled to 
Turkestan, and there imprisoned for life, without the possibility of commutation 
of these punishments. 
 
Tsai Hsün, Prince Chuang, Ying-Nien, President of the Court of Censors, and 
Chao Shu-chiao, President of the Board of Punishments, were condemned to 
commit suicide. 
 
YüHsien, Governor of Shansi, Chi Hsiu, President of the Board of Rites, and 
Hsü Cheng-yu, formerly Senior Vice-President of the Board of Punishments, 
were condemned to death. 
 
Posthumous degradation was inflicted on Kang Yi, Assistant Grand Secretary, 
President of the Board of Works, Hsu Tung, Grand Secretary, and Li Ping-
heng, former Governor- General of Szu-chuan. 
 
Imperial Edict of the 13th February last rehabilitated the memories of Hsu 
Yung-yi, President of the Board of War; Li Shan, President of the Board of 
Works; Hsu Ching Cheng, Senior VicePresident of the Board of Civil Office; 
Lien Yuan, Vice-Chancellor of the Grand Council; and Yuan Chang, Vice-
President of the Court of Sacrifices, who had been put to death for having 
protested against the outrageous breaches of international law of last year. 
 
Prince Chuang committed suicide on the 21st February last; Ying Nien and 
Chao Shu- chiao on the 24th February; Yu Hsien was executed on the 22nd 
300 
 
February; Chi Hsiu and Hsu Cheng-yu on the 26th February; Tung Fu-hsiang, 
General in Kan-su, has been deprived of his office by Imperial Edict of the 
13th February last, pending the determination of the final punishment to be 
inflicted on him. 
 
Imperial Edicts, dated the 29th April and 19th August, 1901, have inflicted 
various punishments on the provincial officials convicted of the crimes and 
outrages of last summer. 
 
ARTICLE IIb. 
An Imperial Edict, promulgated the 19th August, 1901, ordered the 
suspension of official examinations for five years in all cities where foreigners 
were massacred or submitted to cruel treatment. 
 
ARTICLE III. 
So as to make honourable reparation for the assassination of Mr. Sugiyama, 
Chancellor of the Japanese Legation, His Majesty the Emperor of China, by 
an Imperial Edict of the 18th June, 1901, appointed Na T'ung, Vice-President 
of the Board of Finances, to be his Envoy Extraordinary, and specially 
directed him to convey to His Majesty the Emperor of Japan the expression of 
the regrets of His Majesty the Emperor of China and of his Government at the 
assassination of Mr. Sugiyama. 
 
ARTICLE IV. 
The Chinese Government has agreed to erect an expiatory monument in each 
of the foreign or international cemeteries which were desecrated, and in which 
the tombs were destroyed. 
 
It has been agreed with the Representatives of the Powers that the Legations 
interested shall settle the details for the erection of these monuments, China 
bearing all the expenses thereof, estimated at 10,000 taels, for the cemeteries 
at Peking and in its neighbourhood, and at 5,000 taels for the cemeteries in 
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the provinces. The amounts have been paid, and the list of these cemeteries 
is enclosed herewith. 
 
ARTICLE V. 
China has agreed to prohibit the importation into its territory of arms and 
ammunition, as well as of materials exclusively used for the manufacture of 
arms and ammunition. An Imperial Edict has been issued on the 25th August, 
forbidding said importation for a term of two years. New Edicts may be issued 
subsequently extending this by other successive terms of two years in case of 
necessity recognised by the Powers. 
 
ARTICLE VI. 
By an Imperial Edict dated the 29th May, 1901, His Majesty the Emperor of 
China agreed to pay the Powers an indemnity of 450,000,000 of 
Haikwantaels. 
 
This sum represents the total amount of the indemnities for States, 
Companies, or Societies, private individuals and Chinese, referred to in Article 
6 of the note of the 22nd December,1900. 
 
a) These 450,000,000 constitute a gold debt calculated at the rate of the 
Haikwantael to the gold currency of each country, as indicated below…This 
sum in gold shall shall bear interest at 4 per cent. per annum, and the capital 
shall be reimbursed by China in thirty-nine years in the manner indicated in 
the annexed plan of amortization. Capital and interest shall be payable in gold 
or at the rates of exchange corresponding to the dates at which the different 
payments fall due. 
 
The amortization shall commence the 1st January, I902, and shall finish at the 
end of the year I940. The amortizations are payable annually, the first 
payment being fixed on the 1st January, 1903. 
 
Interest shall run from the 1st July, 1901, but the Chinese Government shall 
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have the right to pay off within a term of three years, beginning January 1902, 
the arrears of the first six months ending the 31st December, 1901, on 
condition, however, that it pays compound interest at the rate of 4% a year on 
the sums the payment of which shall have been thus deferred.Interest shall be 
payable semi-annually, the first payment being fixed on the 1st July, I902. 
 
b) The service of the debt shall take place in Shanghai in the following 
manner: Each Power shall be represented by a Delegate on a Commission of 
bankers authorized to receive the amount of interest and amortization which 
shall be paid to it by the Chinese authorities designated for that purpose, to 
divide it among the interested parties, and to give a receipt for the same. 
 
c) The Chinese Government shall deliver to the Doyen of the Diplomatic 
Corps at Peking a bond for the lump sum, which shall subsequently be 
converted into fractional bonds bearing the signature of the Delegates of the 
Chinese Government designated for that purpose. This operation and all 
those relating to issuing of the bonds shall be performed by the above-
mentioned Commission, in accordance with the instructions which the Powers 
shall send their Delegates. 
 
d) The proceeds of the revenues assigned to the payment of the bonds shall 
be paid monthly to the Commission. 
 
e) The seven assigned as security for the bonds are the following: 
1. The balance of the revenues of the Imperial Maritime Customs, after 
payment of the interest and amortization of preceding loans secured on these 
revenues, plus the proceeds of the raising to 5 per cent. effective of the 
present tariff of maritime imports, including articles until now on the free list, 
but exempting rice, foreign cereals, and flour, gold and silver bullion and coin. 
 
2. The revenues of the native Customs, administered in the open ports by the 
Imperial Maritime Customs. 
 
3. The total revenues of the salt gabelle, exclusive of the fraction previously 
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set aside for other foreign loans. 
 
The raising of the present tariff on imports to 5 per cent.effective is agreed to 
on the conditions mentioned below. It shall be put in force two months after 
the signing of the present Protocol, and no exceptions shall be made except 
for merchandize in transit not more than ten days after the said signing… The 
beds of the Rivers Whangpoo and Peiho shall be improved with the financial 
participation of China. 
 
ARTICLE VII. 
The Chinese Government has agreed that the quarter occupied by the 
Legations shall be considered as one specially reserved for their use and 
placed under their exclusive control, in which Chinese shall not have the right 
to reside, and which may be made defensible. 
 
In the Protocol annexed to the letter of the 16th January, 1901, China 
recognised the right of each Power to maintain a permanent guard in the said 
quarter for the defence of its Legation. 
 
ARTICLE VIII. 
The Chinese Government has consented to raze the forts of Taku, and those 
which might impede free communication between Peking and the sea. Steps 
have been taken for carrying this out. 
 
ARTICLE IX. 
The Chinese Government conceded the right to the Powers in the Protocol 
annexed to the letter of the i6th January, 1901, to occupy certain points, to be 
determined by an Agreement between them for the maintenance of open 
communication between the capital and the sea. The points occupied by the 
Powers are: Huang-tsun, Lang-fang, Yang-tsun, Tien-tsin, Chun-liang-Cheng, 
Tong-ku, Lu-tai, Tong- shan, Lan-chou, Chang-li, Chin-wang Tao, Shan-
haiKuan. 
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ARTICLE X. 
The Chinese Government has agreed to post and to have published during 
two years in all district cities the following Imperial Edicts: 
1) Edict of the 1st February, 1901, prohibiting for ever under pain of death, 
membership in any anti-foreign society. 
2) Edicts of the 13th and 21st February, 29th April and 19th August, 1901, 
enumerating the punishments inflicted on the guilty. 
3) Edict of the 19th August, 1901, prohibiting examinations in all cities where 
foreigners were massacred or subjected to cruel treatment. 
4) Edicts of the 1st February, 1901, declaring all Governors, General, Governors, 
and provincial or local officials responsible for order in their respective 
districts, and that in case of new anti-foreign troubles or other infractions of 
the Treaties which shall not be immediately repressed and the authors of 
which shall not have been punished, these officials shall be immediately 
dismissed without possibility of being given new functions or new honours. 
 
The posting of these Edicts is being carried on throughout the Empire. 
 
ARTICLE XI. 
The Chinese Government has agreed to negotiate the amendments deemed 
necessary by the foreign Governments to the Treaties of Commerce and 
Navigation and the other subjects concerning commercial relations with the 
object of facilitating them. 
 
At present, and as a result of the stipulation contained in Article 6 concerning 
the indemnity, the Chinese Government agrees to assist in the improvement 
of the courses of the Rivers Peiho and Whangpoo, as stated below. 
 
1) The works for the improvement of the navigability of the Peiho, begun in 1898 
with the co-operation of the Chinese Government, have been resumed under 
the direction of an International Commission. As soon as the Administration of 
Tien-tsin shall have been handed back to the Chinese Government it will be 
in a position to be represented on this Commission, and will pay each year a 
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sum of 60,000 Haikwantaels for maintaining the works. 
2) A Conservancy Board, charged with the management and control of the 
works for straightening the Whangpoo and the improvement of the course of 
that river, is hereby created. The Board shall consist of members representing 
the interests of the Chinese Government and those of foreigners in the 
shipping trade of Shanghai. 
 
The expenses incurred for the works and the general management of the 
undertaking are estimated at the annual sum of 460,000 Haikwantaels for the 
first twenty years. This sum shall be supplied in equal portions by the Chinese 
Government and the foreign interests concerned. 
 
ARTICLE XII. 
An Imperial Edict of the 24th July, 1901, reformed the Office of Foreign Affairs, 
Tsung- li Yamen, on the lines indicated by the Powers, that is to say, 
transformed it into a Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Wai Wu Pu, which takes 
precedence over the six other Ministries of State; the same Edict appointed 
the principal Members of this Ministry. 
 
An agreement has also been reached concerning the modification of Court 
ceremonial as regards the reception of foreign Representatives, and has been 
the subject of several notes from the Chinese Plenipotentiaries, the substance 
of which is embodied in a Memorandum herewith annexed. 
 
Finally, it is expressly understood that as regards the declarations specified 
above and the annexed documents originating with the foreign 
Plenipotentiaries, the French text only is authoritative. 
 
The Chinese Government having thus complied to the satisfaction of the 
Powers with the conditions laid down in the above-mentioned note of the 22nd 
December, 1900, the Powers have agreed to accede to the wish of China to 
terminate the situation created by the disorders of the summer of 1900. In 
consequence thereof, the foreign Plenipotentiaries are authorized to declare 
in the names of their Governments that, with the exception of the Legation 
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guards mentioned in Article VII, the international troops will completely 
evacuate the city of Peking on the 7th September, 1901, and, with the 
exception of the localities mentioned in Article IX, will withdraw from the 
Province of Chihli on the 22nd September, 1901. 
 
The present final Protocol has been drawn up in twelve identical copies, and 
signed by all the Plenipotentiaries of the contracting countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
